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B u d d h i s t  P h i l o s o p h y  a n d  t h e  I d e a l s  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l i s m  
C o l e t t e  S c i b e r r a s  
 
A b s t r a c t   
 
I examine the consistency between contemporary environmentalist ideals and Buddhist 
philosophy, focusing, first, on the problem of value in nature. I argue that the teachings found 
in the Pāli canon cannot easily be reconciled with a belief in the intrinsic value of life, 
whether human or otherwise. This is because all existence is regarded as inherently 
unsatisfactory, and all beings are seen as impermanent and insubstantial, while the ultimate 
spiritual goal is often viewed, in early Buddhism, as involving a deep renunciation of the 
world. 
Therefore, the discussion focuses mostly on the Mahāyāna vehicle, which, I suggest 
has better resources for environmentalism because enlightenment and the ordinary world are 
not conceived as antithetical. Still, many contemporary green ideas do not sit well with 
classical Mahāyāna doctrines. Mahāyāna philosophers coincide in equating ultimate reality 
with ‗emptiness,‘ and propose knowledge of this reality as a final soteriological purpose. 
Emptiness is generally said to be ineffable, and to involve the negation of all views. An 
important question is how to reconcile environmentalism with the relinquishing of views.  
I consider several prevalent themes in environmentalism, including the philosophy of 
‗Oneness,‘ and other systems that are often compared with Buddhism, like process thought. 
Many of these turn out to have more in common with an extreme view that Buddhism seeks 
to avoid, namely, eternalism. I attempt to outline an environmental position that, like the 
doctrine of emptiness, traverses a Middle Path between eternalism and nihilism.  
I conclude by proposing that emptiness could be regarded as the source of value in 
nature, if it is seen in its more positive aspect, as ‗pliancy.‘ This would imply that what 
Buddhist environmentalists should seek to protect is not any being in its current form, nor 
any static natural system, but the possibility of adaptation and further evolution.  
 ii 
 
C o n t e n t s :  
 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... i 
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................... iv 
Declaration ................................................................................................................................ v 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. vi 
I n t r o d u c t i o n :  W h y  B u d d h i s m  a n d  t h e  E n v i r o n m e n t ?  ................................ 1 
An Overview of Buddhist Environmentalism....................................................................... 3 
Outline of the Argument ....................................................................................................... 7 
C h a p t e r  1 :  B u d d h i s m  a n d  t h e  V a l u e  o f  N a t u r e  .......................................... 13 
1 The Charge of Speciesism ................................................................................................... 15 
Speciesism and the Marginal Cases Argument ................................................................... 17 
Waldau‘s Misappropriation of Western Ideas about Moral Considerability ...................... 19 
Waldau‘s Specific Claims against Buddhism ..................................................................... 22 
Buddhism and the Concept of Intrinsic Value .................................................................... 30 
Summary ............................................................................................................................. 33 
2 Does Nature Have Intrinsic Value on the Buddhist Worldview? ........................................ 35 
Suffering, Impermanence, and the ‗Negative Value of Nature‘ Critique ........................... 37 
Nirvana and the ‗World-Rejecting Critique‘ ...................................................................... 40 
Nirvana and the Doctrine of Not-Self ................................................................................. 43 
Not-Self, Renunciation of Views, and the ‗Insubstantiality‘ Critique ................................ 47 
Summary ............................................................................................................................. 51 
3 Solicitude as an Alternative Way to Evaluate Nature .......................................................... 53 
The Meanings of ‗Intrinsic Value‘ ...................................................................................... 55 
Two Buddhist Virtues: Love and Compassion ................................................................... 64 
Difficulties with Basing Environmental Ethics upon Solicitude ........................................ 68 
Summary ............................................................................................................................. 79 
C h a p t e r  2 :  M a h ā y ā n a  B u d d h i s m  a n d  E m p t i n e s s  ........................................ 82 
Mahāyāna from Sutric Sources ........................................................................................... 83 
1 Nāgārjuna‘s Madhyamaka and the Focus on Negation ....................................................... 87 
The Two Truths; Svabhāva and Emptiness ........................................................................ 90 
The Nonduality of Saṃsāra and Nirvana .......................................................................... 100 
The ‗No-Thesis‘ Doctrine: Emptiness as a Soteriological Device ................................... 104 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 109 
2 The Yogācārin Re-affirmation of Existence ...................................................................... 110 
 iii 
 
Yogācāra and the Ineffable Self-Nature ........................................................................... 113 
The Doctrine of Trisvabhāva ............................................................................................ 115 
Misinterpretations of the Yogācāra ................................................................................... 120 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 124 
3 Mahāyāna Environmentalism; a Preliminary Discussion .................................................. 126 
C h a p t e r  3 :  O n e n e s s  w i t h  N a t u r e  ....................................................................... 131 
1 Oneness as a Metaphysical View ....................................................................................... 132 
Buddhism, Deep Ecology, and the New Physics: the Parallels ........................................ 133 
Divergences between Buddhism and the New Paradigm ................................................. 141 
The Utility of Parallelist Discourse in the Light of the Negation of Views ..................... 148 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 151 
2 Oneness as Identification with all Sentient Beings ............................................................ 154 
Identification and Solicitude ............................................................................................. 156 
The Grounds for Identification ......................................................................................... 158 
How Identification is Attained .......................................................................................... 159 
Identification as Bodhicitta: Solicitude in Union with Emptiness .................................... 161 
Difficulties with Basing Environmental Ethics upon Bodhicitta ...................................... 164 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 169 
C h a p t e r  4 :  A v o i d i n g  E x t r e m e  V i e w s  a n d  P l i a n c y  .................................. 171 
1 Overcoming Eternalism: the Emptiness of Beings ............................................................ 174 
The ‗Balance-of-Nature‘ View and Eternalism ................................................................ 175 
Emptiness of Natural Beings ............................................................................................ 178 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 188 
2 Overcoming Nihilism: the Emptiness of Change .............................................................. 190 
Change, Suffering, and Nihilism ...................................................................................... 191 
The Ecology of Flux and the Extreme of Nihilism ........................................................... 194 
The Emptiness of our Intuitive Idea of Change ................................................................ 197 
The Emptiness of Change and Time; Other Theories ....................................................... 201 
Overcoming Nihilism........................................................................................................ 206 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 210 
3 Emptiness as Pliancy.......................................................................................................... 212 
Emptiness, Pliancy, and the ‗Goal‘ of Evolution .............................................................. 215 
The Concept of Pliancy Refined ....................................................................................... 221 
Environmental Conservation and Pliancy ......................................................................... 224 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 226 
C o n c l u s i o n :  M i d d l e  W a y  E n v i r o n m e n t a l i s m .............................................. 228 
References ............................................................................................................................. 232 
 iv 
 
A b b r e v i a t i o n s  
 
A Anguttara Nikāya 
BCA Bodhicaryāvatāra    
D Dīgha Nikāya  
Dhp. Dhammapada  
HV Hastavālanāmaprakaraṇa 
M Majjhima Nikāya 
MA Madhyamakāvatāra 
MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
MRK Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra 
MSA Mahāyānasūtralaṅkāra 
MV Madhyāntavibhāga 
MVB Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya 
Nico. Nicomachean Ethics 
PE  Principia Ethica 
PPH Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdaya 
S Samyutta Nikāya 
Sn Sutta Nipata 
SP Saddharma Pundarīka 
Sv Sukhāvatīvyūya Sūtra (Shorter) 
SV Sukhāvatīvyūya Sūtra (Longer) 
T Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
TK Triṃśikākārikā 
TSN Trisvabhāvanirdeśa 
Ud. Udāna 
Vin. Vinaya Pitaka 
Vism.  Visudhimagga 
VK Viṃśatikākārikā 
VN Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa 
VPP  Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā 
VV Vigrahavyāvartani 
 
 v 
 
D e c l a r a t i o n  
 
I confirm that no part of the material contained in this thesis has been previously submitted 
for any degree in this or in any other university. All the material is the author‘s own work, 
except for quotations and paraphrases, which have been suitably indicated. 
The first section of chapter 1, ―The Charge of Speciesism,‖ has been published as 
―Buddhism and Speciesism: on the Misapplication of Western Concepts to Buddhist 
Beliefs,‖ in Journal of Buddhist Ethics 15: 215-240. 
  The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without the prior written consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
 
Colette Sciberras 
 vi 
 
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s  
 
My sincere appreciation goes to my supervisors, Prof. David E Cooper and Dr. Simon P. 
James, without whom it is unlikely that this thesis would have materialized. I would like to 
thank them especially for their reliable promptness in reading my work and replying with 
their comments. While I am greatly indebted to their invaluable suggestions and remarks, I 
accept full responsibility for any mistakes that remain. 
I would also like to thank my parents, Patrick and Candida, and my sister, Christine, 
for providing wonderful support, emotional and financial, and for constantly encouraging me 
along the way. My father‘s comments on draft chapters and our discussions were especially 
helpful.  
Finally, I dedicate this work to my dear lamas, Yungdrung Nyima and Chamtrul 
Rinpoche, and to the ultimate happiness of all living beings. Words cannot express my deep 
gratitude for everything you have done for me. 
 
  1  
I n t rodu c t ion :  Wh y  B ud dh i sm a n d  t h e  En v i ron me n t?  
 
  
This dissertation examines the relevance of Buddhism vis-à-vis the current environmental 
crises. Since the 1986 ―Assisi Declarations,‖ it has become common for representatives 
of the world‘s faiths to pledge their commitment to the conservation and protection of 
nature (WWF, 1999). Furthermore, theologians and religious leaders around the world 
have sought to establish the environmental saliency of their respective doctrines and other 
articles of faith, as well as to demonstrate the ecological soundness of their practices. 
Among these, Buddhists have been particularly vocal in expressing their affinity for 
environmental issues. 
 Discussion about the alleged environmental credentials of Buddhism harks back 
at least to the nineteen-sixties; one of the first mentions in an academic context appeared 
in Lynn White‘s seminal paper on ―The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis.‖ White 
made an important hypothesis there, that would serve as a foundation for the nascent field 
of environmental philosophy; he suggested that the way people treat their environment 
depends largely on their conceptions of themselves, of nature, and of the relation between 
the two, in short, on their ‗worldview,‘ and he also implied that these beliefs often arise 
as a corollary to religious faith. White, in fact, denounced Christianity as ―the most 
anthropocentric religion the world has seen‖ and he then proposed Buddhism—in 
particular, the ‗beatniks‘ ‘ version of Zen—as an example of an alternative, ecologically 
sounder worldview (White 1967, 1203–1206).  
 The American ‗beat‘ counter-culture, which involved an experimental attitude 
towards religion and spirituality amongst other things, began in the nineteen-fifties as a 
radical reaction against the conservative values of the time. The Western disaffection 
with Christianity, however, had started well before that and, in the nineteenth century, 
became severe enough for later historians to speak of a ‗crisis of faith.‘ Generally 
ascribed to the conflict between science and a literal reading of the Bible (particularly, 
the Book of Genesis), the Victorian crisis was also compounded by the Church‘s efforts 
to suppress the new theories of Darwin, say, or of Lyell, so that the wide gulf that was 
perceived between reason and faith led to the rejection of Christianity in many 
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intellectual circles (Brooke 1991, 270). Meanwhile, Buddhism was just beginning to be 
discovered by Western scholars, who, from the very start, were impressed by its relative 
compatibility with the new scientific worldview. Consequently, certain aspects and 
readings of Buddhism were emphasized above others, for example, the rejection of a 
Creator God, the affinity with Darwinian evolution, and the interpretation of kárma as the 
law of cause and effect (McMahan 2004, 900).  
 The alleged compatibility with science and reason, however, was only one of the 
qualities that attracted westerners to Buddhism; besides appealing to empiricists and 
rationalists it also found adherents from the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum. 
Idealists such as Schopenhauer, Romantics like Thoreau, the composer Wagner, and the 
artist Van Gogh all acknowledged the influence of Buddhism upon their work and 
thought. For various reasons, then, in the nineteenth century, westerners began to take an 
interest in the Buddhist faith, and in 1880, Henry Steele Olcott and Helena Petrova 
Blavatsky became the first Europeans to take refuge formally in Theravada Buddhism 
(Batchelor 1994, 269). Only a few years before, they had founded the Theosophical 
Society, which, although lacking, perhaps, in academic rigor, and taking a rather eclectic 
approach to spirituality, was commendable, at the time, for initiating the practice of 
Eastern spirituality in Europe, rather than just intellectual study.  
 Contemporary environmentalism also has its roots in the nineteenth century, for 
instance, in Thoreau‘s Romantic proposal of a ―back to nature‖ approach, and therefore, 
arguably, Buddhism and environmentalism have been linked in the West from the very 
start.
1
 It was not until the nineteen-sixties, however, that environmentalism was 
established as an international movement, with the first global conference being held in 
1972. That same year, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess coined the term ‗Deep 
Ecology,‘ to draw attention to the spiritual dimension of the reform in practices and 
attitudes that the ecological crises required, and he too, in some places, made an explicit 
connection with Buddhism (Naess 1986, 2). The same decade saw the publication of 
Fritjof Capra‘s The Tao of Physics (1976) and James Lovelock‘s Gaia (1979), both of 
which contributed to the discourse about a new, holistic paradigm that, allegedly, was to 
                                                 
1
 Sponsel and Sponsel (2003, 363) argue, in fact, that Buddhism contributed significantly to the 
development of Western environmentalism. 
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replace the old mechanistic one. Much of this discussion was based on the parallels that 
holists perceived between twentieth century science and Eastern philosophies, including 
Buddhism. Again, these comparisons were not entirely unprecedented, but drew heavily 
upon the earlier intuitions of physicists like Heisenberg and Bohr (Scerri 1989, 688). 
 In short, the connection between Buddhism and environmentalism has a history 
that stretches back over a century at least, and there is a complex set of relations between 
contemporary science, ecology, and Buddhism. An important reason for this, of course, is 
the heterogeneous nature of Buddhism itself, as well as, to a lesser extent, that of 
environmentalism. Despite this, the green credentials of Buddhism were mostly taken for 
granted until the nineteen-nineties, when Ian Harris (1991, 1994) and Lambert 
Schmithausen‘s (1991, 1997) critical accounts appeared. Owing to these, ―eco-
Buddhism,‖ or ―green Buddhism‖—which I define as any expression of Buddhism that is 
also concerned with environmental problems—today also includes a rigorous and 
discerning branch of philosophical study. In what follows, I shall draw upon Donald 
Swearer and Ian Harris‘s categorization of different approaches within green Buddhism 
in order to place this study within a context. Then, in the final part of this chapter, I shall 
provide a quick outline of my main arguments. 
 
An Overview of Buddhist Environmentalism 
 
Harris sorts the plethora of publications on Buddhism and the environment into four 
categories (1995, 176–180), whereas Swearer, writing ten years later, has five groups 
(2005, 2); their classifications, however, only partially correspond with each other. The 
largest group is made up of those works they both classify as ―eco-apologist‖ and which 
mostly involve a rather uncritical acceptance of the green credentials of Buddhism, or 
else an equally cursory endorsement of ecological principles by distinguished Buddhist 
teachers. Swearer calls this ‗the majority view‘ and places several well-known 
anthologies, like Dharma Gaia and Dharma Rain within this group (2005, 4). Although 
these collections are certainly valuable as sources of inspiration for practising Buddhists 
and environmentalists, most contributions tend to be rather thin on philosophical content, 
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and therefore, in this thesis they will only be referred to occasionally as representations of 
popular eco-Buddhist thought. 
 Similarly, this study will not feature any of the reports on present-day responses 
to environmental degradation, such as the much-publicized tree-ordination ceremonies 
and other ―engaged Buddhist‖ activities that are popular in countries like Thailand and 
Sri Lanka, and that are labelled ―eco-justice‖ by Harris and ―eco-contextualist‖ by 
Swearer.  One reason is that despite their wealth of practical ideas, it is uncertain whether 
any of the rituals recorded in these accounts would work were they to be transplanted into 
Western countries. In any case, fascinating as they might be as descriptions of non-
European cultures, these documents are not usually very philosophically interesting, and, 
as with the eco-apologists, instead of discussing the relation between Buddhism and 
environmentalism, they simply tend to assume their compatibility.  
 This thesis aims to contribute to the literature that Harris calls ―eco-traditionalist,‖ 
and Swearer ―eco-constructivist.‖ As these terms suggest, works in these categories 
attempt to build an authentically Buddhist environmental philosophy from canonical texts 
and other accepted sources. A key feature of these writings, of which Harris‘s and 
Schmithausen‘s are representative, is that they tend to delve deeply into various 
philosophical issues, such as whether Buddhism can accommodate a concept of nature as 
intrinsically valuable (Schmithausen 1991, 12–21), whether the doctrine of ‗the precious 
human life‘ combined with the negative portrayal of existence as an animal implies 
anthropocentricism (Harris 1991, 105–107), and what the moral status of plants and trees 
is (Harris 1991, 107–109, Schmithausen 1991, 4–8). Of course, the main problem that 
this approach faces is that the origins of Buddhist doctrine are separated from 
contemporary environmental issues by two and a half millennia, and therefore, one risks 
the charge of anachronism in trying to bring the two traditions together. Moreover, 
Buddhist philosophy is rooted in Indian thought, whereas environmentalism is primarily 
based on Western concepts and presuppositions, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
care must be taken not to read Buddhist doctrine through an inappropriate conceptual 
framework. 
 Naturally, some authors deny altogether the viability of an authentic Buddhist 
environmental ethic; Harris appears, at times, to belong to this group of philosophers, 
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which Swearer calls ―eco-critics.‖2 Some of Schmithausen‘s work fits in here too3 but the 
most damaging critique I have come across so far is Paul Waldau‘s depiction of 
Buddhism as a speciesist religion (2002). Waldau‘s work will be the topic of the first part 
of the next chapter, where I shall argue that his reading is precisely the sort of 
misconstrual that arises when one appraises Buddhists beliefs against a Western 
background. 
 Two more types of eco-Buddhist discourse remain to be considered. The first is 
that termed ―eco-spirituality‖ by Harris, which comprises the views of deep ecologists 
who also happen to be Buddhists, such as Joanna Macy,
4
 as well as other writers who, 
like David Landis Barnhill,
5
 focus on the similarities between the two fields. Although 
there are several variants of this position, in general, its exponents tend to endorse the 
holistic paradigm mentioned above. Eco-spiritualists relate environmental awareness to a 
metaphysical concept of ―Oneness,‖ and claim that the present ecological crises will only 
be resolved when humans learn to recognize their inseparability from the natural world. 
Therefore, one thread that is common to all versions of eco-spirituality is the idea that 
environmental problems stem from an inadequate worldview, a hypothesis that, as we 
have seen, was already present in White‘s ground-breaking paper. Unlike most of the 
claims of deep ecology and eco-spiritualism, which are rejected in chapter 4, this theme 
lies implicit throughout my dissertation. 
 Finally, a new approach that has already been widely endorsed, and that shows 
promising potential for further research, draws a comparison between Buddhism and 
ancient Greek virtue ethics, and establishes the green qualifications of the former based 
on its vision of human flourishing and well-being. The Buddhist version of ‗the good 
life,‘ according to this view, will involve the possession of certain dispositions that lead 
one to act in an environmentally sensitive way. David E. Cooper, Simon James, and 
Damien Keown
6
 fall within this class, which makes up a part of Swearer‘s category of 
―eco-ethicists.‖ One of the main principles, here, is that it is wiser to search for 
environmentally relevant material within Buddhist ethics, rather than its metaphysics or 
                                                 
2
 See Harris 1991, 1994. 
3
 See Schmithausen 1991, 1997. 
4
 For instance, see Macy 1990. 
5
 See Barnhill 2001. 
6
 See Cooper and James 2005, Keown 2007. 
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worldview (Cooper and James 2005, 2). While I find this work highly compelling, and 
draw upon it in various places to support my own views, as I‘ve already mentioned, I 
tend to believe with White et al. that the way one conceives the world and oneself will 
have a strong effect on what one does to one‘s surroundings and co-inhabitants of the 
earth, and that therefore, the examination of worldviews is an important part of 
environmental philosophy.   
 While I agree with deep ecologists that the way a person conceives her relation to 
the rest of the world will play a significant role in determining her attitude to nature, I 
also tend to endorse the claims, by Cooper and James, that a Buddhist environmental 
ethic does not require adherence to holism (2005, 5). In fact, a large part of this study 
falls within the ‗eco-critical‘ class, although the final section in chapter 4 takes up a 
‗constructivist‘ approach.  Perhaps one significant difference between my thesis and other 
Buddhist environmental philosophy is the importance placed, especially in the 
constructivist part, upon ecology, biology, and other sciences. Although I claim no 
expertise in these areas, I do attempt to interpret Buddhist doctrines in the light of 
contemporary scientific understanding of reality, which I presume readers will be more 
likely to accept than traditional Buddhist mythological explanations. I do not mean to 
suggest here, that theories such as special relativity, or evolution, are generally 
understood, only that there is a background acceptance that they are accurate descriptions 
of the world. I tend to think that it is pointless to worry about the environmental 
soundness of a traditional cosmology that, in general, has been superseded around the 
world, and one, which, in any case, many Buddhist leaders agree is dispensable.
7
 On the 
other hand, any examination of green Buddhism needs to at least consider the issue of 
whether the core Buddhist doctrines can be reconciled with a scientific understanding of 
the world, as well as with environmentalist principles.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 The Dalai Lama, for instance, has repeatedly claimed that should Western science ever find anything that 
contradicts Buddhist claims ―then we must accept the findings of science and abandon those claims (cited 
in Mansfield 2008, 23; see also Wallace 2003, 26, 388). 
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Outline of the Argument 
 
Chapter 1 is an inquiry into whether Buddhism can accommodate an understanding of 
nature and natural beings as intrinsically valuable. I begin by examining the views of one 
of the most vocal critics of eco-Buddhism, Paul Waldau, who claims that the Pāli canon 
attributes nonhuman animals with a very low status and little moral significance. My 
defence against his charge of speciesism rests on the importance of appraising a tradition 
on its own terms, without incorporating concepts or presuppositions that are foreign to it, 
or expecting it to conform to principles that are extraneous. Waldau‘s critique, it will be 
seen, relies on his appropriation of the Kantian imperative to always treat every being 
that is worthy of moral consideration as an end in itself, and never simply as a means. 
Moreover, he seems to attribute moral considerability to a being depending upon its 
possession of certain traits, such as, intelligence or use of language. These principles, 
pervasive though they are in Western philosophy, do not belong in Buddhist doctrine, and 
therefore, Waldau‘s complaint about Buddhism‘s failure to apply them equitably to all 
species of animals, as well as humans, simply breaks down. In fact, Buddhism has often 
been singled out as an eco-friendly system of beliefs precisely because it extends moral 
concern to all living beings, regardless of their intelligence or any other traits.    
The discussion is framed, next, in terms of the wider issue of whether Buddhism 
can accommodate a concept of natural intrinsic value, which is generally defined as the 
value that nature and natural beings have for their own sake, without reference to human 
desires or needs. Often there seems to be the assumption that unless we can locate such 
value in nature, environmental ethics simply cannot get off the ground.
8
 Prima facie, the 
Buddhist doctrines about suffering and impermanence seem to imply a world-negating 
outlook, one that cannot be reconciled with the drive to conserve or protect the natural 
world, and similarly the doctrines of emptiness and not-self suggest there is no ‗thing‘ in 
the world that can have intrinsic value. The second part of chapter 1 examines these 
doctrines, together with the related issue of whether attaining nirvana implies the 
transcendence of the natural world. I suggest that the negative value that is ascribed to the 
                                                 
8
 See for instance Harris 2001, 253; Schmithausen 1991, 12. For a contrary view see Cooper and James 
2005, 4, 140. 
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world is not meant to be taken as an absolute truth and that ultimately, in Buddhism, 
nature, life, and beings cannot be said to have either positive or negative value.  
In the third section of chapter 1, I argue for an alternative sense of intrinsic value, 
which is based, not on any property that beings may have, but on the decision that a 
Buddhist can make simply to value nature and beings for their own sake. In the case of 
living beings, this amounts to an aspiration for their well-being—that is, desiring 
wholeheartedly their happiness as well as helping them to attain it—and therefore, in this 
subjective sense, to value something intrinsically has affinities with the Buddhist virtues 
of love and compassion, or ‗solicitude.‘ However, there are several problems with this 
approach to green Buddhism too, the most important being that Buddhists and 
environmentalists seem to mean very different things by ‗well-being.‘ Moreover, the 
attempt to base environmental ethics upon a doctrine of universal love and compassion is 
subject to all of the objections that are often raised against animal welfarism. 
 These issues are taken up again in chapter 3, where the Mahāyāna interpretation 
of love and compassion is explored. Before that, in chapter 2, I provide an account of the 
main developments in Mahāyāna philosophy, with particular reference to its nondual 
identification of nirvana with saṃsāra. I argue that this equation opens up once more the 
possibility of Buddhist environmentalism; the path no longer involves the outright 
repudiation of the ordinary world of nature, and in fact, some schools, such as Pure Land 
Buddhism, even suggest that part of a bodhisattva‘s mission is to create a favourable 
environment for all living beings.
9
 After a quick glance at the main sutric teachings of the 
Mahāyāna, I explore the philosophies of the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra schools, 
arguing that there is less disagreement between the two than is generally supposed. I 
suggest, instead, that they both express the same ‗truth‘ viewed from two different 
perspectives; the Yogācāra providing a more positive account than the Madhyamaka. The 
inadequacy of such statements, however, as well as the enormous cumbersomeness of 
putting Mahāyāna philosophy into words, will become manifest as we probe deeper into 
the works of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu.  
                                                 
9
 Many Buddhist teachers stress that the Pure Land is to be established on this very earth, and not in some 
transcendent realm, an idea that is also a consequence of the identification of nirvana with saṃsāra.  
Contemporary examples include Ven. Sheng Yen, founder of Dharma Drum Mountain, and Ven Hsing 
Yun, founder of Fo Guang Shan International, both based in Taiwan. See Chandler 2004.   
  9  
One matter upon which these philosophers all agree is the inexpressibility or 
ineffability of ultimate truth, which is a consequence of one of the major pillars of 
Mahāyāna faith, the doctrine of emptiness. It will be seen that this doctrine is not to be 
taken as a straightforward claim about reality; rather, it amounts to the same thing as 
saying that there is no ultimate reality, apart from the conventional nature of things 
(Garfield 1995, 299, 331). Thus, the enlightened being does not grasp at the truth of any 
assertion and has overcome her attachment to all views, recognizing them as illusory. The 
classic Mahāyāna philosophers took pains to point out that this idea is the logical 
outcome of the historical Buddha‘s teaching on the ‗Middle Way,‘ which is described as 
a ‗Middle Path‘ between the extreme of eternalism and that of nihilism, and therefore, the 
search for a Mahāyāna form of environmentalism can be framed in terms of avoiding 
these two ‗wrong views.‘ The main problem for green Buddhism, then, besides whether 
or not nature has intrinsic value, is how to validate it when one has renounced all views.  
 Chapter 3 explores one variety of Mahāyāna green Buddhism, referred to above 
as ‗eco-spiritualism,‘ which, in some places, can be seen as a lapse into the extreme of 
eternalism. When assertions like those of holism, twentieth century physics, or the claims 
of deep ecology are grasped at as true statements about the world—especially, for 
instance, if ―Oneness‖ is taken to be ultimately real—then this has little to do with 
Mahāyāna philosophy, and has more in common with eternalistic philosophies and 
religions, such as neo-Platonism, or Vedānta. Mahāyāna Buddhism, including the Hua 
Yen School, to which eco-spiritualists and deep ecologists most often appeal, does not 
speak about ‗Oneness‘ as generally understood, but refers instead to ‗totality.‘ Contrary 
to the claims of eco-spiritualists, rather than viewing the universe as essentially holistic, it 
emphasizes the relativity of wholes and parts, and instead of attributing ontological 
primacy to relations rather than things, it views both as interdependent, confirming that 
the universe can never be described exhaustively.  
Yet, while much eco-spiritualist work rests on a misconstrual of Buddhism, there 
is a compelling case to be made for the idea of oneness as the felt experience of 
identification with other beings, an attitude which one adopts by taking the interests of 
other beings as one‘s own. As long as no attempt is made to explain this experience in 
terms of metaphysical views, this theme in deep ecology shows remarkable similarity to 
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the second pillar of the Mahāyāna faith, namely, the virtues of love and compassion 
(maitrī and karuṇā). Following Śāntideva‘s account of the concept of bodhicitta, which 
involves the union of emptiness and compassion, I argue that identification (or love and 
compassion) can be based on a realization of the emptiness of the self and the other. In 
this way, we can avoid the problems which deep ecology faces when identification is 
based upon claims of some sort of identity between oneself and other beings. 
Nevertheless, there remain the difficulties that emerged in chapter 1, with deriving an 
environmental ethic from the virtues of love and compassion. The concept of bodhicitta 
will be seen to provide a partial solution; however, it cannot get around the main 
difficulty that the Mahāyāna negation of all views poses for green Buddhism.  
 The first two sections of chapter 4 continue with the critique of green Buddhism. I 
argue that the Buddhist Middle Way between eternalism and nihilism implies the 
emptiness of all those natural beings that environmentalists cherish and want to protect. 
At all levels of nature, from the gene up to the ecosphere, we find, not inherently existent 
things, but rather, impermanent and fleeting patterns of relations. This way of conceiving 
nature seems to coincide with that of the ‗new ecology‘ of flux, according to which, what 
was once thought of as the ‗balance of nature‘ in reality is just a myth. Therefore, to be 
attached to the existence of individuals or populations of organisms, species and 
communities, ecosystems, or the biosphere as a whole, is another manifestation of the 
extreme of eternalism, which the bodhisattva must avoid. Instead, Mahāyāna Buddhism 
recognizes all of these as transient collections of ephemeral phenomena, only 
conventionally thought of as ‗things.‘  
 The danger of such statements is that one might misinterpret emptiness as 
implying that these things do not exist at all, or else, as the claim that only change really 
exists and these ideas too can lead to a wrong view, this time, the extreme of nihilism. 
The relation between change and suffering is an important part of Buddhist doctrine and 
everyday life, and to become too involved in the negative aspects of the world could 
easily lead one to despondency or despair. For that reason, in the second part of chapter 
4, I argue against the everyday view of change as something ultimately real, which sees 
time as unidirectional and pointing invariably towards the future, as described in the 
process philosophy of Charles Hartshorne. Following Nāgārjuna‘s deconstruction of time 
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and change, I show that whether one adopts the ordinary understanding of a time that 
flows from past to future, or else conceives time as a static ‗block,‘ as in the four-
dimensionalist theory of time, ultimately, both change and time are empty, and cannot be 
found as truly existent phenomena. Finally, I submit that nihilism is overcome when the 
bodhisattva realizes the emptiness of change and time and is able to transcend both.  
 The final part of chapter 4 is my own ‗eco-constructivist‘ contribution to green 
Buddhism, and relies on an analogy between spiritual and biological evolution. As we 
have seen, the project of formulating a viable Buddhist environmentalism is hampered 
mainly by an understanding of emptiness as the negation of views, including the view of 
nature as intrinsically valuable. Therefore, relying on the Yogācāra‘s more positive 
account, I attempt to re-describe emptiness and impermanence as the very sources of 
value in nature. I introduce a concept—‗pliancy‘—which I use as a rough synonym for 
emptiness, and analogous to Buddha Nature, but which directs the focus onto the quality 
that allows living beings to evolve, that is, their capacity to change. Instead of conserving 
species or ecosystems as static and unchanging things, I argue that Buddhist 
environmentalism is better described in terms of realizing or actualizing pliancy, and 
protecting the future evolution of living beings. It is important, however, that one does 
not become attached to this concept or grasp at it as a final view.   
To conclude, a few words need to be said about my general approach to the study 
of Buddhist philosophy. First, regarding terminology, I use Sanskrit throughout for the 
sake of consistency, unless, of course, the context requires Pāli.10 Although from chapter 
2 onwards I focus mainly on the Mahāyāna vehicle, I draw upon teachings from several 
diverse schools, including Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, Hua Yen, and Pure Land Buddhism, 
in order to locate elements that are relevant to Buddhist environmentalism. While I 
realize that this opens the door to the charge of eclecticism, I believe that the cost of 
departing from strict tradition is outweighed by the benefits of a heterogeneous approach, 
especially since none of the materials I make use of are contradictory, but are, rather, all 
mutually supportive.  
Second, with regards to the charge of anachronism—that it is inappropriate to 
look for environmentally relevant ideas in a tradition rooted in classical times, when 
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 One exception is that I use the better-known term ‗Theravāda,‘ rather than the Sanskrit sthaviravāda.  
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ecological problems were unheard of—I submit that the problem only arises if we insist 
on taking every teaching literally, without allowing for the different context, perspectives, 
and attitudes of the early Buddhists. Harris, for instance, reads the ―pro-urban‖ and ―anti-
wilderness‖ messages in the Pāli texts somewhat inflexibly (2001, 249); whereas it is my 
belief that these notions are simply the outcome of the Buddha‘s and his contemporaries‘ 
situation, where nature was abundant, and certainly not threatened as it is today. 
Similarly, the wholly unecological descriptions of the Pure Lands (Schmithausen 1997, 
29) merely reflect the preferences and values of the times and place, where things like 
gold and jewels were prized more highly than jungles, wild animals and so forth. 
Therefore, we need not be concerned that there are no animals in the textual accounts of 
Sukhāvatī; instead, perhaps, we are free to revise our conception of a Pure Land in light 
of our environmental values. In short, that is, to enable us to locate elements of Buddhist 
doctrines that might be useful in our current ecological situation, we must be willing, as 
Schmithausen put it, to ―accommodate [Buddhism‘s] heritage to the new situation by 
means of explication, re-interpretation, re-organization, or even creative extension or 
change‖ (Schmithausen 1997, 6).  
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C h ap t e r  1 :  B ud dh i s m a n d  the  Va l ue  o f  N a tu r e  
 
Our values, it is often said, are at the heart of our relationship to nature. This 
chapter will begin to examine the worldview and value-systems that are transmitted 
through Buddhist doctrines, focusing mostly on the collection of scriptures in the Pāli 
canon. As these are generally accepted by all traditions, they can serve as a rough sketch 
of ‗Buddhism‘ for the while.  
  I will be examining, in particular, the value that is ascribed to individual living 
beings, specifically the alleged difference in the way humans and other animals are 
treated. In 1967, Lynn White‘s paper was pivotal in introducing a criticism that today is 
commonly brought forward against the Judeo-Christian worldview, concerning the way 
in which humans are set apart from all the other living beings in the world, which are 
seen as having been explicitly created for man‘s instrumental use (White 1967, 1205). 
Since then, Buddhism too has come under a similar charge of setting a wide gulf between 
humans and all other animals, and of regarding the latter as having less value and moral 
worth. A full-fledged version of this argument can be found in the work of Paul Waldau, 
which constitutes, perhaps, one of the most significant criticisms of green Buddhism.  
The issues raised by Waldau and other critics of green Buddhism expose several 
underlying assumptions and expectations which, I shall argue, need to be brought out and 
examined for their compatibility with Buddhist doctrines and beliefs. I argue, in section 
1, that Waldau makes several assumptions that stem from Western and Christian 
philosophy, and which do not appear anywhere within Buddhist doctrine. Yet, why 
should we expect environmentalism, and, furthermore, a Buddhist environmentalism, to 
correspond to a Western or Christian version? I argue instead, that one must be wary of 
importing uncritically standards and principles from foreign systems of thought and 
expecting Buddhism to comply with them, and then criticizing it for not being able to 
account for these cherished concepts. I suggest that it is more productive to search for 
ecologically relevant material within the tradition itself, and in further chapters, I argue 
that Buddhism does have its own conceptual resources that could fruitfully be applied to 
environmental matters.  
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In this chapter, however, I continue to explore the issue of whether Buddhism can 
accommodate a concept of ‗value in nature,‘ turning, in the second part, to the 
implications of some basic doctrines for our ideas about and treatment of nature in 
general.
11
 Although some of these militate against the sort of positive evaluation of nature 
that the environmentalist wants to give, I argue that there are other, deeper reasons for 
doubting whether natural beings and objects can be said to ‗have‘ value according to 
Buddhism, which will emerge as we consider the doctrine of not-self. Closely connected 
to the teaching on interdependent-arising, and perhaps a ‗seed‘ form of the doctrine of 
emptiness, which becomes more pronounced in the Mahāyāna, in the doctrine of not-self 
we encounter the beginnings of idea that no determinate statements can be made about 
certain aspects of reality, that will be ultimately true. Of course, this applies to both the 
statement ‗nature has value‘ as well as ‗nature does not have value.‘ Perhaps, if the 
Buddha had been asked about it, the question of whether the world has value would have 
been another that he famously refused to reply. 
In the final part of this chapter I approach the issue from another angle. Instead of 
asking about whether nature ‗has‘ value, in the Buddhist worldview, I ask about whether 
and how it can be valued. Value, as I define it here, relies on the relation between valuing 
subjects and the things they value, and need not be construed as an objective property of 
things. This opens the way to an understanding of value that has much in common with 
the Buddhist virtues of love and compassion, and with certain environmental 
philosophies based on a reverence for life. Moreover, value can be construed in such a 
way that other living beings, both individual animals and plants, as well as collective 
wholes like ecosystems, can be thought of as valuers; they value their own well-being to 
the extent that their activities are driven by an attempt to preserve themselves in certain 
states and not others. The chapter will close with an examination of an environmentalism 
that is based upon these.    
                                                 
11
 I use ‗nature‘ in a very general sense to mean the sort of things valued by environmentalists. However, 
this is not intended to exclude automatically all human made objects. Further on, I will argue against 
construing the nature-culture divide dualistically. 
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1 The Charge of Speciesism
12
 
 
Paul Waldau, in The Specter of Speciesism; Buddhist and Christian views of Animals, 
argues extensively that Buddhism, like Christianity, values humans and human life more 
highly than other animals and their lives. Many environmentalists consider such positions 
to be partly responsible for the ecological crisis, as they imply that what is done to 
nonhuman beings has little or no moral significance and open the way to the devastation 
of nature for human purposes. Waldau‘s argument is a major challenge for anybody 
attempting to bring Buddhism and environmentalism together and represents a serious 
critique of green Buddhism, whether of the apologist or constructivist sort (see p 5–6). 
The charge of speciesism consists of the objection against granting moral 
considerability to humans and not to other animals. I will begin this section by outlining 
Waldau‘s general argument, starting from his definition of speciesism. It will be seen that 
this definition is too restrictive and does not correspond to the way the term is generally 
used, and that, in any case, Waldau fails to establish that Buddhism is speciesist 
according to this definition. More importantly, though, throughout the book, Waldau 
makes several assumptions that do not appear to accord with Buddhist doctrine. These 
include the idea that beings are morally considerable if they possess certain traits, an idea 
that has often appeared in Western philosophy. Waldau charges Buddhism with 
speciesism because it fails to include beings with these characteristics within the moral 
circle, but he does not show that Buddhism determines the moral worth of beings based 
on whether or not they possess these characteristics. Without this added premise, 
however, his argument cannot work. 
I will then go on to look at the specific claims that Waldau makes about the Pāli 
texts. The first is that these contain references to the instrumental use of animals, along 
with an awareness of the harm to these animals that this involves. Because the Pāli texts 
do not condemn these uses, Waldau argues that they must therefore accept them and that 
consequently, Buddhism must be speciesist. I will argue instead that the Pāli texts seem 
to contain a tension between acceptance of instrumental use and advocating restraint. 
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 Previously published as ―Buddhism and Speciesism: on the Misapplication of Western Concepts to 
Buddhist Beliefs.‖ Journal of Buddhist Ethics 15: 215-240. 
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More importantly, however, Waldau has once again relied on an unexpressed premise 
that may not fit with Buddhist doctrines; namely, the Kantian imperative never to treat 
morally considerable beings only as means to an end. The conclusion that Buddhism is 
speciesist will only follow if it is shown that Buddhism accepts this maxim and yet 
allows some morally considerable beings to be used solely as means while prohibiting it 
for humans. The Pāli texts however, contain references to the utilization of humans, too, 
and therefore, Waldau‘s charge once again rests on a misapplication of Western ideas. 
Waldau‘s second claim is that the Pāli texts describe humans in a more positive 
light than other animals, which once again, betrays their inequitable evaluation. I will 
identify two ways in which this is the case, and refer to them as separate value-systems. I 
will argue that in the first, where the lives of humans are simply seen as easier, or as more 
pleasant than those of other animals, the charge of speciesism does not apply. As long as 
the higher evaluation of humans is merely a description of the merits or positive aspects 
of existence as a human being, it does not amount to speciesism, as there is no 
implication about the way other animals are treated, nor does it suggest that this is less 
important, as a moral issue, than the way humans are treated. The Buddhist teachings 
about higher and lower rebirths, on the contrary, seem to contain an inherent injunction to 
treat all beings well, and thus cannot be speciesist as Waldau claims. 
However, in the second value-system, which sees humans as better able to follow 
the teachings of the Buddha, the merits of human existence do have implications about 
their moral worth. In a few excerpts from the canon, there is the suggestion that an 
offence committed against a human being is considerably more serious than the same 
offence committed against another animal, and here, I concede that Waldau‘s charge of 
speciesism is correct. These implications, however, appear in very few places in the 
canon, and the second value-system is significant not because of its speciesist undertone, 
but because it reveals a more far-reaching problem for green Buddhism, namely that the 
kind of value afforded to any form of life is always instrumental. Beings and their lives 
are valued, that is, not for themselves, but for the sake of something higher, namely the 
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possibility of attaining nibbana,
13
 and this, it could be argued, is something completely 
different from the natural world, and from ordinary beings‘ lives. 
Several authors maintain that it is difficult to establish an environmental position 
without recourse to the notion of the intrinsic value of nature, where life per se, human or 
otherwise, is what is valued. It is often pointed to, in fact, as one of the major problems 
for anyone seeking to establish the environmental credentials of Buddhism. I conclude 
this section by suggesting that instead of appraising the environmental character of 
Buddhism by seeking ideas comparable to Western concepts—for example, by expecting 
to find a Buddhist counterpart to ‗the intrinsic value of nature‘—it might be more fruitful 
to evaluate the tradition on its own terms, drawing upon its own conceptual resources that 
could gainfully be applied to our ecological problems. 
 
Speciesism and the Marginal Cases Argument 
 
Waldau defines speciesism as ―the inclusion of all human animals within and the 
exclusion of all other animals from the moral circle‖ (Waldau 2002, 38). An animal that 
is included in the moral circle is regarded as morally considerable, and the way it is 
treated is considered a moral issue. This usually means that its essential concerns and 
interests are recognized and protected, and for Waldau, this amounts to having its life 
protected, as well as its freedom from captivity, instrumental use, and infliction of harm 
(2002, 38–39). 
Waldau‘s definition appears unnecessarily restrictive, as speciesism does not 
necessarily have to involve the exclusion of all other animals from the moral circle. 
Someone who valued the lives, well-being, and freedom of all primates, say, both human 
and nonhuman, and yet treated all other creatures instrumentally, would not be speciesist 
under his account. To appreciate the inadequacy of this understanding of speciesism, we 
can compare it to a similar account of racism, with which the former was originally 
meant to be analogous. Peter Singer, who made extensive use of the concept in 
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 I use the Pāli term here in order to differentiate the early Buddhist idea of enlightenment from that of the 
Mahāyāna. As will become clear in later chapters, the following claim and much of the argument in this 
chapter, applies only to the former concept; in the Mahāyāna, nirvana is generally understood as 
inseparable from this world and from everyday life. 
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philosophical discussion, drew a parallel between the two, claiming that the speciesist is 
someone who gives preference to the interests of his own species, just as the racist gives 
preference to the interests of his own race (Singer 1998, 31). Although it is generally true 
that racists tend to be prejudiced against all races other than their own, a Caucasian man, 
say, who included Asian people, Hispanic people and other races within the moral circle, 
but discriminated against black people, would normally be considered just as racist. 
Similarly, a speciesist could be someone who includes humans and certain other species 
within the moral circle but excludes others. Waldau‘s definition, then, appears incomplete 
or simply not wide enough; it does not encompass all the positions that could be 
considered speciesist. The reason for his restricting condition is somewhat unclear and it 
will be seen below that it does his argument no favours.  
Aside from his restrictive definition, Waldau generally appears to be following 
Singer, and a significant part of his book focuses on the reasons for including certain 
animals in the moral circle. Singer argues that if all humans are morally considerable, as 
is usually thought, it must be because of some characteristic they all share. Yet, the only 
characteristic shared by all humans, including marginal cases such as intellectually 
challenged people, is also held by some other animals at least. Thus speciesism, for 
Singer, is the exclusion of these animals from the moral circle, despite their having the 
same characteristics that are deemed to make humans morally considerable (Singer 1998, 
37–38). I shall refer to this as the ‗marginal cases argument.‘  
Waldau makes use of this argument too (2002, 26). He devotes an entire chapter 
to a description of the characteristics that, in his view, make an animal morally 
considerable, arguing that there are certain ―valued‖ traits that are shared by humans and 
some other animals too. These include the use of language, interaction, and 
communication, familial relations and social groupings, social norms and expectation, 
complexity in individuals, intelligence, self-awareness, intentionality, and tool-making 
(Waldau 2002, 67–87). When attributed to humans, these characteristics are that which, 
in many accounts, render them morally considerable. Waldau seems to be saying that 
because many other animals possess these characteristics, they too ought to be morally 
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considerable. Buddhism, he claims, does not always include these animals within the 
moral circle, therefore, it must be guilty of speciesism.
14
 
 
Waldau’s Misappropriation of Western Ideas about Moral Considerability 
 
Waldau‘s argument does not work for two reasons. First, by his own definition he must 
show that Buddhism excludes all other species from the moral circle and not just the ones 
with the characteristics he has picked out, which he calls the ―key species.‖ This is a 
point that he acknowledges (Waldau 2002, 155).  
Second, and more importantly, the argument will not work because Waldau needs 
to show that Buddhism too values those characteristics he has selected, and that it 
includes or excludes animals from the moral circle depending upon whether they possess 
these characteristics or not. He does not do this, however, and it is my belief that the idea 
does not occur within Buddhist doctrine at all, but belongs, instead, to Western ethics. 
Throughout the history of Western philosophy, as is well known, characteristics like 
language, intelligence, and rationality were singled out as the essence of what it is to be 
human, and consequently believed to be that which renders one morally considerable. A 
range of theories and principles were set up about how beings with these qualities, that is, 
other people, were to be treated. Aristotle, for instance, defined man as a rational being, 
and developed an account of the good life from this premise (Nico. 1098a 13–15).  
Moral considerability, therefore, was assumed from the outset to belong primarily 
or exclusively to human beings; indeed, it was granted at first, only to free, adult males. 
Eventually, the class of the morally considerable was gradually widened, and today, 
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 Clearly, Waldau‘s understanding of speciesism corresponds to what others have termed ―indirect‖ or 
―qualified‖ speciesism, which, unlike ―direct‖ or ―bare‖ speciesism, seeks to justify its exclusion of other 
animals from the moral circle, based on other reasons than mere species membership. Of course, if these 
reasons can be shown to be valid, then the charge of speciesism fails; speciesism occurs when the reasons 
that one gives for taking some animals to be morally considerable and not others are themselves based on 
an indefensible preference for human-like qualities. In this respect, Waldau‘s own position can be seen to 
be somewhat speciesist, as all of his ―valued‖ characteristics seem to belong, primarily, to humans. Dr. 
Simon James has pointed out that we need not see it this way; bees, for instance, seem to be more sociable 
than humans (personal communication). Still, we can ask with Paul Taylor, why we should value 
sociability, language, or intelligence over the ―speed of a cheetah, vision of an eagle or agility of a 
monkey‖ (Taylor 1998, 79; on the distinction between direct and indirect speciesism see Waldau 2002, 33–
35). 
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philosophers and policy-makers, at least, generally include all people and perhaps some 
other animals too. Recently, it has been argued that the only quality that ought to 
influence the way we treat other beings is sentiency, that is, the capacity to feel pleasure 
or pain. In other words, Western philosophical discourse still focuses, at times, on the 
characteristics of a being that make it morally important, and a being tends to be deemed 
such precisely because it is rational, or sentient or whatever characteristic is believed to 
confer moral considerability.   
The Pāli texts, on the other hand, do not seem to make any connection between 
moral considerability and the possession of specific qualities. In the Karaṇīya Mettā 
Sutta, for example, we read: 
 
 Whatever living creatures there may be, 
 Without exception, weak or strong, 
 Long, huge or middle-sized, 
 Or short, minute or bulky. 
 
 Whether visible or invisible, 
 And those living far or near, 
 The born and those seeking birth, 
 May all beings be happy! (Sn 146-147) 
 
This sūtra, which is widely quoted on the Buddhist virtues of love and compassion, 
reveals that concern for others‘ welfare is not limited merely to members of this or that 
species, nor does it depend on their having certain characteristics. In fact, the text 
suggests precisely that moral considerability has nothing to do with characteristics at all. 
Rather, the moral circle is extended to ―whatever creatures there may be without 
exception,‖ in other words, to all beings, whether long, short, far, near and, one might 
add, whether or not they are rational, intelligent, language users, social animals, and so 
on.  
The tendency in Buddhism, then, is to throw as wide a net as possible and to 
extend concern for all, independently of what they are like, and this can be inferred, too, 
from the pervasive use, in canonical texts, of catchall terms like ―all living beings‖ to 
denote the object of a moral act.
15
 Lambert Schmithausen argues that originally the term 
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‗living beings‘ was believed to include plants, seeds, water and even earth as well as 
humans and animals. The moral circle was eventually narrowed in order to render 
Buddhism more practicable (Schmithausen 1991, 5–6). Later on, when the teachings had 
spread to China and Japan, the idea that sentient beings alone were the proper recipients 
of benevolence appears to have been considered something of a limitation. A long debate 
ensued about whether plants, trees, and even non-living objects were capable of attaining 
enlightenment, that is, whether they could be considered to possess the seed of 
Buddhahood. It seems that the trend was to argue in favour of widening the class of 
sentient beings, and consequently, the moral circle (La Fleur 1973, 95).  
Therefore, Buddhism takes a very different approach from the Western one, 
which, from the outset, differentiates beings that are morally considerable from those that 
are not, and defines the class of the former rather narrowly. Buddhism seems to start, 
instead, by assuming that all beings are morally significant, and, arguably, only allows 
exceptions to be made as a matter of expediency. It seems unlikely, moreover, that it is 
the possession of any particular characteristic that renders a being worthy of love and 
compassion, or else, that it deserves to have its life and well-being protected, because it is 
living, sentient, or whatever. The main concern does not seem to have been what the 
creature was like. Instead, the focus seems to be on what one is capable of, or else, how 
far one could reach out to others. 
In sum, an important objection can be raised to Waldau‘s general approach. It 
relies on a misappropriation of the Western idea that moral considerability depends on 
the possession of certain characteristics, an idea that simply does not appear anywhere 
within Buddhist doctrinal themes. If the idea of a moral circle can be applied to 
Buddhism at all, it will probably be very different from that in the Western tradition. 
Waldau overlooks this point, and he imports uncritically an idea from Western ethics into 
Buddhism, which he then criticizes for failing to apply it consistently. Yet, without 
showing that Buddhism, too, bases moral considerability upon certain characteristics, 
Waldau cannot conclude that it is speciesist. That is, he needs to show that Buddhism too 
appeals to those valued traits in determining whether a being is morally considerable or 
not. Nowhere does he do this, and in his discussion of what makes an animal morally 
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considerable there is no reference to Buddhist thought at all (2002, 59–87). I have 
suggested that this line of reasoning is, in fact, foreign to Buddhism. 
 
Waldau’s Specific Claims against Buddhism 
 
1) The instrumental use of animals 
 
So far, we have examined the notion of moral considerability in Buddhism, which, I have 
argued, takes a very different form (if it exists at all) from that found in Western 
philosophy. Perhaps a closer look at Waldau‘s case is now warranted. One of the main 
criticisms that emerge throughout the book is that he finds, in the canonical texts, an 
acceptance and subtle promotion of the instrumental use of some animals even though 
there is an awareness of its negative consequences for these animals (2002, 147–148). 
The suggestion, then, is that Buddhism is speciesist because it accepts the harmful 
instrumental uses of other animals (2002, 154–155).16  
Waldau focuses particularly on elephants. He argues that although the Pāli texts 
seem to recognize the harm that is inflicted on domesticated elephants, they do not 
question the assumption that it is acceptable to use them. Rather, he says, they seem to 
uphold the tradition of owning elephants as property, trading or giving them away, and 
using cruel practices to ―break‖ them (2002, 122). For example, in the Dhammapada, the 
Buddha proclaims: ―Now I can rule my mind as the mahout controls the elephant with his 
hooked staff‖ (cited in Waldau 2002, 121). Again, in the Dīgha Nikāya we read: ―E‘en as 
an elephant, fretted by hook, dashes unheeding curb and goad aside...‖ (Waldau 2002, 
128). These examples, and all the similar ones that Waldau provides, are cited to show 
that Buddhism accepts the instrumental use of elephants and the harm inflicted on them. 
Moreover, Waldau claims that because elephants are praised when they are tame rather 
than wild, Buddhism not only accepts but also promotes this utilization (2002, 131–132).   
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 The examples in the texts are only suggestive of speciesism, Waldau claims, because his definition 
requires that Buddhism exclude all animals from the moral circle and not just some (2002, 155). Again, one 
wonders why Waldau chose to use such a narrow definition. 
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Waldau acknowledges that the Buddha‘s First Precept may be supposed, prima 
facie, to go a long way towards protecting the lives and interests of all beings (2002, 137–
138). However, the precise meaning of the First Precept, also known as the doctrine of 
ahiṃsā, has long been debated. In its most popular interpretation, the precept entails only 
abstention from killing, yet in its strictest version it is an injunction against all forms of 
harming others (Schmithausen 1991, 11). Still, as Waldau points out, there are places in 
the texts where it is suggested that the precept protects only humans, and even, perhaps, 
only those who are followers of the Buddha (2002, 145). Besides, it is unclear which type 
of action the precept covers; it is usually assumed to exclude only deliberate acts of 
killing or harming, and the extent to which care is taken not to injure other beings has 
varied widely over different Buddhist communities (Harris 2000, 115). 
In all likelihood, these inconsistent interpretations may be a result of the fact that, 
for lay people, especially farmers, cowherds, and so on, it is difficult to refrain totally 
from harming other beings. One may point out here that the utilization of elephants and 
other animals was simply unavoidable during the times of the early Buddhists, where 
machinery was unavailable. It is hard to imagine any pre-modern society doing without 
the use of animals for farming, travelling, and other daily activities, all of which would 
require some degree of harm to them. As Schmithausen has observed, there is a conflict 
in Buddhism between, on the one hand, the instrumental use of animals that was 
necessary for everyday life, and, on the other, the restriction against killing or harming 
other beings, which only seemed to be an option for monks. This tension was not 
resolved in early Buddhist societies, even when the First Precept was interpreted fairly 
liberally (Schmithausen 1991, 4–9). 
Waldau seems to criticize Buddhism for failing to do enough to challenge the 
methods and technology of agriculture, animal husbandry, transport, and so on, which 
were available in the Buddha‘s times. Buddhism, he claims, simply coexisted with daily, 
obvious harms to nonhumans (2002, 155). Yet, it can be pointed out that despite the 
textual references to circumstances in which animals are harmed, Buddhism does propose 
an improvement in the way animals are treated, as is evidenced by the First Precept. It is 
likely that the examples Waldau points to are merely descriptions of the world as it was at 
the time, and do not necessarily imply approval. I suggest that Buddhism does make a 
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serious effort to influence positively the way animals are treated and that it does not 
totally accept their instrumental use, as Waldau claims. Rather, as Schmithausen has 
shown, there seems to be more of a conflict between the demands of Buddhist morality 
and the necessary utilization of animals at the time (Schmithausen 1991, 4). 
There is, however, a more significant flaw in Waldau‘s argument, which, once 
again, involves the appending of certain Western assumptions onto his reading of 
Buddhism. Waldau, as we have seen, finds several examples where the utilization of 
animals appears to be condoned. Even if this does show that Buddhism approves of this 
utilization, as he claims, and not merely that there is conflict, as I have suggested, his 
argument about speciesism assumes that Buddhism agrees with the Kantian maxim that 
morally considerable beings ought never to be treated only as means. To derive the 
assertion that Buddhism is speciesist because it depicts other animals being used 
instrumentally, Waldau also needs to show that Buddhism specifically expresses 
disapproval of the instrumental use of humans. This is a common idea in Christian and 
Western ethics but may not appear in Buddhist ethics.  
On the contrary, the sūtras and the Jātaka Tales, which are the main sources for 
his examples, also contain several stories about slaves. The Bodhisat himself (i.e., the 
Buddha in his previous lives) appears as a slave in no less than five Jātaka stories (Rhys 
Davids 2004, 246) and similarly the Nikāyas make several mentions of the practice of 
keeping slaves.
17
 Here too, there is an awareness of the harm that is inflicted upon them, 
such as we find in the Kakacupama Sutta. We are told that Lady Videhika ―grabbed hold 
of a rolling pin and gave her [Kāli, a slave-girl] a whack over the head, cutting it open‖ 
(M i 125; Thanissaro‘s translation). Just like the examples about elephants cited above, 
this story contains a reference to the instrumental use of humans, as well as to the harm 
that is inflicted upon them. By citing these examples, I do not mean to suggest that 
Buddhism approves of slavery, but rather, that Waldau‘s argument about speciesism fails, 
as there are textual references both to humans and to other animals being used 
instrumentally. It seems that in referring to the utilization of beings to their detriment, the 
Buddhist texts are merely describing the world as they found it, neither condoning nor 
condemning this instrumental use, whether of humans or otherwise.  
                                                 
17
 For example, see M i 125, M ii 62; D i 60; D i 72.  
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To ask whether Buddhism approves of this instrumental use is, again, to look for 
Western concepts—and perhaps even specifically modern ones—in an ancient, Asian 
tradition. Unless we uncover such hidden assumptions, we could be prevented from 
judging the tradition on its own merits. So far, then, we have identified two ideas foreign 
to Buddhism, which Waldau introduces unwarily into his critique. These are the ideas (1) 
that moral considerability depends on the possession of certain characteristics and (2) that 
humans, as morally considerable beings in this sense, ought not to be treated as means. In 
the following, we will encounter a third Western concept, that of the intrinsic value of 
natural beings, which is given utmost importance by environmental philosophers.
18
 I shall 
suggest that this notion is foreign to Buddhist doctrine as well, and this will emerge from 
discussion of Waldau‘s overall charge that Buddhism attributes greater value to human 
than to animal life.   
 
2) The higher value of human life 
 
Although Waldau recognizes the sense of continuity, in Buddhism, between 
humans and other animals (Waldau 2002, 138–139), there is a stronger tendency, he 
claims, to see other animals as decisively lower. In fact, he says, Buddhism lumps 
together conceptually all nonhuman animals into one group (tiryagjana; Pāli: 
tiracchāno), and affords them negative value, describing animal life as an unhappy, 
woeful existence (2002, 116, 94–95). Indeed, it is well-known that according to Buddhist 
cosmology, existence in the ‗desire realm‘ (kāmā dhātu) is divided into six domains 
(gati); the human and two types of godly existence (devas, asuras) form the three ‗happy 
goings‘ (sugati) or ‗higher realms,‘ while the domains of animals, hungry ghosts (pretas), 
and the hell realms (narakas) form the three ‗unhappy goings‘ (durgati) or ‗lower realms‘ 
(apāya).19, 20 The very terminology suggests, then, that human existence is worth more 
than that of other animals.  
                                                 
18
 For example, see Sylvan 1998. 
19
 The terms sugati and durgati (Pāli duggati) are usually translated as, respectively ‗happy‘ and ‗unhappy‘ 
destinations, or, literally, ‗goings.‘ Another term used for the latter is apāya, which Nyanatiloka translates 
as ―lower worlds‖ (1980, 46), and the implication, therefore, is that the happy destinations are the higher 
worlds. 
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This emerges in several ways. First, the doctrine claims that human life, as a 
‗happy destination,‘ is better than that of animals because it is more pleasant and there is 
less suffering inherent in it. Second, human life is seen as a reward for previous moral 
conduct (M i 285) whereas rebirth as an animal results from a former life of misconduct 
and wrong views (A iv 247; M i 388). Therefore, according to Waldau, beings that 
currently find themselves in the animal realms are regarded as culpable and ignorant 
(2002, 141, 153). Finally, human life is especially valuable as a means to attaining 
enlightenment (S v 456; S iv 126). In fact, several places in the texts suggest that only 
humans can become Buddhas, and the Vinaya specifies that only humans can become 
monks (Waldau 2002, 139).
21
 Thus, it would appear, as Waldau claims, that Buddhism 
deprecates animals, while elevating human life, which it regards as the ―pinnacle of 
existence‖ (2002, 139–140). 
There are several ways, then, in which Buddhism regards human existence as 
better; yet, I shall argue, they need not all affect the moral considerability of animals. One 
needs to distinguish between two ways in which a living being may be said to have value. 
The first is that which Taylor refers to as judgments about a being‘s ―merit,‖22 and the 
second concerns its ―inherent worth,‖ which has also been termed its ―moral value.‖ 
Judgments of merit are those that attribute certain desirable qualities to beings. As 
examples of these, Taylor mentions intelligence, speed, and agility among others. A 
being has inherent worth or moral value, on the other hand, if its own good is valued; that 
is, if there is a moral commitment to it, and certain forms of behaviour and rules 
regarding the way it is treated are deemed to apply (Taylor 1998, 74, 80–81).23  
                                                                                                                                                 
20
 Strictly speaking, the Theravāda offers slightly different accounts from that given here, which is the 
Mahāyāna portrayal popularized through the Wheel of Life diagrams. One Theravāda version leaves out the 
asuras altogether, resulting in five domains rather than six. Another system has eleven domains and places 
the asuras as a fourth lower realm, while humans and six types of devas form the higher realms. In any 
case, the main point being made here, that animals are regarded as being lower than humans, applies to 
whichever system is considered.  
21
 Waldau acknowledges that, in some places, the texts suggest animals too can be enlightened; however, 
the overwhelmingly dominant idea, he insists, is that only humans can (2002, 139). 
22
 Not to be confused with the Buddhist notion of merit. 
23
 Although Taylor uses the phrase ―inherent worth,‖ it is evident that what he has in mind is something like 
‗moral value‘ or ‗moral considerability.‘ Further on, the concept of ‗intrinsic value‘ will be defined as the 
value that something has for its own sake, as opposed to ‗instrumental value,‘ which is the value that a 
thing has for the sake of fulfilling some other purpose. In order to avoid confusion between intrinsic value 
and Taylor‘s ―inherent worth‖ I will specify, each time, that what is meant is ‗moral value.‘ 
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Inherent (or moral) worth appears to be entirely independent of a being‘s merits. 
Taylor demonstrates this by pointing out that humans are generally thought to have the 
same moral value, irrespective of their abilities. That is, we would not normally appeal to 
qualities like intelligence, wealth, or beauty to determine our moral attitude to another 
person; these features are thought to be entirely irrelevant. Even in class-structured 
societies, where people might be thought to have different levels of moral worth, once 
again, this has nothing to do with merit, but simply depends on one‘s birth (1998, 81). 
Therefore, the moral considerability of a person is independent of his merits, and to say 
that, for instance, a person is very intelligent, does not imply that what we do to him 
matters more that what we do to someone less clever.   
The point is that, in most cases, Buddhism‘s higher evaluation of humans seems 
to make no claims about the lesser moral standing of animals and, therefore, it would 
appear to be irrelevant to the argument about speciesism. Speciesism, as we have seen, 
has to do only with moral considerability, and with whether animals are seen as proper 
objects of moral concern. In other words, what is relevant is the question of inherent or 
moral value. To describe humans as morally superior, more intelligent, their lives as more 
pleasant, and as having better prospects for Dharma practice, on the other hand, clearly 
involve descriptions of merits, and contain nothing that suggests we should treat them 
differently from other animals.
24
 Sponberg makes a similar argument, claiming that in 
Buddhism, the point of ―vertical‖ distinctions, that is, between the value of humans and 
that of animals, was not to establish a hierarchy of privilege and subjugation, and 
certainly not to justify domination of one class of beings over another (Sponberg 1997, 
358). 
Still, if we separate two threads in the Buddhist valorisation of humans, we will 
find that a connection between some of these qualities and moral considerability can 
indeed be drawn. One value-scheme is simply about the merits of a particular form of 
life, and has to do with the degree of enjoyment it provides and the moral character of the 
being in its past life. Here, although a human life is better than one as an animal, life as a 
                                                 
24
 It might be objected that to be morally considerable, one must possess a moral character, and that 
therefore, this particular merit has implications for inherent or moral value. However, few would want to 
claim, for instance, that young children, intellectually challenged people, and so on—who certainly cannot 
always be thought of as moral agents—have less moral standing than the average adult. Therefore, a 
person‘s moral character is one of her merits, and is irrelevant to her moral standing. 
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god is valued even more highly.
25
 This is because, in Buddhist belief, the gods‘ lives are 
said to be pervaded with bliss and one is reborn there after having led a morally 
commendable life. According to this value-system, then, the gods are at the ―pinnacle of 
existence‖ due to their previous moral action. 
 This doctrine directs Buddhist followers to act in accordance with what is 
prescribed as moral, that is, to follow the Five Precepts, and the first of these, as we have 
seen, sets respect for all forms of life as the main moral rule. Thus, this system of 
valorisation would appear to contain an inherent appreciation of the moral value of all 
beings. That is, to reach the pinnacle of existence, under this account, one needs to treat 
all other creatures well, no matter how lowly (A iv 245).
26
 What is certainly not being 
said is that animals have less intrinsic or moral worth in Taylor‘s sense, or that this value-
system justifies harsh treatment of them, as Waldau claims (2002, 153). That is, in this 
first value-system there are no implications of speciesism. 
One could object, here, that an appropriate environmental stance will even reject 
this, and claim that in no way should animals‘ lives be considered worse, or lower, than 
those of humans. A dedicated animals-rights supporter, for instance, might be dismayed 
by an account that sees animal rebirth as punishment for one‘s misdeeds, that sees them 
as ignorant, or that assumes their lives cannot be as fulfilling as that of a human. 
Nevertheless, a position that tried to make all animals equal, not only in moral value but 
also in merit, would seem rather untenable. Although it may simply be arrogance that 
leads us to assume, for instance, that our lives are more worthwhile than those of our 
pets, we would still like to think of human life as better than that of a mosquito, say, 
simply on the basis of its duration. Similarly, we want to say that our intellectual 
capacities are better than those of apes. What needs to be borne in mind is that the things 
we pick out as a measure of value—self-fulfilment, longevity, intelligence, and so 
                                                 
25
 By ―god‖ I mean here devas and not asuras. 
26
 It has been argued, by Ian Harris among others, that Buddhist respect for other beings, including animals, 
appears somewhat self-interested, in that, it is cultivated, apparently for the sake of one‘s own ends (Harris, 
1991, 107). Here, too, the motivation for acting morally towards other animals may similarly seem self-
interested in that it is carried out for the sake of rebirth as a god, or at least, to prevent rebirth in the lower 
realms. The question is whether the Buddhist attitudes of love and compassion are beneficial to the 
recipients as well as practitioners. This issue will be examined in the third section of this chapter; here it 
will suffice to point out, as Schmithausen does, that the promise of reward for ethical acts does not make 
the act self-interested. Rather, it is simply another thread in the discourse for motivating people to act 
ethically (Schmithausen 1997, 17). 
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forth—are our subjective choices, and that on other criteria, such as Taylor‘s examples of 
speed or agility, the merits of other animals are greater than ours.  
Thus, although Waldau‘s apprehension at the Buddhist depiction of animals as 
lower beings can be understood, the alternative, an egalitarian outlook that disallows 
comparisons altogether, hardly seems attractive either. Neither is it required, if it is kept 
in mind that the negative evaluation of the merits of animal existence in Buddhism is 
entirely different from its judgments of moral considerability, which are properly sought 
in the First Precept and the doctrine of ahiṃsā, and are usually regarded as covering all 
forms of sentient life. There are no grounds, from evaluations of merit, to draw 
conclusions about moral worth. 
The second value-system, however, reveals that there is, sometimes, a connection 
with moral considerability after all. Here, what is valued mostly is not enjoyment, but 
opportunity to encounter and realize the Dharma. Humans have the most of it; they are 
neither distracted by pleasurable activities, as the gods are, nor are they overwhelmed by 
a life of torment, as in the lower realms (S iv 126). The lives of animals and worldly gods 
contain too much and too little suffering respectively and do not provide opportunities for 
Buddhist practice; they must first be reborn as humans for this. In fact, despite their 
blissful existence and, perhaps, their morally commendable lives, the gods are seen as 
deluded and destined for rebirth in lower realms (S i 133). Therefore, we find a different 
type of evaluation altogether here, which has nothing to do at all with contentment, nor 
with being a reward for previous moral conduct. Rather, the criterion this time is 
opportunity for enlightenment, and from this perspective, it is humans, rather than the 
gods, that are the pinnacle of the rebirth system (Waldau 2002, 139).  
At first sight, this second system of evaluation would seem to be about the merits 
of human existence again, rather than its moral worth, and it does not appear to have any 
direct implications of speciesism. Yet, the Vinaya code proposes expulsion from the order 
for a monk who kills a human deliberately, in contrast with the mere confession that is 
required when a monk kills an animal (Waldau 2002, 124). Moreover, if the human killed 
is an arhat, or, even worse, a Buddha, these are thought to be such heinous crimes that 
only rebirth in hell could follow (A iii 146). This might suggest, then, that the discrepancy 
rests on the greater moral worth of the murdered human being, based on her relative 
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proximity to the enlightened state, and it would seem, after all, that this judgment of merit 
does affect moral considerability.  
According to this account, then, in Buddhism, a being that qualifies for moral 
considerability (if this notion exists within the tradition at all
27
) is one for whom there is a 
likelihood of encountering the Dharma as well as its actual realization. Insofar as humans 
are the only candidates for this and animals excluded altogether, then there is speciesism, 
as it implies that what we do to humans (and especially to arhats and to Buddhas) is more 
important than what we do to other animals. It seems that, at least concerning this 
doctrine about the precious human life, Waldau‘s charge is correct, and he has indeed 
identified a problematic area for green Buddhism.  
Schmithausen has written on this matter too, however, he sees less cause for 
concern, and argues that the teachings about the low status of animals could easily be 
―de-dogmatized‖ for ecological reasons, and ―relegated to their specific didactic 
contexts‖ (Schmithausen 1997, 30). Perhaps this would involve their reinterpretation, so 
that the emphasis is solely upon the ―preciousness‖ of the opportunity that comes with 
human life, and makes no implications about our treatment of animals. In any case, it 
must be stressed that there are very few places, in the texts, where a contrast is made 
between killing animals and humans, and in the overwhelming majority of cases, the 
Buddha speaks out against killing in general, and recommends cultivating love and 
compassion for all living beings, regardless of species. Still, another, more serious 
difficulty arises for green Buddhism from all of this, as I will go on to show.   
 
Buddhism and the Concept of Intrinsic Value 
 
An implication of the foregoing discussion is that Buddhism does not recognize any 
intrinsic value in the natural world, a theme that will be explored more fully in the next 
section of this chapter. Within the context of environmental philosophy, besides having to 
do with moral considerability, the concept of intrinsic value also suggests that something 
                                                 
27
 There is the possibility that, as suggested above, the notion of moral considerability does not appear 
within Buddhist doctrine, and that the act of killing a human or a Buddha is worse than killing an animal, 
not because animals have less moral value, but for some other reason, say, the nature of the act itself. 
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is valued for its own sake (Sylvan 1998).
28
 Yet, from the second type of value described 
above, it emerges that in Buddhism, human life is merely valued for its proximity to the 
enlightened state, and it is not any particular form of life or even any individual living 
creature that is valued as such, but always a future Buddha, or, at least, the possibility that 
one may appear. This is a far cry from the way environmentalists think of natural beings, 
and certainly not what we mean when we say that people and other creatures are morally 
considerable, and that what we do to them matters. For environmentalists, it is this 
person, animal, or species that is valued, and not a future, improved state of them. 
The point can be made about both value-systems in fact. Buddhism evaluates 
beings differently, as we have seen, in dependence upon various criteria. When the focus 
is upon pleasure, rebirth as a god is best, however, this pales in significance when 
contrasted with the opportunity to encounter the Dharma, which is what is really valued 
in the second scheme. Nowhere, therefore, is any being‘s life regarded as precious in 
itself, or for its own sake, and, one assumes, if another form of life were to develop in a 
world that was more delightful, or more favourable for attaining enlightenment, this 
would consequently be more highly esteemed.
29
 The very fact that the gods are at the 
pinnacle of existence when the ultimate end is pleasure, whereas human life is considered 
more precious as an opportunity for enlightenment reveals that neither gods nor humans 
are valued for their own sake. 
Therefore, any value ascribed by Buddhism to human life is of an instrumental 
kind. The final goal of all existence is liberation from the ordinary world of saṃsāra, 
which includes, of course, both the animal and human worlds, and thus, there is a 
negative evaluation not just of animal life, as Waldau believes, but of all life in general. 
As Schmithausen observes: 
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 The term ‗intrinsic value‘ has been used in several ways in philosophical discourse; I postpone a detailed 
examination of these until the third section of this chapter. For now, I will use ‗intrinsic value‘ to mean, as 
well as moral value, the value that a thing has for its own sake, as opposed to instrumental value. 
29
 In fact, later Mahāyāna thought introduces rebirth in the Pure Land, which is neither human, nor godly, 
but outside the desire realm altogether. This type of existence is described as extremely blissful, and, once 
born there, a being is assured of reaching Buddhahood eventually. According to Pure Land Buddhism, then, 
the value of human existence is insignificant in contrast with rebirth there. In the final chapter of this 
dissertation, the notion of a Pure Land will be seen to provide a befitting premise upon which to build a 
green Buddhist philosophy.  
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In the canonical texts of Early Buddhism, all mundane existence is 
regarded as unsatisfactory, either because suffering prevails, or because 
existence is inevitably impermanent... Nature cannot but be ultimately 
unsatisfactory, for it too is marked by pain and death, or at least by 
impermanence...Therefore, the only goal worth striving for is Nirvāṇa, 
which [is] entirely beyond mundane existence (Schmithausen 1991, 12). 
 
Schmithausen agrees, then, that neither animals nor human beings are afforded ultimate 
value in the Buddhist analysis. Although they are not to be killed, as this is precluded by 
the First Precept, ultimately, it would be better if there were none. ―On this level then,‖ 
he goes on, ―there is little motivation for the conservation of nature‖ (1991, 16). This 
problem, which will be the topic of the following section, seems to present a serious 
difficulty for anyone seeking to relate early Buddhism to contemporary 
environmentalism. A view that falls short of seeing anything of intrinsic value in life 
would appear to be a rather unsatisfactory basis from which to develop an 
environmentalist position, and the concern to protect nature appears unfounded on this 
account.  
Whether this is a serious problem for green Buddhists depends upon the 
possibility of finding other doctrinal grounds for concern for the natural world. If any can 
be found, it seems unlikely that they will correspond exactly to Western concepts and 
assumptions, as, I hope, has emerged in this section. We have already seen that there may 
not be a concept of moral considerability, or of treating morally considerable beings as 
ends, and now it has emerged that there might not be any idea of life as intrinsically 
valuable in Buddhism either. In fact, to search for this kind of concept of value in 
Buddhism might even be an anachronistic attempt to locate a modern notion in an ancient 
system of thought.
30
 While I agree that great care is required not to read into Buddhist 
doctrines ideas that are foreign to it, or to expect it to live up to the standards of other, 
modern systems of thought, there are also reasons, I think, not to give up the search for 
value just yet. This is because, although the ancients may not have discussed moral value 
explicitly, it might still be possible to locate an implied system of values in their 
thoughts. This, in fact, will be my task for the rest of this chapter.  
                                                 
30
 I owe this insight to Prof. David E. Cooper (personal communication). 
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Should the outcome of our search be negative, however, we will have to ask 
whether this might stem from a misguided attempt to fit inappropriate Western categories 
onto a Buddhist framework, that is, whether, by asking the wrong questions, we might be 
preventing an authentically Buddhist environmental philosophy from emerging out of the 
tradition itself. In following chapters, I hope to show that Buddhism has its own 
conceptual resources that can be applied to ecological issues, including an alternative 
notion of value to that utilized by most environmental philosophers.  
 
Summary 
 
In this section, I have tried to disentangle various hidden assumptions from Waldau‘s 
charge of speciesism. These were the ideas that rationality, language, and other ―valued 
characteristics‖ are what make a being morally considerable; that morally considerable 
beings ought not to be treated as means; and that humans, at least, are morally 
considerable in this sense. All of these belong properly to Western ethics, and if they do 
occur in Buddhism, this needs to be demonstrated clearly. It is my belief, in fact, that 
these ideas are quite alien to Buddhist doctrine. 
 Waldau‘s general argument fails, it was seen, because it assumes that Buddhism 
determines moral considerability based on whether a being possesses certain valued 
characteristics, and this assumption is gratuitous. In fact, the texts suggest that Buddhism 
extends moral considerability to all living creatures, regardless of their qualities. 
Waldau‘s preference for mental and human-like traits may be one that is widely shared, 
yet it is not necessarily present in Buddhist doctrine. 
 The examples that Waldau cites where animals are used instrumentally do not 
support his claims either; for the conclusion about speciesism to follow, he has to show 
that Buddhism specifically condemns the instrumental use of morally considerable 
beings. Even if the presence of such references to the instrumental use of beings does 
entail acceptance of these practices—which seems rather unlikely—because the texts 
contain stories about human slaves too, as well as domestic animals, it seems that there is 
no speciesism. 
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 The final problem considered was that, in the Buddhist cosmological scheme, 
humans are valued more highly than other animals. As long as the value rests simply on 
the merits of human existence, such as enjoyment, intelligence and so on, no implications 
of speciesism will arise. Yet when the advantages of human existence suggest, as the 
Vinaya code does in a few places, that humans have more inherent or moral value than 
other animals, then, to an extent, Waldau is correct; Buddhism, does contain speciesism. 
It implies that what is done to a human being is more important than what is done to 
another animal, because human life is a better opportunity to transcend saṃsāra.  
Nevertheless, if one follows this argument to its logical conclusion, what is 
discovered is not just speciesism, but something far worse for environmentalists. This is 
the fact that, in early Buddhism at least, ultimately no being, human or animal, is valued 
for its own sake. If Buddhists seek to align their faith with current ecological awareness 
then, it appears they cannot avail themselves of the concept of intrinsic value as it is 
normally understood. However, I concluded by suggesting that it may be more fruitful to 
seek to derive ecological principles and ideas from the doctrines of Buddhism itself. 
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2 Does Nature Have Intrinsic Value on the Buddhist Worldview? 
 
The previous section ended on a rather negative note for green Buddhism. We saw that 
although Buddhist cosmology appears to regard highly some realms and some forms of 
life, in particular, the heavens and the human world, this is not based upon any 
appreciation of these beings or environments per se; rather, they turned out to be valued 
instrumentally, as means of satisfying the desire for pleasure, or, at best, for the 
opportunity to attain nirvana. Other writers have brought up similar concerns; Damien 
Keown, for example, notes that, in Buddhism, there is a ―negative presupposition‖ about 
the value of nature, and he suggests that, according to its traditional beliefs, ―the eventual 
destruction of the environment is... exactly what we should expect‖ (Keown 2007, 97). 
The problem of natural disvalue, as we have seen, presents an obstacle for green 
Buddhism, as, on this worldview, concern about the protection of nature appears rather 
awkward to motivate or defend. 
In this section, I will continue to examine the issue of whether Buddhism can 
accommodate a concept of ‗value in nature.‘ I will consider some basic doctrines, 
primarily the teachings about the ―Three Marks of Existence‖ (trilakṣaṇa), which are 
held in common by all vehicles and schools. Briefly, the Marks of Existence are suffering 
(duḥkha), impermanence (anitya), and not-self (anātman), and, as we shall see, all three 
suggest that the concept of value, as it is usually interpreted in the West, cannot be 
ascribed to nature. In fact, we shall encounter three objections to green Buddhism, which 
are based upon the Three Marks, and which have to do with the evaluation of nature. It 
will emerge, however, that two of these critiques are unfounded; they are most likely to 
result from a misinterpretation of Buddhist doctrine. 
The first objection is the straightforward claim that Buddhism ascribes negative 
value to the natural world and to ordinary life. To understand why this allegation might 
arise, we will need to examine the first two Marks of Existence, namely, suffering and 
impermanence. Some writers, like Schmithausen in the passage cited above, believe that 
these characterizations amount to a negative portrayal of nature; yet, we shall see that 
there is no consensus on the matter, but that rather, a variety of positions exists about 
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whether Buddhism regards nature as having positive or negative value, and whether this 
value is something objectively real or not.  
The second objection raised by eco-critics follows from the idea that, according to 
Buddhist teachings, the only thing worth striving for is liberation from saṃsāra. 
Therefore, I shall go on to examine this concept, and to ask what nirvana entails, in order 
to determine exactly what it is that Buddhism, allegedly, sets up as the sole locus of 
value, in contrast with ordinary life in the natural world. On some interpretations, nirvana 
involves complete transcendence of the ordinary world, and consequently, this renders 
Buddhism susceptible to the charge of being too ‗world-rejecting‘ to be able to provide 
grounds for an environmental philosophy. 
Occasionally, nirvana is not interpreted in this way, and is taken, instead, to be 
compatible with continued existence in this world. In the next chapter, we shall see that 
Mahāyāna Buddhism explicitly states that nirvana must not be understood as being 
starkly opposed to the natural world of saṃsāra. Therefore, the charge of being ‗world-
rejecting‘ does not seem to apply in this case. This chapter though, will be concerned 
with Theravāda philosophy, which, arguably, continues to regard the ultimate goal of 
Buddhism and samsaric life dualistically, and to conceive of nirvana in terms of complete 
transcendence of the natural world. Sometimes it is believed that attaining nirvana 
implies the total extinction of the liberated person after death, otherwise it is held that he 
will be reborn in some otherworldly realm. Yet, as we shall see, there are difficulties with 
all of these interpretations.   
 A more complete account of nirvana will need to take into consideration the 
Third Mark of Existence, the teaching on not-self. In brief, this doctrine suggests that 
there is no permanent or substantial entity that lies behind the constantly fluctuating 
elements that are constitutive of that which we call a person, and which are known, in 
Buddhism, as the Five Aggregates (skandhas). This implies, then, that the liberated 
person does not continue to exist in the world after liberation, yet this is because what we 
refer to as that ‗person‘, or the so-called ‗self,‘ did not exist as was supposed from the 
very outset. For the same reason, it is also incorrect to say both that he is annihilated and 
that he is reborn in some other realm after death. In other words, nirvana clearly cannot 
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involve complete transcendence of the natural world in any of the senses outlined above, 
and, consequently, the second objection about Buddhism‘s ‗world-rejecting‘ nature fails.  
 The notion of value in nature is also compromised by the doctrine of not-self. The 
third objection we shall encounter argues that for a thing to be ascribed value seems to 
require the idea of that thing as a fixed, static entity, which is precisely what the doctrine 
negates. It will emerge that Buddhist doctrine does not take as final any view about the 
value—positive or negative—of a natural being and therefore, the first objection that was 
raised, that Buddhism ascribes negative value to nature, appears to be unfounded too. The 
problem of value for green Buddhism reduces to the third and final critique we encounter; 
that Buddhist doctrine of not-self is incompatible with the ascription of either positive or 
negative value to natural beings.   
 
Suffering, Impermanence, and the ‘Negative Value of Nature’ Critique 
 
Buddhism‘s portrayal of the world as a place of ―suffering, decay, death, and 
impermanence‖ (Holder 2007, 114; citing Schmithausen) features in many works by eco-
critics, who claim that it poses a serious problem for green Buddhism. In brief, their 
argument, as we have seen, is that because of the emphasis on the undesirable aspects of 
natural phenomena, Buddhism cannot motivate an environmental ethic. I shall refer to 
this first objection to green Buddhism as the ‗negative value of nature‘ critique. Those 
who raise this issue generally invoke the first of the Three Marks of Existence, duḥkha, 
which also features as the First Noble Truth, and is variably translated as ―painful, 
disagreeable, ill, entailing suffering‖ (Schmithausen 1997, 10) or, generally, as 
―unsatisfactoriness‖ (e.g. Harris 2000, 125). Throughout the rest of this thesis, I shall use 
―suffering‖ as a shorthand term to refer to all these aspects of duḥkha. 
 J. Baird Callicott discusses the suffering that pertains to biological and natural 
processes, in particular, to the necessity that all creatures inflict some measure of 
discomfort upon others to survive (1987, 123). In a similar vein, Schmithausen states that 
in Buddhism, eating the weak and killing is ―deeply abhorred‖; yet, he also points out 
that the less violent aspects of nature cannot claim ultimate value either, and this is due to 
their impermanent nature (Schmithausen 1997, 10–11). Therefore, duḥkha is intimately 
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bound up with the Second Mark of Existence, anitya, or impermanence, as is manifest in 
the textual allusions to death and decay, and in particular, to the inevitable destruction of 
the natural world. We shall encounter these ideas again in chapter 4, where suffering and 
impermanence will be related specifically to natural evolution. 
Of course, not all authors subscribe to the view that Buddhism paints this negative 
picture of nature and mundane existence, and even some of the harshest critics of green 
Buddhism are careful to qualify their statements where necessary. Schmithausen, for 
instance, emphasizes that Buddhism contains diverse ―strands‖ and he juxtaposes the 
negative portrayal of nature against what he refers to as the ―hermit strand.‖ This includes 
those passages from the Songs of the Elders (Thera-, Therigāthā), which portray the 
forest-dwelling monks‘ and nuns‘ appreciation of the beauty of wild animals, of the 
solitude they enjoy in the wilderness, and which portrays some natural beings as 
standards of spiritual perfection, such as, for instance certain long-standing trees 
(Schmithausen 1991, 18–20). In like manner, Bilmoria (2001, 2) believes that far from 
portraying nature negatively, the Buddha was responsible for shifting perception away 
from the ―fearful, warring natural forces,‖ which his contemporaries tended to discern, 
and onto the ―benign disposition‖ of nature instead.  
Nevertheless, the most frequent reply to the negative value critique is that this 
negative value is not something that exists objectively or ―out there‖ in the world, but 
rather, it has to do with the way we experience that world. Cooper and James, for 
instance, suggest that duḥkha cannot simply be equated with the ―ordinary suffering‖ of, 
say, old age or death; instead, they claim that it is ―one‘s take on [that] experience‖ 
(2005, 69; citing Kupperman). The suggestion is, therefore, that any phenomenon, 
including apparently negative ones like death, and indeed, the entire natural world itself, 
is neutral in value. Padmasiri De Silva similarly suggests that rather than being a problem 
with the world, duḥkha indicates ―a disharmony in the self-society-nature matrix,‖ which 
can be likened to a ―thinking disorder.‖ The eco-crisis is one expression of this, he says, 
and Buddhism, as a diagnosis and cure for the disorder, generates the ―ideal human-
nature orientation‖ and can go a long way towards the solution of our ecological 
problems (De Silva 1998, 30–34). All this suggests, therefore, that the problems we 
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discern in nature have mostly to do with our own perception and our reaction to it, and 
can be removed by working on our own minds.  
Other authors, however, disagree with this outlook. John J. Holder, for instance, 
emphasizes that duḥkha and other attributes of reality are not to be understood as entirely 
subjective phenomena, such as ―mental events.‖ Rather, suffering involves both the world 
and the experiencer, and arises, he says, ―in the interface between a sentient being and the 
world such a being experiences.‖ Thus, it has ―metaphysically objective as well as 
subjective features‖ (Holder 2007, 120). It is true, he goes on, that the Buddha equated 
suffering with ―whatever is experienced‖ and that he never suggested that the world is 
suffering ―in and of‖ itself (2007-121). Holder, therefore, summarizes Schmithausen‘s 
mistake as having overstated the objective part of duḥkha at the cost of its subjective 
aspect, thereby turning it into ―a Buddhist condemnation of the world‖ (Holder 2007, 
120–121). Yet, in Holder‘s view, Buddhism does make a claim about the world itself; it 
attributes nature with positive value objectively. ―Nature has a profound value in early 
Buddhism,‖ he claims, ―as it is through natural means that one makes spiritual progress‖ 
(2007, 116).  
De Silva too, in some places, suggests that nature has positive value in the 
Buddhist worldview, and this time it is the Second Mark, impermanence, that lies at its 
source. That this value has a subjective aspect is clear; at times, he seems to think that it 
originates entirely from the one who experiences impermanence. ―[T]he rhythms of 
nature, of change, transience, the falling of flowers and the changing colours of the 
leaves‖ he argues, could only ―heighten one‘s appreciation of nature‖ (De Silva 1998, 
43). Yet, he also seems to suggest that nature has value objectively, for example, as a 
―remarkable resource for the kind of pedagogy the Buddha evolved‖ (1998, 44). Arguing 
against the popular belief that Buddhism views nature as an illusion, he claims that in its 
impermanence, a monk can discern ―metaphors of a most profound truth‖ (1998, 42–44). 
In Japan, this developed into a form of art that both celebrates and laments the transient 
beauty of nature (cf. James 2004, 73). Impermanence, that is, seems to be an objective 
part of the world, there to be discerned, and not merely a ‗thinking disorder‘ like duḥkha. 
To sum up, two contrary claims have been proposed as replies to the negative 
value critique. The first is the argument that Buddhism portrays nature as having positive 
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and not negative value. The second accepts that nature is valued negatively, but argues 
that this value must not be understood as something that exists objectively in the world. 
Instead, duḥkha is understood to have to do, mostly, with the way we experience the 
world. There is also a third position, which accepts this experiential quality, but insists 
that, on the Buddhist worldview, value has an objective element as well as a subjective 
aspect, and thus, this position re-opens the possibility of there being either positive or 
negative value in nature objectively. Below, I shall argue, against this view, that 
Buddhism cannot make any ultimate statements about objective value in the world, 
whether positive or negative.   
 
Nirvana and the ‘World-Rejecting Critique’ 
 
So far, I have outlined various positions on whether Buddhism can be said to find value 
in nature or else whether suffering and impermanence imply an outright condemnation of 
the world. One way of answering this question is by looking at what it is that Buddhism 
values unequivocally. Unfortunately, there are no indisputable answers here either, for 
although no one would deny the claim that Buddhism values nirvana, it is not altogether 
certain what this entails, other than, of course, liberation from saṃsāra. As we shall see, 
once again, there is a range of interpretations; some of them have existed since the 
Buddha‘s times, while others have a distinctively modern (and perhaps Western) flavour.  
When first encountered by Western scholars, the term nirvana was interpreted, 
literally, as ‗extinction,‘ and, at the time, a significant thread in Buddhist hermeneutical 
studies concerned the question of whether half the world‘s population could really ―yearn 
for extinction‖ as a final end (Welbon 1975, 134). In the context of environmental 
philosophy, one might wonder whether this concept is compatible with the aims of 
conservation, or else, precisely the opposite of what environmentalists wish for individual 
beings and collectivities like species. It is widely accepted today, however, that whatever 
nirvana is, it does not involve the total annihilation of the enlightened person (see below). 
The implication of this would seem to be that the enlightened person must go on 
existing in some way. Some authors seem to think that attaining nirvana can be done in 
this life and in this world. Holder for instance, emphasizes that the Buddha reached 
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enlightenment while continuing to interact with the impermanent things of this world, 
and to experience the suffering of old age, sickness, and death. Thus, in his view the 
Buddhist goal involves ―a way of living in this (natural) world; it is not an escape from 
it‖ (Holder 2007, 122–123; brackets in original). In general, Mahāyāna Buddhism 
categorically states that liberation is not to be found anywhere other than in this very 
world; according to its highest teachings, there is no ultimate difference between saṃsāra 
and nirvana. Yet, according to Bhikkhu Bodhi, a prominent commentator on Buddhism, 
for the Theravāda this ―borders on the outrageous.‖ He stresses that the duality between 
suffering and liberation is an essential aspect of the Buddha‘s teaching, and that it is 
precisely the antithesis between saṃsāra and nirvana that makes the quest for the latter 
so vital (Bodhi 1994, 2). 
Interpreters of the Theravāda insist that in order to overcome suffering—and 
because, being impermanent, life and this world must someday be left behind—Buddhist 
monks and nuns must aim at complete detachment from the world. The consensus among 
eco-critics appears to be that this soteriological aim involves the outright rejection of 
nature, and that, for this reason, it is entirely incompatible with an environmental ethic. 
Harris provides the clearest example of this way of thinking. He claims that, for early 
Buddhism at least, nirvana
31
 is thought of as being entirely ―outside the world‖ and 
liberation is attained only through letting go of it completely, in his words, through 
―escape from the bonds that tie us to saṃsāra,‖ and not, as authors such as Holder or De 
Silva imply ―through some fundamental restructuring of existence‖ (Harris 2001, 236; 
2000, 123). For these reasons, he and others charge Buddhism with being ―world-
denying‖ or even ―world-loathing‖32  (Callicott 1987, 123; Harris 2001, 236) and this 
constitutes the second, ‗world-rejecting‘ critique. The objection this time is that 
Buddhism‘s soteriological aim of complete detachment from the world and its implied 
rejection of nature are impossible to reconcile with an environmental philosophy. To cite 
Harris again, there is nothing in the world, he claims, ―which can be said to possess any 
inbuilt meaning or purpose‖ and consequently, ―[t]here can be no Buddhist justification 
for the fight to preserve habitats and environments per se‖ (Harris 2001, 253). In a further 
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 Or, better, nibbana. 
32
 Clearly, the latter charge cannot be correct, since hatred, as one of the mental poisons, is supposed to be 
eliminated altogether by the arhat. 
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chapter, we will see how taking this attitude to an extreme can result in nihilism, a wrong 
view that Buddhists need to avoid. 
It is not only eco-critics, however, who interpret nirvana in this way. Cooper and 
James agree with Holder that upon one interpretation of nirvana, namely as the 
―cessation of suffering,‖ this was attained by the Buddha during his lifetime and in this 
very world. However, they contrast this goal with another, more ultimate aim—the 
Buddha‘s final nirvana, or parinirvana—which was attained after his death. This concept, 
they claim, is ineffable; it is ―resistant to full, literal description,‖ and ―cannot be fully 
communicated to anyone not already ‗in‘ it‖ (Cooper and James 2005, 71). Both 
parinirvana and nirvana, in fact, are ―temporally and conceptually remote‖; that is, as 
well as being inconceivable, to most practicing Buddhists, nirvana is something they 
believe can only be attained after countless future lives (Cooper and James 2005, 71). 
Throughout this dissertation, I shall continue to use the term nirvana in this sense, to 
refer to the ultimate soteriological aim of Buddhism. One may add that nirvana is 
sometimes even conceived of as being spatially remote, perhaps lying in some other 
world beyond this universe. In short, it is arguably the case that, insofar as it is the goal of 
Buddhists,
33
 nirvana has little to do with ordinary life in this world, and consequently, it 
can give rise to the ‗world-rejecting‘ objection raised by eco-critics against green 
Buddhism.  
One might suppose that if nirvana does not occur in this world and does not 
involve extinction either, it must entail some sort of continuation of the person in another 
realm, an escape from saṃsāra to an ‗other-worldly‘ plane of existence, beyond 
impermanence and suffering. This would seem to be the import of a well-known passage 
in the canon, where the Buddha claims: 
 
There is, bhikkhus, an unborn, an unbecome, an unconstructed, an unconditioned, 
without which, bhikkhus, the resultant born, become, constructed, conditioned 
could not be known (Ud. 80; Thanissaro‘s translation). 
 
                                                 
33
 Cooper and James follow Keyes‘s and Collins‘s suggestion that nirvana is only the ―official summum 
bonum‖ of Buddhism, and that for most followers it is not the central aim. Instead, other concerns occupy 
centre space, such as a good rebirth, and perhaps, even rebirth in paradise (Cooper and James 2005, 72–73). 
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At first sight, this passage would seem to imply a separate ontological realm, something 
analogous perhaps to Plato‘s Forms, or else, some sort of paradise in which enlightened 
beings are born once they have escaped this world.  
In sum, we have seen that several replies could be given to the question of what 
exactly nirvana entails; these are, briefly, the person‘s continued existence in this world, 
in some other world, or else, her total extinction. The first of these seems incompatible 
with Theravāda doctrine, the other two appear world-denying, and raise difficulties for 
green Buddhism. None of these interpretations of nirvana is correct, however, and to 
understand why, we will need to examine the Third Mark of Existence, the doctrine of 
not-self.  
 
Nirvana and the Doctrine of Not-Self 
 
The problem of how to interpret nirvana is not a new one; the Pāli canon contains several 
accounts of the same question being put to the Buddha. In the Aggivacchagotta Sutta, for 
instance, the issue is framed using the classical Buddhist tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi), which 
considers four alternatives that together are deemed to encompass all possible replies. 
There are the views that the enlightened person 1) exists after death, 2) does not exist 
after death, 3) both exists and does not exist after death, or else 4) neither exists nor does 
not exist after death. The Buddha answers to all these possibilities, that he does not hold 
this view (M i 484–485). When Vacchagotta enquires further, the Buddha states that 
these positions are all 
 
a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of 
views, a fetter of views. [They are] accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, 
and fever, and [they do] not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to 
calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding [i.e., nirvana] (M i 485; 
Thanissaro‘s translation; inserts mine). 
 
In other words, it seems that the Buddha advises his followers not to concern themselves 
with whether nirvana means extinction or continuation in this, or in some other world, 
because preoccupation with this matter is not conducive to attaining nirvana. In itself, of 
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course, this reply does not rule out any of the possibilities, and to understand what the 
Buddha means, we will need to look at some other answers he gives to the question. 
In two similar texts, the Anuradha Sutta and Yamaka Sutta (S iii 109–119), the 
issue is examined in depth. Yamaka believes that the enlightened person is annihilated at 
death; Anuradha, on the other hand, believes that there must be a fifth possibility besides 
the four outlined above; that is, while the Buddha cannot be described in any of the four 
alternatives of the tetralemma, still, after death, he can be described in some other way. 
The answer they receive is the same. The notion of ‗Buddha‘ is analysed into five basic 
constituents, or aggregates (skandhas), which are generally rendered as form (i.e., the 
body), feelings, perceptions, mental fabrications (or volition), and consciousness. 
Although the argument here is about the Buddha (Tathāgata), other sūtras make it clear 
that the Five Aggregates are the basic constituents of all individuals, and that the 
argument is about the concept of self (ātman).  
One might believe the self to be any of these aggregates, or else, to be somehow 
related to them; yet, upon further examination, they are all found to be ―inconstant, 
stressful, and subject to change‖ (S iii 118; Thanissaro). Modern interpreters of the not-
self doctrine like to point out that the body is constantly undergoing different processes; 
old cells are dying and being replaced, the blood is continuously circulating the body, and 
the breath inhaled and exhaled. This implies that if one were the body, then Siddhārtha 
the new-born baby, say, would be very different from Siddhārtha the adult.  
Similarly, feelings, perceptions, and the other mental aggregates arise and fade 
away, replacing each other in quick succession. The Mahānidāna Sutta explains why this 
is significant. To someone who believed that the self was somehow linked with her 
feelings, for instance, the Buddha explains that at any one moment there might be a 
feeling of pleasure, at another a feeling of pain, and at a third moment a neutral feeling 
might arise. All of these are mutually exclusive, in the sense that a feeling of pleasure 
cannot possibly exist at the same time as a feeling of pain.
34
 Again, all of the aggregates, 
the sūtra goes on, are ―inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing 
                                                 
34
 Even though some experiences might contain a mixture of pleasure and pain, still, Buddhism holds that 
these must arise successively in the mind stream, and that, as one‘s meditation deepens, one becomes aware 
that no more than one dharma (the class of all momentary phenomena, to which the mental aggregates 
belong) can be present at any one moment (Bodhi 1998, xvi-xvii).  
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away, dissolution, fading, and cessation‖ (D ii 66–67; Thanissaro). Thus, if that person 
identified her self with a particular feeling, once that feeling has ceased then she too must 
have perished. We generally think of a person, however, as stable, fixed, and unchanging, 
something substantial, perhaps, to which the aggregates belong. This is what we mean 
when we refer to them as my body, her feelings, and so forth.  
The doctrine of not-self explains that this way of thinking is mistaken, that there 
is no fixed self behind the ever-changing aggregates. To return to the Anuradha and 
Yamaka Suttas, none of the aggregates in isolation can properly be called the Buddha, 
they claim; he is not the body, or any other aggregate, precisely because of its 
impermanence. The Buddha cannot be said to be in his body (nor the body in the 
Buddha), although, at the same time, he certainly is not anywhere other than where his 
body is, or independent from his body. The same argument can be made for all of the 
other aggregates considered in isolation.  
The most plausible account, it seems, takes the Buddha to be the sum of all his 
aggregates. However, the composite made up of the body, feelings, perceptions, and so 
forth is also inconstant and fluctuating, as well as multifarious, whereas, as we have seen, 
we generally think of a person as a single, unchanging thing. On the other hand, clearly 
the Buddha cannot be anything independent or separate from the collection of his 
aggregates, as there is no way of recognizing him, other than through his body, his 
thoughts, feelings, and so forth. The conclusion reached, in short, is that the Buddha 
―can‘t [be] pin[ned] down... as a truth or reality even in the present life‖ and therefore, 
how can it be correct to say either that he exists or else that he does not exist after death? 
(S i 118; Thanissaro‘s translation) 
Thus, to the question of what nirvana entails, the Buddha replies using the stock 
formula for meditation on not-self. He refuses to state categorically whether or not the 
self survives death because the inquiry is a misguided one that already begs the question, 
in that it assumes the existence of a permanent, substantial self. It assumes that there is 
something determinate that we call ‗the self,‘ and yet, when we look carefully we find 
there is nothing that corresponds exactly with this concept. There are only transient 
phenomena that arise, stay for a short while, and perish, and we would not identify any of 
these as ‗the self.‘ It is important to emphasize that the Buddha is neither stating that the 
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self exists nor that it does not; the point, rather, is about indeterminacy, that there is 
nothing that can be ―pinned down‖ as the self, and that ultimately, it is inappropriate to 
state anything about it, either concerning its present life, or after death.  
Of course, since at other times, the Buddha does speak about himself and about 
other people,
35
 this cannot be the whole story, and, as we shall see in chapter 2, a correct 
understanding of Buddhist doctrine requires that one can distinguish between two levels 
of truth. Conventionally, it makes sense to speak of a person as a shorthand way of 
referring to a cluster of ever-changing phenomena that are related to each other through 
cause and effect. This is why the Buddha does not simply assert that there is no self. 
Ultimately, however, a person (and as we shall see, everything in the world) has no 
permanent, substantial identity, or, put another way, there is no essential core that lies 
beneath its transient properties, and this is why the Buddha does not say that there is a 
self. In fact, all statements are only conventionally true and ultimately, statements to the 
effect that ‗the self exists,‘ or that ‗the self does not exist,‘ are neither true nor false, but 
meaningless. Therefore, if one does make such statements, one must bear in mind that 
this is merely a conventional way of speaking. 
This implies that whatever nirvana entails, it is certainly not the annihilation of 
something that previously existed, and it cannot involve extinction, as some eco-critics 
might fear. Neither does it entail the rebirth of the liberated person in some other-worldly 
realm. To reiterate, this is because that which we have been referring to as the self, or 
person, never existed in the way that is implied by the statements: ‗the liberated person is 
annihilated after death,‘ or, ‗he is reborn in another world.‘ Consequently, the second 
objection raised by eco-critics, that nirvana entails a world-rejecting philosophy, appears 
to be based on an incorrect understanding of what is meant by liberation from saṃsāra. 
Yet, for the same reason, nirvana is not simply ordinary existence in the samsaric 
world either, that is, the Buddha is not to be understood as an ordinary person who exists 
in the world. It is said that to fully discern not-self and thereby attain liberation will bring 
about a complete transformation in oneself and one‘s perception of the world, as well as 
in one‘s way of being ‗in‘ the world (e.g., A iv 53). As already noted, the Mahāyāna 
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 To take just a few examples, in  A ii 61 the Buddha talks about husband and wife being reborn together, 
in M iii 20 he talks about ―a person of integrity,‖ (Thanissaro‘s translations) and in D ii  102 he talks about 
himself being ―grown old, and full of years‖  (Rhys Davids‘s translation).  
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explicitly stresses the ‗this-worldly‘ implications of the doctrine, by identifying nirvana 
with saṃsāra, whereas the Theravāda focuses on the ‗other-worldly‘ aspect by stressing 
the transformation. In any case, although Buddhism sets nirvana as the ultimate 
soteriological goal, this does not amount to a straightforward or simplistic rejection of the 
natural world. However, there are further implications of the not-self doctrine that have 
bearing upon the notion of value, to which I shall now turn. 
  
Not-Self, Renunciation of Views, and the ‘Insubstantiality’ Critique  
 
As we have seen, the doctrine of not-self suggests that there is no determinate, 
permanent, or substantial entity that lies behind the ever-changing and unsatisfactory 
phenomena that make up a person. Cooper and James point out that this idea holds true 
for all types of organisms, and not just people. ―Living beings,‖ they write, ―are not to be 
distinguished from the ephemeral events and states that, as it were, constitute their 
existence. Dogs and tulips, like people, are impermanent and ‗not-self‖ (Cooper and 
James 2005, 110). Some sūtras extend the doctrine to apply to everything in the world, 
claiming that all things, including inanimate ones, are ―empty of a self or of anything 
pertaining to a self‖ (S iv 54, M iii 110–115).  
There are two related implications of this that are pertinent to our discussion 
about value. The first is that this indeterminate and insubstantial view of things suggests 
that since there is no fixed substantial entity behind the collection of ephemeral 
phenomena that make up a ‗thing,‘ then there is nothing that can serve as the locus of 
value, or that can be ascribed value. Or, to put it another way, since nothing determinate 
can be stated about any ‗thing,‘ then neither can we say that it has nor that it does not 
have value. The second implication, then, is that the doctrine of not-self does not allow us 
to retain any final view.
36
 Together, these make up the third objection that eco-critics 
raise, the ‗insubstantiality critique.‘ 
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 Due to the ineffability of ultimate reality, and the relinquishing of all views, putting Buddhist doctrine 
into words becomes a rather complicated affair. All statements, including negatives like ―there is no fixed 
entity‖ are merely conventional, and they too must not be grasped at as views. 
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Throughout this dissertation, a persistent setback for green Buddhism that we 
shall encounter is that the highest level of doctrine seems to advise practitioners to 
relinquish all their views. We have already seen that the Buddha regarded statements to 
the effect that a person exists or does not exist after death as ―a fetter of views.‖ This was 
only one of the questions that he famously refused to answer; others include whether or 
not the cosmos is eternal, whether or not it is infinite, whether the body and soul are the 
same, or independent (A v 186–188), and even the view ―all this is pleasing to me‖ or 
―not pleasing to me‖ (M i 497–500; Thanissaro). The Buddha admonishes his listeners 
not to ―insist firmly‖ or ―adhere obstinately‖ to any views, that is, not to grasp at or cling 
to them (M i 499; Thanissaro; Nanamoli and Bhikkhu). Another sūtra explains further: 
 
Those skilled in judgment say that a view becomes a bond if, relying on it, 
one regards everything else as inferior. Therefore, a bhikkhu should not 
depend on what is seen, heard or cognized... Abandoning the views he had 
previously held and not taking up another, he does not seek a support even 
in knowledge. Among those who dispute, he is certainly not one to take 
sides. He does not have recourse to a view at all (Sn 798–800; Ireland‘s 
translation). 
 
One must suppose that the same would apply to the view of the natural world as valuable, 
as well as to the view that it has negative value. Indeed, environmentalism seems to be 
replete with views, and, one might argue, amounts to a view in itself. It includes theories 
about what nature is, about the way we ought to treat natural beings, and our relation to 
nature, to mention just a few. Assumedly, to cling to any of these would also become a 
bond, and therefore, anybody who was serious about realizing the Dharma would at least 
have to question her adherence to certain causes, for example, to her belief in animal 
rights, or else, to a holistic type of eco-spirituality. As we shall see, this problem will re-
surface frequently and will be one of the major difficulties we shall encounter throughout 
the appraisal of Buddhist environmentalism. 
 It may be objected, here, that Buddhism, too, contains several views, such as the 
view of reality as being marked by impermanence, suffering, and not-self, that is, the 
doctrine of the Three Marks of Existence, with which this section began. To reply 
adequately will require a more detailed examination of the doctrine of the Two Truths, 
which was mentioned briefly above. This is postponed until the next chapter, where we 
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shall encounter Nāgārjuna‘s explanation of how the conventional and ultimate levels of 
reality are related to each other.  
For now, it shall have to suffice to point out that the Buddha often insists that he 
does not hold a view, and that he has not taught anything other than the Four Noble 
Truths; in short, that there is suffering, a cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering, 
and the path towards the cessation of suffering (e.g., M i 140). Lest one should be 
inclined to interpret this as just another view, the Ditthi Sutta points out that suffering is 
not to be grasped at either, rather, when one correctly discerns duḥkha, he also discerns 
the escape from it (A v 188). That is, it is not enough to stop at the belief that ―all this is 
suffering,‖ or worse, to grasp at it as a final truth. Rather, the point of practising the 
Buddha‘s teachings is to overcome that suffering. 
Besides, it was suggested above that the doctrine about suffering is not meant to 
be read as a description of the world, but rather, it has mostly to do with the way we 
experience that world. Other authors have similarly maintained that the Buddha rarely 
spoke of anything objectively ―out there‖ (e.g., Gombrich 1996, 80); his aim, instead, 
was to draw attention to psychological processes, and to reveal a way out of our ‗thinking 
disorder.‘ This is why, in so many passages from the sūtras, he claims not to have taught 
anything other than the path from suffering to the cessation of suffering. Referring to the 
Buddha‘s silence on the ―unanswered questions‖ cited above, Sue Hamilton claims that 
he deliberately transfers attention away from ―cosmogonic and cosmological 
speculation,‖ as well as from questions about the ―nature of the self and the nature of 
everything else,‖ and focuses, instead, on inwardness, and subjective processes. This is 
because the only world there is, she says, is the world of experience, and therefore, ―the 
premise that there must either be or not be an external world is a false one‖ (Hamilton 
1999, 74–83).  
It would appear that the same can be said about so-called individual ‗things‘ and 
natural beings too; as we have seen, the question of whether or not they exist is a 
misguided one. This brings us to the second part of the ‗insubstantiality critique,‘ the 
problem that there is no fixed objective entity behind the transient phenomena we 
experience as a natural being, which can serve as the locus of value. Several writers have 
insisted that in order to ascribe value to a thing, we must be able, at least, to identify it as 
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an entity. Holmes Rolston, for instance, says that it requires the ―pushy defense of 
individual integrity‖ that the Buddhist doctrine of not-self seems to negate (Rolston 1987, 
184). If things like individual organisms, forests, or mountains cannot be pinned down, 
how are we to say that they are valuable?  
 Malcolm David Eckel makes a similar point, although he refers specifically to the 
concept of ‗intrinsic value,‘ which will be examined in the following section. He says that 
this ―seems to suggest precisely the substantial, permanent identity that the idea of no[t]-
self...[is] meant to undermine‖ (1998, 65). Likewise Holder claims that the notion of 
value ―depends on a metaphysical position that gives independent, self-subsisting 
existence to the beings or things valued,‖ which early Buddhism rejects (Holder 2007, 
114; emphasis in original). Finally, Simon James (2004, 84) cites Rockefeller‘s similar 
claim that intrinsic value requires ―the existence of some fixed essence or permanent self 
in things.‖ The import of these statements seems to be, again, that without the existence 
of an entity ‗out there,‘ something that exists permanently and independently of our 
experience of it, there is nothing to which we could ascribe value. 
 Of course, the insubstantiality critique will apply to both the claim that nature has 
value as well as the claim that it has negative value. In other words, it defeats the first 
objection that was raised against green Buddhism, the idea that the doctrines of suffering 
and impermanence imply a negative portrayal of nature. If a thing needs the sort of fixed, 
objective identity that not-self negates in order for us to say that it ‗has positive value,‘ 
then it will also need it to have negative value. The eco-critics‘ complaint about 
Buddhism‘s dismal portrayal of nature, therefore, turns out to be unfounded, as 
Buddhism views things in nature as being far too insubstantial for us to claim anything 
about the way they are objectively; any such statement amounts to ―a thicket of views… 
accompanied by suffering, stress and despair…that do[es] not lead to Awakening‖ (M i 
485; Thanissaro). It seems that, once again, we have defended green Buddhism from one 
charge—that its gloomy view of nature precludes an environmental ethic—only to 
discover another, potentially greater one. This is the charge that Buddhism‘s insubstantial 
account of reality means that nothing exists determinately in nature in such a way that it 
can be ascribed value objectively. 
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 Much more can be said about this issue, and in the next section, I shall delve more 
deeply into the matter, after examining the concept of intrinsic value. Perhaps, though, 
one might argue that attempting to reconcile the concept of value with Buddhism is 
another example of the misapplication of Western ideas to Buddhist doctrine. In the 
previous section, we saw that Waldau appears to believe that a feasible environmental 
philosophy must rely on notions like moral considerability, treating beings as ends, and 
so forth. Holder has described this approach as ―methodologically backward‖ in that it 
starts with a contemporary way of framing environmental ethics, and then tries to match 
it with the ancient texts (Holder 2007, 115). The attempt to locate the notion of value in 
Buddhism might appear similarly flawed; the interpretation of it as an objective property 
of things, it seems, does not cohere well with the Buddhist view of reality, and indeed, 
appears to be a philosophical construction that emerged out of Western traditional 
concerns and viewpoints. Fortunately, we do not need to think of value in this way, in 
order to have a workable notion for environmental ethics, and, as I shall argue in the next 
section, a concept of value as something subjective, and that rests entirely upon our 
attitude towards a being, is perfectly adequate for the purpose it needs to serve. 
Moreover, this sort of concept is available in Buddhist doctrine, and corresponds in an 
interesting way to the two main virtues that are cultivated by Buddhists, namely, love and 
compassion.  
 
Summary 
 
In this section, I began to examine in general terms whether Buddhism can accommodate 
a concept of value in nature, or whether the doctrines of suffering, impermanence, and 
not-self preclude this altogether. We saw that Buddhism lays particular stress upon the 
unsatisfactory aspects of existence as well as on its impermanence, which together 
contribute to a seemingly negative evaluation of nature. Some authors insist that 
according to the Buddhist worldview, nature can be said to have negative value 
objectively, and we referred to this as the ‗negative value critique.‘ A second objection 
encountered was that because Buddhism only values nirvana, and because, whatever 
nirvana is, it involves the total repudiation of this world, Buddhism cannot be reconciled 
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with an environmental ethic. This was referred to as the ‗world-rejecting critique.‘ After 
examining the doctrine of not-self, I argued that this interpretation of nirvana cannot be 
correct. Although, from one perspective, it is true that nirvana is completely different 
from ordinary existence in this world, this does not amount to a straightforward rejection 
of it, and therefore, the second objection fails.  
We saw that according to the not-self doctrine, the Buddha cannot be said to exist 
nor can it be said that he does not exist, either in this life or after death. The same applies 
to the concept of ‗self,‘ and to all individuals or ‗things‘ in the world, whether human or 
non-human, animate or inanimate. Generally, we think of a ‗thing,‘ a ‗person,‘ or a 
‗being‘ as something permanent, substantial, and determinate; yet, in reality, any 
individual can be analysed into a collection of ephemeral phenomena, none of which 
corresponds precisely to that thing, or being. This means that although, conventionally, 
we do talk about individuals, ultimately, nothing determinate can be stated about any of 
them at all; they ―cannot be pinned down.‘ This gave rise to the third objection, the 
‗insubstantiality critique.‘ The first part of this critique is that since nothing determinate 
can be said, we can never arrive at a final truth about anything, and indeed, the Buddha 
often advised his listeners to relinquish all their views. This advice would seem to apply 
to all the statements and views that are included in environmental philosophy; as we shall 
see, Buddhist philosophy can only accept these as conventional truths. 
As a result, the ‗negative value of nature‘ critique was dismissed; the 
indeterminate and insubstantial view of reality in Buddhism implies that, ultimately, 
nature cannot be said to have either positive or negative value. We were left, then, with 
the second part of the ‗insubstantiality‘ objection; that there are no fixed or permanent 
entities which can be ascribed with value. That is to say, to talk of a being ‗having value,‘ 
in Buddhism would have to depend upon the conventional statements and attitudes of 
people and any other valuers there might be. For this reason, in the final part of this 
chapter, instead of asking whether there are any objects that ‗have‘ value in Buddhism, I 
will focus upon the way subjects perceive or ascribe value upon other beings, through 
cultivating an attitude of loving-kindness and compassion towards them. 
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3 Solicitude as an Alternative Way to Evaluate Nature 
 
Thus far, I have examined the concept of value from the perspective of Buddhist doctrine, 
and the outcome has been somewhat negative. One reason for this is that the concept 
itself has remained unanalysed, and I have been working with a rather rough, common-
sense understanding of value. This section will examine the issue from the angle of 
environmental philosophy, and will start by inquiring into what exactly is meant when 
philosophers ascribe intrinsic value to nature. It will emerge that there are several 
connotations of the term that are irrelevant or unnecessary for environmentalism, as well 
as others that are incongruent with Buddhist doctrine. My first objective, therefore, is to 
draw up a working definition of ‗intrinsic value‘ that contains all the meanings required 
for an environmental ethic. I will then show that a corresponding concept can be 
discerned in Buddhist doctrine. 
As we shall see, intrinsic value is defined in several ways. We already 
encountered, in the previous section, one interpretation that identified it with ‗moral 
value,‘ a connotation that can be accepted without further discussion. Other senses in 
which the term is used include that of ‗non-instrumental‘ or ‗final value,‘ that is, the 
value that a thing or being has for its own sake. This is the only sense of ‗intrinsic value‘ 
that may be required for an environmental ethic. However, this interpretation is often 
conflated with two other senses; there is, first, Moore‘s definition of ‗intrinsic value‘ as 
the value that a thing has independently of its relations with any other thing, and second, 
‗objective value,‘ which somehow exists ‗in‘ the object, independently of humans. 
Several authors have shown that the properties or entities valued by environmentalists 
cannot be thought of in either of these ways, and others have demonstrated that 
Buddhism cannot accommodate such concepts of value either.  
The confusion often stems from the requirement that value be independent from 
humans. If this means being independent from human interests, then the definition of 
intrinsic value as ‗non-instrumental‘ has already taken care of that. We shall see, in fact, 
that many philosophers who argue for objective value see it as emerging from what they 
term ‗the good‘ of  other beings, which is independent of human preferences. However, 
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value, I shall argue, can never be entirely independent of a subject that perceives. The 
terms ‗good‘ and ‗value‘ seem to be inseparable from some being‘s desires and 
preferences, even if they are independent of human interests. Therefore, the most 
appropriate way of construing intrinsic value, I shall claim, is by tying it to the welfare of 
living beings, and by interpreting it, not as a property that exists objectively and 
independently in something that has value, but rather, as an attitude or approach towards 
something that can be valued by a living being. 
This opens the way for an understanding of intrinsic value that is closely related 
to two of the main virtues advocated by the Buddha, namely, loving-kindness and 
compassion. Buddhism construes these as the desire to foster well-being in those that are 
loved, and the aspiration to eliminate any suffering one might come across. Like other 
ethical systems that focus on the increase of well-being, such as utilitarianism and its 
subclass, animal welfarism, Buddhism aims to extend this love and compassion 
universally, to all beings that are proper recipients of such moral concern. Yet, this class 
is considerably wider in Buddhism than it has traditionally been for utilitarians, who 
generally seem to focus on ‗charismatic megafauna,‘ and, typically ―rank mammals 
above birds; birds above reptiles, amphibians, and fishes; and vertebrates above 
invertebrates‖ (Dunayer 2005, 14). 
Still, an environmental ethic that is based on the Buddhist virtues of love and 
compassion is subject to several critiques. The most important of these is that when 
Buddhists wish for somebody or something‘s well-being they have something in mind 
that is very different from what environmentalists work to achieve. This can be 
understood better if we consider that environmentalists and conservationists generally 
want to preserve things as they are. Or, if they are working for change, then this usually 
involves restoration to a former state. The well-being that Buddhists work for, on the 
other hand, seems to suggest something completely different from the usual state of 
affairs. Whatever nirvana is, as indicated in the previous section, it cannot be ordinary 
health or flourishing in a biological sense. Sometimes, there even seems to be an 
implication, in the Pāli texts, that ordinary well-being is inimical to liberation. It is clear 
that, to work out definitively whether Buddhism is compatible with environmental 
concerns, we will have to understand better what liberation involves and how it is 
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attained. That project is postponed until we have opportunity to delve more deeply into 
Buddhist philosophy. In what follows, I turn to an examination of the concept of 
‗intrinsic value.‘  
 
The Meanings of ‘Intrinsic Value’  
 
The term ―intrinsic value‖ has been used in several ways; often, unfortunately, diverse 
meanings are conflated and authors do not always define their use carefully. In this 
section, I will be examining some of the different interpretations of ‗intrinsic value,‘ in 
order to delineate precisely which senses are required for a workable concept that can be 
applied to environmental values. In the next part of this section, I shall show how the 
concept of intrinsic value with which we are left is available in the Buddhist worldview. 
 
1) Final or non-instrumental value 
 
In environmental philosophy, ‗intrinsic value‘ generally refers to the value that an object 
has that is independent of its value as a utility, and which is unrelated to the interests or 
preferences of human beings. Another term for value construed in this way is ‗final 
value,‘ or, the value a thing or being has for its own sake. Intrinsic value in the sense of 
‗final value,‘ is revealed when the reasons we give for considering a thing, x, as valuable 
do not refer to anything other than x itself. This account, therefore, is contrasted with 
instrumental value, which is the value x has, not for its own sake, but for the sake of some 
other object, perhaps something valued intrinsically. Instrumental values are related to 
each other and to intrinsic ones; for instance, we might value our job, not for its own 
sake, but for the money that it brings, and again, we probably value that money for the 
sake of the things or services we purchase with it, for the sake of financial security, and 
so forth. In the first part of this chapter, I argued that life in Buddhism is valued 
instrumentally, for the sake of the enjoyment it brings, or as an opportunity to attain 
enlightenment. There has to be a place, though, where the question of why we value x 
must stop, and this usually occurs with happiness, or well-being, or some other quality or 
possession for which the question ―why do you want that?‖ does not seem to have an 
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answer. It appears impossible to provide any further reason why we want to be happy, 
and therefore happiness is something that most people normally value intrinsically. 
Buddhism concurs, and expands on this; it is not just humans, claim the Pāli texts, but all 
living beings that desire their own happiness and well-being. 
 We have uncovered two implications of intrinsic value so far which need to be 
distinguished; there is, first, the value that something has for its own sake, and, second, 
the value it has independently of human interests. Clearly, these two are intimately 
related. If I value a turtle or a beach for their own sake, then I do not value them for the 
sake of the money I could make from selling the turtle‘s shell on the black market, nor do 
I value the beach merely for the well-being that I enjoy on it. Again, to value a human 
being as an end, means to value her independently of any use she could be to me. In this 
sense, then, intrinsic value is independent of human interests.  
One might add that it is also independent of the interests of all other beings. We 
can understand how natural things, like turtles, beaches, and humans have instrumental 
value—which is yet independent of human interests—by looking at the role they play in 
the food or energy web or the ecological function they fulfil. Turtles, for instance, eat 
jellyfish, and therefore, there is a sense in which it might be said that turtles ‗value‘ 
jellyfish. On the other hand, turtles might be thought of as valuable to the marine 
ecosystem, for their function in keeping jellyfish numbers down, while beaches, again, 
are valuable as habitat where turtles lay their eggs. Rolston draws attention to the 
―(nonfelt) interest in their well-being‖ of all living creatures, and as examples of this, he 
describes how trees send their roots deeper and deeper into the soil, ants scurry off with 
crumbs, while simple unicellular organisms, without a brain or spinal cord, are able to 
react to stimuli. All this shows that even where there is no mind, in the usual sense of the 
word, no consciousness, or subjectivity and no awareness of preferences or interests, in 
Rolston‘s words, ―life still has its commitments, something it values...genetically based 
preferences‖ (Rolston 1988, 109).  
It is important to note, as Jane Howarth has, that the capacity to fulfil an 
ecological function is in fact an instrumental value, and not an intrinsic one, and that 
anything else that could serve that purpose would consequently have the same value. For 
a thing x to have intrinsic value in the sense of non-instrumental value, then, x cannot be 
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replaceable (Howarth 2000, 162). This seems to be a minimum requirement if x is to be 
valued for its own sake. Since turtles could feed on something other than jellyfish, the 
latter cannot be thought of as intrinsically valuable with respect to this role. Similarly, we 
saw in the first section, that neither the heavenly realms nor human life are valued for 
their own sake, and if there were another form of life that was more pleasant, or 
conducive to attaining enlightenment, this would automatically be considered better, and 
Buddhists would aspire to be reborn there instead. This shows that there does not actually 
have to be an existent substitute for something to have instrumental value only. For 
example, although in reality turtles can only lay their eggs on beaches, in principle, 
artificial ‗beach-substitutes‘ can be conceived at least, and perhaps they could even built; 
therefore, the value we confer on beaches for the sake of turtle conservation, is not 
intrinsic.  
To say that something has intrinsic or non-instrumental value seems to suggests, 
then, that nothing else could have exactly the same value; this seems to be a second 
implication of being valued ‗for itself,‘ in addition to the suggestion that there is no 
further reason for valuing it. Intrinsic value does not derive from any utility to humans or 
other living beings and is independent, in this sense, of the interests of humans and all 
other beings. There is another sense, however, in which intrinsic value is not entirely 
independent of the interests and preferences of living beings, as we shall see below. 
 
2) Non-relational value 
 
Often intrinsic value is taken to be ‗non-relational‘ in the sense that G.E. Moore used the 
term, as the value a thing x has ―independently of its relations with anything else‖ (cited 
in James 2004, 86). Of course, this is a very wide interpretation, and the definitions given 
above, of ‗non-instrumental‘ value and of ‗final value‘ may also be non-relational in this 
sense. If I value something for its own sake, independently of its relations to my interests 
or to the interests of any other being, then I might also value it independently of any 
relations it may have at all. Although, as we shall see, this interpretation of intrinsic value 
is not compatible with Buddhist philosophy, nor does it correspond to the way 
environmental values are usually understood, it is worth probing further into what it 
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entails. From further examination, it will emerge that the sorts of values environmental 
philosophers have in mind do depend upon some relations, in particular, their relations 
with valuers, and therefore, they are, in a way, dependent upon the very general interests 
and preferences of beings. 
That this ‗non-relational‘ interpretation of intrinsic value is not the sense that 
environmentalists have in mind has been demonstrated conclusively by Karen Green, 
who shows that environmental values have everything to do with the relations between 
living beings and other natural entities. As an example, she mentions the cane toad, 
which, as a living being, one might claim, is intrinsically valuable. At least, this seems to 
be the case when the toad exists in its natural habitat, where it forms part of a healthy, 
balanced ecosystem. In Australia, however, where it is causing havoc to the native 
species and habitat, it is held to have negative value (in Green‘s words ―positive 
disvalue‖). This shows, then, that the toad‘s value is actually instrumental, since the 
toad‘s presence is not valued in itself. What is valued intrinsically by environmentalists, 
according to Green‘s account, are properties such as rarity, uniqueness, diversity, and 
stability. These, as we can see from the case of the toad, are all dependent upon a natural 
being‘s circumstances; its relations with other beings, with inorganic matter, the 
surrounding environment, and so forth. If ‗intrinsic value‘ is taken to be non-relational, 
then rarity, diversity, and all these other environmental values cannot be intrinsic values. 
Green takes this as a decisive refutation of the claim that environmental intrinsic values 
are non-relational ones (Green 1996, 35). 
Furthermore, Buddhism cannot accommodate a concept of non-relational value in 
this sense. If intrinsic value is something a thing x has, independently of x‘s relations with 
other things, then it is probably an intrinsic property of x, which belongs objectively to x, 
independently of any being who perceives or experiences x. We have already seen, in the 
previous section, how the doctrine of anātman suggests that beings and things are 
insubstantial, and precludes any determinate description of x that would account for its 
having this kind of intrinsic property. We also saw how the negative evaluation of the 
world that seems to be implied by the doctrine of duḥkha is intimately bound up with the 
subject‘s experience of that world, or even, his take on that experience. Simon James 
relates these ideas to the doctrines of emptiness (śūnyatā) and dependent co-origination 
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(pratītyasamutpāda), which we shall have opportunity to examine in detail in chapter 3. 
One of the implications of these doctrines, he claims, is that all properties are relational, 
and therefore, upon the Buddhist worldview there are no ‗things‘ with intrinsic properties 
at all. Consequently, if intrinsic value is construed this way, it is incompatible with 
Buddhist doctrine. Fortunately, James goes on, also citing Green, environmentalists do 
not think of value in this way (James 2004, 84–87). 
 
3) Objective value 
 
James agrees that the most commonly-employed sense of intrinsic value in environmental 
philosophy is that of non-instrumental or final value, the value that x has for its own sake, 
or as an end in itself (2004, 87). The properties mentioned above, like diversity or 
stability, may be valued in this way, although it is often the case that they are valued for 
some further, overarching value such as life in general, or (sadly) monetary value. Those 
natural objects and living beings whose existence contributes to diversity or stability, if 
valued solely for these reasons, will be said to have instrumental value, whereas, if we 
value them for their own sake, then they have intrinsic value. The same applies to more 
ordinary, everyday values too; money, for instance, is usually valued instrumentally, as 
noted above, and yet, to a miser, it probably has intrinsic value, and is desired just for its 
own sake. The very same thing, therefore, could be valued intrinsically, instrumentally, 
or in both ways, and this seems to indicate that whether a thing, x, ‗has‘ instrumental or 
intrinsic value rests, ultimately, with the person or being who values x, and that value 
itself is not a property that belongs, somehow, to x.  
This point often appears to be overlooked. It is often thought that if a being ‗has‘ 
intrinsic value, it must have it objectively, that is, independently of whether there is 
anybody or anything who values it or not. Several environmental philosophers have 
advanced this idea, and this probably stems from the concern to distinguish the intrinsic 
value of nature from the interests of human beings, in other words, to emphasize the 
value nature has irrespective of what human beings happen to prefer. Arne Naess, for 
example, states, as the first principle of his ‗deep ecology movement‘: ―The well-being 
and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves 
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(synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth).‖ He then adds that the presence of this 
intrinsic value in a natural object is ―independent of any awareness, interest, or 
appreciation of it by any conscious being‖ (Naess 1998, 196–7). Similarly, John O‘Neill 
believes that intrinsic value is the ―value that an object possesses independently of the 
valuations of valuers‖ (O‘ Neill 1992, 120). Value then, according to Naess, O‘Neill and 
other prominent environmental philosophers, is supposed to exist in the world whether or 
not there is anyone who perceives it, and thought to be a property or state that exists 
objectively in beings and natural objects.  
Typical arguments for the objectivity of intrinsic value draw upon the notion of 
the ‗good of‘ natural beings, that is, they rest on the claim that things in nature have their 
own ends and purposes, such as attaining a state of well-being, and that they are able to 
flourish, irrespective of whether this coincides with human interests and preferences, and 
regardless even of whether there are any human beings present who can perceive it. We 
have already seen how Naess identifies value with the well-being and flourishing of life. 
He and other holistic philosophers, including Rolston, and O‘Neill, go on to claim that 
besides individual organisms, collective entities like species and ecosystems can also be 
said to have intrinsic value in this sense, in that they too can be said to do well or to do 
badly; they can be in states that are better or worse for them, and therefore they too can 
be said to have a good or goods of their own. O‘Neill, for instance, writes:  
 
In order to characterize the conditions which are constituent of the flourishing of 
a living thing we need make no references to the experiences of human 
observers. The goods of an entity are given rather by the characteristic features of 
the kind or species of being it is (O‘Neill 1992, 129). 
 
In chapter 4, I will examine the concepts of natural kinds and biological species, as well 
as other collective wholes like ecosystems and communities, and it will be seen that they 
too can be subjected to the kind of analysis that we encountered in the doctrine of 
anātman, and seen to be insubstantial collections of impermanent phenomena, rather than 
determinate beings with ―characteristic features.‖ This would suggest, as we have seen, 
that the construal of intrinsic value as some sort of property that belongs to that entity 
objectively cannot be reconciled with Buddhist doctrine. There are other reasons, 
however, for rejecting this definition, as I will go on to show.  
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The predicates ‗valuable‘ or ‗good,‘ seem inevitably bound up with our desires, 
preferences, and interests. In his Dictionary of Philosophy, Simon Blackburn, for 
instance, says that the verdict about x that it is ‗good‘ has ―some relationship to our ends 
or desires.‖ Quoting Hobbes, he defines the good as ―whatsoever is the object of any 
man‘s desire or appetite‖ (Blackburn 1996, 160). Although environmental philosophers, 
like O‘Neill in the definition cited above, are careful to define a being‘s good or value in 
a way that does not refer to human desires or interests, and while it is true that the welfare 
of a living being is independent of these, still, this does not explain how we are to move 
from what appears to be a value-neutral proposition, namely, that some property is a 
‗characteristic‘ feature of a particular being, to the value judgment that it is ‗good.‘ There 
are no grounds on which we can establish that x is ―good for a being‖ without referring to 
a general preference for life, well-being, or flourishing, whether these are deemed to be 
human preferences or otherwise. In fact, any property or state that we normally label as 
―good,‖ ―well-being,‖ or ―flourishing,‖ could be re-described, in theory at least,  in value-
neutral terms, as in O‘Neill‘s definition of them as ―characteristic,‖ which does not 
always have implications of goodness or desirability. 
This is, of course, merely a restatement of the ―naturalistic fallacy‖ argument 
made by Moore, over a century ago, in his Principia Ethica, where he argues that 
goodness is a simple and indefinable quality. When someone is asked, ―is this good?‖ 
according to Moore, ―his state of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked, 
―Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?‖ (P.E. § 13 ¶ 3) and the same applies to the 
qualities that environmentalists promote as the good, such as, ―is this property 
characteristic of this kind of being?‖ or, ―is this being flourishing, or healthy?‖ We can 
always ask, of any natural quality or thing identified as the source of value, whether it is, 
in fact, good, and why such things, or beings with such qualities should be valued 
intrinsically (Callicott 1985, 259). It seems that, if we insist on viewing value or 
goodness as an objective property of things, then we have to admit, with Moore, that this 
property is indefinable (P.E. §§ 10–13) and that we can say no more about it. 
Alternatively, we can retain the objectivity of goodness by regarding it as a non-natural 
or supernatural property or thing, and yet, it would seem that this solution, too, inhibits 
further analysis. Callicott describes this as a ―desperately metaphysical‖ move, as a result 
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of which, he says, ―the hope of moral persuasion based on rational discussion is aborted‖ 
(Callicott 1985, 260).  
On the other hand, if we rely upon a general partiality of living beings towards 
life and well-being, we are able to give an account of value and of the good. Perhaps we 
could invoke something like that which Wilson described in his ―biophilia hypothesis‖; 
namely, that over the course of evolution, humans (and, possibly, other creatures) have 
developed an innate tendency to prefer life and lifelike processes, which compels us to 
cherish and protect living beings and to promote their welfare (Wilson 2003, 1; Kellert 
and Wilson 1993, 20–21). This tendency may be so deeply ingrained and instinctive that 
it is rarely observed or made conscious and explicit; instead, perhaps it has become a 
quasi-universal assumption that simply goes unnoticed. This may explain, then, why 
some philosophers hastily jump to conclusions about goodness, from premises about 
health, well-being, and characteristic features.  
Callicott supports his argument against objective goodness by claiming that the 
word ‗value‘ is used, primarily, as a verb and ―only derivatively‖ as a noun. Valuing is an 
intentional act, he says, which is directed towards an object. It is something that subjects 
do, just like thinking, perceiving, and desiring, and this activity or subjective process is 
what renders a thing valuable. In his words: 
 
The intentions, the targets, of a subject's valuing are valuable, just as the 
intentions of a subject's desiring are desirable. If there were no desiring 
subjects, nothing would be desirable. If there were no valuing subjects, 
nothing would be valuable (Callicott 1995, par. 26–27). 
 
―To prefer x‖ or ―to believe x to be good,‖ and the like might be interpreted in the same 
way as a description of a kind of behaviour towards that being or state x. Again, humans 
are not the only subjects capable of these kinds of intentional acts. If a simple organism 
like an amoeba, say, is able to distinguish between edible and inedible matter in order to 
sustain its life, we might say that the amoeba ‗values‘ its life and ‗prefers‘ to eat food.  
Similarly, collective natural entities, such as ecosystems and possibly even 
species, might be said to ‗value‘ their own well-being and states or properties that are 
constitutive of it; perhaps, dynamic stability, or internal diversity are among the latter. 
Complex wholes of these types also ‗act intentionally,‘ insofar as they are able to respond 
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to internal and external stimuli in such a way that they return to a particular state, despite 
the influence of those stimuli. This emerges from the fact that, if these entities were 
simply acted upon by the stimuli, and accepted their influence passively, they would 
reach another, completely different state. Clearly, a related concept is that of 
―autopoiesis,‖ coined by Maturana and Varela, which means ―self-producing,‖ and which 
distinguishes living beings from inert objects like stones (Sahtouris 1996, 329). The 
living system, unlike a stone, ‗struggles‘ to continually re-make itself, to preserve its own 
being against the force of entropy, and for this reason, then, we can say that these entities 
‗act intentionally;‘ they ‗prefer‘ to be in a particular state (such as low entropy, dynamic 
stability, or having internal diversity) and they ‗value‘ those ‗goods,‘ which will enable 
them to reach that state. Thus under this extended account of value, valuers need not be 
human, and the preferences on which value relies need not be conscious ones.  
 To sum up, claiming that something ‗has‘ value is best explained not as a property 
of that thing, and this is because for whatever property we point to as being ‗good,‘ or 
valuable, we can always question whether this is really the case. It seems that if we insist 
on seeing value or goodness as an objective property, then we must accept that it is 
ineffable. Otherwise, we could drop the requirement that value be non-relational, which 
as we have seen, is unnecessary for environmental values, and account for value instead, 
through the relationships between valuers and the things they value. Valuing, on this 
account, is a subjective process or an intentional act, which involves an attitude that is 
adopted towards some object. One values a thing intrinsically for the sake of that object 
itself, and not for the sake of any other purpose that could be fulfilled by something else. 
In its most basic form, value involves an innate tendency to cherish life, and a disposition 
to promote well-being. Instead of talking about an object‘s having value, it is, perhaps, 
more profitable to examine the way in which it is valued. In the next section, I shall show 
that this account of value appears perfectly consonant with Buddhist doctrines and 
bypasses the issues raised in earlier parts of this chapter.
37
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 Strictly speaking, the doctrine of anātman, as well as precluding talk of objective properties of things, 
does not regard valuers as substantial, or as having a determinate nature either, since both objects and 
subjects are said to be not-self. Still, as we saw in the previous section, the Buddha was highly concerned 
with experience and psychological processes. Although objects in nature as well as subjects who value are 
both not-self, it can be said that ‗there is valuing,‘ in the same way as it was said that ‗there is duḥkha‘; 
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Two Buddhist Virtues: Love and Compassion 
 
The account of value I have given here has much in common with the Buddhist practice 
of generating loving-kindness (maitrī; Pāli mettā) and compassion (karuṇā). 
Buddhaghosa, the fifth-century commentator on the Pāli canon, characterizes loving-
kindness as ―devotion to the aspect of [others‘] welfare,‖ and claims, ―It has the function 
of offering welfare‖ (Vism. ix.93; cited in Aronson 1980, 63). Similarly, compassion is 
concerned with removing the suffering of others, and ―has the function of not enduring 
others‘ suffering‖ (Vism. ix.94; Aronson 1980, 63). To love or feel compassion for a 
being, then, seems to involve an intentional act or an attitude towards that being, as 
implied by the phrases ―devotion to‖ its welfare, and ―not enduring‖ its suffering. Both 
have to do, that is, with experience and are, in principal at least, independent of any 
intrinsic properties that being might have. Following Cooper and James (2005, 97), I 
shall use ‗solicitude‘ as an ―umbrella term‖ to encompass these two virtues.38 
 Ideally, according to Buddhist doctrine, solicitude is extended universally. In 
the first section of this chapter, the Karaṇīya Mettā Sutta was cited in support of the view 
that all living beings are worthy recipients of Buddhist love, no matter what they might 
be like. The traditional rationale for this can be found in the following passage:  
   
 Searching all directions with one's awareness, one finds no one dearer than 
oneself. In the same way, others are fiercely dear to themselves. So, one 
should not hurt others if one loves oneself (Ud. 47; Thanissaro). 
  
Albert Schweitzer, one of the first environmental philosophers, put the point in a 
remarkably similar way: 
 
Just as in my own will-to-live there is yearning for more life...and terror in 
the face of annihilation and...pain, so the same obtains in all the will-to-
live around me...[Therefore,] It is good to maintain and cherish life; it is 
evil to destroy and to check life (cited in Callicott 1995, par. 48). 
                                                                                                                                                 
namely, as an event that occurs in the interface between an (impermanent and insubstantial) subject and 
object. 
38
 Cooper and James include a third virtue, empathic joy (mudita), with solicitude; however, I have chosen 
to limit the discussion to love and compassion because these involve the promotion of welfare, as will be 
seen. 
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Again, the focus is entirely on the experience of being ―dear to oneself‖ or ―yearning for 
more life,‖ and the assumption that others must feel the same way. The concluding value-
judgement and its ethical implications are held to emerge from these intuited ‗facts‘ 
alone.  
In the virtue of solicitude, therefore, it appears that there is a way to reconcile a 
belief in the ‗value of nature‘ with Buddhist doctrines. Throughout this chapter, we met 
several reasons to dismiss this project; the concern with suffering seemed to suggest that 
life and the natural world are wholly unsatisfactory and of negative value, and that 
liberation from this world is the only thing worth pursuing. Furthermore, the doctrine of 
not-self suggested that value cannot exist as an objective property, because every ‗thing‘ 
is too insubstantial to be described determinately as having objective properties. The 
virtue of solicitude, however, suggests that natural beings may be evaluated positively, 
under the Buddhist account, as long as the focus is on the way they are valued, that is, on 
the internal process or experience of loving beings and desiring their welfare. To value a 
being, in Buddhism, can be described in terms of love and compassion; these, too, are 
intentional acts which involve an attitude adopted towards some being, for the sake of 
that being itself, and not for some other purpose that could be fulfilled by something else. 
Moreover, they too involve the disposition to relate with life and lifelike processes and to 
promote and cherish health, flourishing, and well-being.  
There are, however, a number of general difficulties with this concept, as well as 
with the attempt to base an environmental philosophy upon such an understanding of 
value. In the rest of this chapter, I shall give a general account of these and indicate, 
broadly, the direction in which their solution might lie. They will be taken up again in 
chapter 3, after an account of Mahāyāna philosophy has been given. This is because the 
Mahāyāna understanding of solicitude, in particular, when understood in the light of the 
emptiness of both the valuer and the valued, has important implications for 
environmental ethics, and can provide a partial solution to some of the difficulties 
brought up here. 
To begin with some general critiques, the argument cited above, for extending 
love and compassion universally, is hardly watertight. It can be restated as: (1) I value my 
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own well-being; (2) others probably value their well-being too; (3) therefore, I ought to 
value the well-being of others. Put this way, it become evident that the inference from (1) 
to (2) is subject to all the difficulties raised by the problem of other minds, and the 
conclusion (3) raises the problem of inferring an ‗ought‘ from an ‗is.‘ It is unlikely, 
though, that either the Pāli excerpt or Schweitzer‘s argument was intended to provide an 
irrefutable argument and perhaps it is more profitable to think of this teaching as a 
recommendation that is based on a familiar experience, and not upon unassailable 
reasoning. In chapter 4, we shall encounter the same idea applied to the Mahāyāna 
understanding of compassion. 
Still, there remain the usual objections against the relativist implications of 
deriving value from the subjective process of valuing. One reason many philosophers 
appear so keen to describe intrinsic value as an objective property of things is that they 
want to avoid the conclusion that no definitive statements can be made about the good. 
O‘Neill, for instance, believes that the intrinsic value of the natural world can be 
discovered through science, through which one can also reach ―grounds for accepting the 
authoritative status of some evaluative claims‖, in particular, those made by the practicing 
ecologist (1993, 162).  
In reply, one might point out that, as we have seen, the alternative to a subjectivist 
understanding of value is a (putative) property about which we can never say anything, 
except that it is objectively real. This means that, in practice, whether we accept a 
subjectivist or an objectivist account, we are left with the same result; there can be no 
incontrovertible definition of good, and no way of making any authoritative statements 
about value. When this is taken into consideration, accepting the relativistic implications 
of our subjectivist account of value, while tying it to a universal disposition to favour life 
and health, appears more satisfying than insisting on regarding value as something 
objectively real, despite admitting that it cannot be known or discussed with certainty.  
A third objection that might be raised concerns the fact that it is not living beings 
as such, that are valued on this account, but only a particular state of well-being, or 
flourishing. Somebody who held a Kantian view of intrinsic value, for instance, would 
tend to think value belonged to a (human) being per se, and not to her health or 
happiness. Prima facie, one might reply that a person or organism‘s well-being almost 
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certainly includes the existence of that person or being. David Cooper has mentioned one 
type of situation where it does not, and this involves the case where a being is deemed 
better off dead. Arguments for euthanasia, in fact, generally rely on the belief that it is in 
the interest of a person‘s well-being that he should no longer exist (Cooper, personal 
communication). Yet, when we make these types of claims, we do not mean, literally, 
that that person is better off once he is dead, for that would be an absurdity. If a being 
does not exist, then it is neither better nor worse off than it was before. This shows that in 
order for me to want you to be well, I cannot want your nonexistence; well-being seems 
to logically entail existence. That is, there might not be much difference, after all, 
between valuing the happiness of a creature and valuing that creature.  
Still, our objector might add, if only certain states are valuable, and not beings-in-
themselves, we might be led to the unpalatable consequence that what is done to 
individuals is unimportant, as long as the total amount of happiness in the world 
increases. In other words, it might be thought that sacrificing one individual for the 
greater good of the many is perfectly acceptable under this account. This argument has 
often been brought against utilitarianism and, insofar as Buddhism too is concerned with 
increasing happiness, it would seem to apply here too. Buddhism, however, contains the 
resources to circumvent this claim. There are numerous places in the texts where love and 
compassion and characterized as the wish that all beings be happy and free of suffering, 
for instance: 
 
May all creatures, 
all breathing things, 
all beings 
— each & every one — 
meet with good fortune. 
May none of them come to any evil (A ii 72; Thanissaro; italics mine). 
 
Clearly then, harming even a single being could never be acceptable in Buddhism, even 
if, as a result, the general happiness in the world increased.  
 Yet, from the perspective of environmental philosophy, there is still a problem 
with valuing, not a being itself, but its happiness. As we shall see below, Buddhists and 
environmentalists have different ideas about what happiness entails, and therefore, the 
question arises whether the two are compatible. In the first section of this chapter, it was 
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argued that because rebirth as a god or as a human was valued, primarily, for the sake of 
attaining nirvana, or for the sake of the pleasure one enjoyed, then gods and human 
beings are not valued intrinsically, but only instrumentally. Similarly, this account 
suggests that if it is well-being that is desired, then ultimately, living beings, and 
especially those currently in the ‗lower realms,‘ are not valued intrinsically after all. 
 A green Buddhist could get around this problem by ‗bracketing‘ the theory of 
rebirth (which many contemporary Buddhists seem happy to do anyway) or else by 
defining value so that it involves a desire for a creature‘s well-being in this very life, and 
not a wish for it to attain an enlightened state in the future. In any case, it appears that to 
extend love and compassion for a being, in this limited sense, is the closest idea that we 
can find in the Buddhist texts to the notion of intrinsic value as used by environmental 
philosophers. I will now turn to some objections that can be raised against it. 
 
Difficulties with Basing Environmental Ethics upon Solicitude 
 
1) The charge of quietism 
One argument that has often been brought against the feasibility of a green Buddhism 
based upon solicitude, is that while the texts are replete with passages on how to develop 
loving-kindness and compassion, they tend to suggest, generally, that what is important is 
merely the wish that all beings have happiness, and they seem to stop short of 
recommending any form of action in this respect. We are encouraged, in the Karaṇīya 
Mettā Sutta, for instance, to think ―may all beings be happy,‖ to ―cultivate a limitless 
heart,‖ and develop ―good will for the entire cosmos‖ (Sn 143–152; Thanissaro). While 
all this is perfectly commendable, a sceptic might wonder whether Buddhist solicitude is 
actually of any benefit to its recipients. This is a charge that has often been brought 
against Buddhism, and which has several strands. In its most general form, it amounts to 
the claim that the Buddhist has ―withdrawn from the world into a life of passive navel-
gazing‖ (James 2004, 121). Simon James provides a comprehensive discussion of this 
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‗charge of quietism,‘ in particular, as it applies to Zen Buddhism, and I shall have little to 
add to his and David Cooper‘s reply.39 
James points out that the Chinese and Japanese traditions of Buddhism took up a 
more down-to-earth conception of spirituality, which did not shy away from manual work 
and productive labour. Consequently, he says, Zen Buddhism can adopt a spiritual 
approach towards any form of activity, including practical manifestations of love and 
compassion (James 2004, 120–123). Cooper and James refer to the Sigalovada Sūtra for 
examples of practical activity that the Buddha recommends. Aside from the usual 
recommendation to have benevolent thoughts, this text, they claim, contains several 
―positive calls‖ upon lay practitioners to work altruistically for the improvement of one 
another‘s lives (Cooper and James 2005, 54, 104–105). To this one might add that the 
Pāli texts describe other virtues (pāramitā), besides love and compassion, some of which, 
like generosity (dāna), might be construed as the active expression of solicitude. Finally, 
there are a number of stories that reveal the practical benefits of Buddhist virtue. In 
particular, we read about a king who cultivated loving-kindness in the forest for twelve 
years and later returned to his kingdom, to continue his practice and pass it on to his 
subjects. 
  
From that point on, love and kindness spread through every home and 
village, giving rise to a sense of friendship, fellowship, and cooperation 
that spread throughout the kingdom. There were no more wars with 
neighbouring kingdoms, and the people lived in happiness and peace 
(Dhammadharo 1958). 
 
These examples show that, to some extent at least, cultivating loving-kindness and 
compassion does have an effect upon their targets. 
Besides, as Harvey B. Aronson has argued, the early Buddhists, unlike we 
moderns, may not have automatically associated the cultivation of goodwill with positive 
action to promote welfare, and the Buddha might not have felt required to relate his 
teachings on love and compassion to those on altruistic activity. This is why, Aronson 
suggests, the two were generally discussed in separate contexts (Aronson 1980, 55, 64) 
and it might also explain why Buddhism has been charged with quietism, and why 
                                                 
39
 See James 2004, 106–126, Cooper and James 2005, 11, 53–56, 104–105. 
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contemporary readers do not always immediately see the practical benefits of developing 
love and compassion. Yet, when love and compassion are considered in the wider context 
of the Buddhist teachings as a whole, these doubts seem to disappear. 
 
2) The charge of egoism  
 
There is, however, a related though more serious charge than the previous, and this is 
that, notwithstanding the positive effects on recipients that developing solicitude may 
have, it remains, primarily, a somewhat selfish undertaking, in that it is motivated by a 
desire to attain liberation, and any benefits to others are merely incidental. Harris points 
out that, in the Anguttara Nikāya and Buddhaghosa‘s commentary on it, it is explicitly 
stated that all the benefits of generating loving-kindness accrue to the practitioner himself 
(Harris 1991, 106). We read that one who develops loving-kindness:    
 
sleeps in comfort, awakes in comfort, sees no evil dreams, is dear to 
human beings, is dear to non-human beings, gods protect him, fire, poison, 
and sword cannot touch him, his mind can concentrate quickly, his 
countenance is serene, he dies without being confused in mind and finally 
if he fails to attain arahantship here and now, he will be reborn in the 
brahma-world (A v 342; Thanissaro). 
 
Schmithausen observes that the Buddhist virtue of loving-kindness, like the early 
Brahmanic concept of ahiṃsā, is motivated by the desire for self-protection, and serves 
the purpose of calming aggressive behaviour in others. Rather than a simple feeling of 
good will, he says, loving-kindness is intended as a way of forging alliances. Still, he 
says, arguing against Harris‘s claim, this does not imply that the genuinely ethical aspects 
of loving-kindness are annulled. Although it has several functions—including self-
protection, liberation or reward in heaven, and purification of the mind—all of these are, 
he says, ―simply another thread of the texture, another strategy for stimulating people to 
practise this kind of exercise.‖ That the benefits for the meditator might form part of her 
motivation ―does not mean that [such practices] have no impact upon the meditator‘s 
practical behaviour‖ (Schmithausen 1997, 15–17).  
Cooper and James remain concerned, however, that it might be thought that 
―deep-down,‖ Buddhism is egoistic, and this is because ―the importance for anyone of 
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cultivating moral principles, virtues and attitudes—genuinely moral though they may 
be—is contingent upon, and hence subordinated to, an essentially self-directed enterprise 
of enlightenment or liberation‖ (Cooper and James 2005, 53). In response, they argue 
against the tendency to dichotomize between self- and other-regarding acts, and between 
inner cultivation and external behaviour. The doctrine of the Five Aggregates suggests 
that body and mind are ―intimately connected,‖ and that it is a mistake, therefore, to 
bifurcate between physical acts and inner states, or to suppose either can be developed to 
the exclusion of the other. It is also a mistake, they go on, to separate concern for one‘s 
own well-being from that of others; rather, these are ―not even notionally isolable,‖ and 
promoting the good of others forms part of the pursuit of one‘s own happiness (Cooper 
and James 2005, 54–55). Well-being in the Buddhist sense, it emerges, is not something 
that one can achieve alone; the summum bonum is defined as the bonum commune, ―the 
good that can be possessed only by being shared‖ (Miller and Yoon 2000, 160). This, 
therefore, seems to refute the claim that cultivating loving-kindness is somehow egoistic. 
 
3) Buddhist versus environmentalist notions of ‘well-being’ 
 
From the preceding discussion, it emerges that Buddhists and environmentalists have 
completely different conceptions of well-being. As we have seen, for environmentalists, 
it is a natural and characteristic state of an organism or being,
 40
 comparable to what is 
ordinarily meant by happiness, health, and flourishing. In this everyday sense, one 
creature‘s welfare is not only conceptually isolable from that of another, but indeed, often 
at odds with that of some others. In the second section of this chapter, we encountered the 
suffering that results from the fact that a being must harm others to survive; it must kill to 
eat, compete for habitat, and so forth. Among humans, even a strict vegan depends on 
farming methods that necessarily harm living beings, and the most vigilant of Jainas—
who wear masks to avoid breathing in microscopic creatures, and sweep the ground 
before them as they walk along, in order to avoid stepping on insects—must deprive 
another creature of food, water, or land just to stay alive. Yet, it was suggested above that 
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 Of course, all talk of organisms and creatures, here and throughout the dissertation, only refers to such 
beings conventionally.  
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the Buddhist conception of one‘s own good is not inimical to that of others, but rather, 
that it even entails the good of all others. This demonstrates, therefore, that when 
Buddhists talk about promoting well-being they must have in mind something quite 
different from, say, food, health, shelter, and the like. The question, then, is whether the 
Buddhist concept of ‗well-being‘ can also include that which environmentalists seek to 
promote, or whether they are two completely different things.  
The sūtras reveal, in fact, that what the Buddha means by ‗real happiness‘ is 
greatly removed from the concerns of environmentalists. For example, one element that is 
certainly constitutive of well-being in this sense, and which environmentalists often 
equate with the good of a being, is physical health. Yet, the Magandiya Sutta (M i 501–
513) explains that ordinary health, in the sense of ―freedom from disease,‖ is a very poor 
substitute for ―true freedom,‖ and that all physical sensations of pleasure are comparable 
to the kind of satisfaction that one obtains through scratching an itch (509–510; 507). The 
body, the Buddha says, is ―a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction‖ and 
therefore the ―foremost good fortune‖ is freedom from clinging to it (510; Thanissaro).  
The ―right outlook‖ concerning these matters is to view ordinary happiness as 
painful, painful feelings as a thorn, and neutral feelings as impermanent (S iv 207; 
Nynanponika). Indeed, in some places the Buddha appears to hold precisely the reverse 
view from the rest of the world about what constitutes happiness. He regards as ―stress‖ 
that which everybody else—the devas, contemplatives and priests, royalty, and common 
folk—considers to be ―bliss,‖ whereas he considers as bliss that which to everybody else 
is stress (Sn 758; Thanissaro). Again, in the Niramisa Sutta, a distinction is made 
between worldly happiness, unworldly happiness, and ―the still greater unworldly 
happiness;‖ the unworldly kind involves different degrees of meditative absorption. It is 
made clear that the ‗highest‘ of these and the proper goal for a Buddhist practitioner is 
―unworldly equanimity,‖ described in terms of freedom from all greed, hatred, and 
delusion (S iv 235; Nyanaponika). Therefore, the kind of well-being that 
environmentalists want to promote seems to be ranked very low in Buddhism.  
In the second section of this chapter, it was argued that liberation has both a ―this-
worldly‖ aspect, and an ―other-worldly‖ one, and that each is emphasized, respectively, 
by the Mahāyāna and the Theravāda vehicles. Therefore, the strong claim that the 
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Buddhist goal is entirely incompatible with ‗well-being‘ in an everyday sense, only 
applies to the Theravāda school, if at all; the Mahāyāna does not support a concept of 
liberation that is entirely opposed to ordinary existence. There does remain the problem, 
however, that insofar as the Buddhist goal could be compatible with a reduction in 
physical comfort, with loss of health, or property, and even with the loss of life, the type 
of well-being the Buddha promoted is very different from that desired by 
environmentalists. 
 
4) The predation critique 
 
Perhaps green Buddhism would have better success if the focus were placed on 
compassion, instead of loving-kindness, and on the desire to alleviate suffering. 
Although, as we saw in the previous section, duḥkha too is not simply equated with 
ordinary suffering, it seems undeniable that it involves an element of this too, as it 
includes the suffering of sickness, old-age, and death. Therefore, even if Buddhists and 
environmentalists do not mean the same thing by ―well-being,‖ perhaps common ground 
can be found in their aim to reduce suffering. 
Green Buddhism is not the only system of ethics that addresses environmental 
problems through this kind of principle, and it would appear to be subject to the same 
criticisms that animal welfarism is. Briefly, ‗animal welfarism‘ can be characterized as 
the claim that ―morality places some limits on how animals may be treated. [For 
instance,] [w]e are not to kick dogs, set fire to cats‘ tails, torment hamsters or parakeets‖ 
(Regan 1993, 41). During the 1980‘s and 90‘s, a controversy arose between certain 
‗holistic‘ environmental philosophers, including Callicott, Mark Sagoff, and Ned 
Hettinger, and animal welfarists like Singer and Tom Regan.
41
 Critics of animal 
welfarism claim that concern about the suffering of certain sentient animals alone cannot 
help with the project of formulating an environmental ethic. There are two sides to the 
objection: the stronger critique is that animal welfarism is anti-ecological and the weaker 
claim is that it cannot provide sound environmental policies. 
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 For example, see Callicott 1980, Hettinger 1994, Sagoff 1984, Singer 1975, and Regan 1993. In his later 
work, Callicott takes a more moderate position that animal welfarism can be reconciled with 
environmentalism. 
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 The stronger claim can be understood by considering the problem of predation. 
This is the suggestion that if morality amounts to reducing suffering, then we ought to 
reduce even that suffering that occurs in nature, and that is a consequence of the need of 
some animals to hunt and prey upon others. With respect to the Buddhist virtue of 
compassion, this might be thought to entail, likewise, a desire to put an end to certain 
ecological processes that appear cruel. Yet, the objection goes on, these are an essential 
aspect of nature, and to repudiate them shows a limited understanding of ecology and is 
not at all what one means by ‗respect for nature.‘  In Callicott‘s words, ―the doctrine that 
life is happier the freer it is of pain, and that the happiest life conceivable is one which is 
uninterrupted by pain, is biologically preposterous‖ (1989, 32). 
Many philosophers who subscribe to animal welfarism have replied effectively to 
these charges, and in Callicott‘s later work, he admits that the divide between the two 
camps is not that great after all. He is prepared to accept, as part of an environmental 
ethic, attempts to reduce the suffering of domestic animals; however, he draws a line 
between these and wild nature, claiming that our duties to both differ widely. Our duties 
to wild animals, he says, are not to prevent their suffering, but, on the contrary, to 
preserve natural processes, and among these, eating and being eaten are fundamental 
(Callicott 1989, 56-57). That is, if we attempted to reduce suffering by forcing carnivores 
to adopt a vegetarian diet, from the perspective of an environmental ethic, this would be 
completely misguided. 
Jennifer Everett denies that animal welfarism has these implications, yet the 
reasons she provides cannot be applied to the Buddhist stance. She claims, for instance, 
that predation has extensive benefits, primarily, that the ecosystem and most of the living 
beings within it flourish. These advantages, she claims, outweigh the suffering predation 
causes, and therefore, predation is morally acceptable (Everett 2001, 47–48). However, as 
we have seen, Buddhists do not have the same idea of well-being as animal welfarists or 
environmental philosophers do, to them happiness is another thing altogether from 
existence in nature. Predation, that is, does not contribute to the Buddhist‘s idea of 
ultimate happiness, and therefore, it would appear he cannot make this move.  
Similarly, the attempt to discriminate between wild and domestic animals is not 
appropriate in Buddhism. Everett, like Callicott, claims that we ought to prevent the 
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suffering of beings, only insofar as this is appropriate to their nature, in other words, we 
ought to respect beings for what they are (Everett 2001, 54) To hunt or to be eaten 
constitutes part of what it is to be a wild animal; therefore, humans ought not to intervene 
in this case. Domestic animals, on the other hand, deserve our compassion and protection 
because it is part of their nature to live close to humans and to be highly dependent on us. 
Yet, as we have seen, the value Buddhism confers on beings has nothing to do with their 
nature or properties. Rather, all living beings are included in the moral circle, and are 
proper targets of loving-kindness and compassion, irrespective of their properties. At any 
rate, it seems arbitrary for a Buddhist feel compassion for a chicken, say, that was caught 
by a fox, yet not to worry about a deer, simply because they have different natures.
42
  
 
5) The charge of vacuousness 
 
This brings us to the second problem with attempting to base an environmentalist ethic on 
the desire to prevent or alleviate the suffering of living beings. The weaker argument that 
can be brought against green Buddhism based on compassion is that it cannot help us to 
decide upon a course of action in the case of competing interests (Keown 2007, 10). 
According to Nanamoli Thera, the ideal of loving-kindness is reached when there are no 
longer any ―barriers‖ set between beings, that is, if one were faced with a compulsory 
choice, one could not choose to harm any one being, even though this would save another 
(Nanamoli 1987). This is the virtue of equanimity (upekṣā; Pāli upekkha), which, 
together with loving-kindness, compassion, and empathic joy (mudita), make up the Four 
Sublime Attitudes (brahma-vihāra). Buddhist solicitude, as noted above, is supposed to 
be extended to all living beings,
43
 whether they are wild or domestic, rare or common, 
native or exotic. Yet, an environmental ethic, it is often claimed, is supposed to offer 
guidance on precisely these kind of matters; that is, it is meant to help us determine what 
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 Strangely, Harris interprets Buddhism as implying the very opposite; he says that ―early Buddhism seems 
to endorse the notion of survival of the fittest...where the weak are at the mercy of the strong,‖ and that it 
also accepts ―the additional burden meted out to them by humans‖ (Harris 2000, 121). However, he reaches 
this conclusion in a similar way to Waldau, who assumed that the description of animal suffering in the Pāli 
canon implies its acceptance. I have argued against this claim in the first part of this chapter. 
43
 Or, at the very least, it is extended to all sentient beings. 
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to do in cases where, for example, we must decide whether to cull an invasive species in 
order to protect an indigenous one (Schmithausen 1991, 35).  
Barbra Clayton has also pointed out that extending solicitude to all living beings 
leaves us unable to decide on difficult cases, where some degree of suffering is 
unavoidable; for instance, ought we to stop testing medicines on animals, for the sake of 
those animals, or persist with it for the sake of those suffering with disease (Clayton 
1999, 30)? Other examples of such ―hard cases‖ include building a bypass, and curbing 
carbon dioxide emissions in poor countries, both of which involve inflicting a degree of 
discomfort on some, in order to benefit others (James 2004, 59, 106). Some 
environmentalists, writing about the Christian notion of agape (which for our purposes 
can be compared to maitrī44) have drawn attention to this problem too. We read that ―love 
turns our attention to the necessity of tragic choices‖ but we are not told how these 
choices are to be made (Miller and Yoon 2000, 166).  
In reply, it can be said that to see environmental ethics as exclusively concerned 
with such policy-oriented questions is to take an unnecessarily limited view. As Callicott 
has argued, the question of how to articulate the ―philosophical grounding‖ of such 
policies is far more pressing (1987, 116; citing Hill). Similarly, Cooper and James 
suggest that this criticism applies to many other systems of ethics, besides Buddhism, and 
that there is no reason to suppose that an environmental ethic must provide us with a 
―decision procedure‖ to be applied to such issues (2005, 30, 144). Whether or not such 
replies are satisfactory will depend, of course, upon our expectations of green Buddhism.  
 
6) Non-living and non-sentient beings 
 
A final objection to consider is the claim that environmental ethics does not involve 
solely the attempt to promote well-being for certain vertebrates; there are non-sentient 
individual beings too, both living and non-living, which are of moral importance, and 
environmentalists also want to protect certain collective entities, like ecosystems, and 
communities, as well as abstract ones, such as, endangered species. Callicott argues, 
                                                 
44
 Maitrī and agape are similar in that both are extended universally, and both confer value on their object, 
rather than discovering it there, that is, both are independent of the properties of characteristics of the being 
that is loved (Bratton 1992, 15–16). 
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against animal welfarism, that its insistence upon sentience as the only characteristic 
relevant for moral considerability is as limited as the traditional argument that deems 
rationality to be the good. Environmental ethics, he says, is concerned for the 
disappearance of species of plants, as well as animals, and for soil erosion, stream 
pollution and the like (1989, 17–19). 
The most serious problem seems to be that of accounting for our concern for 
species as such, for it is hard to see how an abstract entity (James 2006, 88) can be 
thought of as doing well or doing worse, nor is it evident that one could have compassion 
for the tiger, as well as actual, living tigers. Schmithausen provides one example in the 
Pāli canon where loving kindness is extended to ―families of creatures,‖ such as those 
having two, or four legs, claiming that this might entail an appreciation of species as such 
(1997, 19). However, he concludes that ultimately, ―the value at stake…is the life and 
happiness of the individual, not the transindividual continuity of the species‖ (1997, 20). 
In chapter 4, I shall argue that Buddhism regards all species as empty and that the 
attempt to protect their continued existence per se cannot be reconciled with Buddhist 
doctrines. Cooper and James seem to endorse a similar view. Citing Harvey, James 
claims that Buddhism cannot support saving the whale, but it does support saving whales 
(James 2006, 91) and in another work, he and Cooper attempt to justify an indirect 
concern for species based on the principle of non-violence, claiming that ―saving a 
species is a natural corollary of saving individuals‖ (2005, 142). Be that as it may, the 
real problem emerges, as James points out, when conservationists promote the killing of 
members of one species in order to save members of another. For instance, in an attempt 
to save the red squirrel, the British public was advised to destroy grey ones, and one 
method recommended involved stamping upon their young. As argued above, Buddhism 
could certainly not condone this approach, and much less the obvious delight that many 
people took in accomplishing this task (see James 2009, 93–94). The First Precept, the 
doctrine of ahiṃsā, and the virtues of loving-kindness and compassion are meant to be 
extended universally, and one is not supposed to even wish harm on any being, even for a 
moment. Just as we saw with the distinction between wild and domestic animals, 
Buddhism cannot discriminate between beings on the basis of any characteristics or their 
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different ‗natures.‘ In short, wherever there are competing interests, Buddhists cannot 
automatically favour one species, simply because, say, it is endangered. 
 Holder takes a similar indirect approach with respect to ecosystems, arguing that 
the prevention of suffering of individuals will bring about care for the ecosystems in 
which these beings flourish (2007, 22). One might suppose, prima facie, that it will also 
take care of the community. However, James argues, against this approach, that the 
flourishing of an ecosystem or community need not necessarily entail less suffering for 
its members (2006, 90). In any case, there might be another, more direct way to regard 
such collective entities as objects of Buddhist solicitude. Above it was suggested that 
eco-systems are also capable of ‗valuing‘ their own well-being, to the extent that they 
display autopoietic ‗behaviour.‘ Perhaps, then, we could describe a strip-mined 
mountainside, for instance, or a polluted river, metaphorically, as ―suffering.‖ If such 
systems can really act against external influences to maintain a degree of stability, or 
internal diversity, then we might be able to interpret compassion and loving-kindness 
towards these beings in terms of protecting such states. Further on, though, we will see 
that this conception of ecosystems is both out-dated and contradicted by the Buddhist 
world-view.  
With respect to non-sentient living individuals, if we accept Rolston‘s account of 
their ―non-felt interest in their well-being,‖ then we can, at least, widen the class of 
proper objects of Buddhist solicitude to include these beings. Furthermore, one could 
point out that, originally, Buddhism held a remarkably wide notion of ‗living beings‘ and 
that the term was not understood to restrict the class of morally considerable objects in 
the way that Callicott understands it to. As mentioned before, living beings, for the early 
Buddhists, included the four elements, rivers, soils, plants, and seeds (Schmithausen 
1991, 5).  
With the rise of the Mahāyāna vehicle, and especially in China and Japan, the 
question of whether apparently inanimate beings could be considered sentient became an 
important issue in Buddhist philosophy. Part of the reason for this, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, is that Mahāyāna Buddhism tends to collapse all distinctions and dualities, 
regarding them as empty. This can have important implications for green Buddhism and 
for all the objections against it that have been raised here, and therefore, the predation 
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critique, the charge of vacuousness, and the problem of non-sentient and non-living 
beings will be taken up again after I have given an account of Mahāyāna philosophy, to 
which the next chapter will turn.  
 
Summary 
 
In this section, I have concluded the discussion on whether Buddhism can accommodate 
an idea of nature as valuable. I began with an overview of what is generally meant by 
‗intrinsic value‘ and attempted to circumscribe the sense in which it is held to be required 
for an environmental ethic. I then argued that this concept is available in Buddhist 
doctrine, and that it corresponds, in an interesting way, to the virtues of love and 
compassion. 
 We saw that the main significance of ‗intrinsic value,‘ as used by 
environmentalists, is that something is valued for its own sake, and, in this sense, it is 
independent of any being‘s interests or other purposes. Yet, the concern to define value 
independently from human interests has led many philosophers to describe it is as an 
objective and non-relational property of the valuable object. We saw that when intrinsic 
value is defined this way, it rules out most of the things that environmentalists want to 
protect. Moreover, Buddhism cannot accommodate this notion of value. From our 
discussion, it emerged that the same thing can be held dear either for its own sake, or else 
for the sake of something else, and this suggested that, rather than being an objective 
property of the valuable thing, value is dependent upon a relation between a valuing 
subject and the valued object.  
Environmentalists are not often willing to take up this approach and typical 
arguments for value as objective rest on the idea that living beings have a ‗good of their 
own,‘ which is characteristic state they would normally reach, and which is independent 
from any human who values it. I argued against this, suggesting that the move from 
describing a quality or state of a being as ‗characteristic‘ to saying that it is ‗good‘ 
involves a naturalistic fallacy. It seems there is no way of determining the good without 
invoking our general preference for life and well-being. Otherwise, if we insist on 
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viewing the good as objective, we must either admit that it is indefinable, or that it is a 
non-natural and ineffable quality.  
 The concept of intrinsic value I have used in this section, in short, is that of an 
experience, which involves an attitude adopted towards some being, for the sake of that 
being itself, and not for any other purpose that could be fulfilled by something else. It 
involves a disposition to relate with life, to prefer lifelike processes, and a tendency to 
promote well-being. We saw that the focus was not on value as a property or thing, and 
not on which things have value, but on how such things are valued. Besides, it is not only 
humans who do the valuing under this account; other organisms and autopoietic 
collective wholes can be said to ‗value‘ to the extent that they respond to stimuli actively 
and tend towards certain states instead of others. 
 Turning to Buddhism, it emerged that the virtues of love and compassion have 
much in common with this idea of valuing. They too involve an experience of, or attitude 
towards, a being, and the desire and tendency to promote its welfare. Moreover, in 
Buddhism, love and compassion are meant to be extended universally, independently of 
any properties of their object. It was suggested that there is no conclusive argument for 
why one ought to extend solicitude to all living beings, and that it was simply based, 
instead, on the familiar experience of desiring one‘s own happiness, and the supposition 
that others want to be happy too. However, it emerged that there are several difficulties 
with this concept of value. 
One problem is that Buddhists and environmentalists mean very different things 
by ‗well-being.‘ Although this objection is not as strong as the ‗world-negating‘ critique 
that was raised earlier, it too arises from the fact that Buddhism values nirvana above 
everything else, and, therefore, a Buddhist environmentalism that was based on a desire 
to promote ordinary, worldly happiness would seem to fall short of the motivation 
recommended by the Buddha. I suggested that we could refine the concept of ‗valuing,‘ 
so that it involved a desire for the well-being of a creature in this very life. That way, we 
avoid ascribing mere instrumental value to a being‘s life while valuing only nirvana 
intrinsically. Clearly, though, this problem has not been resolved satisfactorily, and we 
will need to delve much more deeply into what is meant by nirvana. 
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 We saw that the different ideas about happiness and well-being also impinge 
upon another objection, the predation critique. Unlike animal welfarists, Buddhists 
cannot defend their position by claiming that predation contributes to the overall welfare 
of the members of a community, since they have another understanding of what welfare 
involves. This means that the doctrine of love and compassion logically entails that 
Buddhists ought to be concerned about the suffering that occurs in wild nature, and that is 
a natural result of predation. Critics of animal welfarism suggest that this consequence is 
completely unecological. 
Another problem with the doctrine of extending love and compassion universally 
is that it generally does not allow us to make the kind of decisions that environmentalists 
need to make. Buddhism cannot discriminate between beings on the grounds of their 
natures or properties, and therefore, it seems unlikely that it could condone killing 
members of invasive species, say, for the sake of an endangered one. I argued that on the 
account of value I have provided, even entities that are not normally considered living or 
sentient can be said to have interests and to desire their welfare, and pointed out that in its 
origins, Buddhism had a much wider concept of life than we have today. Perhaps, we 
could appeal to this understanding in our efforts to motivate an appropriate attitude 
towards nature. 
  
C h ap t e r  2 :  Mah ā yā n a  B udd h i s m a n d  E mp t i n e s s   
 
Throughout chapter 1, we encountered a persistent setback for green Buddhism, namely, 
that only nirvana seems to be intrinsically valued on the Buddhist worldview. It is true 
that, to the extent that living beings are loved and shown compassion, one could say that 
they are valued in this way. Yet, even so, it is not clear that tigers, for instance, are valued 
for what they are, or that their welfare is desired for its own sake, and conservation of the 
tiger species cannot be regarded as a final aim. The ultimate and only legitimate goal in 
Buddhism, it seems, and the only type of well-being worth seeking, has to include 
liberation from saṃsāra. Until we have a clearer picture of what this involves, and until 
we can say with certainty that it is not antithetical to ordinary existence, it seems that the 
issue of the environment can only be regarded as peripheral to Buddhism, at best (Habito 
2007, 133).  
This chapter will address the question of what liberation entails from the 
perspective of the Mahāyāna vehicle. I suggested, earlier, that the later schools of 
Buddhism are more prepared to accept the ‗this-worldly‘ aspects of enlightenment; in 
fact, one could even claim that they positively reject the ‗other-worldly‘ interpretation of 
nirvana. Indeed, Mahāyāna Buddhism ―cuts through‖ all dualistic concepts—including 
saṃsāra and nirvana, suffering and happiness, mundane and otherworldly—through its 
doctrine of universal emptiness. It has been suggested that this ―can pave the way for a 
positive evaluation of earthly realities...and an appreciation of this earthly realm‖ (Habito 
2007, 134–135). 
The next task, therefore, will be to examine the main teachings of the Mahāyāna, 
which I will approach via an exposition of its two major philosophical schools, the 
Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra. One of my main purposes will be to show that, although 
there is a degree of innovation, the ideas expressed by Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and 
Vasubandhu can be seen as the logical outgrowth of the Buddha‘s original teachings. 
Furthermore, my account will also emphasize the continuity between these two schools, 
instead of their divergences, which is often the focus of scholarly exegeses.  
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In the first part of this chapter, I will have little to say about environmental 
matters; I will return to that topic after my account of Mahāyāna philosophy. Before I 
begin the main argument, though, it will perhaps be helpful to say a few general words 
about Mahāyāna Buddhism. 
 
Mahāyāna from Sutric Sources 
 
The Mahāyāna is most accurately contrasted with the so-called ‗Hīnayāna‘ in terms of a 
difference in motivation; that is, instead of having her personal liberation as an ultimate 
goal, the Mahāyāna practitioner‘s main concern is to reduce or eliminate the suffering of 
sentient beings.
45
 Here, one must be careful about making disparaging insinuations; to 
suggest that non-Mahāyāna Buddhists are solely driven by a self-interested desire for 
nirvana is a serious distortion of these traditions. In the previous chapter, compassion 
was spoken of, along with loving-kindness and the other Sublime Attitudes, as one of the 
main virtues taught by the Buddha, and therefore, the desire for others‘ well-being was an 
important part of Buddhism right from the very start. Yet, sometime during the second 
century C.E., new sūtras began to appear whose protagonists were portrayed as having 
postponed their own enlightenment until every single living being is liberated too, giving 
rise to a major Mahāyāna innovation, the ideal of the bodhisattva (e.g. SV 28). Perhaps 
this was a response to a similar worry to that raised in chapter 1; namely, that the practice 
of loving-kindness and compassion could not be genuinely altruistic if undertaken for the 
sake of one‘s own spiritual progression.  
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 I use the term ‗Hīnayāna‘ here, because I only want to make a conceptual distinction, and do not intend 
to make any comparisons between actual schools or practitioners of Buddhism. I am merely defining the 
Mahāyāna (as most Mahayanists do) as Buddhism motivated, primarily, out of concern for other sentient 
beings. Much has been written against distinguishing the Mahāyāna in this way, and there have been many 
attempts to show that compassion is as central in early Buddhism as it is in later forms (e.g. Aronson 1980, 
Ch. 1, 2; Cooper and James 2005, 59–60). I accept that this was true of Gautama Buddha, and indeed of 
many other Buddhists, past and present, who accept the Nikāyas alone. The way I use ‗Mahāyāna,‘ 
therefore, has much in common with Paul Williams‘s construal when he writes that it is not to be thought 
of as a school, or sect, but as a vocation, distinguished from alternative spiritual movements or tendencies 
(Williams 2009, 3). It is also consistent with the recent idea that there is no clear dividing line between 
Mahāyāna and other schools of Buddhism, but that rather, these tend to blend into each other, both 
historically, and doctrinally (e.g. see Cohen 1995). ‗Mahāyāna‘ therefore, when used in this sense, does not 
refer to any school, doctrine, or historical person, but only to a greater motivation.  
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A background assumption, against which this new motivation is set, is that it must 
be possible for all beings to attain nirvana eventually. In fact, the Lotus Sūtra downplays 
the distinction between different forms of Buddhism, extolling, instead, a concept of 
‗One Vehicle‘ (eka-yāna) through which the Buddha leads all beings to the ―full 
ripeness‖ of enlightenment (SP 2: 52–54, 72; Kern 2007, 37–40). Nevertheless, despite 
its being available to all, nirvana is depicted, at times, as even more remote than was 
suggested in the Pāli canon. Universal enlightenment is not a goal that is realistically 
expected to be fulfilled at some time in the future; for instance, in one vivid passage, the 
bodhisattva Mañjuśrī explains that if countless Buddhas dwelt for countless kalpas, 
constantly ferrying living beings to nirvana, still, the number of beings to be liberated 
would not decrease (MRK 46; Chang 2002, 101).  
The reason for this, of course, has to do with the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā), 
the second major innovation associated with the Mahāyāna. Although the Buddha did 
speak about emptiness, as we have seen, this teaching was not given a very prominent 
place in the Pāli canon, whereas with the Mahāyāna, emptiness and compassion together 
take centre stage. Emptiness may be understood as the logical extension of the doctrine of 
not-self (Chang 1991, 75). Kalupahana suggests that it was introduced to address a 
development that was perceived to be an erroneous metaphysical view that had arisen 
within Buddhist scholasticism. He reads Nāgārjuna, in fact, as a response to the 
Sarvāstivādins (Kalupahana 1996, 26),46 who were involved, with other schools of 
Abhidharma, in a classification of all kinds of experience into momentary phenomena. 
The Abhidharma‘s project can be seen as the continuation of the Buddha‘s analysis of the 
self into the physical and mental aggregates, and the breaking down of the physical 
elements into atoms of fire, water, and so forth. The Ᾱbhidharmikas remained faithful to 
the teachings to the extent that they regarded compound phenomena to be impermanent, 
suffering, and not-self. However, the Sarvāstivādins concluded that atoms and 
momentary phenomena, the ultimate constituents of reality (dharma), existed eternally 
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 Kalupahana argues that, in Nāgārjuna‘s times, the bodhisattva ideal and other specifically Mahāyāna 
doctrines had not arisen yet and therefore, he suggests that the early Mahāyāna was not a reaction to early 
Buddhism or the Pāli canon, nor to the Abhidharma as a whole, but only to Sarvāstivādin metaphysics 
(1996, 25).  
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with a determinate self-nature (svabhāva).47 As Kalupahana has suggested, ―No other 
conception could be more heretical in the eyes of the Buddhists who were avowed non-
substantialists‖ (1996, 22). 
The doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā), then, can be understood as a reaction to 
scholastic metaphysics, yet the Sarvāstivāda was not the only target of Mahāyāna 
critique. Many sūtras, while retaining the Buddha‘s original teachings as a backdrop, also 
seem, in places, to contradict those very teachings. A well-known example of this occurs 
in the Heart Sūtra‘s declaration that there is ―no suffering, no cause of suffering,‖ and so 
forth, for the rest of the Four Noble Truths; ―no form, no feeling,‖ or any of the Five 
Aggregates; ―no sickness, old-age, or death‖ or any of the Twelve Links of Dependent 
Co-origination (nidāna) (PPH; Lopez 1990, 98). Of course, if everything in the world is 
empty, then this will include also those concepts that the Buddha introduced in order to 
lead his followers out of suffering. In this sense, therefore, emptiness can be seen as a 
radicalization of the Buddha‘s teachings or as a reflexive extension of their logical 
implications to those very same teachings. Perhaps this is why the content of Mahāyāna 
sūtras is rather perplexing, to put it mildly, and appears to contain several internal 
paradoxes. I shall be claiming that this is also due to the ineffability of ultimate reality.  
One way in which the Mahāyāna explains these seeming contradictions is through 
appealing to a concept of expedient means (upāya kauśalya). Instead of preaching the 
same doctrine to all, the Buddha is said to have varied his teachings according to the 
dispositions, inclinations, and temperaments of his listeners (SP 3; Kern 2007, 59). The 
earlier doctrines, therefore, are regarded as a ―clever device,‖ aimed at those of lesser 
faculties, and intended merely to ―put an end to [their] trouble‖ (SP 2: 66; Kern 2007, 
39). The Buddha‘s talk of nirvana is compared, in fact, to a father‘s promising new toys 
to his children, in order to convince them to leave a burning house (SP 3:  70–72; Kern 
2007, 61, 71). Preoccupation with enlightenment, therefore, is seen as another form of 
delusion, and in the Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra, we read that Mañjuśrī does not seek it, nor 
does he urge sentient beings to seek enlightenment (MRK 15; Chang 2002, 177–178). In 
the Diamond Sūtra, we are told that in the Buddha‘s ―unexcelled‖ teachings, ―there is not 
the slightest thing that can be attained‖ (VPP 22; Patton n.d., 22). 
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 The concept of svabhāva will be examined in detail below. 
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Similarly, the Vimalakīrti Sūtra explicitly states that the aim of the bodhisattva is 
not to renounce saṃsāra or to seek nirvana. Instead, the focus is on nonduality, which 
involves ―neither detesting the world nor rejoicing in liberation.‖ Vimalakīrti‘s final 
‗comment‘ on nonduality is to keep silent; he declines to make any statement at all 
regarding ultimate reality. This is because the highest truth simply cannot be expressed 
(VN 9; Thurman 1976, 67–68), and here, then, is a paradigmatic example of the 
Mahāyāna depiction of the enlightened state as being beyond conceptuality. As 
Nāgārjuna emphasizes, this constitutes a return to the Buddha‘s original message, that is, 
to his advice to relinquish all views (MMK 27:30; Garfield 1995, 83).  
It appears that, throughout the course of Buddhist history, proponents of various 
schools were liable to forget this advice, and to become attached instead to their own 
interpretation of the Buddha‘s teachings, attempting to establish it as the correct view. 
This resulted in the continual rise of new schools and interpretations intended to redress 
such mistakes, and to purge Buddhism of ―certain metaphysical ideas that continued to 
creep into the teachings‖ (Kalupahana 1996, 1). We have already seen that one common 
mistake was to reify certain concepts that were originally intended only as didactic 
devices. The Yogācāra have often been misinterpreted as suggesting a reified view of the 
‗Mind‘ or the ‗Buddha.‘ Nāgārjuna‘s writings, on the other hand, as well as the negative 
declarations of the Heart Sūtra, are particularly prone to a nihilistic misinterpretation. 
That is, while Nāgārjuna was concerned mainly with negating those concepts that other 
schools had mistakenly reified, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu returned to affirmation, 
reinterpreting, as they reaffirmed, the concept of nirvana. 
Therefore, the Mādhyamika and the Yogācārin philosophies can also become 
objects of attachment, and misconstrued as wrong views. Yet, the fact that their doctrines 
appear to be poles apart, I will suggest, is merely a consequence of the inability of words 
to capture nondual experience, or to describe reality as perceived by the enlightened 
being. The best that can be achieved, it will emerge, is a Middle Path attained by 
avoiding two extreme views, which correspond to the two poles of any dualism. A more 
adequate interpretation, then, is to regard the Yogācārin and Mādhyamika philosophies as 
complementary, together bringing Mahāyāna thought to completion (Nagao 1992, 225). 
In what follows, I shall further develop this idea.  
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1 Nāgārjuna‘s Madhyamaka and the Focus on Negation 
 
Nāgārjuna is one of the earliest systematic philosophers classified as a Mahāyāna 
Buddhist, and he is generally regarded as the founder of the Mādhyamika lineage. This 
school, it was suggested above, tends to focus on emptiness and on negation, in the style 
of the Heart Sūtra. Other sūtras that are held in high regard by Mādhyamikas, and 
considered to expound the highest teachings (as opposed to merely useful teachings 
employed as expedient means) include the Vimalakīrti Sūtra and the Mahāratnakūṭa. 
Yet, it has been argued that Nāgārjuna‘s main work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
(MMK), is a commentary upon an older Pāli text, the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta (Kalupahana 
1996, 5), which comprises a response to the question ―To what extent is there right 
view?‖ The Buddha replies, in this sūtra, that there are two extreme positions to be 
avoided; these are, briefly, the belief in existence, and its contrary, the belief in 
nonexistence. The Enlightened One avoids making claims about either, and teaches via a 
‗Middle Way,‘ which is identified with pratītyasamutpāda, the doctrine of Dependent 
Co-origination (S ii 17; Thanissaro).  
The term ‗Middle Way‘ became a standard appellation for Buddhist doctrine, and 
parallel terms, like ‗Madhyamaka‘ itself, were appropriated by most schools as they 
attempted to establish their position as the correct understanding of the Dharma. Yet, 
although Mahāyāna philosophy strove to remain faithful to the Buddha‘s Middle Way, I 
shall argue that the Madhyamaka can be understood as leaning slightly towards 
nonexistence, whereas the Yogācāra tend towards existence. Nāgārjuna emphasized 
negation, that is, his focus was mostly on avoiding the belief in existence. With the 
Yogācāra, on the other hand, the stress lay upon affirmation and the avoidance of the 
extreme of nihilism. I shall argue that the bias, in each case, is due to the impossibility of 
making claims that correspond precisely with ultimate reality. Both Mādhyamika and 
Yogācārin philosophers were aware of this, of course, and emphasized repeatedly that the 
highest truth cannot be expressed. 
Nāgārjuna‘s aim, therefore, was to seek out the Buddha‘s original meaning, as can 
be seen from his frequent citation of the Pāli canon, and his emphasis on Dependent Co-
origination. Yet the MMK, like the Mahāyāna sūtras examined above, contains many 
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declarations that might surprise a Theravādin, not least of all, the identification of 
saṃsāra and nirvana. We are told that,  
 
Whatever is the limit of nirvāṇa,  
That is the limit of cyclic existence [i.e. saṃsāra]. 
There is not even the slightest difference between them,  
Or even the subtlest thing (MMK 25:20; Garfield 1995, 75). 
 
To understand what this means, we will need to examine in more detail the doctrine of 
the Two Truths, which was briefly mentioned in chapter 1. It will emerge that whether 
one is ‗in‘ saṃsāra or nirvana depends upon the way one experiences the world. A 
person who is deluded and trapped within cyclic existence grasps at a belief in the reality 
of the world and of its contents, and he is especially attached to belief in the existence of 
his own self. In Nāgārjuna‘s terms, it is said that he perceives all these as existing with 
svabhāva. Therefore, we will need to enquire into what exactly svabhāva means, and 
what it is that Nāgārjuna seems to be negating with the doctrine of emptiness. Briefly, I 
shall characterize svabhāva as the experience and conceptualization of a thing as existing 
independently, as something unitary and irreducible, and with a fixed essence. 
 I shall then go on to outline various arguments that are associated with the 
Madhyamaka refutation of svabhāva.48 Besides arguing against svabhāva directly, 
Nāgārjuna‘s critique targets several philosophical concepts like causality, unity, and 
essential properties, as well as various Buddhist notions such as the Four Noble Truths, 
nirvana, and the Tathāgata. Yet, he does not intend to refute these altogether, but only to 
demonstrate that if we conceive of them in terms of svabhāva, such concepts cannot be 
rendered consistent, either with each other, or internally. For example, if entities existed 
with svabhāva, then they could never arise, or give rise to anything else; they could not 
change, or ever come to an end. Therefore, when we seek the svabhāva of a tree, say, we 
never find it, we find only its emptiness of svabhāva, or in other words, we find that there 
is nothing other than the collection of fleeting impressions we receive, nothing permanent 
underlying the fluctuating parts and properties that we tend to think of as ‗inessential‘ to 
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 As Westerhoff points out, these arguments are not always explained fully by Nāgārjuna; instead many 
are quickly outlined or simply referred to very briefly. This is because the main purpose of these texts was 
to be memorized by students, whereas detailed explanations were left for the commentaries (Westerhoff 
2009, 6–7). Therefore, what will be referred to as ―Nāgārjuna‘s‖ thoughts relies heavily on the 
interpretation found in such commentaries, especially Candrakīrti‘s Madhyamakāvatāra.  
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the tree itself. Our regarding it as a ‗hard-edged‘ individual has a lot to do, instead, with 
our language and other conventions.   
On one level, then, the two truths amount to a distinction between conventional 
reality, where things appear with svabhāva, and ultimate reality, where they are seen as 
empty. Yet, a number of misunderstandings need to be clarified, each of which involves a 
reification of emptiness, or its misconstrual in terms of svabhāva. For instance, we might 
regard emptiness as some realm or reality that is completely independent of the ordinary 
world of conventional reality. Otherwise, we might conceive of the conventional and 
ultimate as involving two different perspectives on the same world, one held before and 
the other gained after enlightenment is attained. A third misinterpretation is to think that 
although an enlightened being perceives the two truths simultaneously, he perceives them 
as dual, apprehending the conventional and the ultimate as two different things. 
Nāgārjuna‘s emphasis that ―there is not even the slightest difference‖ between nirvana 
and saṃsāra suggests that the two truths are wholly identified with each other. I shall 
argue, following Garfield and other authors, that to perceive the ultimate truth is to 
perceive the conventional as conventional, that is, to see the relation between the two 
truths. 
One needs to be vigilant when it comes to describing ultimate truth, and talking 
about nirvana, as it is easy to be misled by words. In saying that there is no difference 
between ultimate and conventional truth, Nāgārjuna did not mean to imply that they are 
the same. It is often pointed out that both his and many of the Buddha‘s negations are 
―non-affirming,‖ in that they do not imply any contrary or contradictory claim. This also 
explains why Nāgārjuna insisted that he has no position, and that he advances no view, in 
line, of course, with the purport of the Vimalakīrti Sutra. His objective, rather, was to 
follow the advice of the Buddha and completely relinquish all views. 
To teach, however, both the Buddha and Nāgārjuna needed to resort to language, 
just like the bodhisattvas who spoke before Vimalakīrti‘s silence. There is no way of 
explaining what emptiness is, unless we first have a grasp of what perceiving svabhāva is 
like, and again, although an advanced bodhisattva like Vimalakīrti might experience 
nonduality immediately, for the rest of us it needs to be explained through the provisional 
setting up of a dichotomy. The Pāli canon, in fact, has often been regarded as containing 
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such provisional teachings that rely on the use of dualisms. The Buddha‘s discourse about 
truth and falsity seems to be a case in point; clearly, while there could be conventionally 
true as well as false statements, if ultimate reality is inexpressible, then, strictly speaking, 
it can be neither true nor false. That is, there can be no ultimately true statements.  
Therefore, language itself is limited. It tends to promote a reified view of the 
world and its contents and suggests there is a parallel between the structure of our 
sentences and that of reality. For this reason, it also encourages a dualistic view, which 
can be reduced to the polarity between existence and nonexistence, or between 
affirmation and negation. This is one reason, then, why ultimate reality is ineffable. On 
the Mādhyamika account, the closest one can come to expressing nonduality is through 
the double negation, for example, the claim ―nature is neither valuable, nor not valuable.‖ 
Such a formula is also useful as a means of reducing attachment to one‘s views, and 
removing the urge to establish some claim as true. Nāgārjuna was aware, however, that 
the Buddha also affirmed existence whenever this was required to correct nihilistic 
inclinations in his listeners. In short, many of the Buddha‘s statements, including the 
distinction between conventional and ultimate truth, can be seen as soteriological devices, 
interim constructions, which, like Wittgenstein‘s ladder, are to be ―thrown away,‖ once 
they have served their purpose in taking us beyond them (T 6.54).    
 
The Two Truths; Svabhāva and Emptiness   
 
Nāgārjuna explains, ―The Buddha‘s teaching...is based on two truths; a truth of worldly 
convention, and an ultimate truth.‖ He goes on to claim, ―Without understanding the 
significance of the ultimate [truth], liberation [i.e. nirvana] is not achieved (MMK 24:8–
10; Garfield 1995, 68). It would appear, then, that he is setting a straightforward contrast 
between the way reality appears ordinarily, in saṃsāra, and the way it appears to 
enlightened beings in nirvana. Conventional reality (saṃvṛti satya) can be presumed to 
be the everyday experience of the ordinary world; it includes the environment in which 
we operate as individuals, and which is replete with all the varied living beings and things 
we encounter and talk about, as well as their complex relations to each other and to 
ourselves. To use Nāgārjuna‘s terminology, we can say that in conventional reality, 
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things seem to be endowed with svabhāva, a term variously translated as ‗self-nature,‘49 
‗self-subsistence,‘8 ‗own-being,‘50 ‗essence,‘51 ‗intrinsic nature,‘52 ‗substantiality,‘53 and 
‗inherent existence.‘54 Westerhoff argues that none of these traditional translations is able 
to capture the full meaning of svabhāva, and I shall be following his practice by leaving it 
untranslated throughout this thesis (Westerhoff 2009, 4).  
Three general meanings of svabhāva can be distinguished, even though, as we 
shall see, they are intricately related to one another. First, there is the sense in which, 
ordinarily, a thing appears to us to exist from its own side, independent of any relations it 
may happen to have. These include relations with its causes, effects, and conditions, with 
subjects who perceive and conceptualize it, and with the name that is used to refer to it. 
To take an example, the oak in the garden, we assume, is truly there, and its existence is 
given, independently of whether we, or anyone else, experience it. We assume that 
whatever we choose to call it, it will always be that very same thing, that our naming of it 
does not affect its intrinsic identity. We also assume that it is completely independent 
from the wind rustling its leaves or the bird nest it supports. These are seen to be separate 
from the tree itself, and external to it; in other words, everything is perceived to have its 
own clear and distinct identity, and to be autonomous from everything else. 
The tree is even held to be independent from those things that we know are 
necessary for it to exist, such as the acorn or the gardener who planted it (its causes), and 
the soil, sunshine, and rain that support its existence (its conditions). Although we know, 
intellectually, that the tree is dependent upon all these things for its existence, we regard 
it as independent to the extent that we are able to conceive of it separately. In fact, we 
actually do tend to conceive of it as such, superimposing a notion of something ―unitary, 
permanent, and observer-independent,‖ upon the collection of transient impressions that 
we receive (Westerhoff 2009, 49). That is, we tend to disregard the changes that the tree 
undergoes continuously—its growth, for instance, and being pruned—even though we are 
perfectly aware of them, and we similarly ‗bracket away‘ the causes and conditions that 
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 Kalupahana 1996, 22. 
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 Chang 1991, 73; Burton 2001, 2; Tuck 1990, 54. 
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 Garfield 1995, 89; Nagao 1992, 212. 
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 Ames 2005, 1. 
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 Nagao 1992, 47; Kalupahana 1996, 84–85. 
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 Hopkins 1996, 392; Burton 2001, 2. 
  92  
give rise to these changes—the gardener, rain, fertilizer—conceiving them as separate 
from the tree itself. Ᾱryadeva likens this to the projection of the concept of ‗snake‘ onto 
what is, in reality, a twisted rope (HV 1a–b; Tola and Dragonetti 1995, 9–10). Tola and 
Dragonetti explain that this is an ―apparent knowledge‖ of something ―unitary... existing 
in itself, [and] not depending on another entity for its existence‖ (1995, xxv). The first 
aspect of svabhāva suggests, in short, independence. 
Once we correct our mistake, and perceive the rope as a rope, it might be thought 
that we have now attained true knowledge. Yet, Ᾱryadeva maintains that this is as 
illusory as perceiving the rope to be a snake (HV 1c–d; Tola and Dragonetti 1995, 10). If 
we examine it carefully, we find that the rope is made up of threads, and that they are 
made up of smaller threads, and so on ad infinitum.
55
 The second aspect of svabhāva, 
therefore, has to do with parts, both spatial and temporal, as well as with properties. 
While the first aspect suggested independence, the second calls to mind a simple, 
irreducible entity, something that cannot be subjected to further analysis. If we consider 
the tree once more, we might strip away its branches, its leaves, and its bark, and yet, we 
want to claim that no matter how many parts it loses, it is always the same tree. Similarly, 
properties such as height and colour are said to belong to the tree, which, therefore, must 
be something else. We consider it the same tree, despite the changes in appearance it goes 
through, such as turning red in autumn, or shedding its leaves in the winter. This shows 
that what we consider to be the tree itself must be something other than its inessential 
parts and properties; perhaps svabhāva consists of its essential ones, or else it is 
something that underlies these characteristics. In Western philosophy, it is sometimes 
referred to as the individual in which properties are instantiated.  
The reader will have drawn a connection with the Buddhist analysis of self into 
the Five Aggregates. As mentioned above, the Ᾱbhidharmikas carried on with this 
project, yet some ended up with an extreme ‗wrong view‘56 when they claimed that the 
analysis stopped at the ultimately real, primary constituents of reality, namely, partless 
atoms and un-analysable moments of experience called dharmas. The Sarvāstivādins had 
argued that these dharmas exist with svabhāva, and therefore, svabhāva also has the 
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 The Mādhyamikas do not admit the existence of partless atoms (Tola and Dragonetti 1995, 10; 
Westerhoff 2009, 37). Their (possible) reasons will be examined below. 
56
 From the perspective of the Mādhyamikas, that is. 
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connotation of being an ultimate existent, as opposed to compound phenomena, which 
are physical or conceptual constructs. Westerhoff characterizes this sense of svabhāva as 
something that ―exists in a primary manner, unconstructed, and independent of 
everything else‖ (2009, 24). 
These two senses of svabhāva, then, suggest an independent, and ultimate or 
irreducible existent. In terms of Candrakīrti‘s classic account, it can be said that together 
they constitute that which Westerhoff translates as ―substance-svabhāva‖ (Westerhoff 
2009, 23). There is a cognitive and an ontological dimension to these ideas, in that they 
combine a way of conceiving the world and its contents, with a belief in their ultimate 
and independent existence. The notion is somewhat similar, perhaps, to the ancient Greek 
concept of an underlying substance in which properties are instantiated and it too has the 
implication of absolute, permanent existence. 
There is also an epistemological dimension to svabhāva, which determines the 
way we know objects, and enables us to tell them apart (Westerhoff 2009, 12). An 
independent, ultimate existent might be recognizable through an essential characteristic, 
and this is Candrakīrti‘s second aspect of svabhāva, translated as ―essence-svabhāva‖ 
(Westerhoff 2009, 21).
57
 Traditional examples are ‗extension‘ for Cartesian matter or 
‗heat‘ for a fire-atom, and therefore, svabhāva in this sense is a property that a thing 
cannot lose without ceasing to be that very thing (Westerhoff 2009, 21). In our example, 
it might be said that the tree is essentially the plant with a single woody trunk that is 
growing here and now,
58
 or that the acorn‘s power to bring about an oak is part of its 
essential nature. It is through essential properties that we recognize a thing for what it is 
and are able to refer to it in language and make statements about it (Westerhoff 2009, 23). 
Importantly, an essential property must be unchanging, and therefore svabhāva also has a 
sense of something that exists permanently, with a fixed nature.  
Clearly, these three implications of svabhāva are intimately related to each other, 
and perhaps they can be summarized as saying that a thing exists independently, as 
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 Candrakīrti‘s third concept, absolute–svabhāva, will be examined in the next section, with the 
Yogācāra‘s re-affirmation of svabhāva.  
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 Westerhoff, however, points out that for Candrakīrti, the essence-svabhāva is not an individual essence 
(such as the socratesness of Socrates), but an essential property, that is, a property without which that thing 
would cease to be what it is, like heat is to fire, but which is also ―sharable,‖ in the way that all fires have 
heat as their essential property. In an individual, svabhāva is its ―specific quality,‖ which is a combination 
of all its essential properties (2009, 21–22).  
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something unitary and irreducible, and with a fixed essence. Grasping at a belief in 
svabhāva is the extreme of eternalism, or existence, of the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta; the 
belief that things exist inherently, and truly are what they are, an idea that is so 
tautological that it sounds rather absurd when expressed. Conventional reality then, is the 
world as it appears with svabhāva, in which we assume and grasp at the idea that we, and 
everything else around us, truly exist. As a Tibetan commentator puts it, 
 
...all our everyday perceptions are tinged with this type of grasping. When 
we glance at our watch, for example, does it not appear to have its own 
independent, self-sufficient nature, over and above any relationship that 
may be said to exist between it and other phenomena (Gyatso 1992, 45)? 
 
Ultimate truth (pāramārtha satya) is experienced when we are able to eliminate 
this grasping. It is generally equated with the doctrine of śūnyatā, or emptiness, and this, 
in turn, is described as the negation of svabhāva (Nagao 1992, 212; Westerhoff 2009, 
12).
59
 Nāgārjuna adopts a three-fold approach in his arguments against svabhāva. He 
appeals, first, to empirical experience, arguing that if one looks carefully, svabhāva 
cannot be perceived anywhere (Kalupahana 1996, 82, 84). Second, he demonstrates, 
using logic, that svabhāva is a self-contradictory concept (Bhattacharya et al. 1998, 89),60 
and finally, he argues that the belief in svabhāva goes against the Buddha‘s teachings 
(Garfield 1995, 91).  
On this account, the well-known first argument in MMK, the ―Diamond 
Slivers,‖61 appears rather strange, at first, as it seems to negate causation. The belief that 
―this being, that becomes...this not being, that becomes not‖ (S ii 28, 65; Macy 1995, 39) 
constitutes the very foundation of the Buddha‘s teachings, and plays an important role in 
the doctrines of Dependent Co-origination, the Four Noble Truths, and Kárma to name a 
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 The word ‗usually‘ here indicates that this is not the position Nāgārjuna would adopt as a final stand. 
60
 Indeed, it has been argued that Nāgārjuna starts with a definition of svabhāva that is self-contradictory, 
and that he is ultimately ―battling dragons of his own creation‖ (Tuck 1990, 59; referring to Robinson‘s 
critique). While I agree that Nāgārjuna‘s svabhāva is self-contradictory, I also agree with Mādhyamikas 
that the notion is heavily relied upon in our conceptualization of the world. This can be seen in the way that 
philosophy (both Eastern and Western) always ends up going around in circles, so to speak, and that no 
thinker so far has been able to give an account of reality, which has not been contradicted by the perfectly 
valid arguments of another thinker.   
61
 In fact, the argument is only summarized very briefly in MMK 1:1, it is only from the commentaries that 
we are able to flesh out Nāgārjuna‘s ideas. The commentaries also support claims about the centrality of 
this argument in Mādhyamika thought. 
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few. Moreover, causation seems to be given in experience, an empirical fact that most 
people would accept. The arguments Nāgārjuna sets out, however, are directed only 
towards a notion of causality that conceives of it as a relation between things with 
svabhāva, and later on, he will reaffirm the doctrine of Dependent Co-origination, linking 
it with emptiness itself. 
Nāgārjuna‘s argument in the first verse can be summed up as the claim that there 
is no way of describing causation in a satisfactory manner if we assume that causes and 
effects exist with svabhāva. He demonstrates this using the catuṣkoṭi, a form of argument 
similar to the four alternatives discussed by the Buddha. To apply them to our example, 
the four options are: (1) the tree is caused by itself (i.e., the tree and the acorn are the 
same thing) (2) the tree is caused by another (i.e., the tree and the acorn are different); (3) 
the tree is caused by both itself and another (i.e., the tree and acorn are both the same and 
different); and finally, (4) the tree is caused by neither itself nor another (i.e., the tree was 
not caused by anything at all).  
The first alternative cannot be accepted because if a thing were produced by itself, 
its production would be both ―senseless and endless‖ (Hopkins 1996, 58). Some 
philosophers, in India as well as in the West, have affirmed that the effect exists in the 
cause ―potentially‖; in other words, the mature tree already exists, somehow, in the 
sapling and in the acorn. According to Nāgārjuna, this renders the notion of causality 
unsound—if the oak already existed in the acorn, what use would producing it be? 
Something simply cannot give rise to itself; if it exists then it has already arisen and 
cannot arise again. Otherwise, we would have to say that it was continuously arising, or 
giving rise to itself.  
Yet, on the second alternative, where oak and acorn are regarded as two 
completely different things, which exist in complete independence from each other (as is 
implied by svabhāva), then there is no way that either could cause the other. The 
argument holds even if we regard the oak as being caused by something entirely 
different, such as the gardener. A well-known version of the argument in Western 
philosophy involves a similar concept of matter and mind as completely independent 
from each other, which gives rise to the problem of how a change in one could cause a 
change in the other. A further consequence is that if two completely separate and 
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unrelated things could somehow be cause and effect, then this would imply that anything 
could give rise to anything at all. For instance, we might plant an acorn, and end up with 
an orange tree! Clearly, there has to be some sort of relation between a cause and an 
effect. The third option, being a combination of the first two, is rejected for the same 
reasons (Hopkins 1996, 58).
62
 The fourth amounts to a negation of causation altogether, 
and is refuted through experience, that is, through the fact that things do seem to be 
related through causality (Westerhoff 2009, 112).  
What Nāgārjuna seems to be getting at, in brief, is that if we think of things as 
existing independently then they cannot be related to each other in any way, including 
through causal relations. Put that way, of course, this sounds like a rather trivial and 
tautological conclusion; clearly, if we define things as being independent, they cannot be 
related to one another. One has to keep in mind, however, a basic Mādhyamika (and one 
might say, Buddhist) premise; namely, that we do tend to conceive of things in this way. 
Despite knowing that they are produced by other things, we endow them with ―own-
being‖ and regard them as existing from their own side. This also explains why 
understanding the logical reasons for emptiness is not enough; there needs to be a 
―cognitive shift‖ so that we realize, as opposed to merely understand, the absence of 
svabhāva (Westerhoff 2009, 47). 
The most common way of perceiving svabhāva occurs when we suppose objects 
to exist inherently, independently from our experience of them. Yet, Nāgārjuna asks, if 
such an object existed, independent of our seeing it, hearing it, and so forth, how could 
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 This might seem a little too quick, for saying that the oak and acorn are both the same and different, or 
else, say that the oak is caused by itself (the acorn) and another (the gardener) might seem like the most 
plausible account. Oak and acorn are different, to the extent that they succeed each other in time, and 
therefore, in reply to the objections against self-causation, we could reject the claim that acorn and oak are 
identical, and exist simultaneously. On the other hand, they are not completely separate and unrelated 
either, and therefore we can answer the objections against causation by another, by allowing them to be 
―the same‖ to the extent that they are different stages of the same entity and related as cause and effect. 
However, Nāgārjuna‘s concept of svabhāva cannot allow such complex individuals. An entity with 
svabhāva must be irreducible, and therefore, it cannot be divided into different temporal stages. If we 
choose one of these stages and call it ‗the tree‘ then this must be independent from everything else, and 
cannot be related to the acorn stage. Moreover, its essential properties cannot change, so there cannot be 
one entity with svabhāva that is both tree and acorn. This shows, of course, that a tree cannot possibly be a 
candidate for svabhāva, and that the arguments are best applied to simple entities, such as atoms, or 
properties. In any case, though, when we think of things in terms of svabhāva we cannot posit causation 
between them, for svabhāva implies that they are independent, and cannot be related. 
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we possibly know about it (MMK 9:2–3)?63 Here, he seems to be arguing for a two-way 
dependence between object and perceiver (MMK 9:5), and it has often been noted that 
Nāgārjuna generally tends to posit symmetric relations of dependence between things 
(e.g. Hartshorne 1970, 213). A well-known example is his suggestion that father and son 
are mutually dependent. Westerhoff explains that this relies on two different sorts of 
dependence relations; there is the existential dependence of the son on his father, and the 
notional dependence of the father, who would not be called a ―father,‖ without having 
had a son (Westerhoff 2009, 27–28). Similarly, we might say that we would not be 
perceivers, unless there was something we perceived. More will be said about this in 
relation to Hartshorne‘s critique of Nāgārjuna‘s use of symmetry.     
 Concerning the second aspect of svabhāva, which entailed existence as an 
irreducible, simple substance, it is likely that Nāgārjuna rejected the existence of these, 
based upon a well-known Yogācāra argument against the existence of indivisible atoms 
(Westerhoff 2009, 37). Briefly, the argument states that if a compound phenomenon, such 
as our tree, is made up of atoms, then those atoms must be placed next to one another to 
make up the branches, leaves, and so forth. Even if one atom does not actually touch any 
others, it needs to be surrounded by other atoms in all directions to make up a three-
dimensional object. This implies that each atom must have a left side and a right side, as 
well as a bottom and a top, and a front and a back. Therefore, atoms are not irreducible 
after all, but can be divided, conceptually at least, into parts. Otherwise, if we state that 
atoms are ‗point-like‘ and indivisible, then our compound phenomena would collapse 
into a one-dimensional entity (cf. Hopkins 1996, 373).  
If we take svabhāva to be an individual underlying its properties (the second 
aspect of svabhāva) or else, an essential property characterizing the individual (the third 
aspect) we find that neither can be thought of as existing independently from the other. 
An atom of the tree‘s bark64 does not exist without its properties, such as, being brown or 
being hard; it is impossible even to conceive of something existing without any properties 
whatsoever. Neither can properties exist without being instantiated in something (MMK 
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 One could reply here that we cannot possibly know svabhāva directly, that is, one might identify it with a 
sort of Kantian noumenon. However, we would then be going against the Buddhist teachings, as one of 
their main premises is that the Buddha is able to experience ultimate reality directly. 
64
 Nāgārjuna‘s argument is about space, which as the fifth element, stands for all the others too. 
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5; 1–3); there is no ‗hardness‘ or ‗brownness,‘ without things that are hard and brown. In 
Garfield‘s words, ―[T]o think of individuals and properties as existing independently and 
then somehow coming together to constitute particulars makes no sense‖ (1995, 150).  
Therefore, svabhāva cannot be a substance underlying its properties, for there are no 
property-less things. 
Finally, there was the possibility of svabhāva being an essential property, a 
quality of a thing that it could not lose without ceasing to be that thing, such as heat is for 
fire. We have already seen that a property cannot exist without the individual in which it 
is instantiated. Moreover, if things had this kind of essential property, this would imply 
that nothing could ever change. If the tree had, essentially, five branches, say, then we 
could never saw one off; if atoms of bark were essentially hard, they could never 
decompose (MMK 15; 8–9). Westerhoff draws attention to two possible replies to this. 
The annihilationist claims that atoms with svabhāva do not change their essential 
properties; rather, what we experience as change, is actually the arising and fading away 
of a succession of atoms, which exist for a limited time with a fixed essence. The 
permutationist posits the same atoms with fixed essences, yet regards these as existing 
eternally. What appears to us as change is, in reality, a continual re-arranging of these 
atoms. Both arguments are subject to the same critique. Westerhoff asks what could be 
responsible for the arising and perishing of atoms in the annihilationist‘s‘ account, and 
similarly, we could ask about what causes the permutationist‘s atoms to move around and 
to form new arrangements. If this occurs in dependence upon causes and conditions, then, 
once again, we do not have an entity with svabhāva, but just another object which is 
dependently co-originated (Westerhoff 2009, 38–40). In short, Nāgārjuna employs 
several arguments to show that if one believes svabhāva, then nothing could arise or give 
rise to anything else, nothing could change, or ever come to an end either. Besides being 
at odds with everyday experience, this would also contradict the doctrine of Dependent 
Co-origination, and render the whole prospect of following the Buddhist path to 
liberation untenable (MMK 24: 20–32).  
Nāgārjuna can be interpreted as saying that when we seek svabhāva, we never 
find it, we find only emptiness. When we look for a thing, conceived of as a substance or 
essence—the tree itself, underlying the appearance of its properties, or stripped down to 
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its essential part—we are never able to find it. Apart from the parts and properties we 
perceive, like the leaves and their colours, the number of branches, the width of its trunk 
and so on, which we recognize as highly unstable and which we tend to think of as 
peripheral to the actual tree, there is nothing else that can be called the tree. Ultimately, 
then, the ‗things‘ that we experience, do not exist with svabhāva, but are all intimately 
related to each other, to the way we perceive them, to our language, and to our practices.  
To put it another way, we carve our experiential field into ‗distinct‘ objects; they 
do not exist that way prior to our experience of them, and our naming them. The reality 
we take for granted, therefore, where we see things existing with svabhāva, is a matter of 
linguistic and conceptual conventions, which we adopt in order to make sense of the 
world, and to be able to operate in it. Our activity requires, among other things, that we 
can agree on the way we distinguish objects, so that we can communicate about them. 
Yet, this does not imply that there truly are such static, independent, and unitary objects 
to which our words point; as we have seen, when we look for such entities, we cannot 
find them. Rather, so-called ‗things‘ exist as referents of words only in dependence upon 
our actual thoughts and talk of them. Linguistic convention plays an important part in 
Nāgārjuna‘s characterization of the Two Truths, and more will be said about it below. 
In chapter 15, we are told that ―those who see [svabhāva]...do not see the truth as 
taught by the Buddha‖ (MMK 15:6). Grasping at svabhāva is one of the causes, according 
to the Buddhist view, of our incessant wandering in the realms of saṃsāra. In attributing 
more reality to the objects of our experience than they actually possess, as well as to 
ourselves as experiencing subjects, we tend to crave some things and to resist others. This 
leads to the cycle of rebirth, as described through the Twelve Links of Dependent Co-
origination. The doctrine of emptiness is intended then, as ―medicine for those consumed 
by the fever of svabhāva‖ (Schroeder 2000, 557) and serves as an antidote to our natural 
inclination towards reification. Practitioners are encouraged to meditate upon the 
emptiness of whatever it is that attracts or repels them, as well as the emptiness of their 
self, in order to reduce grasping at svabhāva, and the tendency to reify. Perceiving 
emptiness amounts to perceiving ultimate reality, and leads, eventually, to one‘s attaining 
nirvana. 
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The Nonduality of Saṃsāra and Nirvana 
 
The phrase ―meditation on emptiness,‖ can be misleading if it is taken to imply that 
emptiness is something upon which one meditates, and especially if this is regarded as 
yet another thing that exists with svabhāva. In his account of the experience of emptiness, 
Hopkins describes a yogi meditating on not-self, who ―perceives an utter vacuity that is 
the absence of such an I, and he ascertains the mere elimination of the I that is 
negated...with nothing positive in its place‖ (Hopkins 1996, 63, 66; italics added). That is, 
it is important not to reify emptiness itself, which could occur in several ways. In the 
following, I shall try to set aside a few interpretations that have been rejected by 
Mādhyamika philosophers.  
An unrefined grasp of emptiness might take it to imply that the conventional 
world of saṃsāra, in which things appear to have svabhāva, is merely a realm of 
deception, and thus not real at all. Our everyday beliefs about trees and selves, therefore, 
might be thought to be entirely false, products of ignorant and deluded minds. Emptiness, 
upon this misconstrual, is thought to be radically different, and regarded as a true reality 
lying behind (or beyond) the illusory world of appearances. It is reified to the extent that 
it is believed to be independent, ultimately existent, and to have a fixed nature. David 
Burton seems to think that this is the Mādhyamika‘s position; he reads them as sceptics, 
and as implying that there is an independent reality ―that stands behind, as it were, the 
fabricated world of experience‖ (Burton 2004, 107). In fact, it is difficult to give an 
account of the doctrine of Two Truths and their relation to saṃsāra and nirvana without 
employing the appearances/reality dichotomy at times.  
Yet, several writers have argued against this reading of Nāgārjuna. Candrakīrti 
suggests that it is as though, in reply to a shopkeepers‘ claim that she has nothing to sell, 
one replied, ―very well, please sell me this nothing‖ (Huntington and Wangchen 2003, 
29). The seeds of this critique lie in MMK 24, where we read, 
 
 Whatever is dependently co-arisen 
 That is explained to be emptiness. 
 That, being a dependent designation, 
 Is itself the middle way. 
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 Something that is not dependently arisen, 
 Such a thing does not exist. 
 Therefore a nonempty thing 
 Does not exist (MMK 24:18–19; Garfield 1995, 69). 
 
Emptiness then, as this passage explains, is not to be thought of as something that exists 
independently, for then it would be ―nonempty‖ and a nonempty thing does not exist. 
Instead, emptiness is identified with ―whatever is dependently co-arisen,‖ in other words, 
with the ordinary phenomena of everyday experience, things that arise and perish. We are 
reminded of the Heart Sutra’s famous declaration that ―form is emptiness, and emptiness 
is form,‖ where ‗form‘ stands for all of the Five Aggregates. That is, things as they 
appear in our ordinary samsaric experience of the world—our physical bodies and other 
material objects, our perceptions, feelings, and so forth—all these dependently co-
originated things are emptiness, and emptiness is not anything different from them.  
Perhaps we can understand what this means, if we consider that we only 
experience emptiness by relying upon the appearance of these dependently co-originated 
things, that is, we cannot look directly for emptiness itself, we cannot set out to find it. 
Rather paradoxically, one can only find emptiness by looking for the svabhāva of some 
object, and not finding it. This is, after all, what emptiness means, it is the lack of 
svabhāva of some phenomenon, and therefore, it is always the emptiness of this or that, 
that we find, and never emptiness as an isolated, independently existent phenomenon. 
Garfield points out that ―understanding the ultimate nature of things is completely 
dependent upon understanding conventional truth...[it] just is understanding that their 
conventional nature is merely conventional‖ (1995, 299).  
Consequently, this means that, ultimate truth, emptiness, is conventional too, 
since it cannot be found to exist independently. Therefore, although Nāgārjuna introduces 
the Two Truths as distinct, he eventually comes to identify them, and in fact, every 
dualism is ultimately collapsed in the Mahāyāna. Most important among these is the 
identification of saṃsāra and nirvana, yet, it is important to understand exactly what is 
meant by this. Garfield suggests that conventional truth and ultimate truth are the same 
entity characterized, conceived, or perceived in different ways. Given that saṃsāra is our 
conventional reality, and nirvana is reached when we have insight into ultimate truth, 
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then the very same world is nirvana or saṃsāra, depending on our perspective (Garfield 
1995, 324–328).  
This might be appropriate as a conventional description; however, it is not 
accurate from the ultimate perspective. In China, the Ch‘eng-Shih school apparently held 
a similar view, which was derided by Seng Chuan as the ―bobbing melon‖ interpretation 
(Lai 1980, 146). The idea behind this metaphor is that sometimes the melon is above 
water, corresponding to ordinary conventional reality. Through the power of meditation, 
enlightened beings are able, as it were, to ‗push the melon below the surface,‘ and this 
corresponds to ultimate truth. Yet, this characterization of nirvana and saṃsāra as 
alternative perspectives seems unable to do justice to sense of identification expressed in 
MMK 25:20 where we read that there is ―not even the slightest difference‖ between them. 
To say that they are the same world perceived in different ways seems to set up some sort 
of distinction; even though they are not conceived of as different worlds, it implies a 
difference in time, that is, a time before, when the world is perceived as saṃsāra, and a 
time after, when it is perceived as nirvana.  
The same applies to the Ch‘eng-Shih practice of ‗departing and entering insight 
(into emptiness)‘ (cf. Koseki 1981, 459). It similarly implies that conventional reality and 
insight into emptiness arise in chronological sequence, and can be distinguished as two 
separate events, two perceptions arising in succession. One departs, so to speak, from the 
perception of things as having svabhāva, that is, from the ordinary world of saṃsāra, and 
enters a higher level of awareness where one realizes emptiness. Invariably however, if 
one is unenlightened, the experience fades and samsaric appearances arise again. 
Therefore, while this account does not posit two separate realms, there is still the 
suggestion of dualism, in that one perceives either emptiness, or the conventional world. 
The practice and the idea behind it were severely criticized by Chi-Tsang, who called it 
―departing one extreme and entering another.‖ Since it involved dualism, it could not be 
the correct Mādhyamika understanding of the two truths (Koseki 1981, 459). 
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   A more subtle account of the experience of emptiness is to suggest that while an 
ordinary being sees either conventional truth or else something like ultimate truth,
65
 the 
Buddha sees both contemporaneously. This would appear to be the idea behind Chi-
Tsang‘s notion of concurrent insight, (cf. Koseki 1981) and it also seems to be Garfield‘s 
final view, where he claims, ―nirvāṇa is only saṃsāra experienced as the Buddha 
experiences it‖ (1995, 333). The suggestion, then, is that the Buddha experiences both 
nirvana and saṃsāra at the same time, that is, by experiencing the conventional as 
conventional, he experiences the ultimate. Care is required, however, not to construe this 
dualistically, that is, the claim that the Buddha sees ‗both‘ truths, does not imply that 
there are two things put together, an ultimate reality added to a conventional one. This 
account still does not do justice to Mahāyāna nonduality. According to Aaron Koseki 
―concurrent insight is not a theory of combination or union, but the perception of identity 
and interdependency‖ (Koseki 1981, 460), that is, the Buddha experiences only one thing, 
the relation between conventional and ultimate truth. This is what Nāgārjuna means, 
perhaps, by stating that emptiness is in fact dependent co-origination. 
To sum up, if conventional things, such as trees and selves, are perceived as 
conventional, as arising and perishing in dependence upon each other, this amounts to 
perceiving their emptiness. It is only when we fail to see conventional things for what 
they are, and we assume they exist with svabhāva, that opposition between the two truths 
arises, and either one escapes us. Thus, ordinary beings sometimes see conventional 
truths and take them for ultimate truths, assuming that the things they perceive exist 
inherently, and they find themselves in saṃsāra. Otherwise, they sometimes glimpse 
something like emptiness, which they take to be a separate realm, perspective, or else, a 
reality that underlies ordinary experience, and which also exists with svabhāva. The 
Buddha, on the other hand, in perceiving emptiness, sees conventional things in their 
ultimate nature, that is, he sees them as conventional and empty. He does not perceive 
anything different from conventional truth, nor does he perceive two things at the same 
time. Yet, I do not want to assert anything more about what the Buddha perceives as 
ultimate truth, for reasons that will become apparent. 
                                                 
65
 This is ‗something like ultimate truth‘ or emptiness, because its own emptiness is not perceived. That is, 
it is conceived to be independent from the conventional, and one does not realize that it is the conventional 
nature of conventional truth. 
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The ‘No-Thesis’ Doctrine: Emptiness as a Soteriological Device 
 
At this point, it might occur to us to ask why Nāgārjuna introduces the distinction 
between conventional truth and ultimate truth in the first place, if they are not different, 
and we might similarly wonder why the Buddha distinguishes nirvana from saṃsāra, if 
ultimately they are the same. As we shall see, this is due, in part at least, to the limitations 
of language, that is, to the impossibility of saying anything at all that corresponds 
precisely to ultimate truth. Emptiness cannot simply be affirmed because there is no way 
to express the idea without, at first, setting up a dichotomy between the conventional and 
the ultimate. Yet, Nāgārjuna warns, 
 
―Empty‖ should not be asserted. 
―Nonempty‖ should not be asserted. 
 Neither both nor neither should be asserted.  
 They are only used nominally (MMK 22:11; Garfield 1995, 61). 
 
The central idea here, according to Garfield, is that all assertion can only be 
conventionally true and this includes, of course, all discourse about the ultimate nature of 
things (1995, 280). From the ultimate perspective, that is, nothing can be said at all, and 
this is because language itself seems to encourage reification and the belief in svabhāva. 
By demarcating individual objects and events in the experiential field, and applying 
names to them, it deceives us into believing that those things exist from their own side, 
independently of our conceptualization. ―The very act of referring to an entity,‖ explains 
Richard King, ―necessitates its self-identity‖ (King 1994, 671). There is a natural 
tendency, in other words, to believe in the inherent reality of that which we name, and to 
assume that something ultimately real corresponds to our words, and matches our 
concepts. One example of this occurs when the phrase ―this is empty‖ leads us to think of 
emptiness as something inherently existent. This is why Nāgārjuna claims emptiness 
should not be affirmed. The passage cited above, therefore, draws attention to the 
tendency of language to impose svabhāva on those aspects of reality carved up through 
our terms (Streng 1973, 32–33). 
Westerhoff has referred to this as the ―standard picture‖ of language which 
involves, besides the assumption that there is a ―ready-made world‖ that exists 
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independently of our conceptualization of it, the further assumption that that there is a 
structural link between our language and the world (2009, 191). The organization of the 
world, that is, is thought to mirror that of our sentences, and since many of these amount 
to either an affirmation or else a negation, the standard picture of language tends to 
reinforce dualism. Almost everything we say can be reduced to a statement about 
existence or else about nonexistence.
66
 In ascribing predicates to subjects, comparing 
things by identifying or differentiating between them, and making value judgments in 
positive or negative terms, we assume that the world shares this structure too. Yet, ―the 
reality of the universe‖ is said to be ―beyond this identification and differentiation, indeed 
beyond verbal description‖ (Cheng 1991, 27) and the purpose of the doctrine of 
emptiness, then, ―is to eradicate the innate tendency of conceptual thought to construct 
reified notions of being (bhāva) and nonbeing (abhāva)‖ (Huntington and Wangchen 
2003, 30).  
It is often pointed out that emptiness is a ―non-affirming negation,‖ which means 
that it negates something, svabhāva, without affirming anything else. Whenever we 
negate something, we generally tend to think that the contrary must be true, for instance, 
if it is not cloudy, one assumes that the sun must be shining. The catuṣkoṭi serves 
precisely the purpose of emphasizing that this is not the case. In fact, all four alternatives, 
Hopkins explains, ―are non-affirming negatives. They do not imply anything positive in 
their place...[and] do not serve as proofs of another thesis‖ (1996, 133). In negating all 
four alternatives, therefore, one has ruled out the possibility of any proposition being true. 
This is why Nāgārjuna tells us in the Vigrahavyāvartanī that he has sought to establish no 
thesis, and no ―proposition‖ at all (VV 29; Bhattacharya et al 1998, 113).  The best 
response, from the Madhyamaka perspective, is ―the profound silence that ‗roars like a 
lion‘‖ (King 1994, 671). 
                                                 
66
 This would seem to be implied by the Law of the Excluded Middle, yet, a common objection points to 
vague or ―fuzzy‖ concepts, where the line between being and not being is indeterminate. Clark shows that it 
is not just heaps and the like, which raise problems for our laws of logic, but indeed, most concepts do. As 
he puts it ―the classes we employ in conversation are irreducibly vague: so even if there is something that 
‗being A‘ excludes, we usually have no definite idea what it is‖ (2008, 29). Yet, he goes on, ―To mean at 
all we must exclude as well as assert: there must be some meaningful statement incompatible with 
something we meaningfully assert‖ (2008, 34). This seems to suggest that the use of language is inherently 
contradictory; its structure seems to imply a clear-cut distinction between a concept and its contrary, yet 
upon analysis, we find that no concept can be defined in such a way. 
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Importantly, in order to negate svabhāva, we need some familiarity with it, that is, 
we need to have some experience of what it would be like for the self or for things to 
exist in that way. Emptiness, that is, cannot be discovered without recourse to the 
conventional, since it simply is the conventional nature of what we had mistakenly 
supposed to exist with svabhāva. Moreover, emptiness cannot be taught without the use 
of language, which of course, is an important part of the conventional. Therefore, on the 
one hand, ultimate truth cannot be expressed in words, yet, on the other, it cannot be 
known without words. This is why most expositions of Nāgārjuna‘s work start with an 
account of svabhāva, and why Nāgārjuna could not have simply affirmed emptiness 
directly, but could only explain it through contrasting it with the conventional. 
This also explains, perhaps, why there appear to be two very different accounts of 
what the Buddha taught, as suggested at the start of this chapter. The Mahāyāna, in 
general, accepts the older Pāli texts as well as most of the Theravādin commentaries on 
them. Yet, from their perspective, these are regarded as preliminary, expedient teachings 
for the untrained, as they involve the setting up of a number of dualisms, like happiness 
and suffering, saṃsāra and nirvana, the conventional and ultimate, and so forth. For the 
Mahāyāna these are preliminary stages in the realization of nonduality. As the 
Vimalakīrti Sūtra explains, nonduality involves the collapsing of these dichotomies, 
leading to a state of non-conceptuality. In Mañjuśrī‘s words ―to know no one teaching, to 
express nothing, to say nothing, to explain nothing, to announce nothing, to indicate 
nothing, and to designate nothing—that is the entrance into nonduality‖ (VN 9; Thurman 
1976, 73–77). Vimalakīrti‘s silence, therefore, is regarded as the highest expression of 
ultimate truth.  
Importantly, this is not to suggest that anything we say is always false, or that our 
statements have no use whatsoever. The point being made is that ultimate truth or 
emptiness itself cannot be expressed in language, and that no statement can be made that 
will correspond to an ultimate truth. Conventionally, however, there are appropriate and 
inappropriate statements that can be made that are either true or false depending on 
whether they correspond with the facts or not. Mark Siderits draws attention to a number 
of notable excerpts from the canon to show that the Buddha believed that there are 
(conventionally) true and false statements, such as: 
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When in fact there is a next world, one asserts the statement that 
there is no next world, that would be a false statement (cited in 
Siderits 1979, 492). 
 
Therefore, it is clearly not the case that the Buddhist teachings render all our truth claims 
invalid or void; within the conventional realm and for conventional purposes the Buddha 
can and does distinguish between what is true and what is false. 
The suggestion that ultimate truth cannot be expressed, and that Nāgārjuna does 
not affirm any proposition, might appear to jar with the account given above of emptiness 
as the negation of svabhāva. If the doctrine of emptiness simply affirms the proposition, 
―things do not have svabhāva‖ ultimate truth appears to be expressible after all. Yet, as 
we have seen, the negation of svabhāva, is not an expression of ultimate truth. It is only 
one expedient method for reducing the tendency to reify objects, and to grasp at their 
existence, which constitutes the extreme of eternalism. There is also the extreme of 
nihilism to avoid, that is, the belief that nothing really exists at all, or else, that everything 
will ultimately be annihilated. Due to its emphasis on negation, the Madhyamaka has 
often been interpreted as implying such a position. The ―medicine‖ of emptiness, though, 
can perform two functions; it negates svabhāva when one grasps at existence, and it 
negates nonexistence if one happens to be a nihilist. Nāgārjuna tells us about this in 
chapter 18: 
 
 That there is a self has been taught 
 And the doctrine of no-self 
 By the Buddhas, as well as the 
 Doctrine of neither self nor nonself (MMK 18:6; Garfield 1995, 49). 
 
 
In other words, emptiness negates both the inherent existence of the self as well as its 
inherent nonexistence, and it does the latter, apparently by affirming the self once again. 
As we shall see in the next section, the Yogācāra adopted this technique, and reaffirmed 
svabhāva. All this suggests, then, that none of the Buddha‘s claims can ever be taken as 
ultimate or final, and that he can preach any doctrine whatsoever in order to correct his 
listeners‘ mistakes. As one author puts it, the Buddha‘s method is to disparage anything 
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that sentient beings cling to and to extol the opposite as supreme (Liu 1993, 660). 
Emptiness then, is not just the negation of svabhāva, but also the negation of anything at 
all that one might become attached to and construct theories about; in short, it requires 
the relinquishing of all views. Rather than a theory of metaphysics, it is a soteriological 
device, aimed at reducing delusion, and the purpose of meditation on emptiness is to push 
the practitioner into a state of non-attachment, non-craving, and non-grasping.  
It emerges, then, that a realized being is not bound to any one theory or idea. 
Rather, in order to eliminate his hearers‘ attachment to their views, the Buddha is able to 
affirm or negate any view whatsoever and bases the decision upon the dispositions and 
inclinations of his listeners. As one progresses towards ultimate truth, though, all views 
must be left behind. Perhaps, this is why the Buddha characterizes nirvana negatively, as 
the ―unborn, unbecome, unconstructed, unconditioned,‖ and so forth. Once again, these 
too are non-affirming negations and the Buddha does not imply their opposites, that is, he 
does not mean to suggest that nirvana is permanent or that it exists independently. 
Similarly, Nāgārjuna‘s claim that nirvana and saṃsāra are not different is not meant to 
imply that they are the same. 
In sum, while Mahāyāna Buddhism retains the possibility of making true or false 
assertions there is a radical reduction in their import. All our beliefs must be relinquished 
in the quest for enlightenment, and we cannot rely on any fact as established. The aim is 
to reach a state where one does not abide anywhere, and does not settle down into any 
one formulation of truth, or grasp at any one particular view. In the Majjhima Nikāya too, 
we read that an enlightened person neither agrees nor disagrees with anyone, but goes 
along with what is being said in the world, without being attached to it (cited in 
Gombrich 1996, 16). Therefore, it seems that Madhyamaka and Pāli Buddhism might not 
differ so radically after all. As suggested by the parable of the raft, all statements and 
teachings must be set aside once they have served their purpose, and to cling to them 
would involve attachment to views (M i 135). The question with regards to our topic is 
whether we can reconcile Buddhist environmentalism with the relinquishing of views. 
Before I tackle that question, however, I would like to examine the second major school 
of the Mahāyāna, the Yogācāra. 
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Summary 
 
Mahāyāna philosophy collapses the dualisms that were set out in the Pāli canon, and 
regards all teachings expressed by the Buddha and his followers as merely conventional 
truths. Being ineffable, ultimate truth is described only approximately and it is 
approached precisely through identification of one pole of a dualism with its opposite, or 
perhaps, through the negation of their difference. Nāgārjuna‘s method, in fact, is to 
negate the distinction between ultimate truth and conventional reality, by showing that 
neither can be thought of as independently existent, unitary entities with a fixed essence. 
If we conceive of reality this way, he argues, then none of our ordinary concepts and 
experiences can be made sense of; we cannot account for causality, change, or any sort of 
relation between things. Nāgārjuna‘s arguments, that is, are intended to address a 
common way of misconceiving reality, and to bring about a radically new way of 
experiencing the world and ourselves, which is what nirvana entails.  
 It was emphasized that this too is not to be reified, and must not be thought of as 
something fixed, or as entirely different from saṃsāra. Instead, it was claimed that 
emptiness just is seeing the conventional as such. Thus, Nāgārjuna comes to blur the 
distinction he had introduced between conventional and ultimate truth, and ultimately 
identifies one with the other. Experiencing ultimate truth involves the ‗not finding‘ of the 
independence, unity, and fixed nature that we had attributed to reality.  
 Therefore, it is evident that Nāgārjuna‘s approach was to negate, and it was 
pointed out that such negations are different from ordinary negative sentences, which 
often imply their opposite. Nāgārjuna often emphasized that he advanced no thesis 
whatsoever, and that he subscribed to no view at all, and this coincides with the Buddha‘s 
advice, given in the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta, to avoid making claims about either existence 
or nonexistence. As we shall see in the next section, however, affirmation does have a 
role to play within Buddhism, which is vital when it comes to avoiding the two extremes 
and finding the Middle Path.  
  110  
2 The Yogācārin Re-affirmation of Existence 
 
Throughout its history, the Madhyamaka has often been interpreted nihilistically, as it is 
thought to render morality, and all goal-oriented activity, ultimately futile. If nothing 
truly exists, or, if we, along with everything else, will be completely annihilated 
someday, the argument goes, why should anyone bother to practice the Buddha‘s 
teachings? In environmental matters, nihilism includes the question of how to justify 
concern for nature, given a belief in the inevitable eventual destruction of the planet. 
More will be said about the moral implications of nihilism in chapter 4, where I shall 
distinguish separate threads in the argument and draw out their environmental 
implications. For the purposes of this chapter, nihilism will be defined as a tendency 
towards belief in nonexistence, which the Buddha denounced in the Kaccāyanagotta 
Sutta. One of its manifestations occurs when the teaching on emptiness, that is, the idea 
of all things as merely conventionally real, leads one to infer that nothing really exists at 
all. A second nihilistic view is the belief that dependently co-originated entities will 
eventually be utterly destroyed.  
Nāgārjuna‘s philosophy was interpreted as nihilism even during his own lifetime, 
and in several places, he offers a response against such claims.
67
 Yet, despite these 
efforts, his philosophy continues to be labelled nihilistic right up to the present. In a 
relatively recent account, we read that the Madhyamaka School reaches a ―radical nihilist 
position,‖ as it ―denies the true existence, the existence as it appears, of the empirical 
reality‖ and suggests that ―all beings and things, contingent by their own nature, which 
constitute the empirical reality, are unreal, non-existent‖ (Tola and Dragonetti 1995, xvi). 
By contrast, emptiness, the authors claim, ―is the true reality,‖ and it ―has been, is and 
will be always there independently from our analysis‖ (Tola and Dragonetti 1995, xxii). It 
seems hard to reconcile claims such as these with Nāgārjuna‘s insistence that he defends 
no position, and they do not tally with his refusal to affirm either existence or emptiness. 
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 For example, MMK 24 is an extended argument against nihilism, where Nāgārjuna shows that, contrary 
to his opponent‘s charge it is belief in svabhāva, and not emptiness, that renders the Buddhist spiritual goal 
impossible to attain (Garfield 1995, 302–303). In MMK 15:7, 11, he refers explicitly to the Kaccāyanagotta 
Sutta and identifies as the error of nihilism, the view that ―it existed before but doesn‘t now‖ (Garfield 
1995, 224). 
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A similar misunderstanding lies behind some of David Burton‘s comments. He believes 
that  
 
[T]he knowledge-claim that all entities lack svabhāva entails nihilism 
(despite Nāgārjuna‘s advocacy of the Middle Path between nihilism and 
eternalism). Expressed very briefly, this is because...if there is nothing 
unconstructed out of which and by whom/which conceptually constructed 
entities can be constructed, then it is impossible that those conceptually 
constructed entities themselves can exist (Burton 2001, 4; insert and 
emphases in original).   
 
As I hope to show in the following pages, this kind of view results from a lingering urge 
to establish the truth of some claim, and from a residual tendency to see things 
dualistically. On this understanding, an entity must either exist or not exist, and every 
statement must be true or false. Nāgārjuna, however, was concerned with overturning 
precisely this view of reality, and reducing the compulsion, in followers of the Buddhist 
Path, to conceive of reality always in terms of existence and nonexistence.  
Nevertheless, Nāgārjuna‘s choice of terminology and methods do appear to lean 
towards the ―nonexistence‘ side of the ontological debate, and to this extent, the 
Madhyamaka lends itself to a nihilistic reading. Emptiness, for instance, seems to be an 
inherently negative concept. Although Nāgārjuna uses the word in a very specific sense, 
it has a long history of use with multiple senses within Buddhism, some of which allude 
to nonexistence.
 68
 For instance, in the Pāli scripture entitled Cula Suññatta Sutta—a 
central Yogācārin text—emptiness is explained through the example of a forest being 
empty of villages and people, or again, space that is empty of earth (M iii 104–105; 
Thanissaro). Emptiness, in this context, is defined in terms of what is not there, and 
therefore, this might explain why later commentators interpreted it as nonexistence 
(Nagao 1992, 210). The generally negative connotations of emptiness are also amplified 
by the pervasive use of non-affirming negations. Since we are accustomed to thinking in 
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 Chang explains that the term was originally derived from the word for ―swell,‖ and therefore, he 
interprets emptiness as being ―swollen‖ or ―inflated,‖ in the sense that something empty appears to be real 
and substantial, but is actually hollow and empty (Chang 1991, 60). ―Swollen‖ and ―inflated,‖ however, 
also seem to have a sense of something being added, as in something that appears embellished, to be more 
than it actually is. Emptiness, then, could also mean that something extra appears, and this, of course, 
would be svabhāva. 
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dualistic terms, it is understandable that Nāgārjuna‘s negation of existence would be read 
as an affirmation of nonexistence. 
It is often said that the early Yogācārins, with whom this section will deal, were 
reacting to this tendency towards a nihilistic interpretation of Mahāyāna Buddhist 
philosophy. They have been read, for instance, as a response to the ―danger inherent in 
the doctrine of emptiness‖ (Nagao 1992, 214), and their purpose described as that of 
―correcting [the] misunderstanding of the meaning of śūnyatā...as unqualified nihilism,‖ 
thereby rendering it ―less frightening‖ (Willis 2002, 17). Unfortunately, this attitude risks 
downgrading the subtle and intriguing Yogācārin philosophy into mere expedient means, 
presenting it as an inferior version of the truth for those not ready to hear the highest 
doctrine, or as a teaching, as it were, for children caught in a burning house. Even more 
damagingly, it seems to elevate the nihilistic interpretation of the Madhyamaka into 
ultimate truth, and construes the Yogācāra as a sort of ―sugar coating‖ to hide its 
unpleasant consequences.  
On the other hand, if both schools are taken to represent definitive teachings, 
there appear to be several discrepancies between them, which are sometimes regarded as 
controversial (cf., Nagao 1992, 54; King 1994). Over the centuries, Madhyamaka and 
Yogācāra have tended to be polarized into two radically opposed positions, so that the 
standard account of the Buddhist Four Tenet System presents them as lying in contrast 
with each other. In fact, in many monasteries, Tibetan monks learn to refute the latter 
using standard Mādhyamika argumentation (cf. Hopkins 1996, 374–397).  
In this section, I intend to emphasize the similarities, rather than discrepancies 
between the two schools, and to show how both philosophical systems allude to the same 
―truth,‖ albeit viewed from different perspectives. This may appear surprising given what 
was said above. Yet Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu all coincide on one particular 
point; namely, the ineffability of the highest truth. Any attempt to articulate ultimate 
reality, therefore, will necessarily miss its target, and this explains the discrepancies 
between the two schools. Every proposition, being merely conventional, will always 
appear to endorse either of the extremes, and while the Madhyamaka tends to fall on the 
side of nonexistence, the Yogācāra re-affirms existence. 
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 I start with an outline of the central Yogācārin doctrine of the ineffability of 
ultimate truth and explain this with reference to the doctrine of Three Self-Natures 
(trisvabhāva). The generally positive flavour of Yogācārin thought will emerge in their 
reinstatement of svabhāva as ultimate reality, while their agreement with Madhyamaka 
can be seen in the belief that this cannot be captured with words. While Yogācārin 
philosophers seem reluctant, at times, to assert either existence or nonexistence, a central, 
although rather cryptic phrase in Vasubandhu‘s works talks about the existence, the 
nonexistence, and finally, the existence of that nonexistence. Therefore, as we also see in 
the doctrine of the Three Self-Natures, instead of using a dual system, like Nāgārjuna 
does with his Two Truths, the Yogācāra resort to a triad. I argue that in this way, the 
Yogācāra is able to bring out the positive aspect of the experience of emptiness; rather 
than making an ontological claim, the phrase is to be understood as emphasizing an 
encounter with ultimate reality. 
I then turn to a common misinterpretation of the Yogācāra that construes them as 
idealists; as arguing for the reality of the mind, or for the nonexistence of external 
objects. I argue that this reading arises through misunderstanding Vasubandhu‘s 
arguments to be ontological claims, rather than instructions on how to realize emptiness. 
Vasubandhu, it has been argued, often sets up provisional constructs, which he then 
dissolves, and to grasp at these as implying either existence or nonexistence is to misread 
his intentions altogether. I hope to show that, in general, Mādhyamika and Yogācārin 
philosophy tend to cohere well, and therefore, if it is true that Nāgārjuna‘s thought is 
consistent with the Buddha‘s original message, as suggested in the previous section, it 
will also be true of the Yogācāra.  
 
Yogācāra and the Ineffable Self-Nature 
 
In the early Yogācārin texts, we often find the same sort of claims about the ineffability 
and indescribability of ultimate reality, which we encountered in Mahāyāna sūtras as 
well as in Nāgārjuna‘s works. For instance, Asaṅga states that reality is ―above the 
categories of thought,‖ that is, it ―goes beyond...existence and nonexistence‖ (MSA 9.24; 
Shastri 1989, 20) and in a phrase that echoes Nāgārjuna, as well as several Pāli texts, we 
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hear that the Buddha did not ever teach anything (MSA 12.2; Shastri 1989, 20). Thus far, 
then, it appears that Yogācārin philosophers agree with the Madhyamaka that nothing can 
be said, properly, of ultimate truth, that our statements are always inadequate to express 
it.  
The chapter on ―Knowing Reality,‖ in Asaṅga‘s Bodhisattvabhūmi, provides a 
cogent explanation of this claim. Dharmas, that is, the objects of our perception, do not 
correspond in a direct relation to the names that we use to refer to them; in fact, there is 
often more than one name for a single phenomenon. Therefore, if words are supposed to 
express the essential nature of a thing—and here Asaṅga has in mind its svabhāva—then 
that thing would have to have several essential natures. This is clearly impossible, as long 
as ‗nature‘ is understood in terms of svabhāva.69 Moreover, since there is no universal 
agreement about what a particular thing ought to be called, this further demonstrates that 
the relation between a thing‘s svabhāva and its name is merely a contingent one. This 
leads Asaṅga to conclude that the ultimate nature of things is inexpressible; words simply 
cannot point to it (Willis 2002, 158–160).  
What strikes one immediately, from this account, is that Asaṅga adopts precisely 
the opposite approach to Nāgārjuna. While the latter appeared to negate svabhāva 
altogether, Asaṅga starts from the premise that it exists, but goes on to claim that it is 
inexpressible. This, I want to suggest, actually turns out to be saying the same thing. It 
will be recalled that Nāgārjuna did not categorically deny the existence of svabhāva; his 
final position on the topic is that a wise man does not say that it exists nor that it does not 
exist (MMK 15:10). Later Mādhyamika philosophers argued that when one looks for 
svabhāva, it is not found. Similarly, Asaṅga tells us that svabhāva cannot be captured 
with words, concepts, or thought; according to him, too, svabhāva is ineffable. Therefore, 
although one starts from a provisional negation of svabhāva, and the other from an 
affirmation, in the end, both concur that it cannot be expressed.  
Yet, although it cannot be expressed, the key point to Asaṅga‘s chapter is that 
svabhāva, the true nature of things, is knowable. It seems, then, svabhāva takes on a new 
meaning here, and this corresponds to Candrakīrti‘s third definition, translated as 
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 The reader will recall that svabhāva has the sense of unity and irreducibility, whereas an entity with 
multiple essential properties can be divided, conceptually, into parts. 
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―absolute-svabhāva.‖ Westerhoff explains that ―svabhāva is both a mistaken ascription 
made by beings with deficient cognitive abilities as well as something that does not 
appear to such beings, [that is,] there are two different conceptions of svabhāva here‖ 
(2009, 41). Another way of putting it is to say that absolute-svabhāva, ultimate truth, or 
the real nature of things is their conventionality, that is, their lack of substance- and 
essence-svabhāva, their emptiness. Again, therefore, we have an example of the deeply 
nondualistic nature of Mahāyāna thought; it is not that there is a contrast between having 
and not having svabhāva; instead, the two are identified. 
This would seem to suggest that absolute-svabhāva, the conventional nature of 
reality (that is, emptiness), must therefore exist. Certain phrases in the texts might be 
taken to affirm existence, yet, it is dubitable that Asaṅga and his half-brother and 
commentator Vasubandhu, would have adopted this as their final position, given the 
numerous declarations about ineffability and going beyond existence and nonexistence. 
Interpreting Yogācārin thought as an affirmation of existence, I will argue, results from 
an arbitrary focus on certain passages, which may have been intended as provisional 
constructs. Before focusing on the way Yogācāra has been misinterpreted, more needs to 
be said about what it is, exactly, that it affirms. 
 
The Doctrine of Trisvabhāva 
 
The starting point, for the Yogācāra then, is to determine how this ultimate, inexpressible 
reality is known. This is where their central theory, the doctrine of trisvabhāva, comes in. 
Reality, in their view, can be known in three ways; there is a ―mentally constructed and 
therefore imaginary nature‖ (parikalpita), a ―dependent, or relative nature‖ (paratantra), 
and a ―perfected or absolute,‖ consummated nature (pariniṣpanna). According to Willis, 
the first of these, the imaginary nature, corresponds to Nāgārjuna‘s conventional truth 
(Willis 2002, 18). Similarly, Nagao explains that the imagined is that which is perceived 
by deluded beings; through our cognitions, discriminations, and intellect, he says, we 
ascribe concepts, identities, characteristics, and so forth to an originally neutral, 
phenomenal world (Nagao 1992, 63). This is what gives rise to dualism, where, as 
Asaṅga puts it, we imagine that ―this is this and not that‖ (cited in Willis 2002, 150). The 
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parallel between this account of the imagined nature, and that given in the previous 
section of conventional truth should be evident.  
The consummated nature, on the other hand, is the perfected world of enlightened 
beings, which is purified from this false imagination, so that differentiations and dualisms 
disappear. Therefore, according to Willis, there is a rough equivalence with emptiness 
and nirvana, and with ultimate truth. In between the imagined and the perfected natures, 
acting as a bridge, there is the ‗other-dependent‘ nature, which ―account[s] for the 
practical passage to liberation by providing for the transition in awareness from 
conventional to absolute knowing‖ (Willis 2002, 18). 
In Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, Vasubandhu explains the three natures as follows. That 
which appears, he says, is the other-dependent, how it appears to ordinary beings is the 
imagined, whereas the consummated can be described as the absence of how it appears in 
that which appears (TSN 2–3; Anacker 2002, 291). There is a highly intimate relation 
between the three natures, then; the consummated is the other-dependent freed of the 
imagined, and Vasubandhu says that realization of the consummated and other-dependent 
occur together. This follows, of course, from the fact that the former is simply the latter 
without the added element that constitutes the imaginary (Nagao 1992, 71). Therefore, it 
appears that, pace Willis, it is the consummated together with the other-dependent that 
correspond to Nāgārjuna‘s ultimate truth.  
One might wonder why there are three natures in the Yogācārin system, instead of 
a dual system as in Nāgārjuna‘s Two Truths. Prima facie, there seems to be no point in 
adding a third nature to refer to the absence of the first in the second. To use an analogy, 
suppose we represent the other-dependent as a wine glass, and take the wine inside it to 
stand for the imagined, something that is added to the other-dependent.
70
 Do we then 
need a third concept to refer to the consummated, which in this case, is simply the empty 
wine glass, that is, the other-dependent, without the imagined? Nāgārjuna‘s method did 
not require a third concept as he generally negated the added extra, the imagined 
svabhāva, or, in terms of our metaphor, he simply pointed out that the wine glass is free 
of wine. He also emphasized that emptiness, the wine glass being free of wine, is empty 
too, and must not be thought of as an independent reality, or as an ultimately existent 
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 The wine and glass analogy, although not the use I make of it here, is from King 1994. 
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entity. In the end, as we have seen, Nāgārjuna refused to affirm the existence of 
emptiness and of svabhāva and he refused to affirm their nonexistence too. 
Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, instead, introduce a third concept, and, rather 
surprisingly perhaps, they affirm its existence. We frequently encounter statements about 
the existence of emptiness in Yogācārin texts, or, to use their terminology, it is said that 
the consummated nature, the absence of the imagined in the other-dependent, exists. A 
key phrase that is often cited in this context comes from Asaṅga‘s Madhyāntavibhāga 
and Vasubandhu‘s commentary on it: 
  
[E]verything is taught as neither empty nor non-empty 
Because of [1] its existence, [2] its non-existence, and [3] its existence 
And this is the Middle Path (MVB 1.2; Anacker 2005, 212). 
 
The first and third lines are evocative of Nāgārjuna‘s MMK; it is mainly the second that 
requires clarification. The subject ―everything,‖ explains Vasubandhu, is the imagined 
nature, which (1) exists conventionally, to use Mādhyamika terms, and yet (2) does not 
exist independently, or with svabhāva. In other words, as we are told in MVB 3.3,71 the 
imagined nature has both an existent and a non-existent quality to it; it exists somehow 
because dualistic appearances always arise, yet it does not exist as it appears to. That is to 
say, we impute the imagined or constructed nature onto reality, where we see independent 
objects and perceivers, absolute existents and non-existents, and so forth, and to that 
extent, they exist. Yet, the duality that we project does not (truly) exist there (Anacker 
2005, 212).  
So far, all this might sound like a rewording of the Two Truths doctrine. It is the 
final part of the statement, the third attribute of existence (3), which needs explanation. In 
fact, the term ―existence of nonexistence‖ is a special feature of, even ―the basic principle 
for,‖ the Yogācārin interpretation of emptiness (Nagao 1992, 54, 57) and it has been 
commented upon extensively, both in ancient and modern times. Vasubandhu tells us that 
it refers to the existence of emptiness in the imagined, and of the imagined in emptiness 
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 Anacker translates this verse as ―It‘s non-existent, and it is always; it exists, and yet not really; it‘s really 
existent and non-existent: in this way three own-beings [trisvabhāva] are assented to‖ (2005, 232). 
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(Anacker 2002, 212). Thus, there are two parts to the claim, which I shall be examining 
individually.  
The first existence is that of ―emptiness in the imagined.‖ As we have seen, the 
Yogācāra equates emptiness with nonduality, or as Vasubandhu puts it, with ―the non-
existence of duality‖ (MVB commentary to 1.2; Anacker 2005, 212). Perhaps one might 
characterize this as the nonexistence of the way things appear to us, that is, the absence of 
dualisms of subject and object, ‗is‘ and ‗is not,‘ and so forth. MVB 1.2, therefore, 
suggests that this nonexistence of duality exists. Prima facie, this seems to suggest that, 
as Bhāvaviveka complained, hundreds of years after Vasubandhu, when the Yogācāra 
speak of ‗the existence of emptiness,‘ what they refer to is the existence of an illusion 
(cited in King 1994, 676). 
Yet, if we compare this verse to Anacker‘s translation of TSN 3, mentioned above, 
an interesting fact about the precise meaning of ―nonexistence‖ as used in this context is 
revealed. In this verse, Vasubandhu has defined the consummated nature as the absence 
of ―how it appears‖ in that which appears (Anacker 2005, 291). The term he uses to refer 
to this absence is ―avidyamāna‖ (Anacker 2005, 464), which Capeller‘s Sanskrit-English 
Dictionary renders, straightforwardly, as ―nonexistence.‖72 However, the root of the 
word, ‗vid,‘ suggests, ―to know,‖ ―notice,‖ and ―observe,‖ among many other 
connotations, and is related to the well-known term avidya¸ or ―ignorance.‖ ‗Vidyamāna‘ 
is the passive present participle form, ―being found,‖73 and the prefix ‗a-‘ renders the 
term into a negative. Anacker, therefore, translates avidyamāna as ―the constant state of 
not being found‖ (2005, 291).  
It would appear then, that as well as ―nonexistence‖ or ―absence,‖ the concept that 
is being alluded to, here, is the positive experience of not finding. This differs from the 
concept of nonexistence in that, while it is hard to imagine what the ―existence of 
nonexistence of duality‖ could mean, to talk about ―the existence of the experience of not 
finding duality‖ seems to make more sense. Instead of affirming the existence of an 
illusion, as Bhāvaviveka supposed Vasubandhu was doing, a more plausible account is 
that he was emphasizing the experience of duality as illusory, stressing the need for an 
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 Online dictionary at http://webapps.uni-koeln.de/tamil/; Search item= ―avidyamAna‖ 
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 Online dictionary at http://webapps.uni-koeln.de/tamil/; Search item= ―vid,‖ ―avidya,‖ ―vidyamAna‖ 
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authentic encounter with emptiness. Once again, rather than an ontological claim about 
existence or nonexistence, such discourse amounts to a practical instruction for attaining 
knowledge of the consummated nature, and this would tie in perfectly with the expressed 
purpose of Yogācāra, which is evidenced by its very name.74 In other words, what 
Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are saying, on this reading, is that the consummated nature is 
not merely the ―arithmetical remainder‖75 of the other-dependent minus the added 
imagined nature that we ascribe to it, the wine glass without the wine, as it were. Rather, 
it is a familiarity with the deceptive nature of the imagined, or, the ―constant state-of-not-
being-found‖ (avidyamāna) of dualism, a state that is attained through the practice of 
yoga. This, of course, is the experience of emptiness.  
Perhaps here we have found a significant reason for the introduction of the third 
nature. By negating svabhāva and emptiness, Nāgārjuna was unable to bring out the 
consummate aspect of ultimate reality; the Yogācārins needed a third nature to refer to 
the same idea that Candrakīrti alluded to through his description of absolute-svabhāva in 
positive terms. It is here, too, that we see how the Yogācāra was able to protect the 
Mahāyāna from nihilism. While the following is merely speculative, it seems reasonable 
to suppose that some Mādhyamika philosophers were guilty of a similar charge that 
Nāgārjuna had brought against certain Ᾱbhidharmikas, of turning the Dharma into a dry 
philosophy. It often occurred throughout Buddhist history that its followers became 
attached to certain doctrines and their exposition, and it is likely that ordinary, unrealized 
scholars could become adept at negating the propositions of others, in the style of 
Nāgārjuna, and yet have no direct experience of emptiness. Without the experience of the 
enlightened state, it is probable that nihilism would ensue; as we saw, Mādhyamika 
reasoning tends to lean towards nonexistence. Thus, perhaps the Yogācārins saw their 
task as that of placing the emphasis on affirmation once again, and what they affirmed 
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 ―Yogācāra‖ literally means ―the practice of yoga,‖ and it is well known that their focus was mainly on 
meditation and not philosophy (cf. Nagao 1992, 51–52). Anacker interprets Vasubandhu as being mainly 
―interested in the psychological processes which allow us to reach a state where ‗the lack of own-beings 
[svabhāva] in events‘ is realized...[that is] in showing a path, conceived of in conventional terms, which 
leads to the abandonment of all mental constructions‖ (2005, 273). Nāgārjuna, on the other hand, may be 
characterized, perhaps, as interested in outlining the ‗right view,‘ or rather, in explaining why this could 
only be the abandonment of all views.  Therefore, although the distinction must not be interpreted too 
rigidly, it might be said that the former leans towards psychology and the latter towards philosophy. 
75
 The terms is Nagao‘s (1992, 59). 
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was the actual experience of emptiness. In this way, they were able to protect the 
Mahāyāna doctrines from becoming a mere exercise in demolishing the views of others, 
and to set out, once more, the path to enlightenment, which starts precisely from the 
experience of emptiness on the first bodhisattva-ground (bodhisattvabhūmi). 
The second part of the Vasubandhu‘s statement affirms ―the existence of the 
imagined in emptiness.‖ Thus while the first half constitutes a sort of affirmation of 
emptiness, the second is an affirmation of conventional appearances. As we have seen, 
Vasubandhu says that the imagined nature has both an existent and a non-existent aspect, 
and he explains that this is why things are neither empty nor nonempty (MVB 1.2; 
Anacker 2005, 212). In other words, this is another warning not to grasp at emptiness too 
tightly, for instance, by disregarding the imagined nature entirely, or conceiving it as 
absolutely unreal. The imagined too exists, he says, although not in the way it appears. A 
few writers have seemed to focus too one-sidedly on this affirmation of existence, 
forgetting that whatever is affirmed is said to exist in emptiness, and therefore not 
inherently. The next section turns to some of these misunderstandings. 
  
Misinterpretations of the Yogācāra 
 
The Yogācāra is generally construed as a form of idealism; it is believed to amount to a 
―mind-only‖ position, according to which only consciousness is ultimately real. Often, 
the discussion focuses on the question of which type of Western idealism—typically, 
metaphysical, absolute and epistemic idealism—corresponds most closely with the 
Yogācāra School (Trivedi 2005, 232). According to Alex Wayman, this is one of several 
well-established misinterpretations of the Yogācāra, which have been transmitted down 
generations for centuries (Wayman 1996, 447). There are two sides to this alleged 
Yogācārin view; the first is that only mind truly exists, the second is that external objects 
do not exist at all. Therefore, I will consider two separate charges; first, that in affirming 
existence of mind the Yogācārins are reificationists, and second, that their idealism 
implies a negation of the existence of external objects.  
 The basis for this reading of the Yogācāra lies in the Daśabhūmika Sūtra, which 
is held to be one of the basic scriptures of the Mahāyāna, and on which Vasubandhu 
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wrote an extensive commentary (Wayman 1996, 452–3). The sūtra contains an important 
statement usually rendered as, ―This triple-world is mind only.‖76 Wayman proposes that 
this phrase could have inspired a well-known statement by Vasubandhu, which is 
commonly cited as evidence of his idealism (1996, 452). Anacker translates it as follows: 
 
All this is perception-only, because of the appearance of non-existent 
objects, just as there may be the seeing of non-existent nets of hair by 
someone afflicted with an optical disorder (VK 1.1; Anacker, 2005, 161). 
 
Vasubandhu is often taken to be implying, here, that external objects do not exist (at all) 
and that mind alone, or ‗perception-only‘ truly exists (e.g., Feldman 2005).77 Trivedi 
however disagrees; he suggests that, in this line, Vasubandhu is making an 
epistemological point and not an ontological one. ―All this,‖ he argues, does not refer to 
the external world; rather, it denotes ―phenomena as they appear to us‖ (Trivedi 2005, 
236).
78
 Therefore, Vasubandhu‘s point, on this reading, is that unless we are 
accomplished yogis, we are never able to get out of our ordinary consciousness and the 
way it represents the world. There is a marked similarity between this interpretation and 
the philosophy of Kant, who argued that we are never able to go beyond a phenomenon 
or to reach the ―thing-in-itself,‖ the noumenon. As Trivedi points out, this does not entail 
a denial of the existence of objects; in fact, it says nothing at all about whether or not 
there is an external world. Trivedi cites the auto-commentary in support of this claim, 
where Vasubandhu explains that, ―through determination of perception-only there is 
entry into selflessness of all events, and not by a denial of their existence‖ (Trivedi 2005, 
236). 
 In other words, once more Vasubandhu is making a point about praxis, 
explaining that through recognizing dharmas for what they are, that is, by understanding 
phenomena to be ―perception-only,‖ we are able to realize their emptiness, or, to use his 
word, their ―selflessness.‖ Put this way, the issue of whether or not external objects exist 
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 Wayman disagrees with this interpretation, and prefers to translate the sentence as ―whatever is a 
derivative of this world is mind only‖ claiming that the passage refers only to that which is added in 
ignorance, that is, the imagined nature (2002, 454). 
77
 One must bear in mind that, for Buddhists, ―perception‖ includes mental cognition, and therefore, 
―perception-only‖ refers to all kinds of conscious experience. 
78
 Feldman, on the other hand, takes ―all this‖ to mean ―all (external) things in the world‖ (2005, 530–531). 
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is completely avoided and in fact, Vasubandhu is actually warning us against taking this 
approach. This, therefore, coheres with the interpretation given above according to which 
for the Yogācāra, as for the Madhyamaka, the highest reality is inexpressible, and the 
enlightened being avoids making claims about existence and nonexistence. The doctrine 
of ―mind-only,‖ or better, ―perception-only,‖ on this account, is merely a provisional 
construct intended as an aid to realizing emptiness. In a further text, Vasubandhu 
specifies that one must experience the emptiness of ―perception-only‖ too (TK 25–27; 
Anacker 2005, 189).
79
  
 Vasubandhu explains, in these verses, that to grasp at the idea that ―all this is 
perception-only,‖ (and, one might add here, that this true of most idealists) involves a 
dualism; on the one hand, there is the object, perception-only, which one claims to 
perceive, and on the other, there is a subject who perceives the object. Thus, the idea is 
dissolved, as it is seen to involve another perception, and to be, consequently, 
―perception-only‖ (TK 27). The relation between this verse, and Nāgārjuna‘s doctrine on 
the emptiness of emptiness should be clear; both consist of a warning not to remain 
attached to any Buddhist doctrine, and a reminder that each one needs to be discarded 
along the way.  
 Vasubandhu makes his provisional case for perception-only by likening all 
experience to dreams, mirages, and other types of illusions. Joel Feldman reads the 
argument as follows: just as in dreams, we have perceptions of objects that do not exist, 
similarly, waking experiences are illusory because there, too, the objects do not exist. He 
objects that such arguments from illusion are ―parasitical on veridical experiences‖ 
(2005, 532, 535), that is to say, in order to determine an experience as illusory we must 
have at least one example of something that is real. Feldman claims that Vasubandhu‘s 
conclusion, namely, that all experiences are illusory, nullifies his premise; if all 
experiences are illusory, then we have no experience of anything real, and yet, this is 
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 Anacker translates the passage as follows: 
  
 As long as consciousness is not situated within perception-only 
 The residues of a ―dual‖ apprehension will not come to an end. 
 And so even with the consciousness: ―All this is perception only‖, 
 Because this also involves an apprehension, 
 For whatever makes something stop in front of it isn‘t situated in ―this-only‖ (2005, 188–189). 
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required in order to recognize an illusory experience (2005, 535–540). Construed this 
way, of course, the argument is susceptible to the criticism Feldman levels at it. 
 However, Anacker suggests, in his introduction to this text, that Vasubandhu‘s 
alleged negation of the external object is, in actual fact, denying only a perceptible 
object. That is, to reiterate, we have a Kantian-style argument to the effect that we can 
never perceive the noumenon. ―Since all experienced realities are equally without a 
perceptible externally existing reality,‖ he writes, ―the difference between illusion and 
reality falls away‖ (Anacker 2002, 159). In other words, Vasubandhu is denying the 
ability to know the external object, and not negating its existence, as Feldman believes. 
Thus, the argument takes on a completely different sense. What Vasubandhu is saying is 
that we cannot know whether the objects of our waking experience are any more real than 
those in our dreams; or again, that there is no way of establishing that the desk I see in 
front of me is real whereas the falling hairs seen by a person suffering from an 
ophthalmic disorder are not. In both cases, we cannot actually experience the noumena, 
and therefore, as long as ‗real‘ is taken to mean ―corresponding to a truly existent 
external object,‖ the distinction between illusion and real collapses.  
Anacker emphasizes that Vasubandhu sets up several provisional constructs, in 
the opening lines of his works, only to dissolve them at the end (2002, 2–3). ―Perception-
only‖ is not to be taken as an ultimate affirmation of consciousness, but as a device for 
experiencing emptiness, by reminding ourselves that whatever we perceive is, and can 
only ever be, our perception. Lest we become attached to ―perception-only‖ Vasubandhu 
warns us that this idea too, is just that, an idea. Similarly, claiming that our experience is 
like an illusion is not to be taken as implying the nonexistence of external reality. 
Ultimately, neither Vasubandhu nor Asaṅga wanted to assert existence or nonexistence, 
and therefore, the questions of whether they affirm or negate the external world or the 
mind seem to be completely misplaced. Perhaps to these questions, the brothers might 
have responded in the same way as the Buddha, that is, by refusing to respond. Our 
insistence on wanting an answer points to our tendency to view things dualistically, to 
conceive of reality always in terms of existence and nonexistence. Yet, if ultimately 
reality is a non-conceptual, nondual, ineffable state, then clearly all questions about what 
exists and what does not exist are irrelevant. 
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 To conclude, it might be said that, contrary to many interpretations, this reading 
of Mahāyāna philosophy has not found any irreconcilable differences between the 
Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. A standard Tibetan position, in this respect, regards 
Nāgārjuna as exemplifying the highest philosophical understanding, while the Yogācāra 
is held supreme in terms of instruction for meditation. This makes perfect sense, of 
course, considering that the Yogācāra‘s stated purpose is to set out the path, while 
Nāgārjuna‘s was to refute wrong views. 
 
Summary 
 
This section has argued that, in general, the Yogācārin philosophy coincides with the 
Madhyamaka, in that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, like Nāgārjuna, believed in the 
inexpressibility of ultimate truth. While the Madhyamaka tends to focus more on a 
negative concept, the Yogācārins steered towards a positive account of emptiness. Given 
the belief in inexpressibility, however, neither of these is to be taken as a statement of 
ultimate truth, and Vasubandhu, just like Nāgārjuna and the Buddha himself, 
systematically dismantles his own constructions, so that all propositions about existence 
are eventually turned into ones about neither existence nor nonexistence. 
Yogācāra thought starts from the premise that there is an ultimate reality, which is 
equated with absolute-svabhāva, and that this reality can be known. Yet, the fact that 
there are several words that refer to the same thing suggests that the true nature of all 
things cannot be captured with words. The true nature, of course, is none other than 
emptiness, which the Yogācāra explains through the doctrine of the Three Natures. 
Reality is described, in keeping with Buddhist doctrine, to have an other-dependent 
nature. It is generally known in its imagined nature, where we impute all sorts of 
concepts and dualisms onto our experience of the other-dependent nature. Enlightened 
beings, on the other hand, experience reality in its consummated nature, or as emptiness, 
which is explained as the other-dependent without the imagined aspect. It was pointed out 
that the other-dependent and the consummated are intimately related, and that they are 
realized together. 
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In bringing in a third nature in addition to the two truths, it was suggested that the 
Yogācārins are able to insulate Mahāyāna philosophy from nihilism. The other-dependent 
nature was compared to a wine glass, while the imagined nature was represented by wine, 
and by introducing, as a third concept, the consummated as the absence of wine, and by 
claiming that it exists, the Yogācārins provide room for a positive view of emptiness. 
What they affirm, I argued, is the actual experience of emptiness, the ―constant not-
finding of duality,‖ and the experience of the imagined, which has both an existent and a 
non-existent quality to it. Importantly, nowhere is either emptiness or the imagined 
claimed to exist absolutely.  
Finally, I argued against construing the Yogācāra as a form of idealism. I 
examined two implications of this view, that consciousness exists and that external 
objects do not exist. I argued that in those passages that are generally believed to support 
such an interpretation, Vasubandhu is making an epistemological and not an ontological 
point, and that they are to be regarded as provisional constructs. Thus, when Vasubandhu 
says ―all this is perception only‖ what he means is that one can never get beyond 
phenomena to the noumena, and that, by meditating on this one realizes emptiness. Even 
the idea ―all this is perception-only,‖ is to be regarded as such—as only an idea—and not 
as something the meditator must grasp at. Similarly, the analogy between ordinary 
experience and illusion does not imply that external objects do not exist; Vasubandhu is 
only denying the possibility of knowing them. Since we can never know the external 
object, we cannot know whether our waking experience is any more real than our dreams, 
and the distinction between ‗illusory‘ and ‗real‘ as we generally understand these words 
collapses. 
In short, it would appear that there is a great deal more consistency between the 
thoughts of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu than is often claimed. In general, both 
Mahāyāna schools agree on the ineffability of ultimate truth, the need to relinquish views, 
and the nonduality of reality. In the rest of this chapter, I will examine the consequences 
of these Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrines on environmental philosophy, and in particular, on 
the difficulties for green Buddhism that were identified in chapter 1.  
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3 Mahāyāna Environmentalism; a Preliminary Discussion 
 
Clearly, we cannot expect to find material in Nāgārjuna and other ancient Buddhist 
philosophers, which is directly related to environmental issues, since these are a relatively 
recent Western concern. Nevertheless, the Mahāyāna worldview will have bearing on the 
possibility of establishing a green Buddhism, to the extent that it either supports or 
contradicts the assumptions of environmentalism. At the start of this chapter, it was 
argued that the key difference in the Mahāyāna is its identification of nirvana with 
saṃsāra. As we have seen, the Madhyamaka regards these as two different ways of 
perceiving reality, and yet, even this characterization suggests a modicum of dualism that 
Nāgārjuna would have rejected. It was said that the Buddha perceives conventional 
reality—that is, he perceives the samsaric world itself and not anything different from 
it—and yet he perceives it as a conventional reality, and in this way, he perceives its 
emptiness.  
It would seem, then, that the Mahāyāna has the resources to respond to some of 
the main problems for green Buddhism identified in chapter 1; namely, that Buddhism is 
world-rejecting, that it attributes negative value to the natural world, and conceives of 
happiness and well-being in a completely different way from environmentalists. If the 
ordinary world of saṃsāra does not need to be abandoned entirely in order to reach 
nirvana, then it seems clear that these criticisms no longer apply. In order to attain 
nondual awareness, and to go beyond regarding nirvana and saṃsāra as opposed to each 
other, the status of saṃsāra as conventional reality needs to be reconsidered. This is 
because nirvana is reached precisely through the conventional world of dependent co-
origination, and it is nothing different from that. In Mādhyamika terms, ultimate reality is 
the conventional nature of the conventional, or, as the Yogācārins would say, it is the 
same world of the dependent co-origination, seen without the duality we mistakenly 
attribute to it. Thus, the conventional realm would seem to be indispensable for the 
realization of the ultimate truth and the bodhisattva must experience the emptiness of 
ordinary phenomena in the world of nature, in order to attain enlightenment. Therefore, it 
cannot be correct to say that Buddhism is world-rejecting, or that it ascribes a negative 
value to nature. 
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For the Mahāyāna, nirvana is something that is attained in this very world, and 
nowhere else, and the duality between ordinary well-being and the highest happiness, 
suffering and liberation, this-world, and the other-world is dissolved. On this account, the 
Buddha‘s likening of physical health and well-being to suffering, and his discourse about 
seeking a higher form of happiness can be regarded as an example of expedient means, 
intended to reduce his listeners‘ attachment to worldly pleasures and as inspiration to 
seek a more spiritual fulfilment. Within the Mahāyāna, ultimately, there is no opposition 
between the enlightened state and the ordinary world, and if some texts seem to imply the 
contrary, this can be taken as a preliminary stage in the process of realizing their 
nonduality. 
The identification between nirvana and saṃsāra becomes strongly pronounced in 
those branches of the Mahāyāna that focus on attaining rebirth in a Pure Land. Generally, 
this is conceived of as a place located ―a hundred thousand million Buddha-fields from 
where we are... [and where] physical and mental pain are unknown‖ (Sv §6–7; Gōmez 
2002, 16). Rebirth in a Pure Land is considered ideal for Dharma practice, in that 
eventual enlightenment is guaranteed. Moreover, these lands are described as places of 
astounding beauty, and perfectly suited to their inhabitants‘ needs, and, therefore, it 
becomes part of the bodhisattva‘s aspiration to create a Pure Land for sentient beings to 
inhabit.  
The introduction of Pure Land discourse is problematic for green Buddhism; it 
has been pointed out that these are hardly natural landscapes at all, and other than trees 
and plants made of precious metals and stones, the only living beings inhabiting them are 
highly evolved bodhisattvas and magical birds whose sole purpose is to inspire 
practitioners with their Dharma songs—hardly natural beings, that is (Schmithausen 
1991, 16). There are no ecological relations, as ordinary food and other sources of energy 
are not required, while death, and the suffering it involves, do not exist in these lands 
either. Therefore, at a first glance, it seems unlikely that the environmentalist will be very 
impressed by the Pure Land teachings. 
To respond to this critique, it seems plausible to suggest, first, that in classical 
India, when the idea of a Pure Land began to be formed, nature was not threatened in the 
way that it is today; instead, the reality was quite the reverse, and humans might have felt 
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a lot safer in cities. Besides, with forests, wilderness, and wild animals constituting a part 
of their everyday reality, it is unlikely that these things would have featured in their 
account of a heavenly realm. Indeed, it could be argued that the vision of a world decked 
in gold, silver, and jewels is comprehensible, given the value-system of the times, and it 
has often been argued that only when the West attained a degree of affluence did nature 
and its inhabitants begin to be valued intrinsically (e.g., Hollander 2003, 2). Therefore, 
there is no need to be too disturbed by the fact that there are no animals or other natural 
beings in traditional accounts of Sukhāvatī, the Land of Bliss; instead, these can be 
regarded as merely conventional descriptions of a reality that, strictly speaking, cannot be 
put into words, and today, we might feel compelled to re-describe the Pure Land in a 
more eco-friendly way. 
Second, perhaps these aspects of the teachings might be regarded as expedient 
too, designed for those unable, for the time being, to see the inseparability of saṃsāra 
and nirvana. It must be noted that rebirth in the Pure Land is not the same thing as 
attaining nirvana, but constitutes, as it were, a sort of stepping stone to enlightenment. 
The portrayal of the Pure Land as a fabulous place—without the ordinary features of a 
landscape that make life difficult, such as steep mountain paths, rough terrain, and sheer 
cliffs, and without dangerous animals that threaten lives and livelihood—all these may be 
clever devices intended to encourage practitioners to aspire to attain that state. Perhaps 
they are designed for those of us who grasp at the idea of suffering as something real and 
truly existent in the world. This sort of belief renders us unable to see that, as expressed 
in the Zen tradition, ―This very place is the lotus land [i.e., the Pure Land], this very body 
the Buddha‖ (Hakuin Zenji; cited in Kornfield 1996, 200).  
Indeed, although in the sūtras, the Pure Lands are said to lie at an inconceivable 
distance away, this has not prevented Buddhist peoples from identifying them with places 
on this very earth. As is well-known, there are several legends that place Shambhala in 
the Himalayas, while Adam‘s Peak in Sri Lanka has been identified with the Copper-
Coloured Mountain (Tib. Zangdok Palri), the Pure Land of Padmasambhava.
80
 There are 
several mountains on the Indian subcontinent named ―Potala‖ after Avalokiteśvara‘s Pure 
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 Others believe the Copper Coloured Mountain is in present day Afghanistan. 
  129  
Land, as well as various buildings and other structures. Most prominent of these, of 
course, is the Potala Palace in Lhasa, Tibet, which used to be the Dalai Lama‘s residence.  
The introduction of Pure Land discourse in Mahāyāna Buddhism, therefore, by 
bringing the soteriological goal of enlightenment back down to this earth, re-establishes a 
concern with place and environment. It is no longer the meditator sitting alone under a 
tree, or on a cushion, that forms the ‗unit of nirvana,‘ so to speak; rather the emphasis is 
on universal enlightenment, and the aim is to create a place where this purpose can be 
fulfilled. This implies that, according to the Pure Land teachings, at least, the Buddhist 
soteriological goal requires that the environment be transformed into a better place. The 
notion of a Pure Land can be reinterpreted in terms of ecological health, or biological 
diversity; instead of imaginary birds reciting the sūtras, it can be emphasized how real 
natural beings embody the Dharma, by displaying impermanence, dependent co-
origination, and so forth. In short, the Mahāyāna, as a nondualistic interpretation of the 
Buddha‘s teachings, reduces the weight of the charge that Buddhism is world-denying, or 
that it seeks to promote something very different from that which environmentalists want.     
 Yet, a further problem arises for green Buddhism, which was briefly mentioned in 
chapter 1. This concerns the contradiction in the attempt to reconcile any determinate 
system of values, principles, and beliefs—such as those that fall under the term 
‗environmentalism‘—with the Mahāyāna practitioner‘s stated purpose of renouncing all 
views. Supposing our practitioner was concerned about the effects of climate change on 
the planet, the relentless rate of species extinction, deforestation, the food and water 
crises, and so forth, an important question arises regarding the way the doctrine of 
emptiness affects such concepts and beliefs. It has been argued that emptiness, or 
ultimate truth consists of a middle path between existence and nonexistence, and 
therefore, the next task will be to examine how this might be construed, in relation to 
such matters. It will be argued, in the following chapters, that in environmentalism too, 
there is the extreme of eternalism, where one grasps at a belief in the existence of natural 
beings with svabhāva, as well as an extreme of nihilism, where one infers absolute 
nonexistence, and draws conclusions from this about the meaninglessness of our lives 
and activity, including their effect on the environment.  
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Certainly, if there is grasping at environmental beliefs, for instance, if our green 
Buddhist considers them to be ultimately true, perhaps conceiving of the biosphere, 
ecosystems, species, and the like in terms of svabhāva, then clearly, we have an example 
of wrong view. Ecology is replete with dualisms, such as, stability and disturbance, 
exotic species and natives, health and disease, and to the extent that our green Buddhist 
perceives the environment in terms of such oppositions, it can be said that she perceives 
the imagined nature This would include, for example, grasping at the truth of the claim 
that an invasion of exotic palm weevils is decimating an indigenous plant. It also 
includes, however, the claim that there is no such thing as an exotic species, or, since the 
palm trees would have died anyway, the invasion does not matter. Perhaps enlightenment 
requires the delicate balancing act between knowing that these concepts are imputed, and 
yet knowing that the imagined also exists in a way. One must not be swayed by the belief 
in existence or by the belief in nonexistence, and most importantly, one must be prepared 
to relinquish any view that one might have.  
As I hope has emerged from the section on Yogācāra, as well as relinquishing 
views, there needs to be the experience of emptiness, otherwise, we risk falling into 
nihilism. In the final chapter, I will attempt to re-describe a green Buddhism based on this 
experience. I will suggest that by realizing the emptiness of natural beings, we protect the 
possibility of future evolution, and safeguard the persistence of life on this planet. That is, 
the absolute-svabhāva of natural beings—and here, I include collective entities, such as 
an ecosystem, or the biosphere as a whole—their lack of essence- and substance-
svabhāva, as Nāgārjuna pointed out, is precisely what enables them (and us) to change 
and to respond to changes in the environment. This ability is literally vital; it is what life 
is all about. It is only our delusion that makes us view things rigidly, and to want to pin 
things down as ‗this‘ or ‗that.‘ Therefore, if we follow the Yogācārin advice to realize 
emptiness, as well as reducing our attachment and aversion, which, arguably, are among 
the main causes of environmental degradation, we also permit nature to flourish, and to 
reveal its true nature. This, I would like to suggest, is one way in which the notion of a 
Pure Land can be re-described for our times. 
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C h ap t e r  3 :  One n e ss  w i th  N a tu r e  
 
We saw, in Chapter 1, that early Buddhism is not easily reconciled with environmental 
matters; the concepts required, particularly the idea of nature as intrinsically and 
objectively valuable, do not appear unequivocally in the canon. The Mahāyāna, with its 
nondualistic stance towards nirvana and saṃsāra, seems to imply better prospects for 
green Buddhism. Indeed, from the extent of literature on the subject, it would appear that 
the ecological soundness of the Mahāyāna teachings, as well as their applicability to 
contemporary environmental problems, is entirely unproblematic. In the following 
chapters, I will challenge this idea by appraising various concepts in Mahāyāna green 
Buddhism from the perspective of Mādhyamika and Yogācārin thought.   
I will begin with the strand of eco-spiritualism that focuses on holism, referred to 
in the Introduction. This involves the belief that an appropriate attitude and conduct 
towards the environment—sometimes labelled ‗deep ecology‘—depends on having an 
awareness of the so-called ‗oneness‘ of nature, or of the interrelatedness of all things. It is 
also believed that these realizations coincide with the goal of certain Mahāyāna teachings 
and practices. I shall attempt to disentangle the useful threads in this discussion from 
others that could be either a source or a result of the misconstrual of Buddhist doctrines. 
My general claim is that if oneness, or interrelatedness, is understood as a metaphysical 
theory, then it has very little to do with the Buddha‘s message; whereas, if it is the felt 
experience of oneness as identification with all beings with which deep ecology is 
concerned, then there are gainful parallels to be drawn. Particularly, it will emerge that 
the deep ecologist‘s notion of identification corresponds closely to the Mahāyāna 
understanding of love and compassion, and that this can provide a partial response to 
some of the difficulties that we encountered in chapter 1, regarding the possibility of 
basing an environmental ethic upon the virtue of solicitude. 
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1 Oneness as a Metaphysical View 
 
The ‗oneness of nature‘ is a popular idea in eco-spirituality, believed to figure 
predominantly in Eastern religions and to have been all but forgotten in the West. The 
idea of oneness is transmitted through the well-known image of Indra‘s Net, which is 
cited in many places as evidence of the convergence between the Buddhist view of reality 
and that of deep ecology.
81
 Portraying an infinite net with a jewel at each node, the 
metaphor depicts the universe as a web of interrelated phenomena, where every being and 
every aspect of reality reflects—or even contains—all others within it. Thus, the feeling 
of separateness between oneself and the world, and between one being and another, is 
just an illusion, and to use an oft-repeated cliché, in reality ‗all is one.‘ 
Whether this idea appears in academic or in popular contexts, there is often an 
appeal to a ‗new paradigm‘ in twentieth-century science, in particular, physics, which, is 
believed to reveal a similar idea of reality as interconnected, and therefore, to run parallel 
to the wisdom of ancient spiritual traditions. One of the earliest ‗parallelist‘ works, Fritjof 
Capra‘s The Tao of Physics, draws on the intuitions of physicists like Heisenberg and 
Bohr to suggest that ―the basic oneness of the universe is not only the central 
characteristic of mystical experience, but is also one of the most important revelations of 
modern physics‖ (Capra 1982, 142). This idea has cropped up repeatedly in 
environmentalism, in Buddhist studies, and in popular science, and there has been 
copious material published on these alleged parallels, by scholars in all these fields.
82
 
In this section, I shall explore these alleged similarities, paying particular 
attention to three areas where there is said to be convergence. Both in Mahāyāna 
Buddhism and in deep ecology, it is held that there is first, an emphasis on oneness, and 
on wholes over parts, second, there is priority given to relations rather than things, and 
finally, there is the belief in the truth of assertions such as ―everything is related to 
everything,‖ or even that ―humans are one with nature.‖ In all three premises, however, 
there are major discrepancies with Buddhism, which, I shall argue, can lead to a deep 
misconstrual of the Mahāyāna if overlooked. 
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The first inconsistency, I shall claim, is that in some places, deep ecology is 
likened to a form of eternalism, which is mistakenly thought to be a Buddhist doctrine. 
This occurs whenever there is reification of concepts like ‗oneness,‘ ‗wholes‘ or even 
‗relations.‘ More importantly though, as we saw in chapter 2, Mahāyāna Buddhist 
philosophers concur in rejecting or negating all views, and in attributing ineffability to 
ultimate truth. Therefore, I shall argue that insofar as the hypotheses of the new paradigm 
or the convictions of deep ecologists are asserted as ultimate truths, or developed into 
metaphysical theories, and especially if there is attachment to their veracity, then there is 
an important divergence from Mahāyāna Buddhism and its aims. It will be recalled that 
the Buddhist teachings were never meant to be taken as a theory about the world.  
Thus, insofar as it purports to be a truer or more accurate scientific theory, the 
new paradigm appears to be at odds with Mahāyāna doctrine. Yet at other times, deep 
ecology is presented simply as an alternative perspective that one might adopt, and which 
brings deep and highly advantageous implications for the environment. In the second 
section of this chapter, I will delve into the affinities between the deep ecologists‘ notion 
of identification, and the Buddhist virtues of love and compassion. For now, however, I 
wish to emphasize the importance of not grasping at the truth of such views as the 
ubiquitous cliché ―all is one.‖ 
 
Buddhism, Deep Ecology, and the New Physics: the Parallels 
 
The founder and main proponent of Deep Ecology, Arne Naess, is credited with having 
written works of ―paradigm-shifting proportions,‖ where environmentalism is presented 
as a ―deep-seated respect or even veneration‖ for nature, rather than merely self-centred 
concern for its instrumental value (Weber 1999, 350). Naess drew attention to ―the 
feeling(s) of oneness that we can learn to feel in/with the environment‖ (Naess 2000, 20) 
and Capra characterized this feeling ―as a sense of belonging, of connectedness to the 
cosmos as a whole.‖ At times there is the suggestion, as Michael Zimmerman points out, 
that humans should regard themselves as mere parts of the living Earth, analogous to the 
organs of a living being, and far less valuable than the biosphere as a whole, sometimes 
referred to as Gaia (Zimmerman 2004a, 5). Often this new vision is said to be ―spiritual 
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in its deepest essence‖ (Capra 1996, 7) and several writers have compared it to one or 
another of the ancient Eastern wisdom traditions or of hunter-gatherer societies.
83
 Other 
writers draw a parallel with specifically Buddhist doctrines; a recent paper refers to 
Naess‘s work to show that there is an ―intimate relationship‖ between Buddhism and 
deep ecology, present since the latter‘s very inception (Khisty 2006, 300).  
As suggested above, there are three places where the convergences between 
Buddhism and deep ecology are said to occur. These are the focus on oneness and on 
wholes rather than on parts, the emphasis on relations between things as opposed to the 
things themselves, and the claim that through adopting this perspective, one attains a 
truer or more accurate description of reality. In what follows, I shall flesh out these 
claims individually and examine their implications. Then, I shall offer a critical 
assessment of each one. 
 
1) Oneness and holism 
 
In the early twentieth century, it seems that some physicists were rather taken in by the 
philosophical implications that were emerging from recent discoveries in their field. 
Einstein, for instance, spoke of the ―delusion of separateness,‖ and the need to ―embrace 
all living creatures in the whole of nature and its beauty‖ (cited in Maxwell 2003, 259). 
Similarly, David Bohm wrote about the ―unbroken wholeness,‖ and Wheeler of the 
―participatory nature‖ of the universe (cited in Capra 1982, 149, 153). It is a debatable 
matter whether this new worldview was a direct implication of the discoveries of 
quantum mechanics, or whether the interest in Eastern religions and philosophies of some 
of these physicists—such as Heisenberg or Schrödinger—might have caused them to 
interpret the data the way they did. Whatever the case, it is certainly a fact that the last 
century saw the emergence of an alternative framework to classical Newtonian physics. 
The old and rejected model is that of a mechanistic reality, where the world is 
viewed as ―a plurality of discrete individual substances‖ (Matthews 1994, 9), that is, as 
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‗spirituality‘ in general; while Scerri 1989 provides a critical review of this theme. Halifax 1990 deals 
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societies. Finally, Wallace 2003, Mansfield 2008, and Ricard and Thuan 2001 are specifically about 
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single units that are held to be logically, if not actually independent. The traditional 
approach to science proceeds by dissecting, analysing, or otherwise breaking up the 
subject into parts, and the smallest of these—previously supposed to be atoms—are 
conceived as the fundamental units of reality. This approach is charged with leading to a 
fragmented worldview, where matter and mind are fundamentally divided and humans 
are believed to be discontinuous from the rest of nature. It is argued that, with the rise of 
science, during the Enlightenment, these beliefs gave humans the idea that they had 
―ultimate control and dominion over machine-like nature‖ (Oppermann 2003, 8) and a 
prevalent view in modern times, in fact, sees humanity as pitted against the natural world. 
In the explicit words of Bacon, man was to ―dominate nature,‖ ―subdue her,‖ and ―make 
her a slave to his needs‖ (cited in Merchant 1998). 
Those who subscribe to the new paradigm suggest that a holistic worldview is a 
more appropriate or accurate description of reality. On this account, any object is held to 
be more than the sum of its parts, as it has important emergent properties that cannot be 
reduced to the properties of its parts. A classic example posits consciousness as an 
emergent property of life, which can never be comprehended through dissecting a living 
being, simply because it is a property that emerges from the particular structure of and 
relations between that being‘s parts, such as the brain, spinal cord, and so on. The new 
paradigm, therefore, studies its subject, not in isolation, and not by breaking it up, but by 
looking at it in the context of its relations with other things, and by examining the 
relations of its parts to each other and to the whole.  
A recent parallelist article, a review of the similarities between Buddhism, 
science, and ecology, claims that these ―converge on a view of the universe that is 
fundamentally holistic.‖ In this view, it goes on, ―the essential nature of the universe is 
unbroken wholeness‖ (Maxwell 2003, 262). The author, Thomas Maxwell, relates this 
‗wholeness‘ to deep ecology‘s vision of the cosmos, to various spiritual and philosophical 
notions of ‗the One‘ and finally, he even equates it to Nāgārjuna‘s doctrine of emptiness 
(Maxwell 2003, 260–267). Maxwell is not alone in drawing such connections. Another 
parallelist thinker, Brian Edward Brown claims that ―an adequate environmental ethic 
must be grounded upon a cosmology capable of rendering the universe as a coherent 
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whole,‖ and he proposes the notion of the ―Cosmic Body of the Buddha‖84—which, he 
says, is coextensive with the universe—to refer to this one holistic reality (Brown 2004, 
890–893).  
Another recent paper claims, ―[The] Buddhist cosmological vision of 
interdependent causality, or ‗Interbeing,‘ has developed into a robust ontological unity‖ 
(Khisty 2006, 299). The concept of ‗interbeing‘ is borrowed from Thich Nhat Hanh, a 
Vietnamese Monk who also likes to draw attention to the deep ecological implications of 
Buddhism. To quote just a few extracts from his works: 
  
Our ecology should be a deep ecology—not only deep but universal...Life 
is one...When we look at a flower, for example, we may think it is 
different from ―nonflower‖ things. But when we look more deeply we see 
that everything in the cosmos is in that flower. Without all of the 
nonflower elements—sunshine, clouds, earth, minerals, heat, rivers and 
consciousness—a flower cannot be (Nhat Hanh 2000, 86–87). 
 
 
2) The emphasis on relations 
 
The portrayal of the entire cosmos being contained within a flower brings us to the 
second issue on which Buddhism and deep ecology are said to converge; namely the 
priority of relations over things. Nhat Hanh‘s word ‗interbeing‘ is his rendering of the 
Buddhist doctrine of interrelatedness—pratītyasamutpāda—a concept that has often been 
singled out as a source for Mahāyāna Buddhist environmentalism.85 The deep ecologist‘s 
view of the world, according to Naess, is that of a ―relational total field,‖ in which beings 
are ―knots in the biospherical net of intrinsic relations‖ (cited in Srivastava 2008, 144). 
There have been numerous references, in the literature of green Buddhism, to the 
resonances between this view and the image of the Jewelled Net of Indra (Srivastava 
2008, 244; Zimmerman 2006, 307). 
 The idea here is that ‗things‘—individuals, or substances—are secondary to 
relations, and any concreteness they might appear to have is merely an illusion. Callicott 
elaborates upon the concept of a ―relational total field,‖ and explains that, according to 
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 This is his rendering of the Sanskrit term dharmakaya. 
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 For example, Khisty 2006; Srivastava 2008; Zimmerman 2006. 
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this view, organisms are merely ―moments in a network of... relationships, knots in a web 
of life.‖ So-called objects or entities, including individual organisms are, therefore, 
―patterns, perturbations, or configurations of energy.‖ Moreover, on this account of 
reality, ―the conception of one thing... necessarily involves the conception of others and 
so on until the entire system is implicated‖ (Callicott 1989, 109–110). Callicott goes on to 
quote the Buddhist poet, Gary Snyder:  
  
 Eating the living germs of grasses 
    Eating the ova of large birds... 
 Drawing on life of living 
 clustered points of light spun  
           out of space  
 hidden in the grape. 
 
Deep ecologists and parallelists appear, at times, to use the word ‗relations‘ in 
different ways, and in fact, in some places it might seem that several meanings are 
conflated. Occasionally, there are references to causal relations, as the phrase ―knots in a 
web of life‖ suggests. Usually however, ‗relations‘ is used in the specific sense of 
‗internal relations,‘ which they take to mean that the connections between things form 
those very things, as well as forming the identity of the whole that they make up. 
Maxwell, for instance, explains that the whole universe is reflected in the ―fundamental 
internal nature‖ of each of its parts, and by the same token, each part plays a role in 
determining the fundamental nature of all other parts as well as that of the universe as a 
whole (Maxwell 2003, 262). Therefore, it appears that Maxwell has a concept of internal 
relations in mind. In Snyder‘s example, too, the grape is what it is, because of its relations 
with grasses, birds and so forth, all of which are said to be, somehow, in the grape. 
Similarly, Nhat Hanh‘s flower ―cannot be‖ without sunshine, clouds, earth, minerals and 
the entire cosmos. Again, it is internal relations that are involved here and not merely 
external or contingent ones.  
It will be recalled that the Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness, which is often used 
interchangeably with dependent co-origination, is the idea that nothing exists 
independently, or with a fixed essence. Naess expresses this through the Sanskrit phrase 
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―sarvam dharman nihsvabhavam‖86 (2005, 121) which, although not referenced in 
Naess‘s paper, could easily be from Nāgārjuna‘s MMK. Nothing exists with svabhāva, or, 
as a recent formulation puts it, ―in truth...nothing exists which we may call a solid, stable 
and unchanging ‗thing‘‖ (Srivastava 2008, 251). Brown too alludes to this view; ―nothing 
exists,‖ he claims, ―in and of itself‖ (2004, 887) and both these deep ecologists 
specifically relate this idea to the Buddhist notions of śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda. 
One of the implications of emptiness, as James has pointed out, is that all things 
are only internally related (2004, 91). Some parallelists maintain that contemporary 
physics establishes this as true, and that various experiments have shown that nothing 
exists with svabhāva, and that all things are internally related.87 The EPR experiments, 
for instance, have shown that rather than being the smallest independent units, subatomic 
particles are intricately and inescapably bound together; interacting with each other 
instantaneously—that is, at a speed greater than that of light—without any information 
passing between them, even when placed at an infinite distance apart. Thus, it is said that 
particles exist the way they do because of their relationship with other particles, and 
several authors have noted the resemblance of this to the doctrine of dependent-arising 
(Mansfield 2008, 73–74; Ames 2003, 297). Similarly, instead of being separate 
substances, matter and mind have been shown to be intimately related to each other, to 
the extent that the kind of experiments a scientist conducts and the questions she asks will 
determine the results she finds, say, whether a ‗wave/particle‘ will display wave-like or 
particle-like properties. Some philosophers of science have concluded that light and 
matter—that is, everything in the physical world—―have no intrinsic properties‖; rather, 
the way they appear is now known to depend upon the observer. This has been compared 
to Yogācāra doctrine (c.f., Ricard and Thuan 2001, 86), that is, to their claim that we can 
never go beyond our experience of things, and that the world is ―perception-only.‖ There 
is no longer a clear divide between a subject and the object he studies, as was believed in 
classical physics, rather, the new paradigm suggests that ―we can never speak about 
nature without, at the same time, speaking about ourselves‖ (Capra 1982, 79). 
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 See Mansfield 2008, 68-70; Ricard and Thuan 2001, 116. 
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Deep ecology recognizes the interrelatedness of all things and bases its 
environmental ethic upon this conception. One of the inferences that can be made from 
this view, as we have seen, is that humans are not inherently different from the rest of 
nature, but merely ‗one strand in the web of life.‘ This would suggest that all forms of life 
are equally valuable, as they each play a vital role in determining the other‘s nature and 
that of the biosphere as a whole, and therefore deep ecology emerges as bio-centric or 
even eco-centric, rather than anthropocentric. Moreover, the deep ecologist‘s recognition 
of the intricate connections between all beings leads her to be more cautious in her 
dealings with nature, knowing that any action she takes will have consequences well 
beyond those she can predict. The implications of interconnectedness for environmental 
ethics will be examined in more detail below and in section 2 of this chapter. 
 
3) The veracity of the new paradigm 
 
The intentions of parallelist writers in bringing together such disparate traditions are not 
always easy to gauge. From the very start of their introduction to the West, Buddhist 
doctrines have been presented as precursors to modern scientific knowledge, as though 
the Buddha, in his meditations, reached an understanding of the world that anticipated 
Copernicus, Newton, and Darwin (McMahan 2004, 898). Fortunately, this naive idea has 
become peripheral today and most parallelist authors claim to be merely juxtaposing the 
two disciplines out of purely academic interest, simply ‗exploring interesting 
connections‘(Ricard and Thuan 2001, 2; Wallace 2003, 26). The strongest parallelist 
claim made today is that Buddhist philosophy can serve as a heuristic tool for filling in 
the gaps in our knowledge left by modern physics, or even as an aid for overturning our 
innate biases and preconceptions. For instance, it has been suggested that the 
insubstantial and relative vision of reality implied by the new physics—where particles of 
matter lack solidity and the world appears to be a product of the mind—can bring about 
feelings of ―distress about losing ground.‖ Buddhist meditation can do a lot to assuage 
these fears so that ‗losing ground‘ is no longer problematic, but can even promote 
enlightenment (Bitbol 2003, 339). 
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Sometimes, there is the suggestion that the scientific veracity of the new paradigm 
is evidence of the accuracy of these supposedly Buddhist ideas, specifically the assertions 
about oneness and interrelatedness. I have already cited some authors on the ‗reality‘ or 
‗facticity‘ of the new holistic paradigm. It appears that these writers seem to believe that 
the tenets of deep ecology and of the new physics are final and irrevocable truths, in 
Buddhist terms ‗ultimate‘ realities. Weber, for instance, claims, ―In the last analysis, all 
living beings are one‖ (1999, 353) and similarly, although Khisty acknowledges that, in 
the Mahāyāna, there is ―no definite understanding of reality,‖ that does not prevent him 
from claiming, further on, that the ―Buddhist cosmological vision‖ is one of ―robust 
ontological unity‖ (2006, 297, 299).  
Often, parallelist writers explicitly deny that their purpose is to use science to 
prove the truth of Buddhist doctrines. Vic Mansfield, for instance, avoided doing so 
because he worried about what would happen later on when scientific knowledge 
changed, as it inevitably would someday. Would ―the foundations of Buddhism tremble 
at every scientific revolution?‖ he asks (Mansfield 2008, 6, 66; 2003, 316). Despite this, 
it is hard to avoid reading, at times, some deeper motivation into his work. For instance, 
he often claims that Buddhism and science point to the same ―true nature of reality‖ 
(2008, 13) or share an interest in the same ―objective phenomena of nature‖ (2008, 17). 
In another work, the authors suggest that ―science too [i.e. like Buddhism] has discovered 
that reality is nonseparable, or interdependent‖ (Ricard and Thuan 2001, 63; insert mine) 
and another paper suggests that both Buddhism and quantum mechanics ―describe reality 
as a participatory universe.‖ The author concludes by expressing surprise at the fact that, 
despite their diverse starting points, methods, and goals, they have produced some very 
similar ideas (Ames 2003, 301–302).  
It would appear, then, that many parallelist thinkers seem to believe in the final 
and incontrovertible truth of their beliefs about interdependence, oneness and holism—
very rarely is there recognition that in Buddhism, hypotheses about the world can never 
be more than conventional truths.
88
 It will be recalled from the previous chapter that 
Mahāyāna Buddhism accepts no statement or view as ultimately true, and this, one 
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assumes, would apply equally to statements about oneness or interrelatedness. In 
Nāgārjuna‘s words, neither existence, nor nonexistence can be affirmed, and not even 
statements about emptiness are to be asserted (MMK 15.10; 22.11). That is to say, any 
proposition we might make—such as ―the universe is one‖ or ―the cosmos is in the 
flower‖—could never be ultimately true. Therefore, although we can speak of 
interdependence and oneness conventionally, and such statements may be useful for 
attaining ultimate truth, in the end, they are not to be taken for truths themselves; rather, 
they are discarded once they have served their purpose. This suggests that to the extent 
that parallelists are wedded to their views about oneness or interrelatedness and insofar as 
statements about these are taken to be final views about the way the world really is, there 
is deep incongruity with Mahāyāna Buddhism. The next part of this chapter will delve 
into these discrepancies. 
 
Divergences between Buddhism and the New Paradigm 
 
The new paradigm, as expressed in deep ecology and in physics, diverges from 
Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine in two ways. First, it includes various beliefs that are clearly 
different from those that Buddhist philosophers held, but which are nevertheless 
sometimes attributed to those philosophers. As we shall see, the way that oneness or 
internal relations are sometimes described is incompatible with Mahāyāna philosophy 
and has more to do with eternalistic philosophies such as the Vedanta, or theism. Second, 
as mentioned above, parallelists tend to believe in their theories as absolute truths, 
whereas Buddhism ultimately rejects or negates all theories and views. In the following, I 
shall examine in detail these divergences and their implications for green Buddhism. 
 
1) Oneness and the extreme of eternalism 
 
Maxwell, as we have seen, relates Nāgārjuna‘s emptiness to the notion of the ―essential 
nature of the universe‖ as ―unbroken wholeness‖ and he identifies this with the neo-
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Platonic ―One‖ and with Brahman, Allah, and the Tao89 (Maxwell 2003, 267). Similarly, 
Capra lumps Buddhism in with ―all Eastern traditions,‖ which, he says, ―constantly refer 
to a basic oneness,‖ an ―ultimate, indivisible reality that manifests in all things‖90 (Capra 
1982, 141–142). All this immediately jars with what was said in the previous chapter 
about Mahāyāna philosophy, especially the Madhyamaka School. Although some 
scholars have suggested that experientially the Vedic Atman and the Buddhist śūnyatā 
might amount to the same thing—in David Loy‘s words, they are ―phenomenologically 
equivalent‖ (Loy 1986, 14)—philosophically, they are very different notions. When 
philosophers talk about the ‗One‘ they generally have in mind an absolute, immutable 
Being; something that is more real than the everyday world of fluctuating appearances, 
and something which is often equated with a Divine Being. This is Matthews‘s 
understanding of the whole, which she describes as ―the only thing that is really real‖ 
(1994, 68). Naess, too suggests that oneness actually exists and is ―as real as any 
quantifiable environment‖ (2000, 20). Obviously, these concepts are modelled upon 
eternalistic or theistic notions—such as Spinoza‘s ‗Nature,‘ or the Upanishadic Brahman 
or Atman—notions that the Buddha‘s Middle Path was intended to negate. As Simon 
James points out, ―talk of self-existent Absolutes evinces a failure fully to appreciate the 
universality of the teaching of emptiness‖ (James 2007, 454).  
The classical philosophers of Buddhism, such as Nāgārjuna, or Vasubandhu, seem 
to make no references to anything that is translated as ―oneness,‖ and indeed, few 
examples appear in the sūtras too.91 A characteristic text that is appealed to in support of 
holistic theories is the Avataṁsaka sūtra, and in fact, this scripture and the Chinese 
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school of Buddhism that is based on it and that shares its name, that is, the Hua Yen, are 
the sources of certain images, such as the Jewelled Net of Indra, or Fa Tsang‘s analogous 
concept of a Hall of Mirrors, that are so often cited in support of parallelist‘s theories 
about oneness. Yet a pre-eminent contemporary commentator on the Hua Yen school, 
Garma C. C. Chang, uses the word ―totality‖ rather than ‗oneness‘ and offers a very 
different interpretation of this concept from those cited above. 
Prima facie, the word ‗totality‘ says nothing about whether the universe is ‗one‘ or 
not, and indeed, Chang‘s description is more suggestive of plurality. He describes totality 
as an infinitely vast system of universes nested within universes, innumerable as the 
grains of sand in the Ganges. In his words: 
 
As a solar system contains its planets or a planet contains its atoms, a 
―larger‖ universe always includes the ―smaller‖ ones, and, in turn, is 
included in a universe that is larger than itself. This system of higher 
realms embracing lower ones is envisioned in a structure consisting of 
―layers‖ extending ad infinitum in both directions (Chang 1991, 10–11; 
emphasis mine). 
 
This classic metaphor posits a universe in every single grain of sand that exists upon this 
world and on every other world in this universe, which once again, occupies a single 
grain of sand in a higher-level universe and so on. There is, on the face of it, a significant 
resemblance between this image and Zimmerman‘s depiction of Gaia as a holarchy, that 
is, as a hierarchy of so-called ‗holons‘—systems which are both wholes in their own 
right, and also parts of other holons. Following Koestler, Wilber, and other systemic 
thinkers, Zimmerman describes reality as a pyramid, with ―vast numbers of holons 
(subatomic particles) at the bottom level while each succeeding higher level—atoms, 
molecules, organelles, cells, tissues, organs, organ system, and the organism—has fewer 
instances.‖ The highest level is identified with the all-inclusive biosphere, Gaia 
(Zimmerman 2004a, 6–7).  
The ecological concept of holarchy, however, deviates significantly from the Hua 
Yen vision of totality. Zimmerman conceives of an all-inclusive whole, an uppermost 
level of reality, beyond which there is nothing further. Indeed, most deep ecologists and 
parallelist thinkers appear to hold this sort of postulate, as can be seen in their references 
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to ―the One‖ or ―the unbroken whole,‖ (Maxwell) a ―robust ontological unity,‖ (Khisty) 
and a ―cohesive reality‖ (Brown). Similarly, there is a ‗bottom level‘ made up of 
subatomic particles, the ―fundamental indivisible reality‖ (Capra), below which there is 
nothing else. The Hua Yen Buddhist totality, on the other hand, seems to have no 
corresponding concepts; rather, there is always an infinite number of universes all the 
way up, and an infinite number all the way down. This implies that every level of the 
hierarchy is both a whole in its own right and a part of another whole; in other words, 
there is no ultimately smallest part, and no all-encompassing whole either. The 
Avataṁsaka sūtra, and especially the popular section on the vows of Samantabhadra, 
strongly emphasize the notions of ―infinite universes equal to the all the dust-motes in all 
the incalculable Buddha domains;‖ this phrase is repeated several times together with 
―endless spheres of space‖ and ―countless realms of beings‖ (reproduced in Chang 1991, 
118-196). This discrepancy has significant implications that weaken the parallelist thesis 
considerably. 
Contrary to Maxwell, Brown, and Khisty‘s claims, Hua Yen Buddhism does not 
view the universe as ―fundamentally holistic,‖ nor does it conceive of its ―essential nature 
as unbroken wholeness‖ or as a ―robust ontological unity.‖ There is no all-embracing 
level that can be compared to such a notion; in fact, there is not even anything that can be 
called ‗the universe‘ or ‗the One.‘ Rather, any level of reality we examine turns out to be 
a part of something else and the emphasis, as we shall see, is not on holism but on the 
relativity of wholes and parts to each other. Therefore, Buddhism does not share the deep 
ecologist‘s or the parallelist‘s bias for holism, and to cling to the notion of oneness or 
wholeness is to adhere to a wrong view, which corresponds, as we have seen, to the 
extreme of eternalism. 
In a partial segment of totality, such as Zimmerman‘s holarchy or deep ecology‘s 
Gaia, the terms ‗higher‘ and ‗lower‘ make sense, because there is the possibility of 
approaching a final upper or lower level, beyond which there is nothing further. If we 
mentally move ‗upwards‘ from the level of organisms, say, towards the ecosystemic 
level, then this brings us closer to the uppermost level, Gaia, and therefore, it is 
reasonable to call the ecosystemic a ―higher level‖ than the organismic. Similarly, to 
move from molecules to atoms is to move a step down because it brings us closer to the 
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lowest level of subatomic particles. Any universe is ‗high‘ or ‗low,‘ that is, only in 
relation to another, and therefore, because on the Hua Yen account, there is always an 
infinite number of universes in both directions, the terms ‗high‘ and ‗low‘ seem to lose 
their significance. 
For the same reason, every aspect of reality can be seen either as a whole or as a 
part; nothing is intrinsically a whole or a part, in the way that Gaia and subatomic 
particles are, according to the new paradigm. Wholes and parts, that is, are relative to 
each other and the Hua Yen doctrine of totality, unlike the new paradigm, gives no 
precedence to either. To meditate upon the image of universes nested within universes ad 
infinitum would probably bring about a realization of the arbitrariness of our description 
of things as either wholes or parts, small or large, many or one. It suggests that reality can 
never be described exhaustively; ultimate wholes or parts are forever elusive and 
ungraspable, and indeed, empty of inherent existence.  
Therefore, the weight given by the new paradigm and by parallelists to the ―One,‖ 
to ―unbroken wholeness,‖ or even their ―holistic vision‖ simply do not apply to 
Mahāyāna Buddhism. Contrary to parallelist‘s claims, Buddhism does not give primacy 
to wholes, even if contemporary science does. As Steve Odin points out, Hua Yen 
Buddhism expounds a ―simultaneous-mutual-establishment‖ of both the one and the 
many and does not reify either (Odin 1995: 72).  
 
2) The emptiness of relations 
 
Deep ecology and Buddhism were also said to overlap on the subject of interrelatedness, 
which, at first glance, seems remarkably similar to the doctrines of emptiness and 
dependent co-origination. As mentioned above, the word ‗relations‘ is used in different 
ways and some commentators leave its meaning rather vague. Chang, for instance, has it 
that ―inasmuch as one thing is—at least in some manner—related to all other things, it 
reflects them all‖ (Chang 1991, 125; emphasis mine). Other authors unequivocally state 
that the relations in question are internal ones; Maxwell, as we have seen, claims that the 
interdependence of wholes and parts is responsible for determining the ―fundamental 
internal nature‖ of both (2003, 262). Oppermann makes the same point about ecological 
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relations; she maintains that humans are internally related to the ecosystems in which 
they participate, and ultimately to the entire cosmos too. She makes this inference from 
the discovery described above, of the close bonds that exist between subatomic particles, 
and their ―instant communication‖ with one another (Oppermann 2003, 11).  
The concept of internal relations, as Callicott explains, implies that what a thing 
is—in his words its ‗essence‘—is completely determined by that thing‘s relationships, 
and therefore, he goes on, it ―cannot be conceived apart from its relationships with other 
things‖ (Callicott 1989, 110). This suggestion appears frequently in parallelist literature. 
Srivastava, for instance, claims that it is ―impossible to have a notion of us as being 
ultimately ‗different‘ or separate from anything else‖ (2008, 252) and as we saw above 
Capra held that we can never speak about nature without at the same time speaking about 
ourselves. Brown too claims, ―Any element‘s...identity can be defined only as the 
expressive manifestation, the conditioned representation, of those other [related] 
elements‖ (2004, 887; insert and emphasis mine). Simon James regards this as a problem, 
in that the claim that all things are internally related makes it difficult to speak of things 
at all (2004, 91). 
Despite the frequent appearance, in deep ecology, of the claim that we cannot 
conceive of things independently, further reflection will reveal that it is obviously false. 
No matter how many relations a thing may have, and how formative of its identity they 
might be, it will always be possible to conceive of that thing as existing independently. In 
fact, according to Buddhism, this is precisely the mistake that deluded beings make; they 
regard things as being separate and different, that is, as having svabhāva, whereas the 
reality is that all things exist interdependently. The use of the word ‗reality‘ here, must be 
taken as conventional, just like any statement to the effect that ‗a is related to b,‖ or even 
―all things are interrelated‖ cannot constitute a final truth. Ultimate reality, as was seen in 
chapter 2, is ineffable and no statement can ever be formulated that corresponds to it 
precisely. The fact remains, though, that it is possible to make conventional statements 
about things being interrelated as well as their being separate; indeed to make any 
statement at all requires that we can distinguish different things. Therefore, the claim that 
it is ―impossible‖ to regard things as separate, or that an individual ―cannot be conceived 
of‖ by itself, is highly implausible. 
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The difficulty arises because parallelist thinkers tend to interpret conventional 
statements about interrelations as ultimate truths. When this happens, all sorts of 
inconsistencies arise; as Nāgārjuna demonstrated, any attempt to characterize ultimate 
reality conceptually will eventually reduce to absurdity. Thus, if the internal relation 
between a and b were an ultimate truth, and their identities depended upon this relation so 
that, as parallelists claim, a and b cannot be conceived of independently, then we would 
not be able to say anything about them at all. If a represents humanity and b the 
environment, and we cannot conceive of one without the other, all the beliefs of deep 
ecologists—regarding, say, the effects of humanity‘s activities on the environment, our 
feelings of separateness, and whether we are ―a part of‖ or ―apart from‖ nature—all of 
these statements and questions would be impossible to formulate. Indeed, we would not 
even be able to say, ―Let a stand for humanity and b for nature.‖ Clearly one cannot grasp 
at the final truth of the statement ―everything is internally related to everything,‖ for if we 
do, then we cannot account for conventional difference, and we cannot say anything 
about individual things. Instead, reality becomes an undifferentiated block, where 
everything is exactly the same as everything else.  
Conversely, if we took a and b to be ultimately different entities then we could 
not explain how things are related, which, clearly, they are ―at least in some way.‖ When 
we think of objects and individuals as being separate, each having their own identity, this 
is just our ordinary way of perceiving reality, which in Buddhism, amounts to 
ignorance—namely, grasping at svabhāva. Buddha, Nāgārjuna, as well as Capra and 
other parallelists agree that to conceive of things this way is a mistaken, though 
conventional, or traditional view of the world. Under this view, we can account for 
difference, yet we are mistaken if we take this difference or view to be ultimately true. As 
Nāgārjuna showed in MMK, if we take difference to be ultimately true, then we cannot 
explain how it is possible for things to relate to each other. If things are ultimately 
separate, then of course, they cannot be related. Garfield sums up the argument as 
follows: ―it makes no sense‖ he says, ―to think of [the] relations between entities...as any 
kind of relation between independent entities at all.‖ Rather, for Buddhism, ―these 
phenomena cannot be understood as the same, as different, or as neither‖ (Garfield 1995, 
217). 
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To put it another way, some parallelists misapprehend the Buddhist doctrine of 
dependent co-origination by inferring from it only the emptiness of individuals or of 
things and concluding that relations are ultimately real—―more real‖ than beings or 
things. Nāgārjuna would certainly negate both beings and relations; that is, he would say 
that things are ultimately empty of inherent existence because they arise and perish in 
dependence upon each other and therefore, they can conventionally be described as 
related to each other. These relations however are empty of inherent existence too and 
propositions about them cannot be held as final. This is because we cannot explain 
relations whether we conceive of things as separate or as distinct.  
To return to our example, we can affirm, conventionally, that human activity has 
an impact on the environment, which changes both in essential ways. Yet this sort of 
discourse is merely useful for explaining the world, and the emptiness of dependent-
arising is the fact that there is ―no more to it than that‖ (Garfield 1995, 122). Ultimately, 
humans are neither part of nor apart from nature; as we saw above, they are neither 
different nor the same, neither one nor many.
92
 Our innate tendency to want to establish 
something or other as an ultimate truth or reality is precisely the problem that Buddhism 
wants to address. 
 
The Utility of Parallelist Discourse in the Light of the Negation of Views 
 
Some parallelists are keen to use science to support their views about oneness and 
relatedness, and appear to suggest that the findings of physics are evidence for the truth 
of the Buddha‘s claims. At least, this intimation seems to underlie some authors‘ 
fascination with the view of reality allegedly shared by Buddhism and physics. Yet, the 
Buddha‘s spiritual realization was not a scientific understanding of reality, and his 
teachings were never meant to become a theory about the world. The later Mahāyāna 
sūtras and philosophy were even more explicit about the rejection of all views. 
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 As Dr. Simon James points out, even this last formulation ―neither...nor‖ would ultimately be rejected by 
the Madhyamaka (personal communication). All further statements to the effect that Mahāyāna Buddhism 
would accept neither x, nor y are to be understood as implying the negation of that conjunction too, and the 
ineffability of ultimate truth.   
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Therefore, there is a danger, in parallelist discourse, of reducing the Buddha‘s 
enlightened consciousness to a mere description of the world. 
Several authors have commented on this matter. Zimmerman raises the issue that 
by itself, a scientific understanding of the connections between phenomena cannot bring 
about compassion (2006, 316). James draws attention to the ineffability of ultimate truth, 
and concludes that the world of ecological science cannot be the same as the world of a 
realized being, simply because the latter cannot be put into words (2007, 453). According 
to Ken Wilber, deep ecology fails to acknowledge the inner development that a person 
must go through before anything like ‗oneness‘ can be experienced, and before she can 
truly attain the Buddha‘s realization of interrelatedness. In parallelism, what is essentially 
a spiritual experience is reduced to the theory that we are ―just-parts-of-the-whole‖—as if 
studying the relations between things could suffice to gain the depth of the realization 
that the Buddha had. The problem, Wilber goes on, lies not so much in whether we 
describe the cosmos as made up of individual substances or as a whole, neither on 
whether we focus on things or on relations. Rather, our delusion arises from our 
obsession with external reality, through which we have completely lost sight of our inner 
world, or ―interiority,‖ and ignored the subjective aspect of meaning and of value (Wilber 
1995, 130–133). 
In all fairness, several deep ecologists do focus on subjective processes, as we 
shall see in the next section. In fact, Naess, Devall, and Sessions do not place much 
importance on analytic argumentation, but rather, they simply invite readers to adopt the 
deep ecological vision as another way of viewing reality, a fresh outlook on the world 
(Yadav 2008, 238). The Hua Yen teachings also appear merely suggestive of a novel 
perspective; instead of making categorical assertions they seem to encourage an alternate 
vision of reality. For example, the wide use of the word ‗reflection,‘ and the images of 
mirrors are reminiscent of Vasubandhu‘s metaphors of mirage, hallucinations, magical 
displays, and so forth. In chapter 2, it was argued that these metaphors are intended to 
make an epistemological point, rather than an ontological one—the key idea was that we 
can only ever see images, hear sounds, and feel sensations, and we can never directly 
apprehend any ‗thing-in-itself.‘ It was also suggested that concern about whether this 
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implied the unreality of the world or the reality of ‗Mind Only,‘ was irrelevant to the 
Buddhist Middle Path, which is beyond both being and non-being.  
The Hua Yen doctrine of interrelatedness and the images of jewelled nets and 
halls of mirrors might be used constructively in an environmental context, as long as we 
do not grasp at the truth of statements like ‗all is one‘ or ‗everything reflects everything.‘ 
Instead of interpreting them as philosophical doctrines, one might use such ideas as a 
pattern or ‗blueprint‘ for meditation upon dependent-arising. Rather than attempting to 
discern oneness through studying ecological relations, perhaps if we meditate on our 
connections with forests and farms, livestock, air, soil, and so on, as reflecting each other, 
like a magical display or a hall of mirrors, we might lessen our ingrained attachment to 
ourselves and to our own needs, and become better able to identify with others and adopt 
their interests as our own. Meditation on interrelatedness could help us realize how 
profound the impact of what we do is upon the rest of the world and how repercussions 
could be carried to an extent hardly imaginable. We might become more careful in our 
actions if we learnt to perceive a hurricane across the globe, say, as a reflection of our 
leaving the lights on when not needed.  
Unfortunately, this sort of meditation could also have adverse effects on our 
approach to the environment. If we completely internalize a picture of reality as an 
infinite net of relations, we might be led to despondency, since on this view, there are an 
infinite number of causes and conditions for those aspects of the world that we perceive 
as problematic. Climate change, for instance, is the product of so many causes and 
conditions that to prevent it from happening, or even just mitigating its effects, has turned 
out to be a highly complicated affair. Moreover, our decisions too are affected by infinite 
other things so that we might begin to wonder whether we really do have the power or 
freedom to bring about a positive change. In addition, since the repercussions of what we 
do spread out infinitely into time and space, we can never really foresee all the outcomes 
of our actions with certainty. A recent example of this problem emerged with the 
introduction of biodiesel, which, at the time, appeared to be environmentally preferable to 
other fossil fuels, and its widespread use seemed like step in the right direction, 
ecologically speaking. Unfortunately, nobody foresaw all of its actual results, and 
consequently, there was increased hunger and deforestation in certain parts of the world.  
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The holistic view of the planet, especially the theory that sees ‗her‘ as a single 
living being, Gaia, might render us less prepared to sacrifice any of her parts. For 
instance, if a stretch of rainforest is lost, we will no longer simply think of it as a few 
trees that are gone; rather, it will be perceived as the loss of a necessary and irreplaceable 
part of an organic whole, as valuable as life itself (Lovelock 1995, 226). Every seemingly 
insignificant bit of the natural world would then be invested with value it did not have 
under the traditional account, simply because it is now seen to be an indispensable part of 
a greater whole. Aside from the problematic implications this stance might have—such as 
implications of eco-fascism (Barnhill 2001, 78)—the Buddhist idea of totality also 
implies the converse of this view. This planet, Gaia, is also a mere grain of sand in an 
infinite series of universes, and this perspective seems to diminish our earth‘s value 
considerably, and also seems to reduce the import of our concern to save this particular 
biosphere.  
Therefore, even when acknowledged as conventional views, the ideas that ‗all is 
one‘ and ‗everything is related to everything‘ do not necessarily bring positive 
implications for the environment. Indeed James has provided several examples of how 
such holistic views could be reconciled with attitudes that are downright eco-unfriendly 
(2007, 457). It seems oneness and interrelatedness alone cannot serve as a foundation for 
green Buddhism, and the Mahāyāna‘s ‗ecological qualifications,‘ if they exist, must lie 
elsewhere. Before these ideas are ruled out altogether however, there is a second 
interpretation that I would like to examine—the idea of oneness, not as a metaphysical 
theory, but as a subjective way of relating to nature, namely, through identifying with all 
other living beings, including the ―one-living-Earth,‖ Gaia. 
 
Summary 
 
This section has examined the philosophical ideas of the ‗oneness of nature‘ and the 
‗interrelatedness of all things.‘ In general, I have argued that as long as these ideas are 
taken as scientific or metaphysical theories they have very little to do with the Buddha‘s 
teachings, and I have suggested there are several discrepancies between these fields of 
knowledge.  
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The first idea that was supposed to be common to both Buddhism and deep 
ecology was that of the universe as fundamentally holistic, or as an unbroken whole. 
Sometimes, this concept of Oneness is closer to notions like Spinoza‘s ‗Nature,‘ or the 
Hindu Atman, which Buddhism negates. The Avataṁsaka sūtra speaks about ―totality‖ 
rather than ‗oneness,‘ and this is interpreted very differently from deep ecology‘s 
concept. Here, we read about an infinitely vast system of universes nested within 
universes, which is more suggestive of plurality than oneness. 
Moreover, deep ecological holism deviates from the Buddhist doctrine of totality 
insofar as it conceives of an all-inclusive, uppermost level of reality, and a bottom level 
made up of irreducible entities. The Buddhist vision of totality has no corresponding 
concepts; rather, there are always an infinite number of universes all the way up, and all 
the way down. This suggests that every level of the hierarchy is both a whole in its own 
right and a part of another whole, and the very concepts of ‗higher‘ and ‗lower‘ lose some 
of their significance. Contrary to parallelist claims, Hua Yen Buddhism does not view the 
universe as fundamentally holistic, nor does it conceive of its essential nature as 
unbroken wholeness. Buddhist imagery emphasizes, rather, the relativity of ‗wholes‘ and 
‗parts,‘ and of ‗one‘ and ‗many‘ and suggests that reality can never be described 
exhaustively.  
The second alleged convergence between Buddhism and deep ecology was the 
priority given to relations over things, an idea that seemed highly reminiscent of 
emptiness and dependent co-origination. Relations were said to be fundamental because it 
is the connections between things that form those very things as well as forming the 
whole, which they make up. Thus relations are defined as internal ones and this 
suggested, as many parallelists claim, that nothing can be conceived of independently of 
these relations. This proposition was found to be untrue; in our everyday speech and 
experience, we do conceive of things as separate and independently from each other all 
the time. The problem lies in parallelist thinkers‘ tendency to interpret conventional 
statements about interrelations as ultimate truths, which gives rise, as we have seen, to 
several contradictions. It was shown that we can either hold relations to be real, and then, 
we find ourselves unable to account for difference, or else we can hold difference to be 
real and then we are unable to account for relations. The Buddhist doctrine of emptiness 
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suggests that discourse about interrelatedness is merely conventional, simply useful for 
explaining the world and no more. Ultimately, things are neither different nor the same, 
and our compulsion to establish some truth as fundamental, or final, is one of the reasons 
for our delusion. 
The idea that contemporary physics proves the truth of the doctrines of oneness 
and of interrelatedness was the third alleged parallel addressed. Deep ecology often 
deviates from the Mahāyāna by asserting the truth of its metaphysical or scientific 
theories, whereas Mahāyāna Buddhism takes all utterances to be conventional truths. 
Therefore, there is deep incongruity between the two whenever deep ecologists are 
attached to their views about oneness or interrelatedness and insofar as their statements 
are taken to be true descriptions of the world. There is danger in parallelist discourse of 
reducing the Buddha‘s enlightenment to a mere theory about the world. 
Apart from all this, if we disregard claims about the veracity of this view, and 
restrict ourselves to experiencing oneness—as indeed several deep ecologists suggest—
the similarities with Buddhism become more pronounced. The Jewelled Net image might 
be used constructively in an environmental context, to lessen our attachment to ourselves 
and to value more highly the Earth and all its denizens. Conversely, the image of reality 
as an infinite net of relations might lead one to a feeling of hopelessness about our ability 
to bring about positive change, and it could also suggest that this planet, as a mere grain 
of sand in a higher universe, is not all that significant.  
In sum, the most salient element of the new, deep ecological paradigm is not any 
view or belief it includes, but its implications for how one might relate to the world and 
to other beings. It is here that most advantageous suggestions and repercussions for the 
environment probably lie. The next section will turn to the proposal that, as 
environmentalists, we ought to identify with all other living beings, and with the ―one-
living-Earth,‖ or Gaia. I shall argue that this notion is highly reminiscent of the 
Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrines of love and compassion and that there is more benefit in 
drawing parallels here.  
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2 Oneness as Identification with all Sentient Beings 
 
This section will continue to examine deep ecology and its affinities with Buddhism. I 
have argued, so far, that as long as there is an attempt to establish the theories of holism 
or of interrelatedness as ultimately true, then there is a deep incongruity between the two 
traditions, and this is because Mahāyāna Buddhism, including both its major schools of 
philosophy—that is, the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra—ultimately negates all views 
and all propositions. Any description of reality, according to Nāgārjuna or Asaṅga, could 
only ever be conventionally true, and the bodhisattva must be willing to let go of all his 
favourite theories about the world in order to progress on the journey towards 
enlightenment.  
Throughout this study, the negation of all views has constituted one of the main 
difficulties for formulating Buddhist doctrines in an ecologically sensitive way. Although 
Mahāyāna nondualism allows us to avoid the issues of negative value in nature and of 
world-rejection that were found to belong to early Buddhism, there is still the problem of 
finding suitable material upon which to construct an environmentally sound philosophy.
93
 
According to Mahāyāna Buddhism, there is only one thing worth attaining other than full 
enlightenment, namely, bodhicitta, which can be thought of as the combination of a 
realization of emptiness and of universal love and compassion. Realization of emptiness 
requires that all views be negated eventually, and therefore, to the extent that a Buddhist 
practitioner is attached to her ideas about the environment—and this includes all the 
assertions of deep ecology, such as ―humans are one with nature‖ or ―everything is 
related to everything‖—she is impeded from attaining realization.   
 One might suggest that, although attachment to these views is an impediment to 
enlightenment, they might still be sufficient, conventionally, as grounds for 
environmentalism. In other words, while such statements are not ultimately true, and 
should not be taken as asserting anything about the way the world is, they could still 
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 Several authors, for example Keown 2005, Cooper and James 2005, have relied on Buddhist ethics for 
this purpose, in particular, conceived in terms of virtues like generosity (dāna), nonviolence (ahiṃsā), and 
so forth. While appreciating the significant value of this work, I feel inclined to include, as far as possible, 
the teachings on emptiness, in order to avoid the criticism that green Buddhism pertains to the conventional 
realm alone. For a compelling argument against this claim, however, see Cooper and James 2005. 
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serve to motivate concern for the environment, based on subjective processes. This 
section will deal with the consequences of taking such intuitions of oneness or 
relatedness as just that—as a felt experience, or psychological awareness—without 
grasping at the truth of any theories they might imply. I shall examine the interpretation 
of oneness in deep ecology, as a sense of ‗identification‘ with other beings. This, clearly, 
has resonances with the notion of compassion in its broadest sense of feeling or even 
being with others. To suffer with others and to feel joy with them is perhaps the truest 
sense of ‗being at one with the world‘; it is not a description of a fact but of a feeling. It 
will emerge that the way identification is described in deep ecology is, at times, highly 
reminiscent of the Buddhist virtues of love and compassion, which we encountered in 
chapter 1. In both cases, there is a concern for the interests
94
 and welfare of those beings 
that one loves or with whom one identifies. 
I start, therefore, by examining the way in which deep ecologists describe 
identification as well as their reasons for recommending it. The case for taking others‘ 
interests as our own is sometimes bolstered with metaphysical assertions, and therefore, 
as was seen in the previous section, there is a major divergence from Mahāyāna 
Buddhism. At other times, though, deep ecologists deny that any rational grounds can be 
given for advancing identification, and, instead, they simply invite readers to adopt this 
practice through providing a rather loose description of what identification feels like. For 
this reason, there are several different definitions of ‗identification‘ in the literature; 
sometimes it is based on a feeling of identity, at other times there is a sense of 
communality, and in some cases, it is even claimed that one needs to appreciate the 
difference of the other from oneself in order to appreciate fully his needs. There is also a 
technical sense, according to Arne Naess, to which all deep ecologists subscribe, and to 
which I shall limit my use of the term. ‗Identification,‘ that is, will be used to refer the 
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 I use the terms ‗interests‘ and ‗needs‘ interchangeably, following Simon Blackburn‘s definition of the 
former as ―Those things that a person needs, or that are conducive to his or her flourishing and success.‖ 
Perhaps needs can be understood as being more fundamental than interests, and while it is true that ―people 
may not desire or value what they need,‖ as Blackburn suggests, I also subscribe to his claim that their ―real 
interests might not be revealed by their immediate choices and preferences‖ (Blackburn 1996, 196–197). 
That is, whether or not they know it, a being‘s real interests coincide with what it needs. There is no space 
unfortunately to go into the question of how a bodhisattva would determine what a being‘s true interests or 
needs were. Following the discussion in chapter 1, interests and needs will be attributed to individual 
nonhuman beings, and collective entities, as well as to humans. 
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idea, mentioned in chapter 1, of taking other beings‘ interests as one‘s own. I shall appeal 
to Śāntideva to show how this might be grounded, not on any ideas about sameness or 
difference, but rather on a realization of emptiness, which, it is said, gives rise to 
compassion, and causes the bodhisattva to remain in saṃsāra for the sake of other beings 
(BCA 9:52). 
I shall go on to ask whether the practice of identification, understood as extending 
love and compassion to all sentient beings, can be used to support an environmentally 
sound version of Mahāyāna Buddhism. In chapter 1, it was said that the problem of early 
Buddhism‘s negative evaluation of the natural world—the description of it as pervaded 
with suffering—could be resolved by taking solicitude as a subjective way of valuing 
nature intrinsically. In brief, one could simply decide to value nature and natural beings 
for their own sake, regardless of whether or not they ‗possessed‘ intrinsic value 
objectively.  
Finally, I shall take up once more the issues that we raised in chapter 1 concerning 
these themes and explore whether a specifically Mahāyāna understanding could solve the 
difficulties encountered. These included the problem that extending love and compassion 
universally cannot serve as a method for deciding against competing interests, and neither 
can it provide an ecologically sensitive approach. A second complaint was that suffering 
is a natural and intrinsic part of ecological relations, and therefore, to the extent that 
bodhisattvas aim at eliminating it altogether, their actions are unnatural and unecological. 
Lastly, we will also need to consider the possibility of applying solicitude to non-sentient 
and non-living beings, such as species, ecosystems, trees, and rocks, which are also 
objects of concern for the environmentalist.  
 
Identification and Solicitude 
 
Apart from theories about oneness and internal relations, what is held in common by all 
deep ecologists, according to Naess, is a way of experiencing nature ―through which the 
interest or interests of another being are reacted to as our own interest or interests‖ (Naess 
1995, 258–261). Warwick Fox describes this ―central intuition of deep ecology‖ as a 
form of consciousness that does not perceive boundaries between oneself and other 
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beings (Fox 1984, 194). He too talks about identifying one‘s own good with that of others 
and claims that if one has a ―wide, expansive or field like sense of self‖ then one will 
naturally protect the interests of this expanded self (1995, 217). Walking through a forest, 
say, I might embrace all natural surroundings and their inhabitants into my sense of what 
I am. Through identification, I will learn to adopt the needs of these beings as my own 
and to do everything I can to protect them.  
To the extent that it is spoken of as a felt experience, an intuition, or an affect, the 
deep ecologists‘ account of identification sounds remarkably similar to the Buddhist 
practice of generating love and compassion. In chapter 1, the terms maitrī, loving-
kindness, and karuṇā, compassion, were described in terms of the wish that a being has 
happiness and is free from all suffering. Several deep ecologists have drawn the 
connection between identification and love; Freya Matthews, for instance, talks about an 
―extended self-love‖ (1994, 149) and for Bill Devall too, we will naturally love, respect, 
honour and protect that with which we identify (cited in Fox 1995, 226).
95
  
The point of identification, according to Fox, is to gain a ―this-worldly realization 
of as expansive a sense of self as possible‖ (Fox 1995: 197) that is, to identify with an 
ever-widening circle of beings, until one finally embraces the entire cosmos within one‘s 
sense of identity. This brings us to a second important concept in deep ecology, that of 
the ―expanded self‖ or the ―ecological self,‖ which is defined as the set of beings that a 
person loves, or else, as the entire scope of that with which she identifies, ideally, the 
entire cosmos (Fox 1995, 230). This will immediately bring to mind the Buddhist 
practice of extending love and compassion universally; that is, wishing happiness for 
every single being in all the infinite universes described in the previous section. In the 
Mahāyāna, it is based on a concept of ‗the equality of self and others.‘ Śāntideva 
characterizes this as follows:  
 
Since we are all alike in pleasures and pains,  
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 An interesting question, first brought to my attention by Dr. Simon James, is about what would happen if 
we did not love ourselves. Obviously, identifying with other beings is not going to enable us to love them, 
in this case. Assumedly, since deep ecologists speak in terms of ―Self-Realization‖ this implies that, at the 
very outset, there must be, at least, a modicum of comfort with oneself, and any psychological problems 
that involve self-hatred would need to be sorted out before one could hope to reach Self-Realization. 
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I should guard all others as I do myself (BCA 8:90)
 96
 
  
 This account of identification clearly belongs to the sphere of psychology; there is 
no longer the concern with describing external reality, which we saw in the previous 
section. Instead, the focus of deep ecologists, here, is on the way reality is experienced, 
with the suggestion being that it is not experienced as external at all, but rather, it is felt 
to be part of one‘s own self. In fact, Fox coined the term ―transpersonal ecology,‖ to 
relate his work to that branch of academic psychology that seeks to transcend the 
boundaries of the individual. This, therefore has already brought us closer to Buddhist 
concerns, and has avoided the problem raised in the first part of this chapter, concerning 
the inward- rather than outward-looking quality of Buddhist teachings.  
 
The Grounds for Identification 
 
When it comes to establishing why deep ecologists think we should adopt identification 
as an environmentally conscious practice, the similarities with Buddhism end. In many 
cases, the experience is said to emerge from our endorsing certain metaphysical views—
specifically, the view of oneness and of interrelatedness, which were described in the 
previous section—and therefore, this version of identification would appear to be subject 
to the criticisms raised there. Matthews‘s claim that ―identification is not simply 
psychological but grounded in a metaphysical fact‖ (Matthews 1994, 148) would not be 
accepted by Mahāyāna philosophers, for whom so-called metaphysical ‗facts‘ are always 
to be negated. The same is true of Fox‘s description of identification as ―a natural… 
response to the fact that we are intimately bound up with the world around us‖ (Fox 
1995, 218; italics added). 
 As Matthews has rightly pointed out, it is not just the metaphysical facts of 
oneness and interrelatedness that deep ecology requires for its account of identification, 
but rather, it also makes assumptions about goal-directedness or teleology. The claim that 
we are all parts of an interconnected whole cannot by itself explain why we ought to love 
other beings or that whole; we also need to show that both the whole and all its parts have 
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 All excerpts from the Bodhicaryāvatāra are from Thurman‘s translation in Thurman 1996, 152–155. 
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a ―good of their own,‖ in the sense that they can occupy states that are better or worse for 
themselves, and therefore, they have interests and needs of their own. The biosphere as a 
whole, ‗Gaia,‘ and all her parts too, that is, living beings, together with collective entities, 
such as ecosystems—all of these, according to deep ecologists, can be helped to further 
their interests and to secure their ends, or else, they can be harmed when prevented from 
fulfilling their goals (Matthews 1994, 152–154; O‘Neill 1992, 128–131).97 Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, on the other hand, could take these claims to be conventionally true at most. 
From the Buddhist perspective, to attempt to prove them conclusively would amount to 
delusion, or attachment to views, and would constitute an impediment to realization. 
 As mentioned above, sometimes, deep ecologists do abstain from trying to prove 
their tenets decisively and instead they merely propose identification as a way of 
experiencing the world. In some places, Naess emphasized that he was not attempting to 
establish the correctness of his approach, but rather, merely presenting it as a simple 
invitation (Naess 1998, 201–210). Fox too, in some places, suggests that his version of 
transpersonal ecology cannot be confirmed rationally, and he invites us, instead, to decide 
whether to take it up or not on other criteria such as its beauty, coherence, novelty, and so 
forth (Fox 1995, 216). In other words, deep ecologists occasionally seem to display little 
attachment to their theories and views and, to this extent, their ideas might be reconciled 
with Buddhism by taking them as conventionally and not ultimately true. 
 
How Identification is Attained 
 
Although identification could be grounded on conventional rather than ultimate truth, 
there remains the question of how this experience is attained. Here, again, Naess‘s 
philosophy and Buddhism coincide; first, awareness of suffering is described, in both 
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 One might object about the appropriateness of attributing needs and interests to beings such as animals, 
trees, or even forests. I shall follow John O‘Neill here and claim that it is possible to do so, on the grounds 
that individual living things ―are the sorts of things that can flourish or be injured‖ and therefore they can 
be said to have interests (O‘Neill 1992, 129). Moreover, this also applies to ‗higher-order‘ systems such as 
species or ecosystems, which are made up of living and non-living beings too. ―It makes sense,‖ O‘Neill 
explains, ―to talk of the goods of collective biological entities—colonies, ecosystems, and so on—in a way 
that is irreducible to that of its members‖ (O‘Neill 1992, 131). It must be emphasized that all this belongs to 
the conventional realm in Buddhism, and that in any case, recognition of these beings‘ goods does not 
automatically imply that one ought to protect them (O‘Neill 1992, 132). The subject of teleology in nature 
will be taken up again in the next chapter, where I shall deal with the question of purpose in evolution. 
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cases, as an inexhaustible fount of compassion, in Naess‘s terms, the ―most potent source 
of identification‖ (1985, 264). Second, both in Naess and in Buddhism, love and 
compassion are said to stem from the recognition that other beings are just like us, in that 
they too want to flourish and be happy, and to avoid pain and suffering. However, in his 
1985 paper, Naess proposed that there needs to be a sense of similarity—perhaps even 
identity—between oneself and that being with whom one identifies (1985, 262). John 
Seed takes it further, and interprets identification as the actual merging of identities, as in 
his statement ―I am the rainforest‖ (cited in Devall 1986, 24; emphasis mine). Fox is not 
as extreme; in his view, the experience relies not on similarity, but rather, on a sense of 
commonality, that is, the experience of ‗being in the same boat together,‘ and he 
explicitly denies that identification should involve actual fusion, or the absorption of 
one‘s identity into the whole (Fox 1995, 231).   
 Peter Reed challenges this account with the claim that it is because of the 
difference between natural beings and us that we show consideration for them. In other 
words, what is valuable in nature and deserving of our protection is its otherness—the 
fact that it is not like us—which is what gives rise to a sense of mystery and awe (Reed 
1989). In his response, Naess welcomes this as an alternative to his own philosophy 
(Naess 1990, 186) and seems to drop the condition of similarity for the process of 
identification. He distinguishes the sense of ‗identification‘ that involves ―some kind of 
likeness or resemblance‖ from the ―technical sense,‖ which is shared by all deep 
ecologists, and which he defines as ―a process through which the supposed interests of 
another being are spontaneously reacted to as our own interests‖ (1990, 187–188). It is 
this technical sense, he claims, which is important for deep ecology, and in fact, in this 
paper he maintains that we can even identify with something with which we are totally 
unfamiliar (1990, 191).
98
  
 It seems then, that there are several different ways in which ‗identification‘ is 
understood within deep ecology; sometimes it is based on similarity or identity, at other 
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 This last point and Naess‘s reference to the ―supposed interests‖ of other beings shows that we do not 
need scientific accuracy to decide upon which states are good for a being and which ones are not. Rather, if 
we imagine some states to be against a being‘s interests, according to Naess, we may be justified in taking 
this to be the case. He proposes, as examples, an ugly building on Mount Fuji and dancing polar bears. 
Both of these instances, he says, involves the violation of a being‘s dignity, and can be thought of as 
jeopardizing their interests (1990, 189).   
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times, on difference. Yet, the definition that is most commonly accepted is identification 
as wanting and working for the good of those beings with whom or which we identify. In 
what follows, I shall restrict my use of the term to this technical sense alone, and I shall 
also use it interchangeably with ‗love,‘ ‗compassion,‘ or ‗solicitude,‘ due to the close 
affinity, which, I have argued, exists between these notions. The thorny issue of whether 
or not identification requires sameness or difference, I shall argue below, emerges from 
the drive to establish some theory as ultimate truth, and it can be avoided if we base 
identification on a realization of emptiness instead.  
 
Identification as Bodhicitta: Solicitude in Union with Emptiness 
 
So far, I have argued that the deep ecologist‘s notion of identification is very similar to 
the Buddhist virtue of solicitude, in that both involve taking up the needs and interests of 
other beings as one‘s own. Yet, the reasons that deep ecologists propose in favour of 
doing this—whether as a rigid argument, or as a simple suggestion—have all been 
relegated to conventional truth, and are, therefore, ideas that a bodhisattva will eventually 
negate. The Mahāyāna Buddhist does not believe in the ultimate truth of oneness or 
interrelatedness, and neither is she committed to the ideas that other living beings are the 
same or different from us. The question will arise, therefore, why should a Mahāyāna 
Buddhist identify with other beings? On what will she base her love and compassion if 
not on either the sameness or the difference of other sentient beings to herself? 
 This has been a recurrent issue in this study—on what can we ground Buddhist 
environmentalism, given that emptiness will negate every view? In this chapter, I shall 
attempt to show how in Mahāyāna Buddhism, love and compassion are based upon 
emptiness itself. Emptiness and compassion are often spoken of as being ‗in union‘ and 
this, I would like to suggest, can be thought of as an internal relation, in that these virtues 
and emptiness would not be what they are, without this relation to each other. The 
product of this relation is, of course, bodhicitta—the ‗mind of enlightenment‘—described 
as the wish to reach perfect enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings.  
 This implies that there are two ways in which solicitude can be understood. There 
is the relative sense, the wish that all beings have happiness, which I frame with the belief 
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in those beings as existing with svabhāva, for example, as being completely independent 
from myself. I might conceive of their happiness and suffering, in similar terms, that is, 
as ultimately real. In this relative form of solicitude, I see myself as an agent and I have a 
concept of these feelings and actions as ‗mine.‘ There is usually the hope that I will 
succeed, or some other subtle vested interest, and even sometimes, a strong attachment to 
the outcome, which brings about pride or shame in what I consider to be ‗my doing.‘ All 
of this, of course, belongs to conventional reality. Bodhicitta, on the other hand, is the 
bodhisattva’s experience of love and compassion united with a realization of the 
emptiness of those ‗beings‘ whose happiness he desires, of the ‗bodhisattva‘ himself and 
of the very ‗happiness‘ that he promotes and the ‗suffering‘ he prevents. There are no 
expectations and no attachment to the outcome in ultimate love and compassion. The 
question then, is how is bodhicitta generated? The salient issue seems to be that 
compassion must be combined with the realization of the emptiness of all concepts and 
beings. 
 A classic account of bodhicitta, an explanation of how to cultivate the mind of 
enlightenment, is found in Śāntideva‘s Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA 8: 89–118; Thurman 
1996, 152–155). Śāntideva begins, as we have seen, by contemplating the ―equality‖ of 
all sentient beings with himself, in that nobody wants to experience suffering. Up to this 
point, he is using conventional arguments that could easily be found in deep ecology. He 
then goes on to suggest, however, that the way we designate suffering as our own or as 
belonging to others is somewhat gratuitous and unwarranted. Pain becomes unbearable, 
he claims, only because I identify it as ―mine‖ (BCA 8: 92) and therefore, if I took up 
other beings‘ suffering as my own, if I ―identified their pains as mine,‖ they would 
become unbearable too. As there is no difference between my own suffering and that of 
others, Śāntideva goes on, I must help others just like I would help myself. ―What‘s so 
special about me that I strive for my happiness alone?‖ he asks (BCA 8: 95). 
 He supports this argument through appealing to the emptiness of self. If it were 
reasonable to take into account only that suffering that affected us directly, he says, then 
there would be no point in worrying about our future well-being (BCA 8: 97–98). In other 
words, Śāntideva is denying, here, that there is a continuous self that endures throughout 
the course of a lifetime. Again, ―the foot‘s pain is not the hand‘s‖ Śāntideva claims, and 
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he thereby negates the belief that a collection of aggregates makes up a single self (BCA 
8: 99). In brief, ―there is no possessor of pain‖ (BCA 8: 101–102), that is, there is no 
irreducible ―I‖ and therefore, no reasonable grounds for differentiating between my 
suffering and yours. Consequently, Śāntideva proposes that all suffering without 
exception must be eliminated. The notion of identification with all beings emerges in the 
following lines: 
  
 To abolish my own I must abolish all, 
 Otherwise, I, like beings, must stay in pain (BCA 8: 103). 
 
This clearly resonates with the deep ecologist‘s project of adopting the interests and 
needs of other beings as one‘s own. Śāntideva here has taken on the affliction of other 
beings, because his own ‗pain‘ cannot be eliminated without eliminating that of all 
beings. It is only the habit of a lifetime, he suggests, that makes us identify with our 
particular body and our troubles, and he proposes that, with practice, we could come to 
regard others‘ bodies and problems as ours too (BCA 8:110–111). Śāntideva suggests that 
just as we consider our limbs to be inalienable parts of ourselves, we could learn to 
regard all sentient beings as the ―inalienable limbs of life‖ (BCA 8: 113). Again, there is a 
striking resemblance between this idea and the deep ecologist‘s notion of an ―expanded 
self.‖ 
 Although the deep ecologists‘ concept of identification is very similar to the 
Mahāyāna Buddhist‘s idea of solicitude, as we have seen, the reasons for endorsing it, in 
each case, are completely different. The appeal to emptiness and to the fact that no self 
can be found anywhere allows the Mahāyāna Buddhist to avoid the problem of whether it 
is the similarity or the difference between us and other beings that allows and promotes 
identification. It also sidesteps the issue, which eco-feminists have brought up, of 
whether incorporating other beings into our sense of self is an appropriate way of relating 
to them, or if it is not, rather, simply arrogant of us to refuse to respect boundaries, and to 
assume that we know what every other being needs (Plumwood 1997, 178). Basing 
solicitude on emptiness, rather than on a feeling of identity, will also enable us to avoid 
the contradictions inherent in statements such as John Livingstone‘s, ―all that is in the 
universe is not merely mine; it is me. And I shall defend myself‖ (cited in Plumwood 
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1997, 179). One might wonder, if I truly am the entire universe, from what do I need to 
protect myself? From the Mahāyāna Buddhist‘s perspective, all of these problems and 
contradictions arise because deep ecologists insist on viewing the self and other beings as 
possessing svabhāva and on wanting to establish what their relationship to each other is. 
Since neither the self nor the other can be found to exist inherently, in Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, ‗they‘ can neither be said to be the same nor different.99 Through basing 
identification on emptiness, we can also avoid the metaphysical discourse of holism and 
of interrelatedness. 
 In sum, basing identification on emptiness instead of on assertions of identity or 
difference allows us to get around some of the controversies and difficulties that arise in 
deep ecology. Yet, as we shall see, it only offers a limited way out of the quandaries that 
were brought up in chapter 1, where we first considered the possibility of establishing 
environmentalism on solicitude. 
 
Difficulties with Basing Environmental Ethics upon Bodhicitta 
 
1) Discriminating between competing interests 
 
The most important problem that emerged from the discussion on solicitude, in chapter 1, 
was that promoting the welfare of all sentient beings indiscriminately could not serve as a 
basis for a sound environmental policy. Generating universal love and compassion cannot 
aid us to arbitrate between the needs of diverse beings, since it is all suffering that is to be 
eliminated under this account, no matter to whom it belongs. Similarly, not many issues 
in environmentalism can be settled directly by appealing to bodhicitta—whether it is a 
case of human interests versus those of nature, holistic priorities versus individualistic 
needs, indigenous species versus exotics—the bodhisattva is concerned to reduce 
suffering wherever it is found, and cannot discriminate on any grounds. Moreover, since 
promoting a being‘s needs very often involves harming another, the ecologically aware 
bodhisattva might find the task of eliminating all suffering rather hopeless.   
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 It will be recalled that, ultimately, the statement ―neither the same nor different‖ is also negated, and the 
ideal answer, as in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, would be to remain in silence. 
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 Yet, insofar as she sees beings with competing interests, the environmentalist is 
being held sway by conventional truth. This means that if she decides to act in such a way 
that will benefit one party over the other, she can resort to conventional reasons to justify 
her decisions. She might decide to favour an indigenous animal at the expense of an 
exotic one, or to protect an endangered species even though this will deprive her fellow 
humans of some of their income. She might argue that the rarity or vulnerability of one 
party entitles them to her help. As long she remains aware of the conventionality of these 
reasons, perhaps this sort of discourse can be admitted. The bodhisattva’s ultimate, 
nondualistic perspective, however, will collapse the dichotomies of human versus nature, 
whole versus part, self versus other, and so forth, and therefore, ultimately, she will 
perceive no competing interests and nobody being helped or harmed.   
 It is said, in Mahāyāna texts, that a bodhisattva who realizes emptiness is able to 
help all beings effortlessly, and he is better equipped to serve the needs of others, 
including those who are distant in space and time. This is because he is able to identify 
with all beings no matter how far away or how dissimilar they are to him, and he can take 
up their needs as his own, without the obstruction that samsaric beings face, of wanting 
their own happiness before anything else. Instead, the bodhisattva works for the ‗greatest 
happiness of the greatest number,‘ and yet, unlike the utilitarian, he does not get involved 
in adjudicating between needs. His understanding of emptiness will reduce the strength of 
preconceptions or partialities, and the deeper his realization the broader his identification 
will be.  
 Finally, the bodhisattva can teach emptiness to certain beings as a highly effective 
remedy for all afflictions. A direct realization of the emptiness of self will automatically 
eliminate suffering, unlike the theories of deep ecology about our being ―one strand in the 
web of life,‖ which may or may not provide some comfort. In short, extending solicitude 
universally will not provide us with a specifically environmentally sensitive set of 
guidelines or prescriptions, nor can it provide us with any criteria to use in cases of 
conflict. However, combined with a realization of emptiness, what universal love and 
compassion can do is enable us to see through the biases and mistaken beliefs that 
generally lead us to make the wrong decisions, or even to do nothing at all, and it can 
facilitate the opening of our minds and hearts so that all sentient beings are allowed in. 
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2) The predation critique 
 
A second objection against basing environmentalism on compassion was that suffering—
in the form of death, disease, predation, and so on—is an inherent part of nature, and the 
attempt to eliminate it altogether is an outcome of an unrealistic, perhaps over-romantic 
view of nature that contradicts ecological principles. It was argued that if we followed 
our desire for the welfare of all sentient beings to its logical conclusion, rather than 
respecting nature, we would need to alter it radically; in particular, we would need to 
prevent animals from preying upon each other wherever we could. Some parables suggest 
that this idea is not as offensive to Buddhists as it is to some environmentalists, who 
would probably be dismayed by the uncharacteristic portrayal of certain animals in the 
Jātaka Tales and in other Buddhist stories, such as the snake that sheltered the Buddha 
from the rain, or the tiger that slept by Milarepa‘s side. 
 In the next chapter, I will argue that emptiness implies that there is no such thing 
as the ―nature of a tiger,‖ and in fact, several Buddhist stories suggest that, in the 
presence of an enlightened being, normally aggressive animals become submissive 
instead. All the same, although the predation critique is perfectly valid for one who 
displays relative love and compassion, such as the animal welfarist whose views were 
examined in chapter 1, it does not apply to bodhicitta. Since the bodhisattva’s love is 
generated in union with emptiness, she does not infer any views, any ‗oughts,‘ ‗shoulds,‘ 
or ‗musts,‘ and especially, she will not interfere with other beings‘ way of life. To desire 
the happiness of all beings, when beings and their afflictions are viewed as empty, will 
not logically necessitate any intervention on behalf of suffering beings. Someone who 
was under the grip of a deluded perspective, perceiving beings, suffering, and actions as 
real might believe that she had to put an end to all this misery. The bodhisattva, on the 
other hand, would ultimately perceive only emptiness.  
 Of course, this just shows, once again, that an environmentalist cannot appeal to 
bodhicitta or emptiness to support his environmentally motivated decisions. It points to 
the problem we have noted repeatedly, and which we shall encounter again below, that as 
long as it is interpreted as the negation of views, emptiness cannot be used to defend 
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environmentalism, rather, it seems to push our environmental concerns to the brink of 
nihilism. 
 
3) Non-living and non-sentient beings 
 
Through generating universal love and compassion, we might seem to extend concern 
over a considerably wide scope; yet, the final problem identified in chapter 1 was that it 
excludes numerous natural beings that are also valued by environmentalists, beings that 
are not normally believed to be living or sentient. It was suggested that, to the extent that 
some individuals and collective entities display autopoietic behaviour, they can be said to 
have a good of their own, and we show compassion for them inasmuch as we work to 
bring about that good. Of course, this requires quite a stretch in the meaning of terms like 
‗value,‘ ‗good,‘ and ‗compassion,‘ which not everybody might be willing to accept. In 
any case, it is unlikely that these arguments can apply to a species, which is an abstract 
entity.  
 In chapter 2, we saw that Mahāyāna philosophy involves a thoroughgoing 
dissolution of all dualities, which, it was said, could be reduced to the opposition between 
being and non-being.  It is only to be expected, therefore, that the gap between living and 
non-living beings, and between the sentient and non-sentient, would also someday be 
bridged. This seems to have occurred first in China, where the Indian concept of 
extending solicitude to all sentient beings was held, by certain thinkers at least, to involve 
a narrowing rather than an expansion of the moral circle, in that it limited concern to 
those beings that were sentient only (La Fleur 1973, 95). William La Fleur has provided a 
detailed account of the debate in China and Japan regarding the types of beings that could 
become enlightened, including grasses and trees, and even rocks and shards, and for our 
purposes, one might include also ecosystems, species, communities and the biosphere. 
The question is relevant to our discussion because if a being can attain enlightenment, 
this would seem to imply that it can be considered sentient.  
 Chi-Tsang was first to regard trees and plants as capable of attaining 
enlightenment, followed in the seventh century, by Chan-Jan who claimed that even a 
single dust particle contained Buddha Nature. He seems to have been the first to 
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explicitly collapse the duality, when he asked ―Who then is ‗animate‘ and who is 
‗inanimate‘?‖ (cited in La Fleur 1973, 96). Not everybody accepted this outlook, of 
course, and a question arose concerning the way non-living and non-sentient beings were 
supposed to attain enlightenment, given that they could not understand the teachings, 
meditate, and so forth. Clearly, this impinges upon our topic insofar as compassion is 
taken to include the wish that its objects become enlightened. If desiring the well-being 
of a forest, say, requires that the forest can attain Buddhahood, then it is not immediately 
clear that extending solicitude is applicable here. 
 Eventually, the idea emerged that Buddha Nature is already present and fully 
actualized, in sentient beings as well as in non-sentient ones, and that plants, trees and 
dust particles are fully enlightened from the start (La Fleur 1973, 106–107). In Japan, the 
idea of Buddha Nature was quickly taken up; however, it appears that a new dualism was 
set up, in that natural beings were perceived as Buddhas, but not human artefacts and 
common inanimate objects. Saigyō‘s poems, for instance, are all about mountains, willow 
trees, streams, cherry blossoms, and the like, which he regards as possessing Buddha 
Nature, or as somehow soteriologically meaningful (La Fleur 1973, 113). Therefore, it 
seems that in Japan, nature was seen as opposed to culture, or the human, and indeed, La 
Fleur reads Saigyō as attributing a subtle negative value to civilization (1974, 239).  
 This jars with La Fleur‘s statement, elsewhere, that the target of the Mahāyāna 
critique is ―logic‘s penchant for chopping up the world into multiple, disparate, and easily 
lost pieces,‖ including ―the old distinction between sentient and insentient [that was] one 
of those ways of dividing up the world‖ (2000, 111–112). For Ryūgen, for instance, 
plants and trees became a paragon of Buddhist virtue, ―expert practitioners at their own 
kind of zazen‖ (La Fleur 2000, 111). Yet, why not include a concrete slab too, which 
maintains its posture no less than a tree? Tibetan culture perceives impermanence, not 
just in cherry blossoms, and falling leaves, but also in the erosion of stupas and the 
wearing away of prayer flags in the wind. If all these things have Buddha Nature, or if 
they are soteriologically meaningful, the logical conclusion of Mahāyāna non-dualism is 
to accept that landfills, toxic waste and emissions, greenhouse gases, car traffic, and all 
other kinds of environmentally undesirable things have Buddha Nature too.  
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 If bodhicitta truly embraces emptiness, then there will be no difference discerned 
between the living and the inanimate, and indeed, some deep ecologists have drawn 
similar conclusions. Naess, for instance, believes that we can identify with mountains and 
he claims, ―One may broaden the sense of ―living‖ so that any natural whole, however 
large, is a living whole‖ (1985, 263). The problem is, of course, that Mahāyāna 
philosophy gives us no grounds on which to discriminate, and to regard only mountains, 
trees, and rivers as having Buddha Nature is as dualistic as regarding only animals with a 
central nervous system as proper recipients for compassion or thinking that only human 
beings can have a good of their own.  
 To sum up, bodhicitta involves the negation of all views and therefore the 
bodhisattva is not tied to any particular thesis or claim. This has both constructive 
implications for environmental Buddhism as well as disadvantageous ones. It absolves 
the bodhisattva from the need to follow through all the logical implications of a universal 
love and compassion, such as the belief that one must endeavour to ‗soften‘ the harsh 
aspects of nature. Emptiness can also serve as a method of cutting through conventional 
ideas, such as a rigid understanding of what constitutes sentience, and what sorts of 
beings can be said to have interests and needs. However, the emptiness of all our 
conceptions undermines our environmentalist beliefs, and this can result in nihilism. As 
long as emptiness is understood as negation, a bodhisattva has no resources, other than 
mere conventional ideas, for biasing her love and compassion in favour, say, of 
indigenous species rather than exotic ones, to prefer endangered animals to pests, or to 
regard a mountain as sacred, but not a landfill. If the duality between living and non-
living beings is dissolved, then all sorts of undesirable things must be included in the 
class of proper recipients of love and compassion. In short, basing Buddhist 
environmentalism on the ideas of love and compassion, even when understood in the 
Mahāyāna sense of bodhicitta, is less than perfectly cogent.  
 
Summary 
 
This section has compared the deep ecologist‘s notion of identification to the Buddhist 
practice of generating love and compassion. I suggested that both amount to a way of 
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experiencing nature and living beings by taking their interests as our own. Identification 
and compassion result in a feeling of good will towards others, and both Buddhism and 
deep ecology recommend that we widen the scope of these to include the entire cosmos 
and all living beings. 
 I argued that, insofar as it relies on metaphysical ideas as grounds for 
identification, deep ecology is inconsistent with Buddhism, which regards all views as 
empty. Several deep ecologists, in fact, do not attempt to rationalize their case for 
identification, and instead merely propose it as an alternative way of relating to the world 
and to others. Still, there is disagreement between them upon whether identification 
requires a sense of similarity, of identity, or else a sense of difference, between oneself 
and those beings with whom one identifies. The Mahāyāna understanding of bodhicitta, 
on the other hand, avoids this quandary by basing identification not on sameness or 
difference, but upon the emptiness of all beings.  
 Śāntideva‘s Bodhicaryāvatāra contains an extensive elaboration on this concept. 
He suggests that since, ultimately, neither the self nor the other can be found to exist 
inherently, there is no valid reason for discriminating between the suffering of other 
beings and our own. Therefore, the bodhisattva simply promotes well-being, regardless 
of who it belongs to conventionally. The notion of bodhicitta provided a partial solution 
to the problems, outlined in chapter 1, with attempting to base an environmental ethic 
upon solicitude. Although the Mahāyāna understanding of ultimate love and compassion 
cannot be used to ground specifically environmentally motivated actions, applying it will 
reduce egoistic preconceptions and biases, and will enable one to broaden the range of 
their concern. 
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C h ap t e r  4 :  Avo id in g  Ex t r e me  Vi e ws  a nd  P l i a nc y   
 
 
So far, in this thesis, I have taken a mostly critical approach. I have argued that early 
Buddhism is too world denying to value nature intrinsically, and that its transcendentalist 
interpretation of enlightenment depreciates life and the environment. Although Mahāyāna 
Buddhism is not susceptible to these charges, as it locates nirvana in this very world, still, 
the negation of all views relegates environmental philosophy to a merely conventional 
type of discourse, and, therefore, to a secondary pursuit. If we ignore philosophical views 
and statements about facts and turn our focus instead onto ‗interiority,‘100 that is, onto our 
subjective and conscious feelings and perceptions, then Mahāyāna Buddhism and some 
forms of environmentalism do appear to have quite a lot in common. In particular, the 
generation of love and compassion for all beings can be likened to the deep ecological 
notion of identification, which involves taking other beings‘ interests as our own. Yet, 
despite the shared concern for living beings‘ welfare, whenever any specific assertions 
are made—and that includes all propositions about ecology—they are ultimately negated, 
in the Mahāyāna, as conventional and delusional views.  
The first part of this chapter will continue with the critical analysis of the alleged 
environmentally salient teachings of Buddhism. I shall invoke the doctrine of emptiness, 
understood as the negation of all views, to show what sort of ideas the Mahāyāna cannot 
accommodate. The first section will deal with the eternalist belief in permanent and 
unchanging things as it appears in scientific ecology and in the philosophy of biology and 
of the environment. The core concepts of the life sciences, such as the organism, 
ecosystem, species, and so forth, will be examined in the light of emptiness, and will turn 
out to be conventional designations, that is, names that are assigned to a cluster of 
changing phenomena rather than to any thing that exists independently, irreducibly, or 
with a fixed essence.  
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 The term ‗interiority‘ is from Ken Wilber, who relates it to Whitehead‘s ―prehension,‖ Spinoza‘s 
―cognition,‖ Leibniz‘s ―perception,‖ and the Mahāyāna‘s ―Buddha Mind.‖ In general, interiority is opposed 
to the ‗external world,‘ so that ―the within of things is consciousness, the without of things is form” 
(Wilber 1995, 109–112). 
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As we shall see, the Buddhist doctrines of impermanence and emptiness seem to 
coincide with the ‗new ecology‘ of the twentieth century, which emphasizes nature‘s 
state of flux rather than stable equilibrium. Often, though, it is not just flux that we 
perceive in nature, but deterioration and decay; all beings appear to be ‗trapped‘ in time 
as they inevitably proceed towards death or disintegration. If taken to an extreme, this 
view can lead to a pessimistic feeling of despondency, where we wonder why we bother 
about the environment, or indeed, about anything at all. The second section of this 
chapter will turn to this nihilistic extreme, and again, the remedy will be emptiness. I will 
examine several philosophical accounts and argue for the emptiness and conventionality 
of time, change, and causation. By realizing the emptiness of change, the bodhisattva 
avoids being overwhelmed by the suffering in saṃsāra.  
 Emptiness, that is, enables us to avoid nihilism in some ways; still, it is 
impossible to reconcile environmentalism with this doctrine when it is understood in the 
sense of the Mādhyamika negation of all views. For this reason, and also to offset further 
the charge of environmental nihilism, in the final section of this chapter, I will outline an 
interpretation of emptiness that is environmentally motivated, and which is based upon 
the Yogācāra‘s more positive construal. Once again, this has to do with interiority rather 
than with views about the world. It will be recalled from chapter 2 that in order to guard 
against a nihilistic misinterpretation of emptiness, to which Nāgārjuna‘s negative 
portrayal was highly prone, the Yogācāra affirmed ―the existence of the nonexistence of 
nonduality,‖ or simply, the ―existence of emptiness.‖ This was explained as the 
bodhisattva’s actual experience of nonduality or emptiness, which arises together with 
the conceptual negation of views. A similar idea becomes central in the ―third-turning of 
the wheel‖ phase of Buddhism, known as ―Buddha Nature‖ (buddha-dhātu101) (Nagao 
1992, 20; Macy 2000, 156), or as a pure and luminous, ―clear light‖ mind (Reynolds 
2000, 12). 
 The Pure Land sūtras and the doctrine of Buddha Nature suggest that when a 
bodhisattva realizes emptiness, it is not just his own consciousness that is affected but his 
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 A related concept is that of the ‗Buddha seed,‘ tathāgata-garbha. 
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external reality too,
102
 that is, the world around him becomes an expression of the 
enlightened mind, and all other beings reveal their Buddha Nature too. I shall argue, upon 
this basis, that there is an external complement to the Yogācārin positive aspect of 
emptiness; a quality that characterizes the outer world, and which I shall refer to as 
‗pliancy.‘ Defined as a sense of openness, flexibility, and receptivity to change, this 
quality belongs to natural beings in the same way that Buddha Nature belongs to 
consciousness; it is their ‗true‘ nature but not always realized. The concept, like its 
synonym ‗emptiness‘ and its analogs ‗Buddha Mind‘ and ‗clear light,‘ is only intended as 
a rough approximation of that ultimate ineffable reality, and like all concepts in 
Mahāyāna philosophy, it must not be reified or taken as a final truth. It is merely useful, I 
shall argue, for the version of Buddhist environmentalism that I shall offer here, which is 
modelled on the Yogācāra‘s avoidance of nihilism. In brief, I shall claim that there is a 
relation between the extent of realization in a Buddha or bodhisattva’s consciousness and 
the nature of the world that surrounds him. When he realizes emptiness, a bodhisattva 
also realizes the pliancy of nature; these are, in fact, two terms for a quality that is 
essential for future evolution. Protecting pliancy in nature, besides being beneficial to the 
environment, is analogous to cultivating and strengthening the awareness of emptiness in 
one‘s consciousness. To realize and actualize emptiness as pliancy, in short, is a method 
for creating an ecological Pure Land. 
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 Clearly, the bodhisattva will also have to negate the ‗inner/outer‘ distinction ultimately, so that, as stated 
by the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, he can ―enter the Dharma door of nondualism.‖ All talk of internal/external reality 
here, is merely conventional. 
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1 Overcoming Eternalism: the Emptiness of Beings 
 
This section will look at certain controversies in biology and in ecology and will compare 
their philosophical implications to the extreme of eternalism, grasping at a belief in the 
existence of things with svabhāva. Beginning with the debate about the ‗old‘ ecology of 
equilibrium and the ‗new‘ ecology of flux, I will argue that the dispute corresponds each 
time to the opposition between, on the one hand, a realist commitment to the independent 
and unchanging existence of the objects concerned, that is, to svabhāva, and on the other, 
the collapse of this belief when their transient and relative nature is understood. As we 
have seen, the Buddhist Middle Way regards all objects as empty and impermanent, and 
emphasizes the way that all things exist in an intricate web of relations with other things. 
Another way of putting this is to say that all things are conventional and without inherent 
existence. Applied to scientific ecology, the doctrines of emptiness and impermanence 
suggest that things like organisms, species, and ecosystems are continually changing and 
unstable phenomena, highly dependent on other things, and that therefore they do not 
exist with svabhāva. 
 Contemporary ecologists and philosophers like to point out that whenever we 
look for constancy in nature we find change instead (Botkin 1992, 62; Gillson et al 2003). 
Mark Sagoff‘s portrayal of ecosystems as ―transitory and accidental to nature‖ (cited in 
Partridge 2000, 80–81), for instance, appears to coincide perfectly with the doctrine of 
impermanence. Yet, the pervasiveness of change does not imply that these things do not 
exist at all, as Sagoff suggests, or that their existence is of no value. We fall victim to 
nihilistic thinking if we infer from emptiness that all forms of environmental change are 
equally acceptable or if we wonder whether the protection of these transient natural 
phenomena is worthwhile. In the final part of this chapter, I shall attempt to counter this 
extreme view by arguing that better and worse forms of natural change can be 
discriminated—welcome changes in nature, I shall argue, are those that permit further 
evolution and prevent stagnation. Consequently, I shall portray a version of 
environmentalism based on the idea that only those sorts of events that can safeguard the 
possibility of change are acceptable. 
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 For now, though, I shall emphasize the importance of the doctrines of 
impermanence and of emptiness in Buddhism, the need to apply them universally, and 
especially to those concepts to which, as environmentalists, we are most likely to become 
attached. I shall attempt to show how many of our common ideas about nature are, in 
fact, delusional from the ultimate viewpoint, and I shall use the notion of emptiness to 
negate various concepts at all levels of nature, starting from the general idea of its 
‗balance.‘ The genome, the organism, the species and other taxa, the community, and the 
ecosystem will all turn out to be empty of inherent existence. In other words, all of these 
so-called ‗things‘ are ‗really‘103 fluctuating collections of transient phenomena that have 
no reality as svabhavic entities. In Buddhist terms, they are empty, dependently arisen, 
and conventionally designated ‗things.‘  
 
The ‘Balance-of-Nature’ View and Eternalism 
 
One of the oldest and most venerated themes in ecology, which began with Herodotus 
and which still informs popular imagination, is the ―balance-of-nature‖ view, the idea that 
nature is a delicate equilibrium of interacting systems (Cuddington 2001, 465; Worster 
1998, 364–366). Under this paradigm, the proper state of any natural system, whether a 
single organism or the entire ecosphere, is believed to be stability, and it is also thought 
that whenever its balance is upset, a system will return to this proper, stable state 
(Worster 1998, 366). Until recently, the scientific understanding of nature has 
emphasized equilibrium, even though the dynamic aspect was never totally ignored. That 
is to say, nature was never conceived of as perfectly static—it was known to involve 
various fluctuating elements—yet fluctuation was given limited importance and any 
disturbance to a system‘s stability was generally seen as a secondary phenomenon, 
caused by something that lay outside of the closed system.  
  Therefore, a consequence of the balance-of-nature view is the belief that any 
process of change occurring in a natural system will invariably tend towards a final goal, 
which is the proper and natural state for that system to occupy (Botkin 1992, 13; Worster 
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 ‗Really‘ is in quotes because, ultimately, of course, even this statement is negated. Nothing can be 
stated, it will be recalled, that corresponds to ultimate truth. 
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1998, 389). A typical example of this kind of thinking is Frederic Clements‘s view of 
plant succession, according to which, when communities and ecosystems replace each 
other they always follow a predictable trajectory. A pine grove, say, replaces an aspen 
one, and eventually, the sequence reaches a ―final resting point,‖ in this case, an oak 
forest, which is called the ―climax‖ or ―homeostatic‖ stage and which is sustained 
indefinitely unless disturbed (Worster 1998, 71–72, 391). A similar account of stability 
was given by Eugene Odum, who believed that the relations between predators and prey 
worked as negative feedback mechanisms, keeping species populations mostly 
unchanged over the years. Odum conceived of the ecosystem as a relatively closed 
system that oscillated around a stable, fixed point and displayed more continuity than 
change. He held that the ecosystem would depart from that stable point only if it was 
‗invaded‘ by ‗exotic‘ species, or disturbed by something ‗foreign‘ to the ecosystem itself, 
such as fire or other human activity. In fact, Odum warned against anthropogenic 
disturbance of the ―precarious balance‖ of nature and, in general, he took a strong stand 
in favor of preserving the landscape in as nearly natural a condition as possible (Worster 
1998, 278, 368–369).  
 If one follows the ‗balance-of-nature‘ paradigm through all of its implications, it 
appears to be founded on similar desires and assumptions as the extreme of eternalism. 
This, it will be recalled, requires and stipulates a permanent, unchanging reality that lies 
behind the world of shifting phenomena, sometimes conceived of as an immutable 
essence underlying the varying properties of a thing. Some versions of eternalism 
conceive of svabhāva as a logically independent entity, that is, as a thing that can be 
defined without reference to anything else. Often, eternalists display a strong attachment 
to those things that they consider as truly existent, and they frequently attempt to prevent 
them from changing, or else they deny the significance of this change. 
 Similarly, insofar as it emphasizes the stability of homeostatic systems, the 
‗balance-of-nature‘ view implies such a permanent, unchanging entity. Organisms, 
species, and ecosystems are believed to endure with relatively little change and to be 
relatively discrete, that is, they are conceived of as separate from anything outside of their 
borders. Of course, no natural system could be thought of as absolutely independent or 
separate, as all natural beings are related to others in some way. Yet under this paradigm, 
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there is a tendency to envisage such beings in isolation—as we have seen, they are 
described as closed systems rather than open ones and other factors are defined as 
‗external disturbances,‘ ‗exotic species,‘ or ‗invasives.‘  
 Moreover, the idea that there is a ―proper‖ or ―natural‖ state for these systems 
seems to suggest that they have an immutable essence—that what they ‗really are‘ is 
defined through fixed characteristics—even though disturbance changes their properties 
radically. Again, this is because fluctuation is considered negligible, not a proper or real 
part of the closed system. In sum, the balance-of-nature view resembles eternalism 
because it tends to portray permanent, independent and inherently existent natural 
objects, which possess definite and fixed characteristics. The affinities with eternalism 
become clear when ecologists, influenced by this paradigm, talk about the need to 
preserve such objects in their natural state, and to protect them from changing into 
something else. Their attachment to these things and their desire to preserve them, as they 
are, is evidence of an eternalist outlook.  
 According to several authors, the ‗balance-of-nature‘ view has been superseded 
by the new paradigm of flux, or ‗chaos ecology‘, which has been at the forefront of 
scientific ecology since the 1990‘s (Partridge 2000). Under this account, nature is made 
up of intrinsically fluctuating, open systems rather than closed, static ones and the 
emphasis is on disturbance and change rather than on equilibrium (Pickett and White 
1985, xiii). What were previously called ‗external‘ influences—exotic species, fires, and, 
sometimes, even anthropogenic influence—are now believed to belong intrinsically to 
nature; they are a part of the system they affect, and some are even necessary for the 
persistence of life (Botkin 2001, 261). This suggests that there is no one state that is the 
‗proper‘ or ‗natural‘ one for any system, and that there is no oscillation around a fixed 
point, because there is no fixed, final resting point to be reached, and, therefore, no 
definite trajectory for nature to follow either (Botkin 2001, 261). Instead, all natural 
processes contain a considerable extent of ―contingent variability‖ and this is true at all 
levels of the hierarchy, from the gene up to the biosphere (Pavé 2007). In short, the 
fluctuation of nature appears more like an aimless ramble than a journey towards a 
definite destination or an attempt to maintain a steady state.  
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 According to Callicott, Buddhist doctrine ties in more neatly with this new 
ecology, as the emphasis on flux in the latter is reminiscent of the doctrine of 
impermanence. Both Buddhism and the new ecology view change as thoroughly 
pervasive, that is, both ―fully embrace change...and abjure any desire for any state of 
being beyond change‖ (Callicott 2005, 22). Instead of thinking of a forest, say, as being 
‗really‘ an oak forest, that was damaged by fire and then invaded by pines, Buddhists and 
new ecologists just see impermanence and change, and view the ‗forest‘ as emptiness, not 
‗really‘ any kind of forest at all. To negate eternalism, it will be recalled, one meditates 
on emptiness and on impermanence, and this, in ecology, can be applied to all levels of 
nature‘s hierarchical organization of systems within systems. The next section will 
outline emptiness as it applies to various natural objects, with a particular emphasis on 
species. I will argue that those objects that are normally the targets of conservation 
campaigns, ecosystems, species, individual organisms, and the like are all empty of 
inherent existence.  
 
Emptiness of Natural Beings 
 
In chapter 1, we encountered the argument of not-self, or emptiness of self, and saw that 
it can be applied to any nonhuman organism. Similarly, it can be extended to show that 
all natural ‗individuals‘—including genes, demes, species, communities and 
ecosystems
104—are empty of inherent existence too. In this section, I shall outline some 
arguments for the emptiness of natural beings, and explain why contemporary science 
also suggests that ecological concepts must not be reified.  
 
1) Individual organisms 
 
 The doctrine of not-self claims that when we break down, conceptually, the 
individual into its aggregates we find that the self cannot be found in any of these, either 
separately or collectively. In humans, the aggregates are traditionally listed as body, 
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 I use the word ‗individuals‘ following Stephen Jay Gould‘s theory of macroevolution and punctuated 
equilibrium, about which more will be said below. 
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feelings, perceptions, will, and consciousness, although this list was never meant to be 
definitive, but merely to stand for everything that makes up an individual. In any case, 
individuals of other species will possess some, but perhaps not all of these aggregates, 
and for the purpose of this argument, it is unnecessary to establish precisely which ones 
they do possess. The point of the argument about not-self is that when we attempt to pin 
down exactly what an animal or a plant is, we find that we cannot point to any single part 
of it in isolation; a tiger, for example, is not its striped body, or its consciousness, and not 
its ferocity either. Rather, the tiger is supposed to include all of these qualities and 
aggregates.  
 We might think, then, that the tiger is just the composite of all these aggregates, 
the sum total of everything that is said to make it up. However, since all of the tiger‘s 
aggregates (its body, feelings, perceptions, and so forth) are constantly undergoing 
change, this implies that the tiger must be continuously changing too. Yet we usually 
think of the tiger itself as something stable, something that remains unchanged despite the 
changes that happen to its body as it ages, the changes in its feelings, in its perceptions, 
and so forth. Therefore, the tiger cannot be the same as the collection of its aggregates. 
Indeed, this also emerges from the way in which we refer to the latter as the tiger’s 
stripes, feelings, perceptions, ferocity, and so on. This clearly suggests the tiger itself 
must be something else, something different, to which these things belong.  
 Yet, this cannot be true either, since the only way to recognize a tiger is precisely 
through its body, and the rest of its aggregates. Apart from these, that is, there is no tiger 
at all. This suggests that the concept is imputed by thought onto a group of constantly 
changing things; the tiger does not exist inherently but only as a name for a collection of 
ephemeral phenomena. The trouble with using the word ‗tiger‘ in this way, however, is 
that we often make the mistake of thinking that there is something real to which it refers, 
some real substance which owns the aggregates, and which is therefore the real, truly 
existent tiger. Meditation on emptiness has the purpose of dispelling this illusion.
105
 We 
analyse the tiger, or break it down conceptually, into all of its parts and when we realize 
that we cannot find the tiger in any of them, we have reached an understanding of its 
emptiness. 
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 For the classical Pāli loci of the discussion of not self, see Sn 22.1, Sn 22.59. 
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2) Species and other taxa 
 
A similar argument can be constructed to demonstrate the emptiness of the concept of a 
species. Previously, from Aristotle‘s times to Leibniz‘s it was mostly held that  
 
[I]f we...knew things well enough, perhaps we would find for each species 
a fixed set of attributes which were common to all the individuals of that 
species and which a single living organism always retained no matter what 
changes or metamorphosis it might go through (Leibniz, cited in Mugnai 
2005, 513). 
 
In other words, species were conceived in terms of svabhāva, and it was supposed that 
they had fixed essences. Even today, many philosophers believe that species are ―natural 
kinds,‖ construed as ―a class of objects defined by common possession of some 
theoretically important property‖ (Dupré 1981, 68). According to this view, all members 
of a given species are objectively alike in some way, and to determine an organism‘s 
species, one simply checks whether it possesses a particular trait or else a set of such 
traits. Hull claims, for instance, that ―each species is distinguished by one set of essential 
characteristics‖ and that ―the possession of each essential character is necessary for 
membership in the species, and the possession of all the essential characters sufficient‖ 
(cited in Okasha 2002, 196). A more moderate version of essentialism distinguishes 
species through ‗clusters‘ of varying similarities rather than essential properties, yet 
some claim that these clusters are in fact nothing but essences, which, it is argued, do 
not have to be ―neat and tidy‖ (Devitt 2008, 371). 
 Following Locke, Putnam and Kripke have distinguished between a ‗nominal 
essence,‘ which corresponds to the essential characteristics of a thing, described above, 
and a ‗real essence,‘ which, they explain, is what accounts for those characteristic 
properties. The real essence might be unknown as yet, but, according to this view, in 
principle it could be discovered by science (cited in Dupré 1981, 66–67). When applied 
to species, the real essence is thought to reside in the genome or in some other underlying 
genetic property, whatever is responsible for the species‘ characteristic qualities. As 
Dupré notes, the theory of real essences works very well in chemistry, where a 
substance‘s molecular composition is responsible for its external characteristics. 
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However, the theory cannot be extended to biology, and Putnam and Kripke‘s accounts 
do not correspond with biological facts (Dupré 1981, 66), as I hope to show below. 
 If anything like an intrinsic essence could be found for species and other taxa then 
this would contradict Nāgārjuna‘s doctrine of emptiness and vindicate eternalism, the 
belief in svabhāva, instead. The extreme of eternalism, it will be recalled, implies a 
permanent and eternal entity behind changing phenomena, or else an essential core that is 
independent of a thing‘s accidental properties and relations. If biological essentialism 
succeeds, if there is an essential intrinsic core to being a tiger, one that is independent of 
tigers‘ relations with other things, this would be a fatal blow to the doctrines of emptiness 
and of dependent–arising, as it would suggest that species membership is non-empty.106 
Recent discoveries and views about biological taxa, however, reveal an understanding 
that is not very different from that of Nāgārjuna. 
  One argument for the emptiness of species emerges from the theory of evolution. 
Since Darwin, it has been understood that all species are constantly metamorphosing, to 
some extent, and it is now known that evolution can happen in two ways. Sympatric 
species transform very slowly but steadily, resulting in radically different new species 
that emerge over the millennia. An allopatric species, on the other hand, transforms 
rapidly over a short period, after it branches off from an older ancestor and becomes 
reproductively isolated. Importantly, whether a species is allopatric or sympatric, it 
cannot have any single property whatsoever that is fixed eternally (Okasha 2002, 197–
198). All properties of all species are subject to mutation at any time and therefore, 
species cannot have the immutable essence that is posited by eternalism.  
 Moreover, the boundaries in time between one species and another are vague 
(Sober 1980, 356; Dupré 1981, 90; Matthen 1998, 112) and there is no precise point, it 
seems, where one can draw the line between a species and its ancestor.
107
 Rather, the way 
a lineage is split by taxonomists involves a certain amount of arbitrariness. An evident 
example of this emerges in the event where biologists agree that an act of speciation has 
occurred, in which case an individual organism will be said to change its species 
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 On the other hand, if species essences are relational—as I shall argue below—then this confirms the 
doctrine of emptiness, which draws attention to the internal relations between things. 
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 This point is less obvious in the case of allopatric species. If one accepts Gould and Eldredge‘s theory of 
―punctuated equilibrium,‖ or Mayr‘s biological species concept, it appears that there is an objective ‗line‘ 
to be drawn between a new species and its ancestor. I shall be considering these theories below.  
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membership during its lifetime (Okasha 2002, 206; Matthen 2009, 113). This clearly 
suggests that species membership is not a property that an organism has from its own 
side, but that it depends, instead, on the historical and conventional practices of biologists 
and taxonomists.  
 This does not preclude however, that once it is designated as such, an allopatric 
species might have an essence for that period of time during which it is relatively stable. 
As Gould and Eldredge suggest, when evolution is considered over a geologic time-scale, 
the emergence of allopatric species appears instantaneous and not gradual. The norm for 
most species is morphological stasis, and throughout most of their existence, very little 
change occurs. Metamorphosis only happens during speciation events, and then, it 
happens relatively quickly. If we consider evolution over a geological time-scale, 
therefore, it is easy to delineate one species from another (Gould and Eldredge 1972, 
1977). Of course, this does not entirely refute the argument above, for we may insist on 
viewing evolution closer up, on a human time-scale, and from this perspective the 
fuzziness of the boundaries between species is evident.
108
 However, from a geologic 
perspective, it might appear that species do have essences during the time in which they 
do not change, and this in turn, might imply a lesser degree of svabhāva.  
 Naïve essentialism is the claim that locates essences among the observable 
properties of an organism, that is, it posits a ‗nominal essence,‘ which is disclosed in the 
phenotype. For example, if, among other things, an organism is striped then, according to 
this view, it can be identified as a tiger. Naïve essentialism about species, however, has 
been widely discredited since there is so much variation within the observable properties 
of members of any species that no (non-trivial) essential character or set of essential 
characters can be found which every member of that species will possess (Sober 1980, 
379; Dupré 1981, 84; Okasha 2002, 196–198). Whether we think of essences as precisely 
defined or else as ―clusters of similarities,‖ essentialism can even be refuted a priori, 
through considering the case where an organism was born that looked nothing like its 
parents at all. Regardless of how monstrous it might appear, and even if it possessed none 
of the alleged essential properties, we would still want to say that it was a member of the 
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 It will be recalled that the Middle Path does not need to establish the truth of any statement. This is 
merely one argument for the emptiness of species. 
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same species
109
 (Okasha 2002, 197). In other words, determining species membership 
upon the basis of observable properties cannot work at all. 
 According to Putnam or Kripke‘s view, as we have seen, it is the underlying, 
genetic microstructures that constitute the ‗real essence‘ of a species and not its 
observable properties (cited in Devitt 2008, 345, 352). The tiger‘s phenotype and its 
essential characteristics are caused by its genome, or perhaps by some function at the 
genetic level, and therefore, the implication is that an organism is striped because it is a 
tiger, that is, because it possesses these micro-structural features, and not the other way 
around (Matthen 1998, 115). A species‘s ‗real essence,‘ then, is that underlying genetic 
property that is causally responsible for its ‗nominal essence.‘ According to this view, 
science will eventually uncover precisely what these underlying essences are, enabling us 
to ‗carve nature at its (real) joints‘ (Okasha 2002, 195). 
 However, as I shall argue below, genes too are empty of inherent existence, and 
this will refute the idea of a real intrinsic essence for species. What a species is, instead, 
seems to have a lot to do with organisms‘ relations with each other, and their relations 
with the environment. Indeed, the very concept of species as understood today suggests 
that they are defined relationally (Okasha 2002, 199). There are three commonly accepted 
modern species concepts. The ‗biological concept‘ classifies organisms into species 
through their reproductive relations; the ‗ecological niche concept‘ looks at the relations 
between an organism and its environment, while the ‗phylogenetic‘ account looks at their 
evolutionary history and common ancestry. These ideas are all subject to various 
difficulties
110
 yet, the important point here is that they all posit a relational essence, that 
is, they determine species not through any intrinsic property
111
 but rather, through the 
relations between organisms and their environment (Matthen 1998, 115; Okasha 2002, 
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 Below I shall argue that this too demonstrates the emptiness of species. 
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 The biological species concept leaves out asexual species and cannot account for hybrids (Dupré 1981, 
86). The ecological niche and phylogenetic accounts are problematic in that both require an enormous 
amount of data to be collected before one could determine what species an organism belonged to. Moreover 
the phylogenetic account must resort to other criteria, usually phenetic or reproductive, to determine 
whether a speciation event has occurred (Dupré 1981, 89). 
111
 Dr. Simon James points out that an intrinsic property could also be relational, for example, my arms 
being shorter than my legs (personal communication). Here I use ‗relational‘ property (or essence) to mean 
a property (or essence) that a thing x has in virtue of a relation that holds between that thing, x and another 
thing, y, which is not properly thought of as forming part of x in any way. 
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202).
112
 This then, seems to be perfectly consonant with the Buddhist doctrine of 
emptiness.  
 Many biologists agree that the designation of an organism as a member of this or 
that species is a conventional or historical matter (Kitcher 1984, 326–327; Okasha 2002, 
193; Ereshefsky 1991, 98).
 
Yet sometimes there is the suggestion that it is only our 
knowledge that is lacking—that in reality, species are real and there is an objective way 
of classifying organisms, which we have not yet discovered (Kitcher 1984, 330; 
Ereshefsky 1991, 100). Of course, we may someday find this to be true, we may yet 
uncover the ‗gene‘ (or, more likely, the set of genes) for being a human or for being a 
chimp; yet on our current understanding of species and genetics it appears that all these 
concepts are empty, precisely because they are defined conventionally and historically. 
 With higher taxa, like genera and families, the conventional way we delineate 
these groups comes out even more clearly. It is well-known, for instance, that we call 
some creatures with eight legs ―spiders‖ simply because of the way we have defined the 
word, just like we call ―birds‖ those creatures with feathers, ―mammals‖ those animals 
that suckle their young and so forth
113
  (Dupré 1981, 79, 82). One might ask, as Dennett 
does, why we do not consider ‗creatures with eyes,‘ or ‗carnivore,‘ to be as important a 
classifier as ‗warmblooded creature‘ (Dennett 1996, 37). If we think about alternative 
taxological systems, such as, the early Buddhist method, the arbitrariness becomes highly 
apparent. This system classifies animals according to their number of legs, putting birds 
and humans into the same category—completely illogically, it may seem. Yet the 
Linnaean classification of whales as mammals, rather than fish, appears just as unfounded 
if we are ignorant of the definition of these kinds. These classes, that is, are not real 
divisions in nature but correspond to our arbitrary way of slicing up the natural world—as 
Nāgārjuna would say, they are ―dependent designations,‖ ―nothing more than the 
referents of words‖ (Garfield 1995, 305). In short, there are no inherently existent fish, 
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 Devitt claims that this is beside the point, that determining whether a group of organisms is a species 
does not tell us whether this organism is a member of species x or species y. His argument however seems 
to rest on the assumption that there are objectively, groups of organisms that can be picked out as species, 
which is precisely what (some versions of) the relational account of species are intended to refute.  
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 As Dupré notes none of these definitions is complete. Further conditions would need to be added to the 
definition of a spider, for instance, to exclude octopuses and to include spiders that had lost a leg, and so 
on. A truly necessary and sufficient definition would have to be very complex indeed (Dupré 1981, 79f). 
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birds, or mammals, rather these things are conventionally defined, and empty of inherent 
existence. 
 
3) Genes and microstructural features 
 
As mentioned above, several authors think that a ‗real essence‘ will be found for species 
when their genetic make-up is better understood. Today, however, we know that there is 
considerable genetic variation within any single species, and conversely, that members of 
different species share the vast majority of their genes (Okasha 2002, 197). We know that 
genes are ‗pleotropic,‘ which means that any single gene is responsible for more than one 
phenotypic character, and we also know that most phenotypic characters are, in turn, 
‗polygenetically influenced‘ that is, they are the result of more than one gene (West-
Eberhard 1989, 254). In short, there is no one-to-one correspondence between an 
organism‘s genes and its observable properties and talk of ‗the gene for blue eyes‘ or ‗the 
gene for being human‘ is a fictional, shorthand way of describing a much more complex 
reality (Judson 2001). Perhaps, the most surprising discovery has been the considerable 
part played by the environment in the development of any organism. 
 Several studies have revealed that phenotypic plasticity, the ability of a single 
genotype to produce a range of diverse phenotypes, is a widespread phenomenon; a well-
known example concerns goats with reduced forelimbs. The onset of this abnormality 
leads to their developing in a completely different way from other goats, that is, they 
become bipedal, and they also develop radical divergences ―in everything from skeletal 
form to the organization of internal organs‖ (Kaplan 2008, 866). In fact, both 
morphological and behavioural plasticity are now known to be a ―universal quality of 
life‖ (West-Eberhard 1989, 252), and the literature contains an abundance of examples of 
organisms that develop in a very different way from their conspecifics due to 
environmental circumstances. For instance, plants that are normally terrestrial will 
develop aquatic leaves when transplanted into water and vice versa. Indeed, the 
vertebrates‘ move from water to land in the Devonian period must have occurred within a 
single genome of lung-bearing fish (West-Eberhard 1989, 263–264, 267–268; see also 
Dennett 1995, 77–79; 1996, 264; Kaplan 2008, 865–870). This demonstrates, once again, 
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that an organism is the product of both its genes and its environment, that it has no fixed, 
immutable essence, but that in reality, it is a highly plastic being, empty of any inherent 
existence.
114
 In the final part of this chapter, I shall refer to this quality as ‗pliancy‘. 
 The same idea is confirmed by the various ‗genome projects,‘ which have sought 
to identify the genetic sequences of diverse organisms. Far from uncovering the gene for 
a particular species, the genetic make-up, say, of a modern human and that of a 
Neanderthal were found to be mostly identical (Green et all 2009) and the same holds for 
the genome of a human and of a chimpanzee; indeed, it is widely held that the difference 
between humans and chimps is not one of genetic material, but caused rather by different 
genetic expression during development (Cyranosky 2002, 912). In fact, despite scientists‘ 
detailed knowledge of genetic make-up of chimps and humans, they have still not been 
able to relate this to their knowledge of morphological differences between our closest 
cousins and us (Levinton 2001, 3). Instead, the surprising extent of similarity among the 
genomes of all species—including humans, flies, worms and even bacteria—has led 
scientists to argue for the ―commonality of all life‖ and to stress, once more, the 
environmental input in determining what it means to be a member of a species (Pääbo 
2001, 1220).   
 All these considerations would seem to imply, contra Putnam and Kripke, that 
there are no ‗real essences‘ of species to be found among underlying genetic properties. It 
confirms the idea that organisms and species do not have immutable natures, but rather 
they are capable of changing radically, not only on an evolutionary time-scale, but also 
within a single lifetime. ―The critical point never to omit,‖ it has been claimed, ―is that 
genes act in concert with one another [and] collectively with the environment‖ (Judson 
2001, 769). That is to say, genes, phenotypes and the environment are all dependent on 
each other and there is no single, independent unit that we can call ‗a gene.‘ Rather this 
concept too is an empty one—dependent upon conventions and with ―a strong historical 
origin‖ in the way it is defined (Judson 2001, 769). Just as we saw with other natural 
systems, there is no svabhāva to be found within genetics.  
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4) The universality of emptiness 
 
The doctrine of emptiness, therefore, applies to systems at all levels of the natural 
hierarchy, all the way from the smallest unit of life, the genes, right up to the higher 
systems, the demes, communities, and ecosystems.
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 As we saw above, today these too 
are seen as ―erratic and shifting‖ phenomena rather than integrated units. In the 1930‘s 
Henry Gleason had already debunked the idea of an ecosystem, claiming that these 
supposed ‗units‘ were not cohesive at all but rather a temporary and adventitious 
mingling of species and abiotic features. In his words,  
 
Each separate community is merely one minute part of a vast and ever-
changing kaleidoscope of vegetation, a part of which is restricted in its 
size, limited in its duration, never duplicated except in its present 
immediate vicinity and there only as a coincidence, rarely if ever repeated 
(Gleason 1939, 106).  
 
Similarly, Michael E. Soulé writes, ―the idea that species live in integrated communities 
is a myth‖ and, above, we saw that Sagoff describes ecosystems as ―unstructured, 
transitory and accidental in nature‖ (cited in Partridge 2000, 79). Much has been made of 
the lack of real, solid borders in nature, and the arbitrary delineation of units by 
ecologists, biologists, and geneticists for their particular purposes (Fitzsimmons 1999, 
24–25). The new paradigm of flux, as we have seen, focuses precisely on the lack of 
inherent existence of these natural systems and there is a clear resemblance between this 
idea and the doctrine of emptiness. 
 In short, all of the so-called ‗individuals‘ of the life sciences are impermanent, 
constantly fluctuating, without a fixed essence, and highly dependent upon other things. 
There is no svabhavic entity that exists inherently, from its own side; rather, the 
boundaries between things are somewhat porous, in the sense that all natural beings tend 
to influence and to be influenced by one another. This relates, of course, to the holistic 
vision of oneness that was described in the previous chapter, the deep ecological and Hua 
Yen Buddhist portrayal of reality as made up of a web of interconnected beings. There, it 
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was emphasized that such theories and statements are not to be grasped at as final truths, 
and the same point can be made about all the theories and statements reported here. The 
purpose of this section has been to point to the emptiness of natural beings; it will be 
recalled, however, that all statements are merely conventional and cannot directly 
describe emptiness, which is ultimately ineffable. 
 
Summary 
 
In brief, the section has suggested that as environmentally concerned Buddhists, we 
cannot legitimately aim to protect the ‗balance of nature,‘ simply because we understand 
that there is no such thing, and that nature is always in flux. When the emptiness of 
particular landscapes, endangered species, communities, and individual organisms is 
taken into consideration, they will no longer appear to exist inherently, and the desire to 
prevent them from changing will be recognized as eternalist grasping. The oceans, the 
rainforests, the atmosphere are merely fleeting and transient phenomena; just like tigers, 
polar bears, and whales they have no independent existence at all. This might seem to 
make climate change—whether anthropogenic or not—appear perfectly natural, just more 
impermanence, like deforestation, desertification, and so on. 
 A forest, for instance, is not fixed, independent, irreducible or unified; rather, it 
has always been changing and what we once called a ‗disturbance‘—an invasive species 
or a fire—we now known is a perfectly natural and integral part of that ‗forest,‘ even 
though it brings about such a drastic change. There are no svabhavic entities in nature, 
but rather, everything is related to everything, and our habit of delineating parts of nature 
as single beings is merely a conventional practice. If we accept the Buddhist doctrine of 
not-self, we also need to accept that all living beings are collections of variable 
aggregates, and cannot be found to exist from their own side. The same goes for what we 
call a ‗species‘—it does not exist inherently, but is defined through its relations with 
other things. The ―Bengali tiger,‖ say, does not correspond to any real category ‗out 
there,‘ and it has no fixed essence, either in its visible qualities or in its genetic make-up. 
The constant evolution of organisms implies there are no clear boundaries between one 
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species and another, and it also implies the inevitable loss of every single species at some 
point, although, from another perspective, there are no real species that can be lost. 
 In short, I have argued that to find the Middle Path in ecology is to recognize the 
conventionality and emptiness of all beings on all levels of the natural hierarchy, from 
genes up to ecosystems, and to let go of our attachment to their existence and our desire 
to prevent change. This can be extremely difficult because, as environmentalists, we tend 
to care deeply about these beings, and at the very least, we want to safeguard their future 
existence. On the other hand, emptiness must not be taken to imply the absolute 
nonexistence of all our cherished beings. Nor does it entail that there is no point 
whatsoever to our attempting to protect them. To draw this sort of inference would be to 
fall into the other extreme of nihilism, which involves negative emotions as much as 
theoretical views. The next section will outline this second ‗wrong view‘ and explain how 
emptiness provides a remedy for this pessimistic outlook too. Finally, the third section 
will describe a positive version of Middle Way environmentalism.  
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2 Overcoming Nihilism: the Emptiness of Change 
 
Impermanence featured heavily in the previous section, where we saw that all natural 
beings are in constant flux and constantly undergoing transformation. This section will 
explore the connections between time, change, death, and decay, thereby examining in 
more detail the correlations between impermanence and suffering, which were 
anticipated in chapter 1. It is possible, I will argue, to descend too far into a nihilistic state 
if the concept of change is reified.
116
 At this extreme, the difficulty has to do with one‘s 
feelings and emotions, as much as with the intellect and philosophical views. The 
problem of duḥkha can appear insurmountable, and an aspiring bodhisattva could easily 
feel overwhelmed by all the suffering in the world and give into despair.  
 I will start, therefore, by examining the connections between impermanence and 
suffering, to determine how the everyday view of time and change results in a nihilistic 
attitude. The excessive preoccupation with suffering and the sense of hopelessness it 
might incur is a third aspect of nihilism, along with those encountered in the second 
chapter; the delusion of absolute nonexistence, or annihilation, and the sense of 
meaninglessness and purposelessness that this might bring about. To see through the 
illusion of change, I shall conclude, allows the bodhisattva to go beyond duḥkha, and to 
avoid becoming overwhelmed by suffering, or despondent about the continuous flux of 
nature.   
 By the ‗everyday view‘ I mean to refer to a belief that time and change exist with 
svabhāva; that even if beings are not inherently real, as we saw above, time and change 
exist independently, irreducibly, and with a fixed essence. Generally, they are thought to 
be inherently asymmetric, where time invariably points to the future, and causation is 
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1969. 
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intrinsically one-way. Charles Hartshorne and other process philosophers are 
representative of this view, and indeed, his and Whitehead‘s works have often been 
compared to Buddhism because of the way they both emphasize flux and change (c.f., 
Hartshorne 1975, Odin 1995).  
 I shall argue, though, that there is a fundamental difference, in that Buddhism 
does not reify change, but regards it as empty too. The everyday view of change and 
causality, as well as other, more sophisticated philosophical accounts, such as the theory 
of ―four dimensionalism,‖ will turn out to be conventional explanations and not 
ultimately true. I shall follow Nāgārjuna‘s arguments and outline the Madhyamaka‘s 
deconstruction of change, in order to show what is meant by its emptiness.
117
 In short, it 
will emerge that we are unable to explain time or change as ultimately real, svabhavic 
entities. 
 A natural conclusion to draw from the unreality of change is to suppose that when 
the bodhisattva transcends the world of becoming, or saṃsāra, he enters a realm of 
eternal, immutable being. However, as will be recalled from in chapter 2, Mahāyāna 
Buddhism ultimately identifies nirvana with saṃsāra and does not conceive of it as a 
separate place, or even as an alternative perspective. In that chapter, we also saw the need 
for letting go of the propensity to want to affirm some proposition as ultimately true, and 
the Mahāyāna‘s aspiration of renouncing all views and philosophical positions. To that 
end, I shall conclude by attempting to draw out the implications of the emptiness of 
change while refraining, as far as possible, from asserting any definite statement.   
 
Change, Suffering, and Nihilism 
 
One of the central problems of philosophy concerns the relation of being to change, and 
perhaps this emerged from a basic anxiety about the impermanence of human existence. 
Confronted with knowledge of an ever-approaching death, many thinkers have grappled 
with the notion of nonexistence and have tried to understand what it could mean for 
something to come into or go out of existence. In ancient Greece, this question arose 
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during the time of the pre-Socratics, when mythology was beginning to be questioned and 
the possibility was admitted that there might not be an afterlife at all. The discussion 
about the nature of existence and nonexistence leads naturally to the puzzle about 
change—a concept even harder to understand. Notwithstanding the law of excluded 
middle—which was understood long before Aristotle formalized it—change was seen to 
contain elements of both being and of non-being; in the way that a candle that has been 
bent, for example, both is and is not ‗the same‘ as it was before (Hansson 2007). As 
Achille Varsi has succinctly put it, the philosophical problem of change lies in explaining 
how it is that although things change they somehow stay the same (Varsi 2005, 485). 
 Impermanence and suffering are closely linked, not only in philosophy but also in 
our ordinary, everyday experience. Facing changes in our lives often causes unease; 
many people tend to dislike or even fear any sort of disruption to what they are used to 
and try to hold on to things as they are. Yet try as we may, we always seem somehow 
trapped ‗in‘ time, rushing headlong towards the inevitable—the death of those around us, 
and finally, our own. The extent to which this troubles us is proportionate to the weight of 
consideration that we allow it; most of us are content to ignore the problem for as long as 
we are able to, and yet we are all confronted with unwanted changes and death at some 
point. Even if we are lucky enough to enjoy a relatively comfortable life, the more we 
identify with other beings, as described in the previous chapter, the more unbearable their 
suffering becomes for us. In short, whereas life, wholeness, and order are universally 
valued, death, decay, and indeed time itself, as David Loy has pointed out, are 
problematic, and these are not merely philosophical problems, but constitute a ‗basic 
anxiety‘ for us all. This is, of course, the problem of duḥkha all over again, which is a 
‗personal and immediate‘ problem that, one way or another, needs to be resolved during 
our lifetime (Loy 1986, 17). 
 As we saw in chapter 1, the Buddhist doctrines of impermanence and suffering 
are intimately related. Anitya is variously translated as ―inconstancy,‖ ―impermanence,‖ 
―disintegration,‖ and so on, and therefore the concept is a negative one, suggestive of 
lack. The Buddha speaks about impermanence, mostly, as something that is useful to 
meditate upon, suggesting that if one learns to perceive change everywhere and at all 
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times, this will bring all sorts of benefits for this practitioner.
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 In the Loka Sutta, the 
Buddha describes the ―cosmos‖ or ―world‖ (loka) as ―that which disintegrates,‖ claiming 
that ―insofar as it disintegrates it is called the world‖ (S iv 52; Thanissaro) and in the 
Dukkha Sutta this is directly related to ―stress,‖ in other words, the unhappiness and 
suffering that arises due to the impermanence in the world where nothing ever stays the 
same (S iv 259; Thanissaro). A typical account of samsaric existence runs as follows:  
 
Birth is stressful, aging is stressful, death is stressful; sorrow, lamentation, 
pain, distress, & despair are stressful... (D ii 305; Thanissaro). 
 
Elsewhere, the connection between impermanence and distress is made more explicit:  
 
What do you think, monks—is form constant or inconstant? 
Inconstant, Lord. 
And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful? 
Stressful, Lord... (S iii 138; Thanissaro; the same point is made about the 
other aggregates). 
 
 This harsh view of existence is echoed in a certain evaluation of nature that sees it 
as being ‗red in tooth and claw.‘ A contemporary version is put forward by Holmes 
Rolston: 
 
The Greek word is ―pathos,‖ suffering, and there are pathologies in nature, 
such as the diseases of parasitism. But pathology is only part of the 
disvalue; even in health there is suffering. Life is indisputably prolific; it is 
just as indisputably pathetic, almost as if its logic were pathos, as if the 
whole of sentient nature were pathological... (Rolston 2003, 84–85). 
 
For Rolston, natural processes amount to the ―evolution of suffering‖ and he cites other 
thinkers who have similarly been struck by the evil that accompanies natural change. 
Darwin calls the process of natural selection ―clumsy, wasteful, blundering, low and 
horribly cruel‖; Williams refers to nature as a ―wicked old witch‖ (cited in Rolston 2003, 
79). In short, the history of evolution seems saturated with pain, due to organisms‘ 
developing all sorts of weapons and venoms in order to kill and devour each other. The 
unfolding of life always meets with a tragic end, and at the very best, an individual 
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escapes predation, disease, or starvation just to die, eventually, of old age. Things do not 
change further up the evolutionary tree; as the Buddha points out, human life is fraught 
with suffering too, and no matter how ‗developed‘ our civilizations and cultures might 
be, it seems that lasting happiness continues to evade us. In short, the pervasiveness of 
change in the world, and the fact of impermanence cause a tremendous amount of 
distress, and the ubiquity of suffering in the world could easily cause one to despair. 
 The unease caused by this terrible aspect of saṃsāra, and the adversity and 
suffering it brings about is one facet of nihilism. It is related to a second theme, which 
was raised in chapter 2, namely, the problem of nonexistence, and the worry about 
annihilation. Of course, death is an example of annihilation par excellence, and its 
prospect can raise great fear in some. Finally, nihilism includes a sense of 
purposelessness; for instance, a belief in interminable change, without any form of design 
or destination, can cause us to wonder about the meaning of our existence, or indeed, that 
of the universe. In what follows, I shall describe these aspects of nihilism as they relate to 
environmentalism.  
 
The Ecology of Flux and the Extreme of Nihilism 
 
As we saw in the previous section of this chapter, the new ecology of flux and several 
contemporary trends in the philosophy of biology, suggest that the things that 
environmentalists cherish—the species, communities, and ecosystems they try to 
protect—are all concepts which we impute to reality, things that do not inherently exist. 
This was seen to correspond closely with the Buddhist idea of emptiness, which reminds 
us that it is we who ―bundle things together in pursuit of cognitive economy and in ways 
otherwise reflective of our interests‖ (Siderits 2003, 96). Meditating on emptiness reveals 
that these things cannot be held on to for long; species, for instance, cannot be conserved 
forever, and many will eventually become extinct simply because they will evolve. 
Similarly, there is no ‗precarious balance‘ to protect in an ecosystem, and the local 
populations and communities that conservationists value so highly are merely transient 
associations of phenomena, with nothing substantial behind them.  
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 Thus, the Middle Path tells us that the things we value do not exist inherently. An 
easy and common mistake to make is to infer that they do not really exist at all, which is 
the first aspect of nihilism—the concern with nonexistence—and which, as another 
‗wrong view,‘ the bodhisattva seeks to avoid. When applied to ecology one might deduce 
from the idea that ecosystems are ―fictions that exist in the heads of their creators, not on 
the surface of the earth‖ (Fitzsimmons 1999, 161) that the concept refers to nothing real 
in the world at all, and that therefore, it can readily be discarded. The Buddhist Middle 
Path however, also rejects the view of nonexistence, and instead of throwing out our 
concepts it recommends, as several ecologists do, that we keep in mind their 
conventionality, and continue to use them as heuristic devices that help us to understand 
and to talk about the world (Fitzsimmons 1999, 161).  
 The Middle Path between existence and nonexistence suggests that nothing can 
ever be completely destroyed—whether species, ecosystems or whatever—since there is 
nothing substantial behind these things, there is nothing that can be wiped out of 
existence. In Nāgārjuna‘s words; 
 
 When no entities exist [inherently], 
There is no becoming or destruction  
(MMK 21: 8; Garfield 1995, 57; insert added). 
 
Garfield explains that ―(t)he empty cannot come to be or be destroyed simply because 
there is no basis for the predication‖ (Garfield 1995, 270). Of course, this does not mean 
that we cannot say, conventionally, that species become extinct, or that ecosystems are 
degraded. The point about their emptiness is intended to draw our attention to the 
conventionality of this mode of expression and to emphasize that what ‗really‘ happens is 
that as relations change, so too do these so-called ‗things‘ change.119 Therefore, the 
Middle Path rejects absolute nonexistence and destruction, and posits instead, an ever-
changing process of dependent-arising. 
 Naturally, this is not much consolation for the environmentalist; she is only too 
aware that, as forests are wiped out, for instance, they are converted into beef burgers, 
biodiesel, pollution and other products. The replacement of biodiversity by homogenous 
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crops everywhere is not very reassuring, nor is the knowledge that if the bulk of species 
are lost, cockroaches and jellyfish will fill in the empty niches. Claiming that nothing is 
absolutely annihilated does not remove the difficulty of impermanence; that change 
appears, sometimes, to have a detrimental outcome. To become too preoccupied with the 
negative aspect of impermanence, especially if one succumbs to pessimism and 
despondency, is another aspect of nihilism.  
 The insubstantiality of our natural treasures and the seeming inevitability of their 
loss can lead one to question whether there is any point to environmentalism at all. If 
there is nothing that is ‗solid‘ behind that which we want to protect, we might well be 
justified in asking ourselves why we bother. We might suspect that we could even be 
causing more harm than good in trying to impose our will upon the natural world and 
attempting to impede change. We may wonder whether there even is such a thing as an 
environmental good, or whether our efforts to locate it might not be misguided. This sort 
of reasoning can be extended to question all notions of value and amelioration and if 
carried to an extreme it becomes the third aspect of nihilism; the belief that there is no 
meaning or purpose to natural change, that there is no better or worse outcome and no 
value to be gained or lost whatever happens to the environment.  
 This is an especially worrying notion for the environmentalist, since it undercuts 
any attempt to influence the course of events. Leaving aside all considerations about 
suffering (human or otherwise), if, as the new ecology of flux claims, there is no 
particular state that is the ‗natural‘ or ‗proper‘ one for a system—the shape it would 
assume if left undisturbed—then it is hard to see how one could argue for the 
preservation of the system in any particular state. Since disturbance is fundamental to a 
system, a burnt forest, for example, cannot non-arbitrarily be described as worse than it 
was before, and assuming we think of human activity as natural,
120
 it seems we have 
fewer reasons for thinking that clear-cutting it, say, amounts to environmental 
degradation. The problem is that if we ―completely embrace change,‖ and give up the 
idea that there might be better or worse change, it seems that no meaning and no purpose 
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can be found anywhere. Indeed, some have seen this version of nihilism as a direct 
consequence of Darwin‘s theory (Sommers and Rosenberg 2003, 654). 
 The final section of this chapter will propose a way of distinguishing better from 
worse natural change, based on a positive interpretation of emptiness. First, however, I 
will go on to analyse the concept of change itself, and to argue that, according to 
Mahāyāna philosophy, this too is empty, and should not be reified. That is, to give in to 
nihilistic feelings because of the impermanence we perceive around us is another extreme 
view, and the remedy, once more, is an understanding of emptiness. 
 
The Emptiness of our Intuitive Idea of Change 
 
Impermanence and flux are central concepts not only in Buddhism, but also in process 
philosophy and indeed, several writers have commented on the similarities between these 
two traditions.
121
 Process philosophy can be seen as the continuation of the ancient 
project of Heraclitus, which attempts to shift ontological primacy away from ‗things‘ or 
beings and onto events, processes and creativity. To the extent that it views ‗things‘ as 
unreal, process thought does seem to echo Buddhism, however, one divergence that is 
immediately apparent lies in their different evaluation of change. While for Buddhists 
change is a ‗lack of permanence‘ and something negative that causes suffering, process 
philosophers put a positive spin on the concept through the terms ‗creativity,‘ and 
‗process,‘ and sometimes even equate it with the divine (Hartshorne 1970, 10–12).  
 Charles Hartshorne refers to the process account of change and causation as the 
standard, ―intuitive‖ understanding122 (1970, 52, 213) and he explicitly contrasts it with 
the Buddhist version. Citing Nāgārjuna, he criticizes Buddhism for describing the 
relationship between past and future, cause and effect as symmetrical and interdependent, 
and here, the distinction between notional and causal dependency comes into play. As 
concepts, he says, it is true that past and future, cause and effect derive their meanings 
from each other (1970, 99), and therefore they are notionally interdependent. Yet in 
actuality, he says, we intuitively know that the present depends on the past but not on the 
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concreteness to fleeting atomic events, rather than to individual beings (Buchler 1969, 593). 
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future. We believe that a cause will give rise to some kind of effect, but precisely which 
effect is, to a certain extent, indeterminate (1970, 2–3, 103, 213). Therefore, the future is 
dependent on the past, and the effect on the cause, but not vice versa. This construal 
coincides with ordinary understanding, Hartshorne says, in that it endows time and 
causality with an inherent direction, and regards change as invariably pointing towards 
the future. The main difference that he finds between process philosophy and the 
Buddhist doctrine of impermanence, is that the former is clearer on this asymmetry 
(1975, 407).  
 Indeed, it is true that we naturally think of causality and change as real because 
we compare the present to the past, which still ‗exists,‘ somehow, in our memories. One 
implication of this view, therefore, is that reality is cumulative (Odin 1995; Hartshorne 
1970, 105), containing, in a way, everything in the past up to the present moment 
(Hartshorne 1970, 118). The future, on the other hand, does not exist at all, according to 
this view, and each new moment that arises contains an element of novelty, so that what 
happens next is never completely predictable (Hartshorne 1970, 5–7). The similarity 
between this account and our ordinary understanding of change is quite clear. In what 
follows, I will argue that it is a merely conventional description, and that ultimately, 
change and causality cannot be found to exist inherently. 
 The discrepancy between our knowledge of the past and that of the future, 
according to Hartshorne, is not merely accidental, but has to do with the nature of time 
and temporality. Any deficiency in our memory is a result, he says, of our being ―animal 
knowers, limited in perceptual and reasoning capacities.‖ That is, we are liable to forget 
things, and make mistakes, yet theoretically, we could have complete knowledge of the 
past. Prediction and knowledge of the future, on the other hand, is ―in principle 
incomplete,‖ and this is due to the limitations of causal determinacy (1970, 105; italics 
mine). The fact that any process of change always involves some novelty means that we 
cannot extrapolate causal relations into the future, and that no matter how exhaustively 
we study present conditions, we will never be able to make predictions with complete 
accuracy. In other words, time and change are inherently asymmetrical; the past and 
present exist and can be known fully, whereas the future does not exist yet, and is to a 
certain extent unpredictable. The svabhāva of time and change, therefore, consists of this 
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direction and the element of novelty, which appear to exist independently, irreducibly, 
and with a fixed essence. 
 The question that immediately arises is how we can be justified in taking our 
memories of the past to be real, but not our anticipations and predictions of the future. 
Contra Hartshorne, Buddhism emphasizes that both the past and the future are unreal. 
―What is past is left behind [and] [t]he future is as yet unreached‖ claims the 
Bhaddekaratta Sutta, and it goes on to say that only the present moment can be clearly 
seen (M iii 187; Thanissaro). This suggests that there is no intrinsic difference between 
the past and future, and if the past can be fully known, it would seem that there is no 
reason why an omniscient mind that was aware of every present detail could not also 
make accurate predictions. I would like to suggest that perhaps it is only a conventional 
matter that we take our memories of the past to refer to something real but not our 
predictions or anticipations. Indeed, some people tend to live in the future and, 
disregarding their memories of the past, they build up expectations, which they project 
ahead or even in some cases, experience as present (Beck 1976, 60). At least one author 
believes that ―it is the sense of the future, rather than of the past, which has been most 
important in the evolution of our civilization‖ (Shotwell 1915, 201). In short, one might 
raise doubts about the consistency of basing a theory of change and time upon memory 
while excluding altogether prediction and anticipation.
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 Hartshorne‘s asymmetry, on 
this understanding, is merely a conventional bias, and rather than existing independently, 
any novelty in an effect is completely dependent upon its causes. 
 As suggested above, Hartshorne believes that while the past is already definite, a 
future effect is only partly determined by its cause. Unfortunately, he never seems to 
succeed in explaining fully how something can both be determined and to an extent 
unpredictable. He maintains that every event is caused—whether a mechanical incident 
or an intentional human act—and he describes a cause as ―a state of affairs, granted 
which something more or less like what happens subsequently was ‗bound to happen,‘ or 
...could safely have been predicted‖ (1958a, 794; italics mine). Indeed, most people do 
believe that more than one particular outcome is possible, or predictable, given a certain 
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 In his 1954 paper, Hartshorne explicitly says that one cannot hope to understand causality without 
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cause. If that were not true, then we would have no basis for thinking that our actions 
have any freedom at all.  
 The injection of novelty into causation, however, seems to undermine its very 
foundations. The question that arises is where this element of novelty, the unpredictable 
part of the effect, could come from. As Nāgārjuna might say, is it caused or uncaused? 
Hartshorne is clear—the effect‘s ―final particular nature,‖ he says, ―does not come from 
anywhere, but rather it becomes‖ (1954, 497). It sounds then as if Hartshorne has 
introduced some random, uncaused element; indeed he puts it in those very words in 
certain places (1970, 318; 1963, 601). Yet this seems to dispose of the causal relation 
altogether, and renders his account susceptible to the second horn of Nāgārjuna‘s 
dilemma.
124
 If the final, overall character of the effect does not come from anywhere, 
then it must be correct to say that it is not caused at all. That is, we seem to be left with an 
effect that is partly determined, yet with another part that is wholly random, and since 
this novel aspect can also make up a significant part of the effect, it seems that we are left 
with a process that is heavily stochastic. Yet, as soon as we introduce even the smallest 
random element, this seems to undermine causation altogether. 
 Elsewhere Hartshorne says that the novel part of the effect is ―self-created‖ 
(1958b, 519). Nāgārjuna long ago pointed out the contradiction in such statements—the 
first horn of his tetralemma. If the effect does not exist before it arises then how can it 
create itself? And if it already exists, then why would it need to create itself again? 
(Garfield 1995, 116, 120) In short, it seems Hartshorne has not found a way around 
Nāgārjuna‘s arguments and the Madhyamaka‘s classic deconstruction of causality still 
stands. Whether we see an effect as existent in its cause or as non-existent, we come up 
with contradictions, and this clearly demonstrates the emptiness of causation, and that our 
use of causal language is merely conventionally appropriate and no more (Garfield 1995, 
122). 
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 As Nagao points out, ―in the final analysis, the tetralemma can be reduced to a final dilemma of being or 
non-being,‖ (1992, 213) that is, the third and fourth alternatives are refuted with the refutation of the first 
two.  
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The Emptiness of Change and Time; Other Theories 
 
One might reply to Nāgārjuna‘s argument by challenging the claim that there is a 
fundamental difference between past, present, and future, that is, by doing away with 
Hartshorne‘s account and our intuitive view of time. An alternative interpretation, in fact, 
is known as four-dimensionalism, and has also been attributed to some schools of 
Buddhism (Yao 2007). On this account, time exists as a whole ―block‖—a fourth 
dimension added to three spatial ones—and includes present, past and future without any 
distinction (Putnam 1967, 241, 247). In Buddhism, the realization of this state is referred 
to as ―no time,‖ ―timeless time‖ or even, the ―fourth time‖ and is described as a state 
attained by the Buddha upon realization of the sameness of, or lack of difference between 
the three times of past, present and future (Yao 2007, 516).
125
 On this view then, there is 
nothing inherently special about the present, and it is no more real than the past or the 
future. Four-dimensionalism, that is, goes completely against ordinary experience, and 
therefore, it might be claimed, it is not a conventional view. 
 The Western philosophical version of this theory of time is sometimes put 
forward to account for the reality of change. According to this view, individuals and 
objects perdure, that is, they extend over time just as they do over space, so that they can 
be thought of as having a number of temporal parts (Varsi 2005, 485). The problem of 
change, the issue of how a candle, say, could be both bent at a certain time and straight at 
another, is resolved by saying that the part of the candle which is at time t1 is straight and 
another part of it is bent at t2 (Hansson 2007, 267). In this way, it appears that the 
candle‘s having contradictory properties at different times can be understood in the same 
way as, for instance, we could say that the candle was both blue and red; blue in one 
physical part and red in another (Clark 2008, 28). To take some environmental examples, 
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 Although Yao talks about ―four-dimensional time in Buddhism,‖ strictly speaking, what Buddhism 
refers to is not time as a fourth dimension, as in, say, Sider 2001, but a ―fourth time,‖ added to the three 
times of present, past and future. The ―fourth time‖ is also referred to as ―no-time‖ or ―timeless time‖ and is 
the experience of time from the ultimate perspective of the Dharmakaya (Yao 2007, 516). That the number 
four appears in both appellations seems, at first glance, to be merely accidental. On the other hand, in both 
systems, the concept refers to the experience of present, past and future as indistinct—on the western 
account they all exist, whereas for Buddhism they all do not exist. Both seem to suggest, too, that the 
‗fourth time‘ or ‗four-dimensional time‘ is a truer, more primordial or fundamental experience of reality, 
through which our ordinary experience of time flowing through the differentiated past, present, and future 
is revealed as an illusion. 
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we might say that a piece of forest changing into farmland can be conceived as an event 
spread over time that happens to a single entity, so that there are a series of states of the 
forest-farmland that differ from each other by degrees. An endangered species can 
similarly be thought of as an individual spread over time, and, since its numbers are 
decreasing, it will occupy less space in its later parts than it does in earlier ones.   
 According to this view then, Nāgārjuna and other Buddhists are wrong to say that 
the past and future do not exist simpliciter; rather, it is held that past and future events 
and objects ‗exist‘ along with present ones, ‗exist‘ that is, tenselessly—the word is used 
without reference to time or tense. Therefore, the arguments that Nāgārjuna brings 
against causality and change no longer apply, since both present and future, or cause and 
effect exist together. This view, which has affinities with the old Sāṃkhya view of an 
eternal ātman, is also said to be more consistent with Einstein‘s special relativity, where 
the distinction between present, past and future is not an objective fact, but is relative to 
observers‘ positions and velocities (Putnam 1967; Varsi 2005, 486).  
 Still, there are a number of problems with the view of four-dimensionalists. To 
begin with, their somewhat convoluted explanation of change goes against the common-
sense supposition that someone or something is wholly present at any given time. One 
tends to believe, for example, that one is here ‗as a whole‘ at this very moment (Hughes 
2005, 465) and the idea that there is a part of the self which is left behind in the past or 
which stretches out into the future seems a little improbable.
126
 Besides, claiming that the 
forest or species ‗exist‘ tenselessly in the past does nothing to mitigate our grief or anger 
at their loss, precisely because we feel that past objects do not exist any longer. Of 
course, since the previous section argued that our everyday understanding of change was 
merely conventional, we cannot appeal to it here to refute four-dimensionalism. There are 
further reasons to reject four-dimensionalism, however. 
 Several authors have pointed out that the four-dimensionalist understanding 
cannot really account for change, rather ―the universe seems to be an unalterable block‖ 
(Bottani 2005, 398) without any real movement or flux happening anywhere. McTaggart, 
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 This is a simplification of the discussion, which involves several highly detailed positions that have been 
elaborated over the years as theorists modified their views in response to criticism. My point here is that 
even if we take account of four-dimensional theories of time we are unable to discover change as an 
inherently existent reality. For a recent discussion, see the special issue of Dialectica 59(4). 
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for example, points out that if there is only one eternal and unchanging reality, then, there 
is no real change or time at all (cited in Hansson 2007, 267). Four-dimensionalism 
appears to be susceptible to the same argument Nāgārjuna brought against the Sāṃkhya 
theory of self-causation—that there is no real arising or production if the future already 
‗exists‘ along with the present and past. In fact, Nāgārjuna rejected both views of time: 
   
A nonstatic time is not grasped 
  Nothing one could grasp as  
  Stationary time exists... (MMK 19: 5; Garfield 1995, 50). 
 
Kalupahana explains that ‗nonstatic time‘ is the idea of the ―flowing present,‖ while 
‗stationary time‘ refers to ―absolute time‖ (Kalupahana 1996, 278) and therefore the 
distinction seems comparable to that between three- and four-dimensional time.  
 The three-dimensional view is the intuitive idea that sees objects as extending 
across three spatial dimensions, yet lacking in temporal thickness. On this account, 
objects persist by enduring, that is, by being fully present at different times (Varsi 2005, 
485). This view coincides, therefore with our everyday belief that objects that presently 
exist are somehow more real. Still, change cannot be found to exist from its own side 
even on this interpretation. In Nāgārjuna‘s words:  
 
If the present and future  
Did not exist [in the past],  
How could the present and future  
Be dependent upon it [i.e. the past]? 
(MMK 19: 1, 2; Garfield 1995, 50; inserts added)  
 
Garfield explains: ―By the time the present comes around, the past isn‘t around to give 
rise to it. And when the past was around, the present didn‘t occur‖ (Garfield 1995, 254–
255). To return to our examples, the particular stretch of forest which formerly occupied 
a piece of present farmland is no longer there for me to say ―it has gone‖ when I become 
concerned about its disappearance, and the same can be said for the red squirrels, say, 
which ―were lost‖ when grey ones were introduced. What happens is that we recall the 
earlier objects and events and we ascribe the labels ―predecessor,‖ ―object before it 
changed‖ onto them, as we hold them fixed in our minds. This shows that change is 
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dependent for its existence upon permanent phenomena; that is, we project change and 
succession over the series of moments which contain static phenomena, and no matter 
where we look, we cannot actually perceive anything changing. Change, that is, does not 
exist independently, or irreducibly. 
 One way to respond to this argument would be to say that, although it is true that 
the forest is not there after it has been changed into farmland, perhaps if we looked more 
closely and analysed the sequence of changes into smaller parts, we would find that the 
forest was still there when the first trees were cut down and that it gradually disappeared 
as it was turned into farmland, or again, that as the grey squirrels increased in population, 
they slowly wiped out the red ones which were still there when the invasion began. In 
this way, we might be able to insist on the reality of these events. We find, however, that 
no matter how deeply we analyse succession we are never able to explain how it is that a 
changes into b. Whether the change is a causal one or not, we find that we cannot isolate 
the point where it happens.  
 Let us say a exists at time t1 and b at time t2. The change, presumably, will 
happen somewhere in between—let us say at t1.5. The time between t1 and t2 has been 
divided into eleven points and at the first five (t1.0–t1.4) we find a, and at the last five 
(t1.6–t2.0) there is b. Yet, if we think of time as a continuum, then the point t1.5 itself—
which is where we said that the change happens—can also be divided into parts, and it 
will be found that a exists at some of them, (t1.51, t1.52....) and b at others (t1.58, 
t1.59...). Or else, something that is a only slightly different from a will exist at the first 
few points and something a lot more like b will exist towards the end (Clark 2008, 27). 
Any point we identify as the place where the change occurs—again, say t1.55—can be 
similarly divided into parts, the first of which contain a-like things, the later parts b-like 
things. Westerhoff reads Nāgārjuna as claiming that there is nowhere we could point to 
and say (non-arbitrarily) that the change happened right there if time is a continuum 
rather, every point we isolate seems to contain a static thing
127
 (Westerhoff 2008, 470).  
 Thinking of time as divided into discrete parts does not solve our problem either. 
If all there is between t1 and t2 is one indivisible moment, then there cannot be any 
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 Westerhoff‘s article is about the chapter on motion however as Garfield points out too, the arguments 
there are about change in general (Westerhoff 2008, 455; Garfield 1995, 93). Westerhoff, however, prefers 
to read it primarily as an argument about instantiation of properties, rather than change or motion.  
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change happening in it, since change requires temporal parts to occur (Westerhoff 2008, 
463, 470). We seem to have to commit to the belief, then, that there is simply an abrupt 
switch from a at t1 to b at t2 and stop our explanation there.
128
 At no point can we 
observe the change actually happening; rather we always have a series of moments with 
stationary objects onto which we impute change.  
In the chapter on motion, Nāgārjuna makes a number of arguments, reminiscent 
of Zeno, to show that the beginning of motion is inconceivable, and the same could be 
said of any type of change (Garfield 1995, 129–130, 125). Westerhoff reads this as a 
denial of the claim that any point qualifies, independently of us, as the locus of motion; 
rather it is our decision to regard it as such, as ―we split up the flow of events according 
to our cognitive needs‖ (Westerhoff 2008, 473). To return to our examples, I recall the 
forest occupying different states or different numbers of indigenous red squirrels at 
different times and from this, I infer that there has been a change. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine what it would mean to understand change, other than as a series of phenomena 
that differ from each other. The emptiness of change, therefore, consists of the fact that it 
is dependent upon permanent phenomena, and can be reduced to a series of permanent 
phenomena. Emptiness makes pseudo-problems of the classical puzzles about change, 
such as Kant‘s Antinomies and Zeno‘s Paradoxes (Rychter 2009), yet it leaves us unable 
to explain change as an ultimate truth, and we are left with a conventional appeal to our 
experience of it. 
 Other writers agree that, unlike process philosophy, Buddhism does not view 
change or time as ultimate realities. David Loy for example shows how our ordinary 
understanding of change requires that there be something permanent; we can only see a 
thing move, he says, in relation to something that is stationary (Loy 1986, 16). Again, this 
shows that change is empty, since it depends upon stasis. It is not enough to understand 
the emptiness of objects, Loy claims, as their lack of inherent reality also implies the 
unreality of time. In Nāgārjuna‘s words, ―all beings are impermanent, which means that 
there is neither permanence nor impermanence.‖ Loy rephrases this as ―to say that there 
is only time turns out to be equivalent to saying there is no time‖ (Loy 1986, 1, 19). The 
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 Many philosophers believe that this coincides with the view, from physics, that energy comes in packets 
It is held that quantum theory demonstrates that movement is discrete rather than continuous (Clark 2008, 
27; Sheldon 1926, 143). 
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closest we can come to expressing ultimate truth, therefore, is to say that there is ―nothing 
permanent, for everything is in flux; and ... no flux [because] there is nothing [permanent] 
to be in it [and with which flux may be contrasted]‖ (Loy 1986, 21; inserts added). 
 Kalupahana also discusses the Madhyamaka‘s deconstruction of time. ―Past, 
present and future,‖ he says, ―[are] comparable to such concepts as above, below and 
middle‖ and thus Nāgārjuna insisted that they are unreal, because they are relative 
(Kalupahana 1974, 188). This point emerges beautifully in the Avataṁsaka Sūtra, where 
universes are related to each other so that a day and night in the realm of Amitābha is 
described as the equivalent of an entire kālpa in our realm of Śākyamuni (Lancaster 
1974, 211). To meditate on the relativity of past, present and future brings about, as we 
have seen, an experience of ―timeless time‖ or the ―eternal present,‖ and when one 
meditates on the emptiness of that, one is said to attain ―the primordial state of total 
perfection ... completely beyond [any] limits‖ (Yao 2007, 514). 
 
Overcoming Nihilism 
 
To view change as ultimately real and interminable could easily lead to despair. 
Hartshorne, for instance, maintains that there is no end to the creative process; there must 
always be some sort of change happening, he claims, something or other must become 
something else, ad infinitum (1970, 14). In his words, ―what is objectively necessary 
absolutely is that the creative process must produce and continue to produce creatures‖ 
(1970, 30; emphasis added). Rendered into Buddhist language, this would sound like he 
is saying that there is no escaping the cycles of saṃsāra and no way to stop creating 
kárma—that is, no enlightenment or nirvana. Beings are simply condemned to keep 
turning the wheel of becoming, from one birth to another, and, coupled with the bleak 
picture of life that was painted above, it would not be surprising if someone with this 
view were to fall into a nihilistic mood. Hartshorne seems to imply a similar view when 
he admits that, on his account, there can never be complete satisfaction of one‘s wants 
(1970, 66). 
 On the other hand, on the Buddhist account, one is able to transcend the realm of 
becoming, to go ‗beyond‘ time and change, precisely by seeing their emptiness. Yao 
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suggests that the ―very goal‖ of Buddhism, as he puts it, is to ―see through the passage of 
time, and to realize the nature of reality, beyond the momentary and impermanent‖ (Yao 
2007, 513). His use of the word ―goal,‖ however; is a little ambiguous; as he 
acknowledges further on, one of the ways of transcending time requires that we give up 
all thought of achieving goals, and, most of all, we give up hope of attaining spiritual 
accomplishments. We cut off clinging to the past, he says, as well as anticipating the 
future, and in that way, we remain in the present moment. This is not to be grasped at as a 
static moment, but a dynamic present, ―a continuous effort and activity to maintain 
presence‖ (2007, 514). Once again, the word ―effort‖ could be misleading, since, as many 
Buddhist masters reveal, and as Yao too is well aware, one of the key ingredients in 
‗remaining present‘ is the ability to stay fully relaxed (Yao 2007, 513). 
 In chapter 2, it was suggested that when it comes to Buddhist practice, the 
realization of emptiness, as opposed to philosophical understanding, the Yogācāra School 
was supreme. To view change, time or movement as empty, in Yogācārin terms, is 
perhaps, to see them as subjective or imaginary additions onto a phenomenologically 
neutral world. When a bodhisattva realizes the pure, consummated nature, reality without 
dualistic contamination, it is said that ―all differentiations disappear‖ (Nagao 1992, 64). 
Therefore, time and change disappear too, since, as we have seen, both depend on, and 
emerge from the experience of differentiated phenomena. Importantly, this is not to be 
understood as an absolute negation of change. It is not accurate to say that time and 
change do not exist at all—conventionally, it is entirely legitimate for us to go on uttering 
statements about the past, and making predictions for the future, and we can also retain 
our belief in causation. Another misinterpretation to avoid is the idea that there are two 
realms, one with time and change, and another without. Rather, the consummated world 
is this very same world, only without the imagined additions, or where time and change 
are experienced as imaginary. It is ―established anew by the enlightened sages,‖ every 
time they realize the conventionality of the discriminations made in the everyday world 
of change (Nagao 1992, 63). 
 Realizing the emptiness of change allows the bodhisattva to overcome nihilism. It 
will be recalled that there were three facets to this extreme view; the concern with 
nonexistence and annihilation, a gloomy vision of the world and preoccupation with 
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suffering, and finally, a sense of the purposelessness of unending change. Regarding 
nonexistence, it has emerged several times throughout this dissertation that the Middle 
Way has no room for either absolute existence, or absolute nonexistence. A certain 
degree of existence in phenomena is necessary if we are to recognize their emptiness—it 
will be recalled from chapter 2 that emptiness cannot be cognized directly, but rather is 
dependent too; dependent, that is, on phenomena that arise and perish. This was referred 
to as ‗the emptiness of emptiness.‘  
 For this reason, perhaps, the grief that arises at the loss of someone or something 
that is held dear can be mitigated if it is understood that nothing in the world ever 
perishes completely. Individuals or objects do not exist inherently, and therefore they 
cannot cease to exist either; rather, what happens is that these so-called ‗things‘ become 
other ‗things.‘ The next section will consider some examples of environmental changes, 
in particular, extinction, which generally cause us distress. For the time being, we can 
consider whether the Buddhist teachings on death have anything to say to Westerners 
who may not believe in rebirth. It is not necessary to believe in past and future lives to 
see that an individual does not perish altogether when he dies; rather, parts of him live on 
in his works, offspring, and in other people‘s memories of him. Of course, this does not 
mean the individual is immortal; again, since he was always empty of inherent existence, 
it is not accurate to state either that he exists or that he does not, as the Buddha pointed 
out. Meditation on emptiness can lessen, perhaps, the semblance or sensation of loss that 
we naturally experience when bereaved. 
 Regarding the second facet of nihilism, the preoccupation with adverse or 
repugnant aspects of the temporal world, this sort of discrimination too could begin to 
wane once the emptiness of change is glimpsed. If one were contemplating the loss of an 
ecosystem or an indigenous species, for instance, one could mentally try to establish 
precisely where the change lay. Is it in the past forest? The future one? Is it in the present 
moment? Above it was argued that change itself could not be found anywhere; rather it is 
something we ascribe to reality. When we acknowledge our inability to find change, to 
―pin it down as a reality‖—when we understand, for instance, that we cannot apprehend 
the forest‘s ‗becoming-degraded,‘ or the population‘s ‗dying-out‘—we free up emotional 
energy that we had been wasting on worrying about this decline, and which we are then 
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able to redirect into useful work. We can then actually let go of the past, and question our 
expectations of the future. As we have seen, strict determinism is not true, and this means 
that any prediction has a tone of probability rather than absolute necessity. Rather than 
fearing or dreading future changes, we could instead work to bring about more desirable 
ones. 
 In Buddhist imagery, time is seen as the devourer of humanity—―Mara the 
dreaded evil‖ (Koller 1974, 206)—yet once the bodhisattva realizes time‘s emptiness, 
duḥkha is eliminated and the bodhisattva becomes the ―devourer of time‖ (Koller 1974, 
207). Kalupahana stresses that the bodhisattva does this by eliminating craving for 
existence or nonexistence, thereby putting an end to change (Kalupahana 1974, 183). 
―When time is understood to be a conceptual construct, with no real power,‖ according to 
Koller, ―one is freed from one‘s bondage to an inevitable death‖ (1974, 207). Obviously, 
it is not that one becomes immortal, but rather dying is no longer a worry (Kalupahana 
1974, 183). Realizing that time and change are not real, therefore, also reduces suffering. 
In short, when the bodhisattva sees through the illusion of time, sickness, death, and other 
inimical characters of the natural world lose their fearsome aspect. ―The terrible and 
productive aspects of time are [then] shown to be the same‖ (Lancaster 1974, 212). 
 It is important that we do not attempt to read a positive affirmation in what has 
just been said. To talk of the negative and positive aspects being ―the same,‖ for instance, 
is not, of course, an ultimate truth, but merely a conventional way of intimating an 
ultimately indescribable experience of the world. Since our negations are non-affirming, 
we must not assume the truth of the contrary of that which we have negated; to say that 
there is no change, ultimately, does not mean that there is permanence. Rather, we 
attempt to stay with the experience of the ―unfindability,‖ of change, which, in chapter 2, 
was equated with the Yogācāra‘s affirmation of the ―existence of emptiness.‖  
 This endeavour could provide a direction to the everyday flux of arising and 
perishing phenomena, and could therefore overcome the third aspect of nihilism, the 
sense of purposelessness. Rather than attempting to find a purpose by positing a goal to 
be reached at the end of a process, instead we could achieve our purpose at every moment 
when we fulfil the ‗goal‘ of remaining present at each moment, realizing the lack of 
svabhāva in the phenomena that arise and perish in our mind stream as well as their 
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fluctuation. Whatever samsaric experience arises, that is, we attempt to realize its 
emptiness. This could provide a meaning to our lives despite the incessant change that 
process philosophers have pointed out. We could use that very never-ending process 
itself to accomplish our ends at each moment. The same point was made at the start of the 
last century when Leighton spoke of the ―time-transcending...experiences... [that are] 
constituted by the fulfilment of purposes,‖ where every present moment is taken as a 
complete end in itself (Leighton 1908, 566). In the next section, I shall take up this theme 
again, where I shall relate it more specifically to environmental purposes. 
 
Summary 
 
While exploring the relations between time, change and suffering, it was suggested, at the 
start of this section, that to become too caught up with the unfavourable aspects of 
existence could cause one to fall into a nihilistic attitude, an extreme view that the 
Buddhist Middle Way avoids. Although Buddhism and process philosophy share an 
emphasis on change and flux, I argued that there was a fundamental difference, in that, 
unlike Hartshorne, Buddhism does not take change to be ultimately real. The process 
view of change coheres with our ordinary understanding of time and causality as having a 
direction, in the sense of pointing towards the future. The past is believed to be real and 
determinate, while the future is unreal and completely open. I argued that this was merely 
a conventional description of change, which arbitrarily relies on memory but excludes 
prediction and anticipation. The Buddhists hold, instead, that time is unreal and does not 
exist. This is because the past is no longer here, the future is not here yet, and the present 
is ephemeral, and does not linger even for the shortest moment. Hartshorne‘s arguments 
for the reality of the past as opposed to the novelty of the future, could not withstand 
Nāgārjuna‘s deconstruction of causality.  
 I then considered the theory of time as a fourth dimension. On this account, there 
is no difference between past, present, and future, rather, all objects and events at all 
times exist tenselessly. This appears to pose a challenge to Buddhist doctrine; however, 
we found that this view could not account for change; it merely posits an eternal 
unalterable block. Nāgārjuna, in fact, rejects both the three-dimensional and the four-
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dimensional views of time, arguing that on neither account could change be found. This 
is because, no matter how deeply we analyse a stretch of time, we can never point exactly 
to where the motion or change is. Instead, we impute change onto a stretch of time; we 
perceive a series of differentiated events and conclude that there is change.  
 Finally, I drew out some implications for overcoming nihilism. The view that 
change is real and interminable could suggest that there is no escaping the suffering of 
saṃsāra and could easily lead one to despair. On the other hand, the Buddhist goal of 
transcending change and time, by giving up clinging to the past and future and relaxing in 
the present, enables us to overcome all three aspects of nihilism. Regarding the first 
problem of nonexistence and annihilation, since beings and change have no inherent 
existence, nothing can be absolutely annihilated. Meditating on this could lessen the grief 
of losing those that are dear to us. This has to do with the second aspect, the concern with 
the terrible nature of the impermanent world. By realizing that change cannot be found to 
exist inherently, we are able to reduce our emotional response and free up energy for 
useful work. We are then no longer in the grip of our dualistic ways of seeing things but 
can instead experience all phenomena that arise with equanimity. Finally, the third aspect 
of meaninglessness in a dysteleologic world can be overcome by making it our purpose to 
achieve this transcendence of time at each moment, making every moment an end in 
itself. 
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3 Emptiness as Pliancy 
 
The previous section introduced a broad hypothesis regarding the bodhisattva‘s 
avoidance of nihilism. Despite the pervasiveness of never-ending and goalless change in 
natural processes and in evolution, existence could acquire meaning when a bodhisattva 
makes it his purpose to realize emptiness at every moment. When he discerns the 
―constant fact of not finding‖ temporality, he will appreciate its nature as a conventional 
imputation, or as projection of the mind, and thereby impermanence will lose its 
fearsome and terrible aspect. Besides, the lack of a teleological goal lying ahead in the 
future is compensated through his having a purpose to fulfil at every moment. This 
section will illustrate, upon similar lines, a specifically environmentally motivated 
version of this purpose, which will also be based on the Yogācāra‘s positive 
interpretation of emptiness. 
 As we saw in chapter 2, some Buddhist philosophers, like Asaṅga and 
Vasubandhu, saw the danger of a nihilistic interpretation of emptiness that could arise if 
it was understood to involve only negation. For this reason, they turned to affirmation 
once more; apart from the negation of concepts and views, they affirmed the existence of 
the experience of nonduality that the realization of emptiness involves. That is to say, 
realization, on this account, is not just a matter of conceptually understanding the lack of 
svabhāva in things. Rather, one perceives that lack of existence, and thereby experiences 
its existence.
129
 By maintaining a continuous presence and awareness of that experience, 
it was suggested that every moment could be imbued with meaning and with purpose.  
 I shall begin by describing an analogous sense of purpose to be found in nature 
and in natural beings. Clearly, everything that I shall say here will be merely 
conventionally true, if true at all, because all the natural beings I shall talk about are, 
ultimately, empty. Their emptiness is not just a conceptual negation of svabhāva, though, 
and, I shall argue, it appears as a positive quality too. This is Candrakīrti‘s absolute-
svabhāva, which can be characterized as the fact that beings have no hard or fixed 
essence. Later on in Buddhism, and especially in China and Japan, it was conceived of as 
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 Of course, the Yogācāra could only affirm existence after they had established, as Nāgārjuna did, that 
emptiness was not to be understood in an eternalist sense as some kind of absolute existence. 
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Buddha Nature, or as clear and luminous mind. I shall argue that in the ‗external world‘ 
this takes the form of a quality of pliancy, which I shall define as an openness at the heart 
of all beings, and a sense of flexibility and capacity for change.
 130
 The realization of 
emptiness brings this quality into light, and therefore, there is a link between the 
cultivation of inner qualities and wisdom, and the state of the external environment. 
 In some early sūtras, the connection between the state of the world and the 
spiritual and moral character of beings is made explicit. The Aggañña Sutta contains a 
well-known parable, which describes the progressive degradation of the natural world 
parallel to the deterioration in conduct and psychological make-up of its inhabitants. For 
example, when beings harvested only what they needed for the day, food was plentiful 
and grew easily; it became coarser, however, once beings started hoarding it greedily (D 
iii 90). Unfortunately, the message of this sūtra has generally been interpreted negatively, 
and reference is only made to the effect that moral degeneration has on the external 
environment (c.f., Harris 2007, 155; 2000, 123 De Silva 1987). I would like to suggest 
that it contains a valuable idea for green Buddhism, namely, that spiritual development 
and following the Dharma brings about welcome changes in the world around a 
practitioner, and that as the teachings become more diffused, the effect becomes greater 
still. 
Pure Land Buddhism, for instance the Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra, suggests that the 
bodhisattva does not only work to increase his own and other beings‘ internal realization, 
but also strives to create an environment that is ―completely free of evil, suffering and 
unhappiness...a veritable paradise‖131 (Gōmez 2002, 9). In chapter 2, it was argued that 
the traditional descriptions of these ―Pure Lands‖ in terms of precious metals and stones, 
and brilliant colours could be regarded as expedient teachings—a rather naïve vision, 
perhaps, of environmental improvement. In any case, it is often emphasized that the 
bodhisattva’s realization enhances both the inner mental world, as well as the outer 
natural world experienced by other beings. Masao Abe cites the Mahāyāna sūtras:  
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 It should be clear by now that this quality, absolute-svabhāva or Buddha Nature, is dependent on other 
factors, and therefore, not to be understood as a svabhavic essence.  
131
 Although the classical Indian descriptions of the Pure Lands, such as Sukhāvatī,  have been criticized for 
their ecological naiveté, the general point of this statement—that the bodhisattva works to enhance not just 
inner conscious realization, but also its external expression in his surroundings—is clearly evident from the 
descriptions of the bodhisattva’s aspirations in these sūtras. For example, see Gōmez 2002, 69–76.    
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Grasses, trees and lands: all attain Buddhahood ... Mountains, rivers and 
the earth totally manifest the Dharmakaya (Abe 1992, 50). 
 
 In other words, contrary to the objection raised in chapter 1, the Buddha‘s 
teachings increase both spiritual and natural well-being, and realization creates an 
environment that is both pleasing and well adapted to its inhabitants‘ needs.132 This can 
also be discerned from the way that the state of natural phenomena is portrayed as 
hinging upon the circumstances of the Dharma in the traditional texts. The appearance of 
a Buddha and his teachings, for instance, is described as ―dharma rain...that showers 
moisture upon all the dry and withered beings‖ (Lotus Sūtra, cited in Kaza and Kraft 
2000, 45). The tone changes completely when it comes to describing the world during the 
degenerate age (kali-yuga), when the Buddha‘s teachings have all but disappeared. 
During this apocalyptic age,  
 
No rain falls in season, but out of season; the valleys are flooded. Famine 
and hail govern many unproductive years. Diseases, horrible epidemics, 
and plagues spread like wildfires, striking men and cattle ... fires, storms, 
and tornadoes destroy temples, stupas, and cities in an instant. 
(Padmasambhava; cited in Stanley, Loy and Dorje 2009, 44). 
 
 Therefore, there is a relationship between the level of realization, or the measure 
of wisdom that is present in a world—perhaps, the number of enlightened beings—and 
the nature of that world itself, and in fact, I would like to suggest that there is also an 
analogy between natural and spiritual evolution. As Nāgārjuna pointed out, if things were 
non-empty, nothing could change (MMK 24:20; Garfield 1995, 70) and therefore, 
bodhisattvas and natural objects are able to evolve because of their emptiness, which, in 
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 A good question, brought to my attention by Dr. Simon James, is whether realization affects the way the 
world is, or the way it is experienced. One might suppose that to the extent that there is realization of 
nondualism, there is no difference between the external world and one‘s conscious experience of the world. 
The Pure Land teachings suggest that those beings with enough realization (or devotion) will experience 
the paradise created by a Buddha, and in fact, they participate in its creation, whereas other beings remain 
stuck in hell or other samsaric realms, which are also of their own making. The same idea is also found in 
early Buddhism. According to Bhikku Bodhi:  
From the Buddhist perspective...consciousness and the world coexist in a relationship of mutual 
creation which equally require both terms. Just as there can be no consciousness without a body to 
serve as its physical support and a world as its sphere of cognition, so there can be no physical 
organism and no world without some type of consciousness to constitute them as an organism and 
world (Bodhi 2001, 5). 
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the case of natural beings, I will refer to as pliancy. Furthermore, they evolve by realizing 
and actualizing this emptiness at every moment. This, therefore, can be said to be the 
Buddhist environmentalist‘s ‗purpose‘—not to be understood as a final objective reached 
sometime in the future, but as one that is fulfilled at every moment. In this first part of 
this section, I shall flesh out the analogy between the ideas of purpose in natural
133
 and in 
spiritual evolution.   
 Actualizing pliancy in nature, I shall propose, can be thought of as environmental 
improvement or at least as environment-friendly. This is because any intervention in 
nature that safeguards the pliancy of the beings involved is likely to be beneficial to those 
beings; it enhances their capacity for change, and increases the possibility of its further 
evolution. As I shall argue in the final part of this section, humans do most damage to 
nature when they limit evolvability. Through the realization and actualization
134
 of 
emptiness and natural pliancy, the environmentally aware Buddhist will allow nature to 
unfold in a way that best serves its interests and those of natural beings. She will not 
attempt to stifle change or growth in nature, although she might try, as far as she can, to 
oppose that kind of change that ultimately leads to death and stagnation.  
 
Emptiness, Pliancy, and the ‘Goal’ of Evolution 
 
As long as we discount unpredictable events like meteorites or climate change, it would 
seem that certain tendencies can be discerned in the history of life on earth, and evolution 
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 In what follows, I use ‗natural evolution‘ to mean evolution by natural selection, and I ignore other ways 
in which species evolve, such as through genetic drift. ‗Evolution‘ is also restricted to mean the 
development and transformation of natural beings over time, and excludes geologic, climatic and other 
non-biological features. 
134
 Nagao has pointed out the connection between ―realization‖ and ―actualization,‖ in the sense of ―to 
bring into concrete existence,‖ in his discussion of the two directions‘ of the bodhisattva’s activities. 
Ascent implies emptiness as negation—self-negation, or world-negation—through which the bodhisattva 
moves towards nirvana, whereas descent implies the affirmation, once more, of the natural world through 
the bodhisattva’s compassion (Nagao 1992, 201–207). In the terms of this thesis, ascent can be carried to 
an extreme, and one would find oneself adhering to eternalism, as in belief in ātman, a theistic God, or even 
nirvana as a truly existent otherworldly realm. The bodhisattva negates these concepts, and reaffirms the 
ordinary world in order to begin the descent. To descend too far would take him to the extreme of nihilism, 
which the bodhisattva avoids through affirmation of the existence of emptiness and (re-)negation of 
saṃsāra. In his descent, the bodhisattva makes use of a new type of knowledge which is ‗discriminative 
and worldly,‘ but which differs from ordinary knowledge in that it arises from nondualistic awareness 
(Nagao 1992, 204). Using this knowledge, the bodhisattva ‗actualizes the truth‘ (i.e. emptiness or pliancy) 
in himself and in the world around him. 
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appears as though it has an objective. Of course, many will be uncomfortable with the 
idea of attributing purpose to something that is not conscious, yet there are also 
advantages to adopting what Daniel Dennett calls the ‗intentional stance‘ with respect to 
evolution. Just as we can view machines or computer programs as fulfilling their aims, 
Dennett says, we can also interpret the processes of natural selection as ―sensitive to 
rationales, making myriads of discriminating ‗choices‘ and ‗recognizing‘ and 
‗appreciating‘ many subtle relationships...selecting...for one reason rather than another‖ 
(Dennett 1998, 299; italics in original). For Dennett, that is, evolution and the process of 
natural selection can be gainfully described as though they possessed intentionality, 
thereby avoiding an enormous amount of cumbersomeness and unwanted detail in our 
descriptions of these processes. Besides, unless we adopt the intentional stance, certain 
patterns that allow us to understand these processes and to make predictions would 
remain hidden from our view (Dennett 1998, 316). To take an example, it would be hard 
to describe the dances of bees, without assuming that there is a purpose to their 
behaviour.
135
 In the rest of this chapter, I shall follow Dennett in adopting the intentional 
stance with respect to evolution and natural selection. 
 If we want to ascribe to evolution some sort of purpose, surely we can say that it 
aims at ensuring the continuation of life. In other words, natural selection can be 
described as a process designed
136
 to increase and maintain life—not in any specific 
configuration, of course—but in many and diverse forms. Indeed, several theorists have 
made similar attempts to identify an overall evolutionary trend, and proposals have 
included the following ‗aims‘: increasing size, complexity and diversity (Carroll 2001, 
1102), increasing ―adaptability‖ (Hahlweg 1991, 441), and increasing ―fitness‖ (Okasha 
2008, 322). Gould coins the term ―plurification‖ to describe his version of—in his 
words—the ―goal‖ of natural selection, and by this, he simply has in mind a broad sense 
of ―more-making‖ (Gould 2002, 611). Importantly, all of these theories attempt to 
identify the direction that evolution follows, with everything else being equal. The 
general idea, in short, is that considered exclusively, evolution can be said to aim at 
increasing the number and well-being of various living things. 
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 I owe this example to Professor David E. Cooper (personal communication). 
136
 For more on how an object or process can be designed, without the implication of a conscious designer, 
see Dennett 1998, Allen and Bekoff 1995.  
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 According to the theory of ‗macroevolution,‘137 these ‗things‘ include more than 
individual organisms, which are the sole units of natural selection in Darwin‘s original 
theory. In Gould‘s version, for instance, selection operates at six levels of the natural 
hierarchy—the complex arrangement of systems nested within systems—namely: genes, 
cells, organisms, demes, species and clades.
138
 All of these, according to Gould, can be 
thought of as individual beings competing against others of their type. Or, to put it 
another way, these six types of unit can be considered to evolve through some sort of 
selection. Therefore, a certain amount of variation between individuals of each type is 
important, so that as a result of their interaction with each other and the environment, 
some of them will be fitter, or better adapted, than others are. Those that do well will 
have more ‗reproductive‘ success, and in fact, at all six levels of the hierarchy there is 
some kind of mechanism for producing roughly similar copies of those individuals.  
 Genes, for instance, can be considered as units of selection in their own right, 
‗selfishly‘ competing against their alleles in order to proliferate copies of themselves in 
future chromosomes (Dawkins 1989, 36). Species are Gould‘s paradigmatic example of 
group selection, which he sees as analogous to the natural selection of organisms. 
Reproduction at this level consists of speciation events, with one species having as many 
‗offspring‘ as it has daughter species, to which, clearly, it will pass on some of its 
properties. This, therefore, is a species‘s version of ―descent with modification,‖ while 
extinction is the equivalent of the death of an organism (Gould 2002, 673–745). In brief, 
evolution is envisaged here as a multilevel process, with change and variation occurring 
at all levels of organization, from the genetic up to the ecosystemic.
139
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 See, for example: Eldredge and Vrba 2005, Futuyama 1997, Levinton 2001, Okasha 2006, Williams 
1992. 
138
 In Gould‘s version, genes make up DNA, which is enclosed in cells, which collectively form an 
organism, and groups of organisms make up a deme. Added together, demes of the same type form a 
species, and several related species form a clade. An alternative characterization includes groups of diverse 
demes in a community, and adds this to abiotic features to make up an ecosystem.   
139
 Gould briefly considers the possibility that communities and ecosystems might be units of evolution too, 
but he dismisses the idea because, as we saw above, ecosystems are transient and fluctuating aggregates, 
and not really individuals as he defines them (Gould 2002, 612–613). This paper has argued that the same 
applies to species and organisms and the doctrine of emptiness could be extended to apply to all of Gould‘s 
six individuals. The Buddhist Middle Path could accept Gould‘s hierarchical theory of macroevolution as a 
conventional truth about conventional ‗individuals‘ and could also include ecosystems with Gould‘s other 
evolutionary units since they are no less ‗real‘ than his individuals (see Fiscus 2001, 2002; Lekevičius 2006 
on ecosystems as units of natural selection). 
  218  
 It is renowned fact that the continuation of life requires a high level of diversity 
(Pavé 2007, 190) and indeed, we have seen that variation between individuals of a type is 
essential for evolution to take place (Gould 2002, 609). Consequently, besides increasing 
volume or number, it appears that evolution is also inclined towards increasing variety, as 
evidenced by the emergence, from a single, common ancestor around 3500 million years 
ago, of roughly between 5 and 50 million species living today. It would seem that there is 
no limit to the potential diversity on earth (Benton 1995, 52), yet it must be emphasized 
that the tendency towards diversification is only manifest when other things are held 
equal. Actually, 450 million years ago, for example, there were twice as many Linnean 
classes of biota as there are today (Gould and Eldredge 1972, 110) and the fossil record 
reveals several periods of decline and mass extinctions, in particular, those events known 
as ―the Big Five.‖ However, these incidents are not a part of evolution per se; they have 
to do with geologic, atmospheric, and perhaps stellar conditions and processes rather than 
biological ones. In any case, they were followed, eventually, by periods of extraordinary 
rapid diversification (Pavé 2007, 196). Overall, then, the rate of speciation throughout the 
history of life has been described as ―exponential‖ (Benton 1995, 54), and therefore, 
although drops in diversity are to be expected when all factors are taken into account, 
there does remain the tendency, other things beings equal, of evolution to go on 
diversifying.
 140
 
 Evolution requires a wide range of variation at all levels of organization, so that 
organisms, demes, species, and any other units of selection there may be, can go on 
adapting to environmental disparities, both in time and in space. For this reason, diversity 
has been called a ―life insurance‖ as it enables natural systems to survive environmental 
flux by making better use of their internal resources as well as those in their surroundings 
(Pavé 2007, 190, 194). It is important to emphasize that this diversity exists on multiple 
levels of organization. To cite from Pavé: 
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 According to the punctuated equilibria view, natural selection tends to preserve stasis rather than 
introduce innovations during normal periods of equilibrium. That is, the tendency to diversify is only 
present during periods of disturbance or perturbation, when changes in the environment trigger processes 
such as speciation events (Gould 1972, 112; Gersick 1991, 12). Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not correct 
to say that evolution always diversifies; however, it seems that if one takes into consideration the entire 
history of life, the disposition towards increasing variety of life forms will become evident. 
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 The diversity that is produced by this stochasticity at all levels (i.e., 
organisms, populations and species, ecosystems) of the hierarchical 
organization of the living world is essential in that it provides living 
systems with the possibility of surviving environmental hazards or allows 
them to better exploit the resources in their milieu (Pavé 2007, 193; italics 
mine, brackets in original). 
 
Therefore, evolution tends towards increasing the number of living things as well as their 
diversity. Yet importantly, it is not number or diversity for their own sake that is being 
proffered here as the ‗goal‘ of evolution, and neither is it diversity for the sake of the 
continuation of life. As I have already mentioned, the purpose that I want to establish is 
not a goal to be reached at the end of the process, but rather a motivation that directs 
every step of the way.
141
 What I want to identify is an aptitude for change; the same 
concept that was espoused by others, as we have seen, through the terms ―adaptability‖ or 
even ―evolvability‖(Hahlweg 1991, 441; Carroll 2001, 1107) and which was referred to 
in the first section of this chapter as ‗plasticity.‘ It is the capacity for a system to answer 
to a new challenge that the environment presents—to be able to draw upon several 
internal resources and to have need of fewer external ones. It entails a widened range of 
available responses to variable conditions (Borvall and Ebenman 2008, 99; Romanuk et 
al 2009, 820) and a diminished reliance on particular elements (McCann 2000, 231). It is 
an improvement, in other words, in the ability of living things to survive, and in this 
respect, it can be thought of as a condition for evolutionary progress (Hahlweg 1991, 
438). 
 This quality, which I have been calling ‗pliancy,‘ is a condition for both natural 
and spiritual evolutionary progress. I use the term in its original Buddhist sense to include 
all the connotations of the Pāli mudutā, such as ―elasticity,‖ ―resilience,‖ ―adaptability,‖ 
―the capacity...to learn and unlearn ever anew,‖ ―to discard inveterate habits and 
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 Further on, I will argue that this goal or motivation is another name for the realization of emptiness. 
Conceiving of it as available at every moment seems brighter than the idea of a goal never reached, or one 
that is reached after countless aeons and lifetimes—which is sometimes the way the bodhisattva‘s 
commitment is understood. Sheldon calls the notion of a goal never reached ―the very essence of self- 
contradiction, disheartening and paradoxical‖ and claims that religion needs to posit a definite goal to be 
accomplished at a specific moment (Sheldon 1926, 153). Rather than envisaging this moment as lying far 
into the future, in another life or perhaps at one‘s death, I would like to follow Dōgen‘s suggestion that the 
Buddhist ‗goal‘ is one that can be reached at this very moment and at all moments. In his words ―(a)t all 
times he [the fully awakened individual] abides continually in the Buddha Mind, and there‘s not a single 
moment when he‘s not in the Buddha Mind‖ (cited in Zelinski 2000). 
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prejudices,‖ ―non-resistance,‖ and the ability to ―widen the boundaries of the so-called 
ego by admitting into it new elements from the world of non-ego‖ (Nyanaponika 1998, 
73–74). Clearly, pliancy is a consequence or an aspect of emptiness, the fact that nothing 
exists with a fixed essence, but that rather, everything has a quality of malleability and 
plasticity. If this were not the case, then nothing would be able to change and therefore, 
pliancy or emptiness benefits natural systems and spiritual beings in enabling their 
evolution to proceed uninterrupted. The term ‗pliancy‘ is used here, rather than 
emptiness, in order to pick out that positive quality of being changeable, apart from the 
negative sense of emptiness as lack of svabhāva. It can be conceived in terms of absolute-
svabhāva, and Buddha Nature, and is an analogous quality to the ‗clear light‘ mind; all 
these terms allude to a sense of openness and expansiveness. 
 The analogy between spiritual and natural evolution can be seen when one 
considers the importance of emptiness or pliancy for evolution to occur. When the 
experience of emptiness occurs in consciousness, one becomes better able to evolve 
spiritually; in fact, the bodhisattva‘s journey through the ten bhūmis involves a deepening 
of this experience (Hopkins 1996, 98–99). As realization of emptiness is cultivated and 
strengthened, attachment to ways of life, material amenities and conceptual binds fall 
away, and as the Paramatthaka Sutta says, ―abandoning what one had embraced, 
abandoning self, not clinging, one doesn‘t make oneself dependent, even in connection 
with knowledge‖ (Sn 796–803). Moreover, the range of viable reactions to samsaric 
events increase so that bodhisattvas do not repeat habitual patterns but can find new 
creative ways to respond to external stimuli. In Loy‘s words, rather than ―settling down‖ 
or ―getting stuck‖ in particular ways of thinking and acting, the bodhisattva is able ―to 
move freely from one concept to another, to play with different conceptual systems 
according to the situation, without becoming fixated on any of them‖ (Loy 2008, 228). 
 To recap, both natural and spiritual beings evolve because they are empty, and 
this can be seen as a positive quality that I have termed pliancy, which includes first, an 
increased capacity for differential response, and second, diminished dependence on 
external resources. Pliancy is another conventional term for that ineffable quality which 
is the ultimate nature of beings, and described as their lack of any determinate essential 
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characteristic. As we have seen, the more of this quality a being has—or rather, in the 
case of humans, the more one realizes one has—the better one is able to evolve.  
 Conversely, extinction becomes highly probable when natural beings are stuck in 
old habits and ways of life, or reliant on specialized resources. As the theory of 
punctuated equilibria shows, the tendency for most beings is not to seek pliancy, but 
rather, to settle into periods of stasis, and rapid evolution occurs only under special 
conditions when systems are disturbed. Perhaps there is an analogy here with the way 
most people tend to become stuck in saṃsāra, and that it usually takes a particularly 
strong dose of duḥkha—a form of disturbance—to trigger spiritual evolution. In 
Buddhism too, rigidity and stagnation lead to countless rebirths in unfavourable places. In 
short, evolution seems to suggest that the optimal state for beings is one of flexibility and 
receptivity to change, and therefore environmentalists might endow their activities with 
purpose by actualizing pliancy, both in themselves and in other systems. 
  
The Concept of Pliancy Refined 
 
It might be objected here that this espousal of pliancy as a purpose amounts to a positive 
thesis or view of the sort that would be negated by Nāgārjuna. It is important to 
emphasize the conventionality of this concept, and that it is only intended as an 
‗expedient means‘ of overcoming a particular nihilistic thought, namely, that any form of 
environmental change is equally acceptable under the doctrine of emptiness. From the 
perspective of Mahāyāna Buddhism, I would like to suggest, this idea is wrong. Certain 
changes imposed upon the natural environment—such as the decimation of demes and 
species, or dumping toxic waste—seem comparable to murder, or to polluting the mind 
with anger or hatred. All of these are hindrances to further natural and spiritual evolution, 
and this is why the value of pliancy can be appreciated for the sake of developing both 
consciousness and nature. However, pliancy itself is ultimately empty too, and must not 
be reified. 
 Although it has been singled out here as the ‗goal‘ of evolution, pliancy is not to 
be understood as a determinate characteristic that one might become attached to—like 
diversity or the balance of nature—as it says nothing specific about any fixed outcome 
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that we should seek to bring about. The concept can be used to discern better from worse 
change, in that more pliancy is preferred to less, as we shall see below. Yet, this must not 
be construed as a view to which one might become attached. Pliancy must not be reified, 
first of all, for as soon as we attempt to fix it down as some sort of ‗thing‘ we lose its very 
meaning, which is openness, the capacity to change, and not being any fixed sort of 
thing.
142
 Just like all the other ‗approximate‘ terms of Buddhism—emptiness, Buddha 
Nature—it is a conventional term which only points at ultimate truth. 
 Natural evolution is open-ended and involves a considerable extent of 
stochasticity (Gould 1989, cited in Okasha 2008; 325; Pavé 2006, 2007) and, as we saw 
in the first section, there is no entirely predictable outcome of any natural process. There 
is no fixed, stable balanced state, or final resting point in any process, rather, all there 
ever is, is unending, directionless change. The concept of pliancy becomes useful in order 
to evaluate particular changes. Changes that protect or enhance pliancy are acceptable as 
they bring about more change or protect the possibility for future change.
143
 This, 
therefore, gives the bodhisattva a motivation to act that does not fall into either of the two 
extremes, that is, she does not grasp at an idea of an natural object that exists with 
svabhāva, nor at an idea of its absolute nonexistence. At the same time, realizing 
emptiness injects a sense of purpose into her actions. To follow the Middle Path in 
environmentalism, therefore, will involve actualizing or increasing natural pliancy—that 
is, one will protect the possibility of further evolution at every level of the natural 
hierarchy, through realizing the emptiness of natural systems and their interdependent 
nature.
144
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 If I become attached to pliancy, grasping at it as something to be protected or increased, I end up losing 
that very property, the flexibility and capacity to change, both in myself in that I am attached to one thing, 
and in my environment, which I am trying to fix down in a particular way. In the same way that emptiness 
is not to be reified but is simply the conventionality of things, so pliancy too cannot be reified but just is the 
capacity of things to change. 
143
 One could object, here, that I am committing a naturalistic fallacy; that is, deriving an ‗is‘ from an 
‗ought.‘ Although the mistake is evident insofar as one is concerned with logic, in environmental ethics, 
there does seem to be the general supposition that if we could find out what nature‘s ways are, then it 
would be good—indeed, we ought to—follow those ways. In this paper, I follow King in suggesting that 
some aspects of Buddhist ethics are derived from natural law (King 2002). However, the main thread of my 
argument does not depend on any statement about the way nature is, as will be seen below. 
144
 The focus on pliancy that I have offered here has some affinities with Fox‘s theory of responsive 
cohesion (Fox 2006) in that both place absolute value on the fact of relatedness and flexibility. Fox 
however makes many categorical assertions about what sort of relata are to be taken into account, whereas I 
have attempted to follow the Madhyamaka by not laying down, as far as possible, any determinate views. 
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 A second misunderstanding to avoid is to read the argument here as some form of 
naturalistic ethic, implying that humans ought to protect pliancy because that is the way 
nature is. As I have suggested above, most of the time nature is precisely the opposite of 
pliant, in that it tends to settle into a static state of equilibrium and to resist all further 
forms of change.
145
 Beings—humans, especially, but all other beings too—tend to 
become overspecialized and heavily dependent upon particular resources, that is, they 
tend to seek stasis rather than pliancy. Therefore, the main theme here is not a naturalistic 
ethic; rather, this version of environmentalism is based upon an alternative interpretation 
of the doctrine of emptiness. As well as the negation of all environmental views, 
emptiness involves a positive experience, and what I have tried to do is to ground 
environmentalism on this facet of emptiness, claiming that welcome environmental 
changes are those that result from or manifest this positive quality of emptiness.
146
 
 To sum up the argument, there is a quality in nature I have called pliancy, which 
is an aspect of Buddha Nature and synonymous with emptiness. This quality is what 
allows a natural being to evolve biologically, just as emptiness allows consciousness to 
evolve spiritually. All beings have it in some measure, yet, in the usual state of affairs, 
they do not realize it, and through our delusion, most of us grasp at its opposite, 
svabhāva. The deeper a being‘s realization of emptiness, the more pliancy it will display 
and the more easily its natural evolution will proceed. The argument might work the 
other way, too, so that the more pliant a natural being is, the easier its spiritual evolution 
will be. The salient point is that just as a bodhisattva cultivates the realization of 
emptiness in his consciousness, he also protects and promotes pliancy in nature, as 
emptiness‘s ‗external‘ counterpart. To do so will encourage the evolution—both spiritual 
and natural—of other beings, and, as I shall argue below, will have beneficial effects on 
the environment too.   
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 This seems to be an outcome of the second law of thermodynamics too, which, as Huw Price puts it is 
―the theory which brought with it the crucial notion of equilibrium—the state toward which a system tends, 
when left to its own devices‖ (1996, 24).  
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 Of course, beings with little pliancy, such as concreted areas or polluted rivers, are also empty, in the 
same way that a mind that is clouded with attachment or anger is empty. Some states—of the natural world, 
and of our minds—that contain more pliancy can evolve more easily, and perhaps, can allow beings to 
deepen their experience of emptiness. 
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Environmental Conservation and Pliancy 
 
Above, I suggested that pliancy can be used as a criterion by which environmental 
improvement is distinguished, conventionally, from deterioration or degradation, so that 
our acceptance of pervasive impermanence does not have to imply that all forms of 
change are alike in value nor do we have to perceive all natural change as detrimental. 
Any change that results in more pliancy can be thought of as an improvement, more 
natural, and better attuned to evolution and to the Middle Path. Conversely, 
environmental change that results in more rigidity can be considered to be harmful, as it 
is more likely, eventually, to result in extinction (Hahlweg 1991, 443). Botkin clarifies 
the issue pithily when he calls attention to our present conundrum: 
 
[We can] either preserve natural processes and therefore preserve life in 
the long run or preserve a single condition and either threaten the 
persistence of life or else substitute a great amount of human intervention 
for natural, dynamic processes (Botkin 2001, 261). 
 
Likewise, Soulé highlights the difference between death and the ―end of birth.‖ He 
suggests that the reason we should be worried about the current rate of extinction is that it 
threatens to break off evolutionary processes that have persisted for millions of years 
(cited in Myers and Knoll 2001, 5389). Both these conservationists, that is, are drawing 
attention to the need to safeguard the possibility for certain processes to occur, to protect 
the future evolution of natural systems, rather than any single system in any single state. 
It is what I have called ‗pliancy,‘ and what others call ―evolvability‖ or ―adaptability‖—
and which, I have argued, is another facet of emptiness—that is to be protected according 
to the new ecology. 
 This suggests a different course for efforts in conservation than has traditionally 
been pursued. Rather than trying to protect current biodiversity, or stability, it has been 
argued that effort should be made to protect ―the active processes of contemporary 
evolution‖ (Erwin 1991, 757). Many conservationists have stressed the need, not to 
protect this or that precise phenotype of any particular species, but rather to maintain the 
possibility for evolutionary adaptations to persist, and for new species to arise (Myers and 
Knoll 2001, 5390). Unfortunately, there is no agreement on precisely what this would 
involve. Some suggest, for instance, that endemic species are already on their way to 
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natural extinction and that the pliancy that we ought to protect today occurs mostly in the 
―widespread, even weedy species‖ that we generally tend to ignore (Erwin 1991, 757). 
Others insist on the very opposite, namely, on the importance of preserving local 
specialized populations so that interactions can continue to coevolve at the species level, 
thereby maintaining the cycles of extinction and colonization that are a necessary part of 
evolution (Thompson 1996, 302). In any case, there seems to be consensus that we need 
―a concerted attempt to overcome our intuitive propensity to equate stasis with stability; 
[viewing] stability [as] being desirable, [and] change being resisted‖ (Brooks et al. 1992, 
57). This is precisely that which the Buddhist doctrines of impermanence and emptiness 
recommend, and the same idea that I have tried to render in terms of pliancy. 
 Several implications can be drawn from this. First and most obviously, it is 
important that a measure of diversity is protected at every level—from the gene to the 
ecosystem—not for its own sake, but for the sake of pliancy and further evolution. 
Variability in fact has become an important measure of the extent of human influence and 
a foundation for ecological management of ecological systems, such as lakes and natural 
parks (Landres et al, 1999, 1180–1186). To preserve diversity increases the chances that 
some form of life will continue to thrive in the region, no matter what sort of disturbances 
arise. Similarly, genetic variation within a population is another central concern, more 
important than population size, since it impinges on the required population necessary to 
retain evolutionary potential (Franklin and Frankham 1998). Populations with uniform 
gene pools are unable to adapt or to evolve and therefore a wide range of genetic 
variation within a species is preferable to having organisms with identical genetic codes, 
no matter how ‗enhanced‘ these might be, since any future change in conditions will 
require an enormous amount of human input to ensure their perpetuation. 
 To preserve the pliancy of ecosystems we need to make sure that that they are not 
turned into isolated and static entities but are able to respond to changing conditions, such 
as variation in climate patterns or invasions by ‗exotic‘ species. This suggests that natural 
parks and other protected areas need to be connected with corridors, and some have 
suggested that this is vital if we want to prevent great extinctions in the future (Erwin 
1991, 752). Some biologists have also spoken against various popular conservation 
programs, such as relocation programs to preserve local populations that have become 
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fragmented. This fragmentation, they claim, is what initiates speciation events (Brooks et 
al. 1992, 57). In short, although the science may be poorly understood at this stage, there 
is widespread assent to the need to study and protect evolutionary potential rather than 
stasis, and this concurs with the Buddhist Middle Path that does not cling to the current 
state of affairs, but accommodates change as a pervasive and natural phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, the Middle Path does not accept any kind of environmental change, but 
rather, it seeks to preserve the capacity of natural entities to go on evolving. 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that emptiness and impermanence can be viewed as those 
very qualities that endow nature with value. Synonymous with Buddha Mind, they are the 
very factors that allow the evolution of life to take place; it is the pliancy of all beings, at 
all levels of the hierarchical organization of nature, which allows them to change into 
something else when the conditions require it. As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, 
no natural being exists with a fixed, immutable essence; rather, its nature is determined 
by its relations with other things. For this reason, beings are always susceptible to 
change, and every aspect of the natural world is impermanent. 
 The impermanence of nature can take on an abhorrent appearance if we equate it 
solely with death and disintegration. Yet there is also a positive aspect to it, which is the 
openness at the heart of all beings, their capacity for evolution. Although none of the 
things we cherish will last, and despite their changing, sometimes, in ways we do not 
like, we need not accept any kind of development. Instead, by drawing an analogy 
between spiritual and natural evolution, we can conceive of emptiness in positive terms 
as pliancy—analogous to Buddha Nature‘s luminosity, or purity.  
 Evolution occurs through the realization and actualization of these qualities. 
Natural evolution aims at insuring the continuation of life, and at all levels of the 
hierarchy, we can discern, conventionally, various individuals, each evolving through 
some process of selection. The continuation of this process requires a high degree of 
diversity at all levels of organization, and therefore, protecting diversity is an important 
aspect of conservation. Besides diversity, though, pliancy involves the capacity of a 
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system to respond in a new way to a new set of challenges and to be in need of few 
external resources. The possession of these qualities enables a natural system to continue 
evolving in the same way that realizing emptiness allows beings to evolve spiritually.  
 Conversely, the more beings are stuck in old habits or reliant on specialized 
resources, the less likely evolution becomes and the greater the chance of extinction. 
Therefore, one can describe a Buddhist environmentalism construed as protecting the 
pliancy of natural objects. This will suggest a change in conservation policy, so that 
rather than protecting static natural objects, one is concerned with safeguarding, instead, 
the possibility of future evolution. Processes will be deemed more important than 
particular beings, and the emphasis will be on preventing rigidity or stagnation. 
 It is important that this idea be taken as a merely conventional view, set out in 
rough and approximate terminology. ‗Pliancy‘ is merely a means of describing absolute-
svabhāva; a quality in nature that results from its lack of substance- and essence-
svabhāva, and which is, ultimately, inexpressible. While the traditional texts talk of 
transforming the world into jewelled trees and Dharma-preaching birds, I have tried to set 
out a more ecologically realistic vision of how a bodhisattva creates a Pure Land through 
his realization of emptiness. The environment is enhanced, and the Pure Land created, I 
have claimed, when the emptiness of all beings shines through. 
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C on c lu s i o n :  Mi dd l e  Wa y  Env i ron me n t a l i s m  
 
I would like to wrap up the discussion by gathering some of the more positive results that 
have emerged throughout this thesis, most of which appeared in chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 
1, it will be recalled, ended on a rather negative note. Although, to a certain extent, we 
were able to dismiss the claim that Buddhism depreciates nature, and despite having 
found an alternative way of conceiving intrinsic value that coincides with Buddhist love 
and compassion, we were still unable to formulate a satisfactory environmental ethic. The 
main reason for this is that some forms of Buddhism seem to value nirvana above 
everything else, which makes it difficult to find a basis for motivating concern for 
anything mundane. Indeed, promoting ordinary, physical well-being or, indeed, any of 
the other features of life and aspects of nature that environmentalists revere is hard to 
reconcile with the intention to renounce the world.  
 For this reason, chapter 2 turned to Mahāyāna philosophy, which, in its doctrine 
of emptiness, upholds a thoroughgoing nondualism that deflates even the distinction 
between nirvana and saṃsāra. Green Buddhism becomes feasible again because the 
ultimate soteriological goal is conceived as attainable in this life on Earth. Indeed, some 
later forms of Buddhism stress that this very world has all the elements required to be 
experienced as a Pure Land. Two major schools of Mahāyāna philosophy were described; 
the Madhyamaka, which portrays emptiness mainly as negation, and the Yogācāra, 
which, I argued, focuses on the more positive fact of not finding the object of negation.  
 Chapter 3 turned to an investigation of Mahāyāna green Buddhism, where I 
rejected a popular eco-spiritual conception of ‗Oneness,‘ in favour of a notion of 
‗totality.‘ Instead of holism, the Jewel Net of Indra metaphor was interpreted as 
emphasizing unqualified relativity, with no fundamental or ultimate level of reality. 
Rather like a Necker Cube, perhaps, our focus can flip back and forth between parts and 
wholes, individuals and relations, bringing either to the fore.   
It was suggested that the implications of totality for environmentalism are both 
positive and negative. To relate the discussion to a contemporary ecological issue, such 
as climate change, eco-spiritualists make much of the way that, to paraphrase Nhat Hanh, 
we could learn to perceive broken ice shelves, water shortages, and species loss, say, in 
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an automobile. It was argued that focusing on the intricate relations that are involved in 
this group of phenomena (assuming that we can, someday, achieve a satisfactory 
understanding of these) might either serve as an aid to thwarting their effects, or else, 
their complexity might discourage us from even attempting to do something about the 
problem. However, the more we familiar we become with nondualism, and the wider our 
vision grows, it is likely that we will no longer perceive anything as inherently negative. 
Notwithstanding clichés about every crisis presenting an opportunity, from the 
perspective of emptiness, reality is neither positive nor negative. Therefore, to return to 
our conventional perspective, tackling our patterns of over-consumption, for instance, 
might be seen as a chance to heal psychologically, instead of an unpleasant burden that 
we feel obliged to take up (Stanley and Stanley 2009, 231). Of course, from the 
perspective of emptiness, it is neither of these inherently.  
Moreover, through meditating on totality, it is likely that we will become 
accomplished at taking in a wider picture of reality than the partial and fragmented vision 
our normally egotistic mind allows. This is now known to diminish our craving and 
attachment; we are filled with a sense that nothing is lacking, precisely because we feel 
that we participate in everything (Groth-Marnat 1992, 271–272). It was suggested that a 
fruitful way of conceiving of totality involves recognition of the inseparability between 
oneself and other beings, based on an experience of not finding any self that can be 
separated from others. It was argued that this will result in a sense of identification, 
which is at least as successful as the belief in metaphysical oneness at prompting the 
bodhisattva to take up the interests of others as his own. Therefore, the understanding of 
totality seems to retain all of the positive implications that oneness involved.  
While we may learn to see the Earth and its inhabitants as an integrated, unitary 
body, the view of totality reveals that it is as legitimate to regard our planet as a mere 
speck of dust in a much larger universe. This can act as an important affective 
counterbalance, so that we avoid becoming overwhelmed by our cause, or too attached to 
our planet. Some might object that this sounds like a rather lacklustre commitment, and 
that what the environment needs, at this juncture, is people who are ready to stand up for 
their ecological principles. The bodhisattva, though, is strongly committed to creating a 
Pure Land wherever she may happen to be, and this is not a belief that can ever be 
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falsified, simply because it is beyond the duality of true and false. She regards every 
tiniest part of reality as imbued with Buddha-Nature—the miniature ecosystem that 
revolves around a pitcher plant, say, or a single unicellular organism—is regarded as a 
universe in its own right. Therefore, the view of totality does not in any way diminish the 
value that a Mahāyāna Buddhist might attribute to this Earth or any single part of it. 
Importantly, in giving priority neither to wholes nor to parts, the problem of eco-fascism 
is circumvented and the green Buddhist can avoid altogether the accusation that concern 
for the health and flourishing of the greater whole might result in the rights and interests 
of the smaller individuals being trumped (c.f., Zimmerman 2004b). 
In chapter 4, it was shown that the Mahāyāna Buddhist has a different conception 
of natural beings from other people, who tend to view the world as made up of a number 
of static things. In all likelihood, familiarity with emptiness will cause one to let go of the 
desire to save the whale, or the rainforest, at least insofar as this involves a propensity to 
‗freeze‘ these entities, as it were, in their current state, an approach that is now known to 
be counterproductive. I argued that the fluctuating, ‗kaleidoscopic‘ nature of natural 
beings, their emptiness and consequent evolvability, can be regarded as the source of 
their value, perhaps as part of their Buddha Nature.  Protecting, or conserving them, 
therefore, is not so much a matter of preserving their existence or enabling them to 
increase in number; instead, I suggested that a more worthy goal is to allow them to 
develop and unfold. I proposed that we understand emptiness in a positive way to involve 
a form of pliancy, and that realizing or attaining this quality could be seen as the goal of 
evolution.  
Still, if the bodhisattva is beyond time, then the goal of evolution, spiritual and 
natural, is probably already attained, or else, perhaps it is re-accomplished at every 
moment. This, therefore, can provide a powerful argument against the objection, raised 
by Harris, that Buddhism‘s view of interminable change is unable to account for any 
sense of purpose. Instead, I suggested that bodhisattvas, including aspiring ones, can 
inject purpose into every single moment by realizing emptiness. With regards to the 
external world, when we realize the emptiness of an entity, we will naturally protect its 
pliancy and its capacity to evolve. 
  231  
In short, although Buddhism does not appear to provide any direct answers to our 
environmental worries, it is likely that if more people put its teachings into practice, this 
would have an appreciable beneficial effect on nature. Among environmental 
philosophers, a common postulate is that more is required, at this stage, than a simple 
technological fix; that our situation requires a major upheaval in our worldview and 
system of values, and that we need to reconsider our understanding of ourselves and our 
relation to nature. I have argued that Buddhism contains various resources that could be 
fruitfully put to use for this purpose.    
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